bernanke is to be blamed for this. while i cannot reveal any specifics, i can tell you that bank of america, along with many, many mortgage companies, were pushing its people to process mortgages that many of us did not believe deserved credit, i guess, is the way to say it, ok? we must remember that the chairman and secretary of the treasury, and the chairman of the reserve, ok, they are political appointees. if you are going to blame somebody, you know, as a republican, a lot of republicans cannot believe i am saying this, but i think maybe we should look at the lobbyists that control our government, ok? we do not control the government anymore. no, i am not a conspiracy theorist, but see in what i have seen over the last 30 years probably, the control of our financial stability is controlled more by congress and the senate, both democrat and republican, and they are of course controlled by the lobbyists. host: ok, let's leave it there. let's go to bishop, louisiana, david on the independent line. caller: thank you f

bernanke. >> can you explain that? >> well, let's say that i can't -- but i have a kind of look at life that is marked parallel and a look at economics and financial methods that are more comparable. i think it must have been quite difficult situation for mr. bernanke when the financial crisis turned and maybe you can go back in your memory, it took quite a while for paulson and the bush administration to realize that this was really bad. this is not just a minor crisis that would go away in three months' time and i think there have been very interesting articles amongst "the new york times" about what bernanke had to do to convince paulson and other people in the bush administration that this was serious and is needed urgent personal reaction to prevent from getting into something really bad. >> there was a lot of resistance to government intervention in general which now we have seen pretty much told. practically anything goes of the moment is what it seems so what was the source of that resistance? was at the chicag

now it is dead chairman bernanke's turn to give his side of the story. next, it will be former treasury secretary hank paulson to give his side. we need to get all of the facts out on the table before we are in a position to say what happened and when it happened. but, i promise you this. we will follow this investigation wherever the road leads, and we will do our best to make sure the facts get out on the table, where everyone can see them by subpoena if necessary. let me stop and thank chairman bernanke for coming today to this hearing. and i look forward to your testimony. i now yield five minutes were ranking member on the full committee, mr. derrell eyes of california, for his statement. >> thank you mr. chairman for holding this second hearing in a series today. our work together on a bipartisan basis should in fact be a model for all the members of congress. today chairman bernanke's here is part of this process, not because of one side or the other, but because we came to a consensus that for all the good work in a financial crisis, oversight's

. -- ben bernanke or henry paulson. i realize that you do not want to characterize -- to characterize it as a threat or any one word. but did you feel that you were being pressured to go through with the deal at least as strongly as that salesman trying to sell you the car and get you to close or the insurance salesman. you know the pressure i'm talking about. were they advocating strongly and using both positive and negative forces to do so in those conversations? >> yes, sir, but i think it was in the context of them thinking was in the best interest of bank of america and the financial system. >> you said the best interest to bank of america and the financial system. i'm not going to quible over their motives on the financial system. but why do you say bank of america? did you believe that they really believed this was a good deal for bank of america, even know you were seeing a change which would have affected your arm's length negotiation of a price? >> well, their concern obviously was from the top and that is for

bernanke in terms of being one on one. i remember council called the federal reserve advisory council and we -- there were 12 of us and we have dialogue with federal reserve, including mr. bernanke in a group setting. >> any interaction with the administration -- >> gentleman from utah, your time has expired. >> my apologies. >> now yield to the gentleman from maryland, mr. cummings. >> mr. lewis, i've listened to your testimony very carefully and you know, i understand and read about you're a great man. i think one of things you have tried to do today is to walk a very thin line. you just heard republicans and democrats say to some dree that whatever was said to you about losing your job and the board being dismissed, basically what we've said is i don't buy it. let me -- i assume the minutes are accurate from your board meetings. these things you vote on. the minutes from board meetings -- >> yes,sir, we do -- >> i'm talking about december 22nd, 2008. >> let me read something to you. it says, you've apparently -- mr. lew

bernanke, mr. paulson, ken lewis and his board of directors in order to force the bank of america to acquire merrill lynch for going recognize the actions took place and significant economic challenges and uncertainty but there must be limits to government action even in the time of crisis and those limits must be respected. we must keep in mind is pressure was exerted after many of the nation's banks were forced to accept taxpayer money to the tar program. winnowed in october 2008 mr. paulson, mr. janke, mr. geithner and ms. bair brought the ceos of the largest banks to the treasury department and demanded they except the partial nationalization of their banks. i look forward to learning more about the role in this process as well. thank you again and i would ask for unanimous consent to include in the record majority and minority reports and all documents referenced in those reports. >> without objection, so ordered. mr. bernanke is a longstanding policy that we swear all of our witnesses in. ple

