i think what goes on in basra, see basra is not just about basra. the leadership in basra, the political leadership, the governor and city council, they belong to strong parties that are national parties. these are the leaders who are from outside basra who call their own politicians and say don't approve this. the biggest problem basra has to achieve its provincial status is the politicians of basra and baghdad who are resisting it. but i think right now -- there is a mechanism to collect sits and then present them to the election commission. then it will go forward that way. the question is will the same people who caused the previous attempt to fail do it again, or is the momentum too strong right now in light of the national changes that will force it. that remains to be seen. i am personally -- i think it is more workable to have not just basra but at least three south provincial -- what used to be in the ottoman times, basra reliant. that's more contiguous goe graphically and many other suspects, that will work. but also this idea of having a

i think what goes on -- basra is not just about basra, the leadership and the political leadership -- the governor and city council, they belong to strong parties that are national parties. also there are leaders from outside who paul their own politicians -- poll their own politicians, but the biggest problem to achieve political status is the politicians. but i think he is trying because there is a mechanism to collect signatures and present them to the election commission and then it will go forward that way. the question is will the same people who caused the previous attempt to fail do it again or is the momentum to strong right now -- too strong -- that remains to be seen. i think it is more workable to have not just basra but the south provincial -- that is more kind of a contiguous demographic and geographic and in many aspects -- that will work better. this idea of having a full-fledged shia presents, if you get that you will force more than one province and that will lessen the tensions nationally. >> i think the answer is both -- it is a real thing but it becomes more salie

with the basra there was another a basra region in the past, and when i met his son him in 2010, he told me point blank wectly in this direct quote, made the so i think anybody who is interested in keeping iraq together they should say thank depod for sis tani. >> u.n.? why not the u.n.? >> the u.n. could be that -- i mean, the process needs to happen under an u.n. umbrella in my opinion. can provide that legitimate -- legitimacy. they have had a role to play on the prevention act. o it has provided venues and fora that enabled some elements of -- some agreements, as i said, like the 2013 act to take place. the question is that in this situation i think what needs to happen is the arab legitimacy for that process. iraq looks at itself as an arab anchor, as an arab center of power. and having egypt, for example, with still the political grativas that egypt carries in the arab region can

basra ishat goes on -- not just about basra, the leadership and the political leadership -- the governor and city council, they belong to strong parties that are national parties. there are leaders from outside who paul their own politicians -- poll their own allocations but the -- politicians, but the biggest problem to achieve political status is the politicians. but i think he is trying because there is a mechanism to collect signatures and present them to the election commission and then it will go forward that way. the question is will the same people who caused the previous attempt to fail do it again or is the momentum to strong right -- thatoo strong remains to be seen. workable tos more have not just basra but the -- that is more kind of a contiguous demographic and geographic and in many aspects -- that will work better. this idea of having a full-fledged shia presents, if you get that you will force more than one province and that will lessen the tensions nationally. both --nk the answer is it is a real thing but it becomes more salient whenever bargain is toived make the rest

as the perceived deal that basra gets starts to look worse then the sailions of basra's regional status or larger regional status just becomes ore salient. i'm from the city college of new york, graduate student. my question is again i want to go back to the role of the u.n. itself. you mentioned that it has no oblinald power over iraq or any. actually, they do have in 2005 the outcome of the conference all member state are obliged to act collectively should any member state fail to protect their own citizens. and they already did that. and they -- they could do that sing coercive means. ut the question is, with the p 5 led the u.n. interfere in the iraqi issue? they could -- i mean, for example they could build the trust that they lost in all these attempts to reconciliate iraqi society or the iraqi political system. so i think they do have that ole. >> i think the u.n. has a role to play but i think in this issue -- and it has played over, since 2003 it has played important roles in helping iraqi's reach agreement on some laws and some acts it has play add role in training with the ir

support the pkk wils a group on the terrorist list, or it ended up being supported to support the basra militias in iraq, the kdp and the pkk was asking for more autonomy and having big tensions with turkey. so what was the implication of such a strategy? the implication of several -- the iraqi state which has become more and more important. despite the genuine attempt to train for example, sunni iraqi army units in an bar province, which the iraqi states do not want to really use, you end up having an iraqi state which is more and more closing itself on one of the sectarian groups. in syria, the free syrian army is still not supported. we are in a situation which strategically a victory over the islamic state builds daily, every time the islamic state won a territory--but now we say in iraq, every time iraqi state lose -- the dpe feet of the islamic state can have dire consequences, and when you have two bad possibilities, it means there is really a problem. in afghanistan, the militarization strategy and the fact that the election ended up in a deal where the tension went out from the

they spend half the year back in basra and they would hang out at the house and we would cook them.interrogate my daughter as to who she was dating. >> they were raised there, basically. >> yeah, absolutely. it was great. >> well, let me bring in former congressman from massachusetts. you were there, i think, most recently. what is life like in a house where, you know, you were there with schumer and with durbin and very close quarters. you guys are in congress all day and doing tv shows and you come back at night. what is it like there after hours? >> it's tough. it's really tough. occasionally we would threaten a rent strike. i was once asked aabout the cleanliness of this particular unit. and my response was, well, we don't have any cockroaches. because our rats scare the cockroaches away. >> you are saying a rent strike. how was the rent? was it a reasonable rate? >> well, john said it was reasonable. but myself, senator durbin said this is outrageous. $850 for a slump. it was bad. you know, the public thinks that we are indulging in eating at fine restaurants or at embassy rece

basra region and the efforts. if you look at the israel of the last two, three years, the issue of basra region would come up when there is negotiation with kurdistan region. it appears for me that baghdad is trying to use the formation of basra region as a leverage. so my question is are there like real efforts or credible efforts by the people to form autonomous basra regions to the kurdistan region. thanks.