he's got a really good read on mcclellan or even burnside. burnside has a problem where he'll freeze up when he's given too much. kind of burn side bridge. it takes him a long time to get across that bridge. burnside can be take advantage of and exploited, as can mccl mcclellan, obviously. he doesn't get that good of read when it comes to grant. yes. there's something deeply wrong about the the potomac. i don't know if the historians have done such a great job. the army fights really hard as is effective. but it's generals. it's partly because mcclellan because a lot of the officers he selects and the culture he creates is passive ones. also beaten by the same team too often. there seems to be a sense they get the culture of losers. and what is the opposite thing in the army of northern virginia? they think they're always going to win. and what's interesting about is is it's not just the army thinks that. who else thinks that? and gallagher has a lot of it. >> that's part of it. and what other important group of people? the confederates. aver

mcclellan breaks and burnside breaks. shiloh doesn't break. wilderness when he gets flanks, he doesn't break. he withdraws and stabs again. >> and how does that relate to the big picture? how do those two connect? >> if he loses the battle doesn't necessarily mean he's done. he's able to get over it and move to the next one. who is a contrasting figure on this question of character? who is the guy who gets the strategy right but due to a moral failing -- i mean, that's basically the way 19th century americans are seeing it doesn't succeed. it's mcclellan. what's widely's evaluation of the concept of mcclellan's peninsula campaign? >> it's pretty positive. he doesn't have the guts to follow it through. >> exactly. and not only that. what doeswi widely talk about? >> there's a lot less revolutionary. so there weren't any changes. slavery wasn't touched. >> and whether or not that was really a good or bad thing. is it plausible likely? did you say something? >> would it be possible to bring the union back together? because the south wanted the wa

burnside has this problem where he'll freeze up when he's given too much. it's shown -- kind of burnside -- it takes him a long time to get across that bridge. burnside can be taken advantage of and exploited as can mcclelland obviously. mcclelland will break if pushed right, but he doesn't get that good a read when it comes to grant. >> yes, i think and while -- also what should be added good read on the army of the potomac. there's something deeply wrong of that. i don't know if historians have done a great job -- even bruce cannon talks about this. they fight really hard, its rank and file are pretty effective but its generals -- kind of an organizational problem. partly because of mcclelland because a lot of the officers he selects and the culture he creates is a very defensive passive-minded one and the sports team that gets beaten by the same team too often, right? there seems to be a sense that they get the culture of losers, all right, and what is the opposite thing in northern virginia? they think they're always going to win. and what's interesting

>> burnside. >> joe hooker. the army of the potomac in general. arguably the army of tennessee is perhaps an even worse army. the confederate army of tennessee, than the union army from the potomac. when i say that i mean things in terms of -- you can make the argument that the confederate army is plagued and we don't have time to cover that in this class. maybe some of you did. is at happy relationship in the army of the confederate army of tennessee's high command? what's going on. >> none of the generals like each other. >> and davis never adjudicates the issue. davis probably should have picked one side and fired everyone else. you have essentially a corrupted command climate. he stays with bragg for too long, doesn't fire polk, so they are all attempting to undermine bragg and it's sort of this -- and bragg is this difficult human being. we think he might have had stomach problems, so you got to read stories. there is a story of braxton bragg how he happened to -- i think a line officer and he was i think the quarter master of this company. y

>> collin, burnside. >> right. the army of the potomac in general. but arguably the army of the tennessee is perhaps a worse army. the confederate army of the tennessee is a worse army than the union army of the potomac. all right. so, and when i say that, i mean things in terms of -- i mean, you can make that argument that it's plagued. we don't have time to cover that in this class. is it a happy army? no because what's going on? >> none of the generals liked each other. they're all at each other's throats. >> and davis never adjudicates the issue. he should have picked one side and fired everybody else. instead he stays with bragg too long. he doesn't fire polk. they're all attempting to undermine bragg. and bragg is sort of this difficult human being. they were really cranky. there's a great story of braxton bragg, in the old army of how he -- it was a lying officer and the quarter master of his company. that happened a lot. the army was very small. you had to do double duty. he sent a requisition to himself as a line officer that he rejected. it