connolly. >> welcome, chairman bernanke. mr. bernanke, i guess i come at this differently than my friend from utah. i guess i'm interested who was threatening whom. what point did you learn from mr. lewis the deal with merrill lynch, loops, had a $12 billion of a hadn't realized in doing their due diligence. >> december 17th. >> i can't hear you. >> december 17th when he called secretary paulson. >> and wind in retrospect to your knowledge did they learn they have a 12 million-dollar they have a 12 million-dollar problem? >> they claim they haven't known any earlier than the 14th of december and that we have no direct evidence to the contrary. >> were you concerned about the lack of due diligence? >> we did have concerns, yes. >> did you take it as a threat or do you think -- did you take it as a threat or did other senior officials perhaps discuss it as a threat in plight or otherwise that mr. lewis far from being a victim was actually manipulating the federal government that we are going to back out of this deal because the 12

test", "bernanke's test: bene bernanke, alan greenspan, and the drama of the central banker". booktv live coverage from the 2009 chicago tribune printers row lit fest will continue after a short break. coming up next, authors kim bobo and jon jeter talk about workers and the economy. >> we are heading over right now to the in iran institute which is always set up here and for some reason we're going to find out why and talk with jeff of here. what is your name and position. >> i'm archivist at the ayn rand institute. >> why is it that ayn rand always seems to bump up in sales when there's a lack of a crisis of blacks. >> the sales of "atlas shrugged", up and that is directly result of the story and the ideas in the book. this is a book about the not too distant future when of the creative people of all stripes come all talents and all liability is the side to go on strike against a world that does not appreciate their value in their contributions and a world very much like the one we are currently facing economically. >> what do you think of the current response of public poli

this is from chairman bernanke. mr. lewis, is chairman bernanke's e-mail describing his call with you an accurate statement of your concerns and the bank of america's situation? >> i cannot recall the exact e- mail, but we did have concerns. there were some assurances they would support our position. >> i yield back. >> thank you very much. i yield to the ranking member. >> let's me go back to this so-called threat concern here mr. lewis. i want to be clear of the on december 17th, when you called mr. paulson, mr. bernanke, did you -- i want to know the nature of the call, did you say we were going to exercise the mac clause or thinking about exercising the mac clause? >> again, it seems like a long time ago. to the best of my recommendation i said we're strongly considering a mac. >> in other words, what the response you then got changed your decision? you were going to exercise the clause, you felt that was the best interest of your bank and your shareholders, you were going to do it. and then what the government told

bernanke believed that your thought to invoke a mac was not credible. take a look at the following e-mail from chairman bernanke dated december 21st 2008, i think the threat to use mac as a bargaining chip -- we don't see it as a likely scenario at all. you did get a specific amount of assistance when you dropped the threat to back out of your deal, isn't it true? >> yes, we did. >> tell the committee houp. >> $20 billion. >> you got the promise of 118 billion in asset protection for a combination of merrill and bank of america toxic assets. >> we hadn't settled on an amount until sometime -- the wrap wraz being considered. >> that was in addition to the 15 billion of t.a.r.p. moneys you received in october, 10 billion in t.a.r.p. you received upon acquiring merrill, is that right? >> we didn't sign the agreement on the wrap. >> contrary to your representations to the fed, you were concerned primarily about the losses at merrill lynch. merrill's losses were less than half of the problem you faced. losses orng orng naturing at bank of america itself were

bernanke and mr. paulson interactions, you had come to an independent conclusion on the basis of financial review by your people that it still made sense for your shareholders to proceed, correct? >> no. as i recall, they were done in a context of the receiving the money. >> let's be clear. you're saying two things now, one you, did an independent financial analysis that said it would stretch out the payback time but it's still prudent to proceed but on the other hand, you had bernanke and paulson breathing down your neck so that was a factor? are you saying those two things? >> no, i don't think i a i'm trying to say that we -- >> okay, i don't understand that. because i think you have said those two things. another thing that is very important. i think to sharehold, $12 billion is a candidacy kwens to you, correct. >> yes, it is. >> did you tell your shareho shareholders you had come upon this information that the deal they had voted on was not the deal that was going through because baugh they had

