i themmy director for the center for biosecurity of upmc. i am an infectious disease physician by training and have seen many patients with influenza die, despite excellent medical care in american hospitals. for many years, my center colleagues and i have been studying avian and pandemic flu and the public health actions that need to be taken to protect us from those challenges. and like all of you, i am deeply concerned that h5n1 is a major global threat. i have been opposed to the publication of the fouchier manuscript. just as it kills ferrets when instilled into their tracheas this engineered virus also kills ferrets the same way. so there's no evidence that i've seen publicly presented that this engineered virus would have less virulence than h5n1 would. were it to cause a human infection it could acquire new virulence properties. if it led to human infection, we can't rule out the chance it would lead to high case fatality and spreading epidemic, doflt st stop. there are others in the scientific and health communities who share this c

paul keim, acting chairman of the aforementioned national science advisory board for biosecurity. we thank you very much, dr. keim for being here. and please proceed with your testimony now. >> chairman lieberman, thank you for holding this hearing on

in this regard, the national science advisory board for biosecurity or nsabb was asked to advise the united states government on the publication of these manu scripts. you will hear in detail from dr. keim, the chair of that group, about the board's deliberations. importantly, the public attention and concern generated by this issue has triggered a voluntary moratorium or pause on this type of research on the part of the influenza research committee as well as a fresh look at how the u.s. government handles durc as manifested by a formalization of a governmentwide policy to address the issue. this policy which was released on march 29th, strengthens and formalizes ongoing efforts in durc oversight and is described in my written testimony. the ultimate goal of the nih in its embrace of this new policy is to ensure that the conduct and communication of research in this area remain transparent and open at the same time as the risk benefit ratio of such research clearly tips towards benefiting society. the public, which has a stake in the risks as well as in the benefits of such research

i name is tom ingalls be and i'm the director for the center for biosecurity.e physician or drink in the last two decades have seen many patients with influenza died despite excellent medical care in american hospitals. for many of my center colleagues and i then discovered -- that need to be taken to protect us from those challenges. and like all of you, i am deeply concerned that h5n1 is a major global threat. i have been opposed to the publication of the revised fouchier manuscript. the breakthrough and it was making h5n1 transmissible in the air between ferrets. just as well, h5n1 kills ferrets, the sentient virus also kills ferrets the same way. so there's no evidence that i've seen publicly presented at this engineering virus would have less virulence in humans and wildlife h5n1 infection with the with this virus -- so this word were replicated after publication and it led to human infection following accident or mischief, we can't rule out the chance it would lead to high is tallied and the spreading epidemic, difficult to stop. as you noted, there are o

i'm the director for the center for biosecurity.llent medical care in american hospitals. for many years my colleagues and i have been studying the gm pandemic flu and the public health actions that need to be taken to protect us from those challenges, and like all of you lamb deeply concerned that age five and one is a major global threat. i've been opposed to the publication of the manuscript. the break through network was looking at transmissible through the air first. just as it calls ferrets when it's still in the tricky it also kills ferrets the same way so there's no evidence i've seen publicly presented that this virus would have less virulence in humans than the wild infection would. it could acquire new unpredictable properties, so this work replicated after the publication and if it led to the human infection following misuse we can't rule of the chance that would lead to high fatality in the spring of endemic difficult to stop with quarantine vaccine are anti-viral. as you noted, there are others in the scientific public

particularly for those that work on biosecurity and terrorism issues. i wonder if you have a sense of how the information's going to be used and whether any of you expect that your agencies will be asked to support the oversight charged with carrying out here. i'll start with you. >> i would just like to take you back to deliberations today. we have used those deliberations to better understand what has gone on with the papers. we have been briefed on the science. we've been briefed on the policies, the issues that have surfaced. and i think what's come out of the 29 march white house-led effort is a good first start. what we expect is that this will continue. that this is not an end point so to speak, but the beginning of a process that we will continue to look and try to ensure that our policies with regard to dirk are as good as they can be. to ensure national security, homeland security and that scientific work goes on unfettered. so in that record, we're hopeful. it's a reporting requirement. all departments and agencies are submitting to that. and

for the range and responsibilities it is given, particularly those on the nse staff that work on biosecurity and bioterrorism issues and i wonder whether you have a sense of how the information is going to be used to support oversight of such research and whether any of you expect your agencies and/or the nsaab will be asked to support the oversight that the white house national security staff has charged with carrying out here. maybe i will start with you, dr. girsky. >> that would be somewhat speblg la active. we used the deliberations to better understand what has gone on with the papers. we have been briefed on the science. we have been briefed on the policies, the issues that surfaced, and i think what's come out of the 29 march white house led effort is a good first start. what we expect is that this will continue, that this is not an end point so to speak but it is the beginning of a process that we will continue to look and try to ensure that our policies with regard to durc are as good as they can be to ensure national security but also homeland security as well as insuring scientif

request of the department of health and human services, the national science advisory board for biosecurity or nsabb was asked to review the h5n1 research papers. the nsabb concluded that more needed to be known before the research was made public, and they asked the editors of "science and nature" to delay publication. both magazines agreed. last month, after further review, the nsabb withdrew its objections and voted unanimously to allow the university of wisconsin study to be published and by a vote -- a divided vote of 12-6 to allow the netherlands study to be published with some revisions and clarifications. one of the things that apparently influenced the board's decision was the revelation that the modified strains of h5n1 had become less lethal. but as the members of the panel know, i am sure that decision has drawn criticism from dr. michael t. osterholm, director of the center for infectious disease research and policy at the university of minnesota. and an nsabb board member himself. in a letter to the nih he wrote the nsabb had ignored the voice of scientists who believed public