brizinski the national security advisor and he i was in the room with brijinsky and and sullivan and know bijinski asking what what's going on in iran and and what what's the situation. "and he said, don't worry about it, the shaw has it all under control and you have nothing to worry about. set against such backdrop, the shah appointed jafar sharif emi as his prime minister. his close connection to the clergy had made him the successful candidate in a competition with more qualified rivals. به برنامه دولت جناب جعفر شعرامی رای اعتماد از امروز بنده شریف امامی ۲۰ روز پیش دیگر نیستم بنده نه به خودم نه به بستگانم نه به دوستانم دیگر فکر نخواهم کرد فقط به مصالح مملکت اختلافاتی که پیش آمده است به علت عدم تماس به وجود آمده. اگر ما با دست جات مختلف هر چقدر باشن تماس پیدا بکنیم با هم مذاکره بکنیم صحبت بکنیم تفاهم به وجود بیاریم رفع اختلاف خواهد شد اگر حرف حساب دارن باید ما بپذیریم اگه حرف ناحسابم دارن ما به اونها باید بفهمانیم که به این دلیل این کارتون یا این حرفتون یا این تقاضات اون ناحسابه و با این ترتیب بنده فکر می کنم که اون هایی که واقعاً حسن نیت دارن و مخالف هستند. رفع اختلاف عموم میشه ب

the disagreement between brizinski, carter's national security advisor and cyrus vans, the secretaryence between sunnis and shiites and came out tearing his hair, and this was fellow that got elected president, you know, there's just very, very limited understanding of, foreign nations and cultures, were superpower by the fact that we're super economic power and a super military power, we're not a super power in terms of foreign understanding, problem was you had a regime, an administration, i should say, carter administration, that had deeply divided council about countries like iran. what they did do is bring in a guy by the name of stanascadero who was later ambassador to, i think azerbaijan and and some other one other country in the the caucasus after the breakup of the soviet union, and and escadero was kind of a controversial figure in the sense that he had been an outspoken critic in the mid-70s of our support of essentially of putting all the american national security eggs in... shah's basket. the third problem was that the american embassy in tehran was wowfully ill-inform

security advisor, and he, i was in the room with... and and sullivan, and sullivan said to him, brizinski asked him, what, what's going on in iran, and and what, what's the situation, and he said, don't worry about it, the shah has it all under control, and you have nothing to worry about, set against such backdrop, the shah appointed jaff. فکر نخواهم کرد فقط مصالح مملکت اختلافاتی که پیش آمده است به علت عدم تماس به وجود آمده اگر ما با دست جات مختلف هر چقدر باشن تماس پیدا بکنیم با هم مذاکره بکنیم صحبت بکنیم تفاهم به وجود بیاریم رفع اختلاف خواهد شد اگر حرف حساب دارن باید ما بپذیریم اگه حرف ناحسابم دارن ما به اونها باید بفهمانیم که به این دلیل. این کارتون یا این حرفتون یا این تقاضاتون ناحسابه و با این ترتیب بنده فکر می کنم که اون هایی که واقعاً حسن نیت دارن و مخالف هستن رفع. by september 1978, the shah had changed his tune on public demonstrations. he called for martial law in the capital city of tehran and other big cities. demonstrations were prescribed, nighttime curfew was imposed and arrest warrants were issued for opposition leaders. با توجه به اینکه حکومت نظامی برقرار شده آیا دولت در

as brizinski, well that will be very, we have to announce it on the air so it doesn't look peculiar. your majesty, are you being sold weapons in the united states in part so that you can uh defend our point of view? well, i can't uh really uh see ' what that means? but if you say that we are allies, i can say yes, we are allies. in his official visit to iran, president carter of the united states said, the military alliance between iran and america is indestructible. just a week later, ital art newspaper published insult to ayatalah khumaini an article by ahmed rashidi mutlah. the article hurt public feelings and rocked the country, the epicenter was the city of com. one of the most staggering things to me about the revolution and the american attitude to the revolution was the failure of american policymakers to understand just how weak the shah of iran was. i'm not talking about weak. militarily or weak in the sense of not having a good police force, i'm talking about weak in terms of a character structure. let me give you an example, so jimmy carter is the president of the united

, you want to know if it was all right with the american, if it was okay with the americans, and brizinski told him on the telephone, it's a it's a problem of order, of course we would be behind you if you do that, and then i learned from my iranian friends later something, well lashad didn't really believe and he says, yeah, yeah, we'll go around and kill him and then we'll take the heat later, but marvin zonas says, he had no balls, on april 14th, 1978, asadullah alam died from cancer in new york city, the shah lost his chief advisor. remember that the pillar of the regime, the really tough guy who really helped the shot to be strong and as tough as he needed to be, and i think we have to be very sympathetic here. it was not easy to be the shah of iran, and the shah was a weak character, found it especially difficult to be the shavaran, which is what's wrong with hereditary monarchies, i mean his. father was a real tough guy, the show wasn't a tough guy, so who was the guy that made him tough? asadola alam, his boy at friend, the guy was prime minister when i first arrived in iran and ho