you from any way from bernanke? >> henneberg said that we should not disclose anything that was already disclosed. i never heard from him on this issue of not disclosing something. >> it looks like you are trying to go somewhere. ing. >> anything else -- look like you')gg@@ @ @ @ @ m" z >> when did he do this? >> he expressed this on more than one occasion. >> last but not least, you are experienced, and you have used the trade judgment -- great judgment. this was based on your own experience. this was of the clearest -- clear blue sky. >> the were out of line with other institutions and the institutions that we have. >> this was not this kind of situation? there was not a mac situation? >> i can't say that there wasn't a mac because we never called it so we just don't know. >> very well. >> if the gentleman would yield for a moment. >> my time is up. >> the gentleman's time is expired. i now yield to congressman flake from arizona for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i just want to share my colleague's ske

then there's an e-mail from the fed general counsel to bernanke on december 23rd, 2008. "lewis should have been aware of the problems of merrill lynch earlier" perhaps as early as mid-november and not caught by surprise. that could cause over problems around the disclosures bank of america made for the shareholder vote. now, mr. lewis, i'm going to ask you a series of simple questions. if you're not forthcoming i'm not going to have any choice but to interrupt you. i'm asking for your cooperation. isn't it true that bank of america examined merrill lynch's book of business before signing the merger agreement and then received detailed financial reports every week from merrill lynch after signing the merger agreement on september 15th? >> that is true. >> isn't it true that the merrill losses of mid-december that you claimed motivated you to go to the government were not the largest week-to-week losses at merrill you observed since agreeing to purchase the company. in fact, wasn't the week-to-week loss experienced in mid-november larger than the one in mid-december. >> th

bernanke, for your appearance here today. i read your testimony and it appears reasonable for your role in the merger and the advocacy of certain additional bailout funds. however, while that is the narrow purpose of this hearing is to unpack whether or not there were any conflicts there and certainly you can understand the cynicism in that we have conflicting impressions from you and mr. lewis about the nature of this deal. what is at the heart of the matter is the fed's fut role as a systemic regulator. let me go back to a few points just touched on in that regard. do you believe it was in the best interests of this country for merrill lynch and bank of america to be merged and to receive the bailout funds they received, first the 25 billion between the two, and later the 20 billion as bank of america expressed concern or waffling about the potential deal? >> i think it was critical we avoided the failure of those terms and the implications it would have had for the financial system. we did so in a way to protect the taxpay

now, chairman bernanke, did you really believe ken lewis' threat to invoking was m.a.c. was a bargaining chip as you stated in an e-mail? >> i thought initially it might be, yes. >> his use of a bargaining chip would help him obtain a deal he would not have otherwise received had emirly asked for increased assistance from the government. >> but as i also said later after listening to him and having more discussions, i came to the conclusion that he was really uncertain about what to do. we provided advice, which he ultimately took, and we took steps to prevent the destabilization of his common and the system. >> mr. chairman i ask for one more minute. >> you will be granted an additional hin. >> isn't it true that you did not believe the merrill lynch losses merited special attention from the government? let me direct your attention to handwritten notes from your first meeting with lewis on december 17. you reportedly stating the downside of 50 billion doesn't sound big for bank of america. 50 billion refers to merrill lynch assets lewis wanted protection for from the go

bernanke, we must be very thankful that we have a guy who understands this mechanism and acts accordingly. there are risks involved but not doing that then you get the great depression. sure as hell. >> now, why does the german chancellor think bernanke has too much power and what was she thinking when she talked about that sort of off the cuff? kim and she doesn't have the have to think. so this time around a their. she has an election in september -- that is it. as you was to blame and the economic situation in germany and europe in general on the central banks and that is it, it is no more than that. >> is that it. criticism of the or strictly politics? >> strictly politics.

