lieutenant general caldwell was trying to tell us by the fact that he was actually you know engagingin ordering his soldiers to do this does that mean that there is you know a lack of confidence and what's actually going on in the training the afghan troops right now if clearly if he's telling his men to stop focusing on that and start focusing on the senators then they're asking for more money they're asking for more time all right well let me let's just talk about what's in the news marjah which is a battle of marjah started a year ago almost to the day they espouse it to be the format for winning the war first thing they said and they said will take about three weeks to take care of the small hamlet took almost ten months and even now we're going back and having to redo things so when something like that happens where you set up a very high expectation and it gets knocked down over time because of results you have a hard you have a hard sell right there so with that said then we've had to slide back on a number of things we said we're going to do in the war and i think there's som

>> patricia leanne caldwell born in tennessee. daughter of robert and irma. at age of 3 moved to missouri and returned when she was 12 years old. patricia grew up with segregation and injustices which she writes about. she spent many countless hours in the nashville public library. it was her family life that was bountiful and flowing with tales told by her story telling grandfather. raised with love of reading and oral tradition. graduated from tennessee state and degree in english in 1964. she married her childhood friend on december 12. they are the parents of fredrick and twins robert and john. her education continued with a master's degree in early childhood literature, and programming in 1975 from webster university. patricia has a successful career as a teacher and children's book editor. she changed careers to become a full time writer of children and young adult books. her goal is to create books for and about african-americans. i write because there is a need to have books for, by and about the african-american experience and how we helped to develo

general caldwell has steadfastly denied it. but i don't see how it could have affected my positions. in any way. and so we'll see what happens. but i'm, put me down as skeptical. >> senator mccain, we'll leave it there thank you very much and safe travel. >>> coming up, as a government shutdown looms, budget battles front and center in the capitol and in state houses across the country. ground zero for it all this week -- wisconsin. what is at stake there? what will it mean for the rights of workers? and how will it impact the 2012 race for the white house? a political roundtable weighs in. we'll be joined by afl-cio president, richard drumpk, mississippi governor, haley barbour, the chirm of the congressional black caucus, emmanuel cleaver. and msnbc's lawrence o'donnell and "the wall street journal's" kim starve. in 1968, as whaling continued worldwide, the first recordings of humpback songs were released. public reaction led to international bans, and whale populations began to recover. at pacific life, the whale symbolizes

. >> lieutenant general william caldwell, in charge of training afghan troops, was seeking more money and american soldiers to to target lawmakers with a propaganda campaign filled with favorable news on the training and the war to win their votes. but using psychological operations against any americans is illegal under any circumstances. lieutenant colonel michael holmes of the army national guard told nbc news he refused to follow the order. >> we weren't going to do it. we just flat out drew a line in the sand and said we're not going to do this. this is illegal flatly. >> reporter: the information campaign was reportedly aimed at the senate leaders in military affairs. senators john mccain, carl levin and jack reed, even joint chiefs chairman admiral mike mullen. >> what was the intent? were there any regulations violated? if there was, there has to be suitable punishment for violations. >> but when holmes objected he was shocked by the response from one commander. >> he screamed at me literally. he screamed at me in front of witnesses and said if i tell you to do it, it's not il

not only is it miraculously general caldwell has done. is stunning to me that we are in 2009 and 30% of the nco corps and afghanistan to reach. when he took over, he tested the afghan army for literacy. on paper, every nco should read up a third-grade level. when they tested the nco corps, 70% could not reach the third-grade level and he's going about six of that. we need to know after eight of involvement, 90% of the afghan currently could not shoot to make a standards 18 months ago. after all these years, we are finally getting it right. in many ways, we've been in afghanistan with the right formulation for about eight months. is that a fair statement? >> that's a fair statement. and that's a very difficult discussion to ask because it was 10 years ago when this started. >> i want the american people to know that we've made mistakes, but when 2014 pounds i am very optimistic that there will be a better afghan police and army to return there soon. but i've been discussing among my colleagues and others about what an enduring relationship

just as you will mr caldwell to thank you very much for joining us today with the low that's been lang now recalling the recent clashes that the miners in a square in moscow what measures should be taken to stop growing extremism and intolerance that we are observing at the moment. in the news which was through.

