let jim talk. >> i was about to go back to beauregard and johnston. anyways -- i think that grant unquestionably was, as well as sherman, who was acting on the field as more or less commander since grant's headquarters was nine miles downriver in savannah, i think that initially, both of them looked bad in regard, that is grant and sherman, in regard to being prepared. and, of course, neither of them is expecting to be attacked. but once the battle is joined i think grant handles himself quite well from all i can understand. i think sherman does too. and -- so -- i give them high marks. fighting defensively. but, of course, fighting defensively, particularly if you have got good terrain, is a different ball game from trying to go on the attack. and i think that the confederates, of course, with an inexperienced army trying to take the offensive, face a very, very difficult situation, and, also, we need to realize in regard to both johnston and beauregard, that they have never commanded in anything like this kind of a battle before. nor have grant and

i'm not a beauregard fan, as many of you already know. but, in fact, from my interpretation, what i read and the research i have made, if there was one real culprit at s shiloh, i would have to say that pgt beauregard would be my estimation of that. why? for a variety of reasons. but in deference to what larry said, and i agree. the man was very sick. he had a respiratory infection. he probably shouldn't have been involved in a command situation at all. but, again, it gets back to interpretation of what was said. how it was said and who was there and who was favorite of who and so on, so forth. but at a conference the day, the very night before the battle, there was a big discussion as to whether the confederate army after -- after this horrendous delay of a couple of days. when they thought they were going to fight the battle, the day after they began the march, two days had gone by and they hadn't -- hadn't gotten in position yet to attack. and so there was a conference. and indeed in that conference, was beauregard and hardy and johnso

why do you think, you know one of the issues is always beauregard's role in this. and buearegard and johnson worked together. why the battle formation the confederates chose. kidding they were trying to sweep around the, the union army and push them into the, into the swamps. why did they choose the battle formation they did? and itf you were a confederate general. what formation would you have chosen instead or would you have used the same one? simple question, right? again -- essentially -- you have a complex scenario here. and there is really further study to be made in terms of the actual battle formation of the confederate army. why? because we have such new accounts as that of dudley hayden whose an aide-de-camp on the staff of albert sydney johnston. he and heap writes writes in a j published in a newspaper that has come to light. the fact that the plan per se. he is writing, you know the day before the battle, the plan was, essentially -- that -- that they had a right-wing and a left wing. and this is in contrast to -- to thomas jordan and -- and some of th

and beauregard says, i'm going to order a retreat. and so word went across the lines the troops are to retire. they gather up what they can. they've been doing that all day, anyway, destroy what they can, and retire. now the situation is, can we retire with some semblance of organization so that we're not caught by a rapid pursuit and destroyed on the move? so he'll have to constitute a ready reserve. he'll take breckenridge, basically, to build this reserve on. he's the most inexperienced corps commander, but beauregard picks him to command the reserve to fall back. not because breckenridge has great tactical skill, it's because he has a whole organization to mount what is going to be a very difficult mission, and that constitutes a suitable rear guard. and the battle terminates with a successful withdrawal from confederate forces. gregory spends the night, basically, in the position the confederates hailed on april 5th when the battle began, and the next morning he'll slowly begin to retire towards mickey's, which is a road junction

confederates under beauregard, they have a serious problem. they can't replace those first day losses. in fact, they get one lone regiment marching in on the battlefield that man marching in on the battle and that constitutes the reinforcement, the army, the mississippi under beauregard. beauregard claims he barely had 20,000 men to fight the second day fight. historians believe he cut himself a little short and probably has upwards to 28,000 to 30,000 troops, but grant's force if you see the number of troops he is able to get back into play on day two, he gets roughly 36,000 troops on day two. you add that up with buel's force and now the federals almost out number the confederates 2-1. the arithmetic is complete ily altered. grant now attacks on day two with an overwhelming force. also, that overwhelming force, the fact that it has been reinforced catching beauregard and his generals in the entire confederate completely by surprise. where do the confederates go over night? they go back to the first camps they entered in the battle, the first

beauregard will ride that evening of the 7th and actually

beauregard had given his map to colonel tom jordan. he took those notes his general had prepared throughout the night and was finishing them off in final form so that it could be distributed amongst the corps commanders. so without a map, beauregard took a pencil and at the desk they were seated, he drew the roads linking corinth to pittsburg landing. ladies and gentlemen, think of the audacity to put 44,000 men in motion to do battle, and you have basically a blank page of a tabletop and you're drawing from memory the roads linking your forces to the enemy. our modern military couldn't get out of bed with that kind of information. these guys are committing an entire army to do battle. next map, please. johnston had a plan. in the approaching battle every effort would be made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut his line of retreat to the tennessee river and force him back on isle creek where he will be obleg obliged to surrender. very simple. concise battle plan. turn a flank. gain leverage. use your army's mass to crush y

beauregard, brag and on and on we could talk. the wonderful that shiloh has above all the other battlefields in today's world and listening to the additions that are going to be made to shiloh makes this more a fact. it is location. location in a rural part of tennessee, a place which in so many ways remains very much akin to what this area looked like in that previous period. so we are very fortunate to have a july like shiloh here. what we are going to do today as van indicated. we are going to hear from three of the leaders in civil war scholarship as pointed out. i am not going to reintroduce them again. we have larry daniel at the en. we have wylie sore here at this end and in the middle, james lee mcdonough. the frightening thought is if a terrorist puts a bomb under this table and it goes off, we lose most of our historical knowledge in the battle of shiloh. if you see any suspicious packages, please inform your nearest agent. let me begin by asking our panelists, what we are going to do is have each person do an opening s