bernanke and mr. geithner and miss bear. did you and eight other bank ceos meet with them back in october 13th? >> yes, sir, we did. >> tell us what happened at the meeting. what the documents indicate is that you had -- we had a lot of conversation, discussion about the threat that's been talked about here by just about everyone relative to the mac clause, but it looks like that there was maybe threats here or at least strong suggestions that you initially partake, participate in the t.a.r.p. program. can you tell me about what took place at that meeting and walk me through it, that october 13th meeting? >> the nine chief executives were called by hank paulson or at least i was -- >> let me interject. you said earlier, i believe, too, i forget which member's question, you initially felt your bank and your board did not need any infusion of cash or t.a.r.p. money from the government, is that right? >> yes. >> when did you make that decision as a bank, this obviously was prior to -- >> that's the first reaction that i had to

bernanke has testified he was concerned about systemic collapse. we all understand that. he's concerned about think of america, we understand that and he said bankamerica would hardly be a good thing for investors, that was your testimony but if the fed do merrill lynch was feeling before the shareholders voted, why did you not inform the sec? >> if they knew about it, if you knew about before you approved the merger why did you approve the merger? >> the $14 billion of losses that mr. lewis reported i don't believe, i am sure we didn't know about in november. >> the gentleman's time is expired. and i yield five minutes -- >> thank you mr. chairman. mr. dvorkin is going to be primary closing i just want to wrap up a couple things. as you know kneal cash cory appeared before this committee multiple times and another question in the one thing we found is he didn't know at that time how much he paid for things. he didn't know what they were worth, he didn't know how they valued then but he was going to get back and never did. i understand he's left the government, but with t

. >> but next, federal reserve chairman, ben bernanke, updates members of congress on the upper air -- on the economy. next, the labor secretary talks about the employment situation. after that, senator john ensign on the future of the republican party. >> tonight on "q &a" governments daniels. he was director of the office of management and budget under president george w. bush and a senior adviser to president ronald reagan. that's at 8:00 eastern tonight on c-span. >> federal reserve chairman, ben bernanke, testified before congress on the state of the economy. some of the topics addressed are the gm bankruptcy, interest rates, and health of the nation's banks. this is just over two hours. >> the committee will come to order. we meet today to hear the distinguished chairman of the federal reserve, benjamin bernanke, testify on the recession that is plaguing our economy and on the prospects of recovery. chairman bernanke testified before our committee on october 20 of last year, as we searched for ways to mitigate, if not avoid a long recession. the chairman acknowledged then that m

bernanke for coming here. i am going to give you a series of the fence and i will give you some questions and you can answer them all of together. first, despite the fact that the plan for a merger was announced on september 15th of 2008, there was no mention of the 20 billion-dollar capital injection from the government until january the 16th. utt what point during the negotiations between bank of america, merrill lynch in the federal government was it determined that this money would be necessary for the merger to be finalized and then, given that as of january 16, merrill lynch has projected losses for the fourth quarter were approximately $15.3 billion, how is this the of the $20 billion agreed upon and finally, in this set of questions, today, to this money has been drawn down and how has it been used? >> at the time that merrill lynch and bank of america initially announced their merger agreement in the middle of september this was before the congress had passed the t.a.r.p. law and so they had been no c

bernanke i have one comment into questions. my comment is thank you for your incredible service and very turbulent times. you have been very steady and all of us appreciate that. two questions, one that mr. lewis and is following up on what mr. fortenberry was asking about. mr. lewis was here and he had a number of different stories on a single transaction. >> told the shareholders that this merrill deal with a great deal for them and persisted in that story even in december after he found out about $9 billion additional deterioration into frankly my amazement and shock he never bothered to tell the shareholders the news that led him to add extra assertion he made that it was so dire that he might invoke the nuclear option of the mac klauss. and then he told us basically that, using his words, he did not use the word fret but he said there was heavy pressure from the fed and treasury to go through with this deal, with the assurance that the american tax they payer would back up any of these toxic assets from marolt. and i will

bernanke to testify at a future date. the committee's willingness to issue subpoenas should clarify our expectations of full cooperation by perspective witnesses. i want to thank, mr. lewis, for being here today. and i look forward to his testimony. at this time, i yield to the ranking member of the committee, mr. darrell icea of california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this important bipartisan hearing today. it is important that those of us who see this hearing today recognize that we are not here to evaluate the value of bank of america or merrill lynch or their transaction, whether it was a good deal then or a good deal today for either of the parties. we're here because there's been a serious allegation and a number of pieces of evidence have arisen that make us believe that government officials felt necessary to use the power influence and in fact potentially threats in order to cons mate this deal. when congress envisioned the tarp and other assets or in other powers in order to help in the

