it is useful to understand brezhnev through khrushchev. brezhnev proceeded -- proceeded khrushchev. the person who represents her bolshevik tradition, that is the existing capitalist system and the revolution. if you ask yourself why there is only one khrushchev, truly, in the history of the cold war? there were no imitators of khrushchev before, since, and there were no willing imitators of khrushchev after him, which is easy to understand. you come up with a more normative picture of soviet foreign policy were most people, even stalin at many points of his career, and certainly people after stalin's death began to search for some kind of soviet-american data or some kind of a conceptual system structurally, structure that would accommodate both soviet and american interests. so it makes khrushchev a colorful, but only in episode, a heroic episode in this search for accommodations between the two great powers. whatever khrushchev did, was quite awful, especially in foreign policy. [laughter] at times a visceral reaction to khrushchev's risk-taking. brezhnev something opposite to wh

brezhnev's idea, and not only brezhnev's idea, the idea of huge number of soviet nomenclature communist officials, mostly russians, but also ukrainians and other, that there could be some inevitable famework that the two powers dould form a stable world order was under delusion and a misperception of what america is about and how america wanted to build the world with u.s. leadership and only u.s. leadership. so when brezhnev meets nixon, who's already, you know, half drunk, you know, in the watergate stage, that's in crimea, their last meeting, he raises a toast to the doctrine of lasting and universal peace, the nixon version of doctrine. that's a joke. but there's something deeper behind this joke. so i would -- brezhnev could never fully realize this a u.s. world order is -- never wanted to create such a world order. they wanted the prevail in the cold war. the united states did offer strategic alliance to a big communist country, but it was china, not the soviet union. and they offered that alliance to china because it's explicitly and strategically directed against the soviet unio

brezhnev's idea, not only brezhnev's idea, the idea of huge number of soviet communists, officials, mostly russians but also ukrainians and others that there could be a conceptual framework where the two powers would form a stable world order based on delusion and misperception of what america is about and how america wanted to build the world with u.s. leadership and only u.s. leadership. so when brezhnev meets nixon who's already, you know, half drunk in watergate stage, that's crimea and that's the last meeting he raises a toast to the doctrine of lasting and universal peace, the brezhnev/nixon doctrine. that's a joke but there's something deeper behind the joke and i would argue that brezhnev could not realize it's an oxymoron. american elites never, ever wanted to create such a world order. they wanted to prevail in the cold war and the united states did offer strategic alliance to a big communist country but it was china. not the soviet union. and they offered the alliance to china because it expoli explici directed to the soviet union. now moving to putin. putin is a very different

deeplylike brezhnev, is illiberal. he celebrates great fatherland war, much like brezhnev did. a kgb man isin to privileges of. -- primitivism. he had a state learning curve. he learned a lot what it means when the state is destroyed. russia is flooded with highly unpleasant realities linked to political liberalization. so he accepted the fundamental failure of communism as ideological doctrine. he does not want to rebuild a territorial soviet empire. is to improve russia's place in the existing world order, not to create a new one. and here comes the rub. . non-eligibleo very -- very knowledgeable russians, and even they don't understand why russia cannot find a proper mode or place for itself in the world. sometimes russia acts as if it is a superpower. but everyone understands that it is not a superpower. it doesn't have enough umpf for that. and then russia refuses to act as a regional power because it is in itself diminishing or derogatory. the relationship of russia to the existing liberal order is not an easy thing to establish. in terms of provoking a discussion, i woul

it's useful actually to compare khrushchev to brezhnev. khrushchev is the last person we heard so much from tim, the person who represents heroic bolshevic tradition. that is -- that's take by the existing capitalist system and believes in revolution and all that. bill wrote a beautiful biography of him. he was a true believer. but if you ask yourself why there was only one khrushchev truly in the history of the cold war, there were no imitators of khrushchev's before him and certainly no willing imitators of khrushchev after him which is easier to understand. you come up with a more sort of normative picture of soviet foreign policy where most of people, even stalin at many points of his career, and certainly people after stalin's death, begin to search for some kind of soviet/american detente or some kind of a conceptual system structurally -- structure that would accommodate both soviet and american interests. so that makes khrushchev a colorful but only an episode, heroic episode, in this search for accommodation between the two great