i think that the comments you quoted earlier from general caldwell has illustrated that, over the lastyear or so, the afghans have in fact done this to a considerable degree. particularly in terms of their own troops. i must say that i was very pleased to have -- and i recognize the risks of the message we were also sending to our adversaries, to the taliban. however, it seemed to me that, the teller of bonn was messaging to all their people that we were leaving -- it seems to me that, if the taliban was messaging to all their people that were leaving, there would be very surprised in october when we were still hunting them down in large numbers. i think it was a close call for me. but i became -- but i came to believe that it was the right thing. i very much support and applaud nato's decision to except the idea of full turnover of security responsibilities to the afghans by 2014. i think that bookends the july 11 statement and lets everyone know that we're not leaving precipitously. we will do this by conditions on the ground and continue to carry the fight to the taliban. >> thank y

those two documents to me from general caldwell will be made part of the record.en, and the afghan police by a similar number which would bring total afghan security force levels to 378,000 by the end of 2012. these additional forces would add important enablers, logistics, engineering, intelligence, and others that would reenforce and sustain the transition of responsibility for afghanistan's security to the afghan security forces. i support this proposed increase, and i know from our conversations that secretary gates and admiral mullen support it as well. i have urged president obama as recently as last friday to approve that request. in the field afghan security forces partnered are coalition forces employed in helmand and kandahar. u.s. and afghan forces are taking the momentum from the insurgency, particularly in former taliban strongholds in the south. the afghan army is increasingly in the lead in planning and executing operations. that's what the taliban fears the most, afghan security forces opposed to foreign forces out in front providing security to th

i live in caldwell this -- with mr. grover, the minister of that place. my dear son, i pray you come to see your dear old mother, or send me $20 i will come to see you in philadelphia. and if you can't come to see your old mother, pray, send me a letter and tell me where you live, what family you have, and what you do for a living. i am a poor old servant. i long for freedom, and my master will free me if anybody will engage to maintain the so that i don't come upon him. i love you, cato. you love your mother? you are my only son. this from the affectionate mother, hannah, hannah grover. ps, my dear son, i have not seen you since i saw you at staten island about 20 years ago. if you send any money, send it to the doctor and he will give it to me. if you have any love for your poor old mother, pray, or send to me. my dear son, i love you with all my heart. >> this is a letter, september 19, 1858. i take the pleasure of writing you these few words, with much regret, to inform you that i'm being sold to a man by the name of pearson, a traitor who stays in ne

again, that is really a general caldwell question. i am just telling you the effects of what i see in the field. they continue to improve. on the size of the army, they are going to that decision process right now on the size of the army and the police and everyone is made their recommendations and we will see how it comes out. >> again, looking forward to july and your decision-making process regarding any kind of drawdown, can you elaborate on what factors will play into that decision-making process? levels of violence, security forces? >> the things that other measures of effectiveness and the metrics that we have been using all along. you have got the effectiveness of the afghan national security forces. the real question there is, can they do it with less of us were to march in reality, that gets down to the question. can they provide that security for the afghan people so that they go about their daily business? is there sufficient governance out there that does not negatively impact on security? those of the things we will be l