bernanke. >> mr. larsen? >> chairman bernanke, there is escape hoods here in front if you need one. >> that's okay. >> to get away from that question. but i wanted to chat a little bit about -- ask a question, but i want to clear something up. i was just in china as well this week and visiting with a lot of their leaders on the economy, trying to get some perspective. and the characterization that my colleague from new jersey made about mr. geithner's reception was inaccurate. and may have been a little bit accurate when he spoke at peking university but i never spoke to a group of college students that didn't take me on either. so there is perhaps a disconnect there. but in our discussions with folks from the central bank, and from the ministry of commerce and vice premier wong and others, there is a real desire for cooperating on the economy with the chinese. i want to give you a few assessments and ask a few questions based on those meetings. the first, i guess headline, there is a general concern regardin

on capitol today, fed chairman ben bernanke before a house committee, taking questions on that merger between bank of america and merrill lynch. one headline in "the new york times," the gop expected to paint ben bernanke as an ally of big government. the senate health committee continues its market appearance today on the issue of health care reform. nancy pelosi holding her weekly news conference. president obama meeting with some members of congress. today the issue is immigration. there's also a white house picnic on the south lawn for lawmakers. governor mark sanford admitting his affair yesterday on the front page of "the washington times." social conservatives fall from the moral high ground. that is our focus for the next half-hour. our phone lines, as always, 202- 737-0001, of our line for republicans. 202-737-0002 for democrats. if you are an independent, the number to call is 202-628-0205. beginning with the "los angeles times," another gop bombshell. the "atlanta journal constitution," where the governor flew back cut from his trip to argentina, a costly confession for the

chairman bernanke testified before our committee on october 20 of last year, as we searched for waysto mitigate, if not avoid a long recession. the chairman acknowledged then that monetary policy has its limits. without being specific, he welcomed a fiscal compromise. congress had just passed a bipartisan compromise offering $700 billion to dispose of troubled assets, so-called t.a.r.p. backed by these funds, the treasury, the fed, the fdic have made extraordinary measures to banks and other financial institutions, recognizing what chairman bernanke told the joint economic committee last month, quote, a sustained recovery in economic activity depends critically on restoring stability to the financial system. this is one question we hope you'll address today, mr. chairman. just how strong and how table are our financial institutions. by february of this year it was clear that t.a.r.p. relief was a necessary, but not sufficient, solution. so, congress bassed on a partisan basis an even bigger boost, the recovery and reinvestment act, which packed $787 billion of official simply in the

the importance for chairman bernanke is to get back on track. host: i realize this is a simple question with a complicated answer, but how do you get to the goldilocks economy? guest: the fed is

bernanke before we draw any hard and fast conclusions. i do believe in fairness. however, i do think it is fair to observe that a flawed financial regulatory process was at work in this case. we see closed doors, meetings, coded messages. motives questions and private e-mails. basically the regulators and the financial institutions seems to be making up the rules as they went along. as congress considers financial regulatory reform, one of the lessons from this case is that we need much more transparency and accountability in the financial regulatory and oversight process. the american taxpayers and corporate shareholders deserve no less. they need to know what's going on. let me again, thank you mr. lewis, for being here today. before we adds adjourn let me stay, this committee has and will continue to protect the american taxpayers. and we'll continue to make sure that the taxpayers dollars are spent in a transparent and wise manner. without objections, i enter this binder into the committee records and without objection, the committee stands adjourned. >> this

clear, and i am reinforcing that by a number of authorities, paul volcker for example, chairman bernanke, people of the british financial services committee, the problem with compensation is that it has encouraged excessive risk-taking. that is once we leave the area of the recipients of t.a.r.p. money is into any part of my concern as to the dollar amounts given from the governmental standpoint. we are not talking about amounts. we are talking about the structure of compensation and i believe the structure has been flawed. namely we have had a system of compensation for top decision makers in which they are very well rewarded if they take a risk that pays off but suffered no penalty if they take a risk that costs the company money. now, risk is a very important part of the business and we are not trying to discourage people from taking risks. that is not the government job. but it shouldn't be a system in which risk is artificially encouraged and excessive risk-taking takes place. i said and i should correct myself before someone else does that we were all talking about dollar amounts.