that brezhnev brezhnev would be likely to take advantage of him staying in office that it would affect the united states and all three branches of government. very likely for a few years to come. not just weeks or months. but certainly the executive branch. the legislative branch. and the judicial branch. they would all be engaged in this and brezhnev would be taking advantage of that. and he said -- that he could hurt his own presidency by doing something like a resignation. but he could hurt the united states by staying in office. that was quite something. i don't know if i answered your question but i probably do not. and i apologize. i did not quite comprehend it all. >> next question to your left, sir. >> thank you. richardndering -- helms, the cia director, was an important part of the whole watergate puzzle. and he was someone when i am reading about watergate -- i said to myself it would be interesting to know more about richard helms. and someone like you who has personal knowledge of the president. anything that the president said about richard helms? it would be interesting

watching american >> next on the presidency, a look at what motivated richard nixon and lynn and brezhnev during the period known as detente. the miller center can be and scholars looking at the complicated history between u.s. and russian leaders over the last entry. the discussions included discussions of franklin d. roosevelt, jfk, george h.w. bush, and bill clinton as well as their russian counterparts. this is about an hour. quiet's this is our second half of this panel. we will go to a little bit past glad lastg i just met evening over dinner. after dinner, we had a fascinating, decision about khrushchev and kennedy. but it was different ones, mrs. jacqueline kennedy and mrs.

richard nixon and soviet premier lee annoyed ration of during the premierwn as -- soviet leonid brezhnev.

since brezhnev's death, moscow has tended to release more information on a selective basis about the proceedings of official soviet organs such as -- to hold periodic western-style news conferences. by releasing more information about foreign and domestic events, the regime can put its own interpretation on these events, there by combat what the population hears from western sources. the regime made a particularly vigorous effort in this regard following the downing of kal flight 007 in 1983. while this propaganda effort appeared to backfire in the west, soviet citizens to judge from reporting of western embassy officials accepted the soviets' version as correct. party leader has called for an increased counter propaganda campaign to resist what he calls the full-scale information and propaganda invasion launched by the united states against the soviet union. this campaign features greater vigilance against the alleged efforts of western propaganda to undermine the ussr internally. in addition, soviet counterpropaganda denigrates all dimensions of life in the west, charges the united

this guy broke with stalin, brezhnev, putin. he was ready for a transformed world beyond the cold war. against the background of that possibility, which we also have to worry about him being able to sustain at home, maybe yeltsin was also pushing for. i think that central america pales. in some of the other things with relations with allies, that shaky or fragile, that repairing them had to be put ahead of the possibility of this kind of outcome. maybe i'm a romantic, a f fantacist along with gorbachev and reagan. i wonder whether we couldn't have done more. >> i think that's an elegant statement of the other side of the case. >> bill properly points out the gates position and scocraft. this is where written sources, it is a challenge for historians. as i told you separately, baker had to crush gates a couple times on this. that tells you something. gates wanted to give a speech that pointed out some of the cautionary stuff. baker we first watered it down and basically said, i don't want this speech delivered at all. brent, by n

this guy broke with stalin, brezhnev, putin. he was ready for a transformed world beyond the cold war. against the background of that possibility, which we also have to worry about him being able to sustain at home, maybe yeltsin was also pushing for. even if he was, it is a few short years. against the possibility of that kind of outcome, i think that central america pales, and some of the other things with the relations of allies that shaky or fragile that repairing them had to be put ahead of the possibility of this kind of outcome. maybe i'm a romantic, a fantasist along with gorbachev and reagan, but i just wonder if we couldn't have done more. >> i think that's an elegant statement of the other side of the case. >> well, there is a little bit of a lesson of historical method, because bill properly points out the gates' position, and scowcroft. and this is where written sources, and it is just a challenge for the historians, because as i told you separately, baker had to crush gates a couple of times on this, okay. but it t

