this was a week ago -- that isil was going to post a direct imminent threat to the homeland, but ben rhoades insisted that if we did get that clear indications and warnings then, of course, the president would authorize a strike. what that does though is put a tremendous amount of pressure on your indications and warning capacity. that was a shot across the bow of the intelligence community that quote, saying because that was in political terms saying we don't need to act on because the intelligence community has told us that we do not need to act. if we are wrong, if there's a strike intel is committed has to what is. setting the political predicate for a blame shipped which has tremendous pressure on the intelligeintellige nce community to open the aperture and make sure that there's not a single one, a single possible threat that goes unnoticed. and so this leads me to my fifth and final proposition. that there is an interesting policy maker and academic gap in this area, in the study of this issue. let's stipulate for the sake of argument, we can argue whether it's true or not but for th