i think caspar weinberger was more of a neocon. ian lamb: this is an unfair question to ask, why did george shultz and weinberger not get along? they both worked for bechtel and republican administrations. sally denton: they were very different men in temperament and it just seemed like it was a legendary battle between the two. brian lamb: george shultz is a very much alive and is 95-years-old, will turn 96 at the end of this year. our guest has been sally denton and her book is "the profiteers: bechtel and the men who built the world." thank you very much. sally denton: thank you. ♪ [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] ♪ announcer: first free transcripts or to give us your comments about this program, and-a.org.t q- q&a programs are also available a c-span podcasts. announcer: the bechtel corporation issued a response to this book. announcer:

i think caspar weinberger was more of a neocon. brian: i have 30 seconds. is is an unfair question to ask, why did george shultz and weinberger not get along? they both worked for bechtel and republican administrations. noty: they apparently did get along going back to the next and administration. they were very different men in temperament and it just seemed like it was a legendary battle between the two. brian: george shultz is a very much alive and is 95-years-old, will turn 96 at the end of this year. our guest has been sally denton and her book is "the profiteers: , bechtel and the men who built the world." thank you very much. sally: thank you. ♪ [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> for free transcripts or to give us your comments about this program, visit us at q&a.org. the programs are also available as c-span podcasts. >> the bechtel corporation issued a statement in response to sally denton's book and it in part, "our employees consistently delive

in this process, i stood up to pressure from president reagan, defense secretary caspar weinberger, secretaryarry goldwater, senator john tower, chairman of the committee, and many others. i remember a meeting it he white house where i reminded the president that he had been talking through the campaign about the welfare queens fraudulently on the budget. it happens that i reminded him that there was defense queens as well. i started doing oversight on the defense department. it wasn't long before the evidence of waste and fraud began appearing. we uncovered contractors that billed the defense department $435 for a claw hammer, $750 for toilet seats, $695 for ashtrays. we found a coffeepot that even cost $7,600. i had no problem finding democrats to join my effort -- oversight effort back then, but it's somehow kind of interesting how hard it is to find bipartisan help when doing oversight in the current democrat administration. nevertheless, 12 months later, on may the 2nd, 18the 1985, afta year to make the case that the defense department needed structural reforms and slower spending growth

in your notes section you write this, i was denied access to caspar weinberger's papers. why?ally denton: i was really shocked about that and it turns out it is not really shocking at all, that a lot of public officials who give their papers to the library of congress, with restrictions that keep them from the public for as long as the family wants, and it was the library and -- librarian of congress that made the arrangement with caspar weinberger's family or maybe with him personally, that they would be restricted and the son would determine who would be able to view them. i was surprised but i have learned through my friend, that it is a usual thing. i thought that maybe you would put personal papers in a situation like that, what not -- but not papers related to your position as secretary of defense or secretary of state. brian lamb: what difference does that make to you in this book? sally denton: i think it would have created a treasure trove of documents for me relating to his role as secretary of defense, and i was looking specifically for his relationship with and the

in your notes section you write this, i was denied access to caspar weinberger's papers. why?enton: i was really shocked about that and it s

four years of work, not to mention strong opinions i my former boss, then defense secretary caspar weinbergerresulting transformation is what we now refer to as goldwater nichols. it solidified the chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. it affirmed civilian control of the military by codifying and -- codifying in law that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is outside the chain of command. in order for him to be able to provide vital, objective, independent military advice to the defense secretary and the president. at the same time, it also strengthened the chairman's role, created the position of the vice chairman of the joint chiefs and centralized the role and voice of combatant commands. it reinforced the concept of jointness, especially with respect to the careers of senior officers by requiring them to gain professional experience outside of their service in order to advance further in their careers. all senior offices -- officers know these policies today. they're integral to career advancement and achievement and reflect the

newly released notes made in 1986 by then defense secretary caspar weinberger appear to contradict bush'sor hostages deal with iran. >> they just -- like hitting a brick wall. >> reporter: the 1986 iran-contra scandal nearly broke the reagan/bush administration. now conveniently for the clinton campaign, it's back. >> today's disclosure not only directly contradicts the president's claims, it diminishes the correct of the presidency. >> that guaranteed bringing iran-contra to the top of the news for the last four days of the campaign. >> reporter: wounded, bush lashes out. >> being attacked on character by governor clinton is like being called ugly by a frog. don't worry about it. >> good morning. george bush, bill clinton, ross perot. americans go to the polls and select a president today, election day, november 3rd, 1992. >> oh, boy, nervous. as anyone would be in that situation. everyone was. >> well, there are a number of very, very close races in the south. indeed we expect a great deal of drama in this region throughout the evening. >> i was scared. thinking the difference in my lif