and the faith healer juna davitashvili is said to have helped soviet leader leonid brezhnev and latert boris yeltzin. nearly 30 years later, countless healing services are now available online. the patriarch of the russian orthodox church considers president vladimir putin's rise to power a miracle of god. he also foresees an impending apocalypse. it's not unusual for a police officer to ask a priest to bless a location where numerous car accidents have occured. christ has become an antidote for misfortune. sociologists point to depression, anxiety, and a disoriented society as an explanation for the rising belief in the supernatural. >> people have no idea what's going to happen in the near future. they plan their lives from one paycheck to the next -- maybe a few months at most. >> back in the altay mountains, yelena gomayun insists healers are more than a rural phenomenon. she says her clients from moscow couldn't get by without people like her. >> my clients work with psychics, energy therapists, fortune tellers, maybe a good psychologist, or me. >> this interest in the supernatur

junot really was sought by many in the politburo her famous patients included soviet premier leonid brezhnev and later president boris yeltsin. nearly thirty years later countless healing services online represent a major enterprise. the patriarch of the russian orthodox church considers president vladimir putin's rise to power a miracle of god he also foresees an impending apocalypse. it's not uncommon for a police officer to ask a priest to bless the sites of numerous car accidents jesus has become an antidote for misfortune. sociologists point to depression anxiety and a disoriented society as an explanation for the rising belief in magical thinking. no idea what's going to happen in the near future and they plan their lives from your paycheck to the next maybe a few months of. work from this that are. back in the other time manton's the spiritual guide yelena got mail insists healers are more than a rural phenomena she says her clients from moscow couldn't get by without people like her. in a country where reality is a painful experience for many russians cope by hoping for miracles. rus

we heard this before lunch about the parallels in the differences between brezhnev and putin. so it strikes me even more as a result of this conference that gorbachev, and yeltsin to some extent to be determined after this panel, is the great exception, truly exceptional, both at home and his determination to try to democratize his country, and abroad, in his determination to end the cold war and help to ,uild a new world order post-cold war order that would be based as much as possible on the nonuse of force. so if he is such an exception, the question is how did the inted states react to him the persons of presidents reagan and bush? to what extent did it understand ?he exception that he was to what extent did it try to meet him and help him as he pursued his goals? to what extent did it. -- did it not do so in a way that it might have hindered his efforts to obtain these exceptional goals? in my book and, to some extent in my paper, i talk first about reagan and then about george bush. as ironicallygan an almost perfect partner to gorbachev. strange as that seemed at the ti

and the faith healer journal davi tash really the said to have helped soviet leader leonid brezhnev and later president boris yeltsin. nearly thirty years later countless healing services are now available online the patriarch of the russian orthodox church considers president vladimir putin's rise to power a miracle of god he also foresees an impending apocalypse. it's not unusual for a police officer to ask a priest to bless a location where numerous car accidents have occurred christ has become an antidote for misfortune. sociologists point to depression anxiety and a disoriented society as an explanation for the rising belief in the supernatural. but it's the libby to go have no idea what's going to happen in the near future and that was they plan their lives for one paycheck to the next of the maybe a few months at most work from them when you're for komisarek back in the timezone tens yelena go my who insists healers are more than a rural phenomenon she says. her clients from moscow couldn't get by without people like her. i think that's fair think my clients work with psychics en

togan attempted early on engage with brezhnev and his successors. at times, giving real emphasis on the role of history in russian foreign policies. the russian role of history and the lives of the russians he was dealing with. in thinking through this letter ie wrote in february of 1984, " have reflected at some length on the tragedy and scale of soviet losses and warfare throughout the ages. surely those losses, which are beyond description, must affect your thinking today. neither i, nor the american people hold offensive intentions towards you or the soviet people ." when it came to policy decisions, i think reagan put option fortable zero an intermediate nuclear forces treaty. he put that out in the fall of 1981. there was a wide perception that it was a purely cynical thing because the u.s. and nato had yet to have launch ground missiles. he stuck to this, even throughout 1987, where a lot of put -- onend him had not so excited to go forward with gorbachev. reagan put forward with the strategic reduction talks, a much more ambitious proposal t