and in all honesty, mcclellan looks good compared to burnside. well, he doesn't do very well though. so you have success with numbers. and it comes back to this issue. how much can we really put, how much credit can you really give to an individual general? for their success or failure? and how much of it is due to circumstances beyond their control? whether it be who happens to be their opponent, whether it is what is the material of resources they can call on. what's the political restrictions they're operating under. what's the institutional structures? >> certain years of the war they were less likely for troops to run away and flee. other times they weren't as dedicated to the cause or the cause they didn't see. >> these are things that no individual can control. even they have the knowledge. what's good about him being obscure early in his career? why? he gets less political interference. he gets less exposure. the grant had done shiloh in the east, what would have happened to him? by the way, he does okay, arguably. his army is very motiva

when he is given too much and burn a bridge and takes him along time to get across that bridge and burnside can be taken advantage of and exploited as mcclellan obviously and will break if pushed right and he doesn't get that good of read when it comes to grant. >> yes. also what should be added is a good read on the army of potomac. the army potomac fights hard and rank and foul are effective, but its generals and kind of an organizational problem and partly because of mcclellan and a lot of the officers he selected and the culture he creates is a very defensive passive minded one and it is also it is like the team, the sports team that gets beaten by the same team too often, and there seems to be a sense they get the culture of losers, and what is the opposite thing in the army of northern virginia? they think they're always going to win. what's interesting about it is one, it is not just the army thinks that. who else thinks that and gallagher has a lot of it. >> the army thinks that the army of northern -- >> that's part of it. what other important group of people? the confederates, the

there was a lost colony there, too, and it was about 2,500 confederates who were lost to ambrose burnside's 10,000 federal. so, he lost mill springs. lost roanoke island as jack montcastle has pointed out, the confederacy has lost forts henry and donaldson on the tennessee and cumberland rivers. and what that does is open the tennessee, the cumberland, too, if they wanted it, to union penetration by combined arms, navy, army. up the tennessee river as far as they want to go, chattanooga if they'd like. what it did was eventually result in the battle of shiloh, well, pittsburgh landing. which the confederates lost, too, as well as p-ridge in arkansas. so, you lose a good hunk of arkansas and any chance to make missouri a bona fide, de facto confederate state. jefferson davis in his inaugural speech delivered not too far from here on february 22nd, a few days ago, george washington's birthday, not by chance, said this is the darkest hour of our struggle. and our struggle in davis' perspective just got darker and darker after that. lee himself had lost arlington, his home, which wasn't really

as you probably know more you have folks like mcclellan, in honesty looks pretty good compared to burnside. well, he doesn't do very well, though. so you have here a successive numbers and it comes back to this issue is how much can we really put -- how much credit can you give to an individual general for their success or failure. and how much of it is due to circumstances beyond their control. whether it be who happens to be their opponent. whether it is -- what's the material resources they can call upon. what it is the political restrictions they are operating under. what's the institutional structures. >> during the time period, what time of the war were they in, because certain years of the war there was less likely for their troops to run away and flee. then other times they weren't feeling it. they rimt as dedicated to the cause or the cause that they didn't see. >> and these are things that no individual can patrol. some people have, even those who are very -- have that knowledge. what is good about him being the obscure western theater early in his career? but he gets less politi

mcclellan breaks and burnside breaks, all of these generals break, but shiloh doesn't break, the wilderness when he gets outflanked he doesn't break, he withdraws and stabs again. >> how does that relate to having the big picture? how do those two connect? >> he loses the battle doesn't mean he's done. >> yes. >> he's able to get over the fact and go on to the next one. >> you have your -- and this is a traditional military historian's argument why you focus. wigley uses it. who is the contrasting figure on this question of character? who is the guy who gets the strategy right but due to a moral failing, that's basically the way 19th century america sees it, doesn't succeed. it's mcclellan. if he know what is is wigley's evaluation of the strategic concept of mclellen's peninsula campaign? >> pretty positive. just he didn't have the guts to follow it up. >> exactly. that is what -- not only that, what does wigley talk about, how does he character ice mcclellan's political ideas? >> he was a lot less revolutionary than -- he would have rather had the civil war carried south there weren't any

mcclellan breaks and burnside breaks. shiloh doesn't break. wilderness when he gets flanks, he doesn't break. he withdraws and stabs again. >> and how does that relate to the big picture? how do those two connect? >> if he loses the battle doesn't necessarily mean he's done. he's able to get over it and move to the next one. who is a contrasting figure on this question of character? who is the guy who gets the strategy right but due to a moral failing -- i mean, that's basically the way 19th century