four years of work, not to mention strong opinions by my former boss, then defense secretary caspar weinberger, the resulting transformation was what we now refer to as goldwater nichols. it solidified the chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. it affirmed civilian control of the military by codifying and -- in law that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is outside of the chain of command. in order for him to be able to provide vital objective, , independent advice to the defense secretary and the president. at the same time, it also strengthened the chairman's role, created the position of vice chairman of joint chiefs, and centralize the role of combatant commands. it required senior offices -- officers them to gain professional experience outside of their service in order to advance further in their careers. all senior officers know these policies today for they are integral to career advancement and achievement and they reflect the reality of power service members train and fight every day as a joint force. right around this time

in your notes section you write this, i was denied access to caspar weinberger's papers.ally denton: i was really shocked about that and it turns out it is not really shocking at all, that a lot of public

in this process, i stood up to pressure from president reagan, defense secretary caspar weinberger, secretary barry goldwater, senator john tower, chairman of the committee, and many others. i remember a meeting it he white house where i reminded the president that he had been talking through the campaign about the welfare queens fraudulently on the budget. it happens that i reminded him that there was defense queens as well. i started doing oversight on the defense department. it wasn't long before the evidence of waste and fraud began appearing. we uncovered contractors that billed the defense department $435 for a claw hammer, $750 for toilet seats, $695 for ashtrays. we found a coffeepot that even cost $7,600. i had no problem finding democrats to join my effort -- oversight effort back then, but it's somehow kind of interesting how hard it is to find bipartisan help when doing oversight in the current democrat administration. nevertheless, 12 months later, on may the 2nd, 18the 1985, afta year to make the case that the defense department needed structural reforms and slower spending grow

the policy was on my side. , i stood up to pressure from president reagan, defense secretary caspar weinbergercretary barry goldwater, chairman of the committee and many others. i remember meeting at the white house. i reminded the president ian khama talking to the campaign about the welfare queens fraudulently on the budget. it happens that i reminded him queens as was defense well. i started doing oversight in the defense department, and it was not long until the evidence of waste and fraud appeared. we uncovered defense contractors 400 34 4:00 hammer, $695 for ashtrays. pot cost $7,600. a coffeepot that cost $7,600. i had no problem finding democrats to join my oversight effort accident. but it is somehow interesting how hard it is to find bipartisan help when doing oversight in the third democrat administration. nevertheless, on december 2, 1985, after one year of work to make the case the defense department needed structural reforms and slower spending growth, i was successful. to freeze the defense budget and allow for increases based on inflation was agreed to when a motion to table of

in this process, i stood up to pressure from president reagan, defense secretary caspar weinberger, secretaryry goldwater, senator john tower, chairman of the committee, and many others. i remember a meeting it he white house where i reminded the president that he had been talking through the campaign about the welfare queens fraudulently on the budget. it happens that i reminded him that there was defense queens as well. i started doing oversight on the defense department. it wasn't long before the evidence of waste and fraud began appearing. we uncovered contractors that billed the defense department $435 for a claw hammer, $750 for toilet seats, $695 for ashtrays. we found a coffeepot that even cost $7,600. i had no problem finding democrats to join my effort -- oversight effort back then, but it's somehow kind of interesting how hard it is to find bipartisan help when doing oversight in the current democrat administration. nevertheless, 12 months later, on may the 2nd, 18the 1985, afta year to make the case that the defense department needed structural reforms and slower spending growth,

four years of work, not to mention strong opinions i my former boss, then defense , thetary caspar weinberger resulting transformation is what we now refer to as goldwater nichols. it solidified the chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. it affirmed civilian control of the military by codifying and law that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is outside of the chain of command. in order for him to be able to live fido, objective, independent advice to the defense secretary. at the same time, it also strengthened the chairman's role, created the position of vice chairman of joint chiefs, and centralize the role of combatant command. of seniorize the role officers by requiring them to gain professional experience outside of their service in order to advance further in their careers. all senior officers know these arecies today for they integral to career advancement in achievement and they reflect the reality of power service members train and fight every day. as a joint force. right around this time, albeit unrelated to goldwater nich

four years of work, not to mention strong opinions by my former boss, then defense secretary caspar weinberger, the resulting transformation was what we now refer to as goldwater-nichols. it solidified the chain of command or the president to the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders. it affirms civilian control of the military by codifying a month and the joint chiefs of staff outside the chain of command. the defense secretary and the president. and it also strikes at the chairman's role, created the position of vice chairman of the joint chiefs and centralize the role and voice of the combatant commands and to reinforce the concept of joint finance, especially with respect to the careers of senior officers by requiring them to gain professional experience outside of their service all senior officers and others all as he is today for the career enhancement and they reflect the reality of how the service members are trained in right every day. as the joint force. albeit unrelated to goldwater-nichols is south, important changes were made to reform defense acquisitions. these were b