so the soviets tried to shift the argument about -- about a common home that brezhnev made a speech on the environment and signed up to a u.n. pact on acid rain. they didn't mean they that to do anything but all about demonstrating to greens in the west that soviets were on the right side of the environment. on the nuclear winter, the evidence is very clear, defector said this was -- the kgb's proudest achievement, the nuclear winter scare which was taken up by american signties, conference in washington to play up the threat and basically put -- it was really to undermine the reagan administration and the nuclear arms build up, and if they got their way, if the scientists got their way the outcome of the cold war would have been very different. >> okay. right here in the back and then to you. >> paul larken, heritage foundation. i've read a few newspaper conditioned that surmise that the russians are involved currently in efforts to fund opposition to fracking for the same sort of long-term purpose that you described. is there evidence that is actually going on? >> i think it's certai

after that, how nixon and brezhnev interacted. then we'll continue between u.s. and soviet union leader at the height of the cold war from virginia miller center you can see american history tv prime time 8 eastern here on c-span3. and today on c-span, the white house correspondents association host a discussion with current white house press secretary sarah sanders and former white house press secretary mike mccurry, that will be followed by a panel discussion with white house correspondents, live coverage begins at 7:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and today we continue to bring you unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, and public policy events in washington d.c. and around the country h c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. >> join us tonight on c-span for portions of the first unrigged system summit from new orleans, such as campaign finance, speakers actress jennifer lawrence interview

in fact, reagan attempted early on to engage with brezhnev and his successors and above and povhis successors, yuri andro chenenko.ntin at times, giving real and to the role of history in russian foreign policy, the role of russian history and the lives of the russians we were dealing with. in a letter, he wrote in 1984, i have reflected at some length on the tragedy and scale of soviet losses in warfare throughout the ages. truly, those losses, which are beyond description, must affect your thinking today. i want you to know that neither i nor the america people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the soviet people. when it came to policy decisions, just as importantly or more importantly, reagan put out on the table, zero options on intermediate nuclear forces treaty talks. he put that out in the fall of 1981. bute was a wide perception it was a purely cynical thing, because the u.s. and nato did ground launched missiles. reagan stuck to this position even throughout 1987, when a lot of people around him and nato allies and leaders put their political careers in a line, and were not

next on the presidency, a look at what motivated president richard nixon and soviet premier leonid brezhnev during the period known as dtente. the discussions included assessments of franklin d. roosevelt, jfk, george h.w. b

. >> next on the presidency, a look at what motivated president richard nixon and soviet premier brezhnev. the university of virginia's miller center held a conference looking at the complicated history between the u.s. and russian leaders over the last century. the discussions included assessments of franklin d. roosevelt, jfk, george h.w. bush and bill clinton as well as their russian counterparts. this is about an hour. >> this is our second half of this panel. we'll go to a little bit past 1:00. i have just met vlad zubok last evening over dinner and after dinner and which we had a fascinating conversation about khrushchev and kennedy but two slightly different khrushchevs and kennedys about whom we've been speaking and it was mrs. jacqueline

next on the presidency, a look at what motivated president richard nixon and soviet premier leonid brezhnev during the period known as dtente. the discussions included assessments of franklin d. roosevelt, jfk, george h.w. bush and bill clinton, as well as their russian counterparts. this is about an hour. >>> this is our second half of this panel. we will go to a little bit

next and the presidency a look at what motivated president richard nixon and leonid brezhnev during the. known as detente. the university of virginia's has a conference looking at the complicated history between u.s. and russian leaders over the last century. the discussions include an assessment of franklin dave roosevelt, jfk, george eight the h w bush and bill clinton as well as their russian counterparts. it's about an hour. barbara: this is our second half of this panel. we will go to a little bit past 1:00 during i just met vlad last

next on the presidency, a look at what motivated president richard nixon and soviet premier leonid brezhnev during a period known as detente. the miller center held a conference looking at complicated history of the u.s. and russian leaders.