>> i am not going to make news about ben bernanke. i think he has done a fine job under a very difficult circumstance. i would say that all financial regulators did not do everything they needed to do to prevent the crisis from happening. that is why we have put forward a bold as a set of reforms in financial regulation in 75 years. there were too many gaps. there were laws on the books that would have brought about a prevention of the crisis. the enforcement was not there. there was not sufficient law in some cases. i think the fed probably performed better than most other regulators prior to the crisis taking place. they would be the first to a knowledge that in dealing with systemic risk and anticipating its, they did not do everything that needs to be done. since the crisis occurred, ben bernanke has performed very well. one of the central concept behind our financial regulatory reform is that there has got to be somebody who is responsible not just for monitoring the health of the individual institutions but someone who is monito

does the president we approved ben bernanke? if you look at the set of economists that he is likely to pick from, and the kinds of people he picks, they are the kind of people who will let the president run the printing presses. they believe in lots of government. that is their point of view. my feeling is the person that is most likely to take the punch bowl away from barack obama is ben bernanke. he would not be a person that barack obama would choose if he was not there already. he is more likely to exercise some monetary discipline than anyone else the president appoints. i would suggest that at some point there will be some kind of showdown between the fed and the administration over money. at that point, all of those conservatives out there that like to put jefferson about central banks will be very happy to have what is left of an independent and a boric economists over there holding the crank. host: north carolina on the democrats' line. caller: have you read a book called fool's gold? guest: know i have not. can you giv

bernanke is asked that a lot when he testifies. he responds that it must be independent but during a serious financial crisis id must work with the treasury and government in power to keep the economy stabilized. host: our guest is with market news international ,john shaw has joined us to give us insights and answer your questions. florida, scott on our independent line. caller: good morning to you both. the big picture seems the reason why we needed this tarp which, yes, republicans and democrats -- whoever would have been president would have had to do something. president bush wanted to past tarp and nancy pelosi said nick, thanks, we will take your time and do right. meanwhile lots of companies lost businesses. lost olots of companies lost jobs. taking their time seems to be the problem. but there did need to be the tarp, no matter whether with republicans or democrats holding the reins. however, these toxic assets were given -- started in the clinton administration. were it managed by the house and senate, both of them seem t

my colleagues know i have the highest respect for chatman bernanke but in this case he obviously couldn't have been more wrong. this committee must have the courage to reject calls for a new regulatory regime that depends on the infallibility of the government regulators who

bernanke, the chief of the fed, the guy that does it, says we are printing money. why does this matter to the average american, even those not planning to buy a treasury bill any time soon, will be affected. that is because mortgage interest rates, what we pay to borrow money to buy a house with, track the ten-year treasury yield so as a ten-year treasury goes up, mortgage rates go up, too. and it's much harder for people to buy a home or to refinance or if you want to sell a 40e78 it's harder -- sell a home it's harder for the person who wants to buy because they have to pay considerably more in interest rate. according to the "wall street journal." 30 year mortgage rate has gone up 16% in two weeks from 5% to 5.79%. this is the money when you go out to borrow money to by a house with. what we need to happen in america is for people to decide to buy a home and take these vacant homes off the market and get somebody in them so they cannily icanlive in them and the difference between 5% and 6%. on $100,000, a 5% interest it would be $5,000 a year you pay just in int

bernanke, another we the public money seemed to flow to these financial institutions. back in march of 2009, aig disclosed the name of the counterparties. the people that had credit stifel swap agreements and bank of america was among them as others. it appears from the records that there were losses in the so-called super senior multi sector credit default swaps portfolio aig had and that it created a liquidity problem and had obligations there were problems in the portfolio to push more cash or collateral security for the obligation. the federal reserve board of new york had $85 billion loan to a ing. the testimony today is that money was used to buy all the contracts and cancel them, that's how they took care of that obligation. what was of concern to me and others is the counterparties appeared to have received 100% of that even though testimony from people at aig before the committee said they thought there were a lot of contentious reasons to think they did not all 100% if they would anything at all on those particular obligations that there had been serious nego

>> i'm not going to make news about ben bernanke. although i think he has done a fine job under a very difficult circumstance -- under very difficult circumstances. i would say that all financial regulators didn't do everything that needed to be done to prevent the crisis from happening. and that's why we've put forward the boldest set of reforms in financial regulation in 75 years. because there were too many gaps where there were laws on the books that would have brought about a prevention of the crisis, the enforcement wasn't there. in some wayses -- cases there just weren't sufficient laws on the books, for example, with the nonbanking sector. i think that the fed probably performed better than most other regulators prior to the crisis taking place. but i think they'd be the first to acknowledge that in dealing with systemic risk and anticipating systemic risk they didn't do everything that kneed to be done. i think -- needed to be done. i think since the crisis has occurred, ben bernanke has performed very well and one of the ce