rate citizens for instance decisions by paul bremer is occupational authority like destroying the baath party dismissing the iraqi army and shutting down iraqi public institutions were wrong the way the government implemented all that was very harmful. to annihilate the party was taken as an order to annihilate sonic's people in western bend and then forgotten or their country did nothing for them and did not protect their rights so they took to the streets the protests continued for over a year the iraqi government paid no attention to them its it was too overwhelmed with its military potential too busy equipping and training the army but it overlooked the fact that these masses could become infuriated. in which case no military force would stop the authorities do it with those demonstrations. strongly over sixty people were killed and. as well as in fallujah and other cities soldiers storming the square's another ramadi became the final straw sunni it's turned into a movement generating mechanism ready to fight against the government i believe it was your stories who pushed some news to the

and before that the baath party, but certainly by 1979 the state had been taken apart, and had become largely kind of an alter ego of saddam hussein certainly by 1979 before the 1980 war. what we're saying here is that it's not some exercise of imperial huberis on the part of the angelo frencha allies in creating these areas, and one of the biggest bugga boos of scholars is to say this is an artificial state. there is nothing artificial about iraq. it is not 1960s. it's not 1970 that is cause of the fray that we're seeing now. truthfully what we're seeing now is now-government s, which could take societies that were quite promising and then govern them so poor li poorly. >> there is nothing artificial about the iraqi state. we'll look at that a little later in the program. but this idea right now we're looking at something far more significant than previous attempts to weaken the iraqi state. it sometimes happens in the human body when you catch something, when you're already ill it's more dangerous to you than when you're strong. and no one would have tried to dismember iraq in the 1

and we are talking about baath party. these are the organizations active in this area. but gradually, from the ninth of june until now, the information we receive is that these people are almost controlling the field. they are stronger because they've got the weapons. they've got the organizations. their ideology is more clear than others. they've got money, they've got training, and they've got leadership. whereas the other side, there is lack of leadership. gradually it's going to be the biggest organizations and the others will follow. from within, it will be difficult to destroy this state from within. if there would be pressure from outside, then there is a possibility that some of these organizations which i mentioned they will be in conflict with is is, and there will be fights among themselves. but that is a big if. if there would be pressure from the outside or an attack or an army from the outside, if there is a strong support from outside. it is difficult. it is not easy. >> the question of weapons -- [inaudible] >> the u.s. weapons, we don't know about that.

one doesn't want -- in iraq, successful, a baath party here, too. we wouldn't want it here. we want ways people have been followers, sort of marched into this can redeem themselves and reconcile with neighbors. we want those who are authors of these crimes to face consequences. the pattern international with countries fair and balanced system want to do it themselves, that's always our preference. sometimes more senior leadership, make sure more fair and balanced process, look for international organizations, mixed courts to be involved in that kind of thing. for the larger group of individuals, lou for national institutions. those institutions need to be ones that are representative of every community. obviously as we clearly see in syria, sunnis, christians, kurds, other communities, they have to be represented in that judicial process. that's one example. even after bosnia we worked at establishing state court war crimes at the national level with judges from the three major communities, but also with international judges there for six years so when victims came in and lo

it joined in an unholy alliance with the baath party and some former insurgent groups like the islamic army of iraq. going forward, the iraqis with our support must seek to split the latter groups from isl and isolate isl from the hard core militant groups from the population. the platforms we have established through the immediate crisis response are providing additional information to inform the president and national security team as we develop openings to protect our interests in iraq. any further decisions in this regard will be made in full consultation with this committee and the congress. any efforts we take moreover must be in conjunction with iraqi efforts to isolate isl from the population. this is because while we have a serious counterterrorism challenge in iraq, iraq has a serious counterinsurgency challenge and the two are linked. based on my last seven weeks on the ground in iraq, there is a clear recognition by iraqis from all communities that substantial reforms must be undertaken. this will require the formation of a new government, together with restructuring of the

this is a hierarchical regime, baath party structure with the same person on top of it. this is a situation which clearly there is a high command and responsiveness through those change of command. a situation documents have come out of the command center at the highest level. the evidence of the crimes are not notorious. no one account able no matter how horrible, vicious in the syrian republic. >> lets take up front here. >> hi there, tyler thompson united free syria, part of the public international policy group. i'm happy they are co-hosting today. a lot of familiar faces. thank you, ambassador rapp. i want to know how your office or how the administration in general is using accountability in syria to drive to a political solution. what are the risks in united states interest in pressing harder on accountability? thanks. >> well, as i think i indicated earlier, the issue of accountability to the question of the future of syria, those implicated in syria's violations, blood on their hands, the kind of people not likely to be accepted by folks on the other side whose

it joined in an unholy alliance with the baath party and some former insurgent groups like the islamic army of iraq. going forward, the iraqis with our support must seek to split the latter groups from isil and isolate isil from the hard core militant groups from the population. the platforms we have established through the immediate crisis response are providing additional information to inform the president and national security team as we develop options to protect our interests in iraq. any further decisions in this regard will be made in full consultation with this committee and the congress. any efforts we take moreover must be in conjunction with iraqi efforts to isolate isil from the population. this is because while we have a serious counterterrorism challenge in iraq, iraq has a serious counterinsurgency challenge and the two are linked. based on my last seven weeks on the ground in iraq, there is a clear recognition by iraqis from all communities that substantial reforms must be undertaken. this will require the formation of a new government, together with restructuring of t

it joined in an unholy alliance with the baath party and some former insurgent groups like the islamic army of iraq. going forward, the iraqis with our support must seek to split the latter groups from isl and isolate isl from the hard core militant groups from the population. the platforms we have established through the immediate crisis response are providing additional information to inform the president and national security team as we develop openings to protect our interests in iraq. any further decisions in this regard will be made in full consultation with this committee and the congress. any efforts we take moreover must be in conjunction with iraqi efforts to isolate isl from the population. this is because while we have a serious counterterrorism challenge in iraq, iraq has a serious counterinsurgency challenge and the two are linked. based on my last seven weeks on the ground in iraq, there is a clear recognition by iraqis from all communities that substantial reforms must be undertaken. this will require the formation of a new government, together with restructuring of the