unfortunately, beauregard in the area for a number of months had not really taken the time, even though, an attack was planned. at least a week in advance, to scout, and/or detesh min what the terrain was. of course, one of the major rsh what the terrain was. of course, one of the majosh mi what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoinsh what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoesh mn what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoh min what the terrain was. of course, one of the majo min what the terrain was. of course, one of the majomin what the terrain was. of course, one of the majoin what the terrain was. of course, one of the majon what the terrain was. of course, one of the majo what the terrain was. of course, one of the major mistakes of the battle was, confederates frying to roll out the flank along the tennessee river where the deep ravines were late as the day before the battle. those are my observations. >> if i might add. in thinking about the terrain. i certainly agree that the terrain was extremely rugged and had a major impact. but also, keeping in mind th

and then -- general beauregard drawing up the plan of march to -- to shiloh. comes up with very complicated march planned and -- and, when you put -- the complicated march plan the rugged terrain the inexperienced troops altogether. no wonder if the took them so long to get there, and then with the rain coming down as well. plus -- never really understanding the battle as well -- terrain on the -- close over to the tennessee river as wily has been bringing out. >> larry. >> the biggest terrain feature -- in the battlefield is of course, the tennessee river. that leads to the biggest mistake on either side in shiloh, grant's decision to leave the safety of savannah tennessee and cross over to the west bank. had he not done that there would not be a battle of shiloh, the confederates at that point in the war had no way to cross the tennessee river. they would get a pontoon train in 1864, come pritzed. 130 pontoons, required 600 mules to pull it. but, at that time -- they -- had no way to -- get across. and the second issue is -- did the terrain present in essenc

two days after shiloh with the out come still in doubt, confederate general beauregard sent his troops to work throwing up earth work fortifications to defend the corinth crossroads and cabled the haunting prediction to his superiors in richmond, if defeated here, we lose the mississippi valley and probably our cause. thus in the spring of 1862, the relationship represented by rivers and dirt roads and junction of iron rails serve to remind why shiloh and corinth remain linkedin time and space. it's a shared significance forged by war, helping to define the most violent and socially important crossroads in the american experience. thank you. [ applause ] >> good afternoon. i fully understand that i'm the last speaker between you and lunch. [ laughter ] so i will be brief. what i want to talk about, though, is what paul harvey would call the rest of the story. we heard a lot about the battle itself. the two day battle, we've had our panel discussion and stacey taking us through the maps but there's a lot more to the history of shiloh than two days of battle. now, granted those are the m

father kicked off last year's symposium with a typically vigorous speech by pierre gustave toutant beauregard as the person of the year in 1861. he did not do a great job and he did not finish high in the vote. that is the basic concept for this symposium. the talks you will hear today are speeches nominating candidates for the person of the year of 1862. the person who most influenced events, or who exemplified important developments of that year. at the end of the day we will pass out ballots and you will get to vote. as i was last year, i am very pleased that so many of you came to an all day symposium without even knowing who the lecture topics were going to be. and that c-span is interested in not only recording the symposium but broadcasting it live. yes, we are live, without knowing the subjects of the lectures. we thought that not divulging the nominees in advance would enhance the suspense. and you've confirmed this with your attendance today. we thank you for trusting us to arrange an interesting and worthwhile program and are confident that you won't be disappointed. the person who

defensive but they're concentrating and the purpose of that on behalf of albert sidney johnston and beauregard is to bring forces together and strike back. and where they're going to strike back is ulysses s. grant's army encamped immediately to the north. because that's the number one threat on the runway, so to speak. it's the closest, it's the most immediate, at any given day they can march out against the railroads and receiver them. so they have to march against grant. they believe they have to strike grant before buell arrives because they knew that buell was marching overland. their intelligence kept them informed of his daily progress. so in the first week of april of 1862, although the concentration isn't fully complete, johnston doesn't have all the elements of the western confederate army that he believes he needs to successfully mount a counterstroke, he will be urged by subordinates that time is now to go because of the near proximity of buell to the tennessee river. and he will decide on the night of april the 2nd to put the army into motion and attack grant. it's clear by lookin

their first battle and in doing so they find themselves based upon the attack plan designed by beauregard engaged in the same point of ground, the commands completely co-mingled, under the federal guns being shot to pieces and they're losing command and control. it was nightmarish for them here. they had to be literally nightmarish. on top of it, they're attacking through this swamp, and that's what clayburn called it. he called it a morass. people go, well, golly, you hear that story, you have these three brigades here, you have a fifth slightly over to the right. we know that pond's brigade is over further to the west. he's been brought to a halt because he's not challenging the far right of sherman's division. and here's five brigades now kind of stacked up and at the same time a sixth comes into play in support. it's part of the reserve from breckinridge. there's six federal confederate brigades locked up in combat with sherman's division supported just by brigade from mclaren. you think, what the heck reverses the scene here? why does sherman lose shiloh church? because he seemingly