>> again, that is a general caldwell question. i am telling you what i see out in the field. they continue to improve. in the army, they are going through a decision process. the army and police have made their recommendations, and we will see how it comes out. >> we are looking forward to july and your decision making process regarding the drawdown. can you elaborate on what factors will play into that process? >> there are measures of effectiveness and metrics that we have been using all along, the effectiveness of afghan security forces. the real question is, can they do it without us? that is what gets down to the question. can they provide that security for the afghan people so they can go about their daily business and is there sufficient government out there that does not negatively impact on security? those are the things we will be looking at. you have to understand, this is already occurring in different places. when you look at an area down in the helmand province, a year ago, there reticular marine battalions there. now there is a company plus. and the afghan nati

again, that is really a general caldwell question. i am just telling you the effects of what i see in the field. they continue to improve. on the size of the army, they are going to that decision process right now on the size of the army and the police and everyone is made their recommendations and we will see how it comes out. >> again, looking forward to july and your decision-making process regarding any kind of drawdown, can you elaborate on what factors will play into that decision-making process? levels of violence, security forces? >> the things that other measures of effectiveness and the metrics that we have been using all along. you have got the effectiveness of the afghan national security forces. the real question there is, can they do it with less of us were to march in reality, that gets down to the question. can they provide that security for the afghan people so that they go about their daily business? is there sufficient governance out there that does not negatively impact on security? those of the things we will be l

we had good meetings in kabul with the general caldwell and his team are doing excellent work but they're also very explicit that the systemic cost cost of the nsf are about $8 billion a year. and where is that going to come from? so are we creating these institutions that are completely unrealistic in this context? and given the context as a troops withdraw, the appetite for funding these things is going to also decrease. we're seeing that in the right. for everyone american troop could pay for -- the fact of the matter is the american congress is much better to pay for one american troop. but also just the amount of resources that is invested into building the afghan national see kitty forces relative to civilian institutions. and again, this problem that you don't need to look too far in the region to see what did he stabilizing consequences, and so question i think is also the umbrella of isaf starts to move away, how will the afghan national army in particular be perceived? we know the afghan national police is not too terribly will proceed. it has been so closely linked to isaf that

department of defenses ministry of advisors program, moda going out to serve with general caldwell, the commander of training forces in afghanistan. usip, madam chair, is a small, agile center in support of american national security, funding for it obviously should not be eliminated today. and i want to draw from a letter that governor -- i'm sorry, general petraeus, the general of the united states army commanding forces in afghanistan most recently wrote to rob goldberg, the director of international affairs at n.s.p. he says, and he extrapolate, usip's experience in working closely with the u.s. military will be a great asset in developing unity of effort between levels of the government. i hope soon to see u.s. military officers training alongside civilian government and nongovernment counterparts in usip's headquarters at 23rd and constitution, the wonderful building of my colleague mr. weiner pointed out to us moments ago. their facility is not an important symbol of our nations commit to peace but home to a wonderful training center to increase understanding in today's complex o

we had good meetings in kabul with the general caldwell and his team are doing excellent work but they'relso very explicit that the systemic cost cost of the nsf are about $8 billion a year. and where is that going to come from? so are we creating these institutions that are completely unrealistic in this context? and given the context as a troops withdraw, the appetite for funding these things is going to also decrease. we're seeing that in the right. for everyone american troop could pay for -- the fact of the matter is the american congress is much better to pay for one american troop. but also just the amount of resources that is invested into building the afghan national see kitty forces relative to civilian institutions. and again, this problem that you don't need to look too far in the region to see what did he stabilizing consequences, and so question i think is also the umbrella of isaf starts to move away, how will the afghan national army in particular be perceived? we know the afghan national police is not too terribly will proceed. it has been so closely linked to isaf that i

we had good meetings i kabul with t general caldwell and his team are doing excellent work but they're also very explicit that the systemic cost cost of the nsf are about $8 billion a year. and where is that going to come from? so are we creating these institutions that are completely unrealistic in this context? and given the context as a troops withdraw, the appetite for funding these things is going to also decrease. we're seeing that in the right. for everyone american troop could pay for -- the fact of the matter is the american congress is much better to pay for one amican troop. but also just the amount of resources that is invested into building the afghan national see kitty forces relative to civilian institutions. and again, this problem that you don't need to look too far in the region to see what did he stabilizing consequences, and so question i think is also the umbrella of isaf starts to move away, how will the afghan national army in particular be perceived? we know the afghan national police is not too terribly will proceed. it has been so closely linked to isaf that i