we convened meetings of those employers on a quarterly basis to update us and our cdo partners in media mean -- in near-term and immediate options, how we can make sure that we are training to meet the needs. supervisor kim: so if we are training 700 applicants, we are treating them looking at the market, with an optimistic view that we can get them higher? >> absolutely. we demand -- defined as as a demand-driven system. we are training to meet the needs of job-seekers and local employers. we do not want to train folks for job opportunities that do not exist. supervisor chu: thank you, supervisor. is there anyone from the public that would like to comment on this item? >> i have here before me a news flash from the office of economic development and workforce. in the first paragraph it says there are these one-stop career centers. it mentions a figure of 130,000 visits. i have this here but this lady does not have it. i am representing members of our district. i am representing my experience so that people at home can hear. what is happening here is our federal taxpayer money is being

continuing are basically assigned to a cdo-career advisor or specialist. they are essentially case managers with a vocational focus. at that point, they are essentially walked through the rest of the process of enrollment. supervisor kim: how many people come to orientations, how many apply, how many do you accept? >> we have a goal of training just over 700 people in our three academies over a two-year period. we will hit close to our enrollment goals in terms of training. the academies are required to hit a nine% replacement rate for everyone who actually graduates from the training. they are also required to require 90% of those who enroll in training graduate. these are very ambitious goals. given the state of the economy today, our partners are working hard to meet those goals. supervisor kim: but what do we actually achieved? >> we are still in the process of running the majority of our trading now and will begin place the services in the next three to six months. supervisor kim: how many apply to our programs? >> many more than that. to answer the f

we will use these to provide staffing and cdo support really to coordinate the variety of green program that we have running currently, including both of our youth programs and the green academy we were speaking of earlier. i am happy to answer any questions you might have. supervisor chu: on item two, a $750,000 grant going primarily -- almost 100% of that going to contractual services. the 71 is going to fund a position with a bit of contractual services, $30,000. >> exactly. supervisor chu: why don't we open up these two items to public comment. seeing none, public comment is closed. -- is there anyone from the public that would like to comment on this item? >> the first time i was only given two minutes. now we have two agenda items and i am given another two minutes. if this is not mickey mouse in the issue, i do not know what is. you representatives, i think, should be ashamed of yourself to call on people to have public comment but not give them sufficient time to address such issues. what i am saying here categorically -- and i want to start a freedom of information act. when st

dave cortese/supervisor , cdo santa clara 7:49:00 no more worrying about, you know, i am charged withisdemeanor, i have to hire an attorney, i have to go to jail. este supervisor del condado dijo que la gente ya no tendr que preocuparse de contratar abogados e ir a la crcel, y el condado de gastar recursos en corte.. ahora slo habr una multa de por medio. s.o.t. 5:34:00 pero no los van a arrestar, no les van a quitar la movilidad.. bajo la poltica anterior, un polica tena la discrecin de arrestar a un individuo que manejara sin licencia.. segn el abogado almanza, eso ponia en riesgo de deportacin a inmigrantes indocumentad os que eran encarcelados y luego fichados por el servicio de inmigracin. s.o.t.3 3:40:00 entonces yo creo que esto tal vez es un primer paso a la discusión que tenemos que tener sobre conseguir una forma de dar licencia a la gente que necesita movilidad.. la fiscalia dice que todava tiene que reunirse con los jefes de policias de las 'otras' ciudades en el condado para tratar de implementar una poltica uniforme sobre la confiscacin de vehculos... blanca, regreso con

sylvia soublet/agencia de servicios sociales, cdo.9:18 we will take into consideration all available options and certainly we will consult with allison because she is of an age where she can have some input. la portavoz de la agencia de servicios sociales dijo que considerarn todas las opciones, y que la preferencia de alllison tambin ser tomada en cuenta. una tia paterna que vive en oakland ya pas por un estudio socioeconmico para determinar si es apta para cuidar a allison, pero el abuelo materno en el salvador tambin se ha ofrecido a hacerse cargo. mientras tanto, el departamento de bomberos de oakland anunci hoy la creacin de un fondo para su educacin. s.o.t. servando morales/paramédic o de oak. 3:30:04 lo queremos lograr es hacer seguro que esta niña le toque una educación para poder avanzar ya que este en su tierra con su familia para tener chance que su familia no tuvieron. s.ot. carolina greene/'royal ambulance' 7:56:21 si ella llegase a irse a el salvador esos fondos, se haria un transfer al cuerpo de bomberos de el salvador

nontransparent cdos. you talk about that in the paper. could you say a bit more about do you think we should revive securitization, how do we survive securitization and stop it from getting into trouble the way it did in this crisis. >> my view is we should preserve a financial system that -- in which banks are a substantial source of credit but not the only source of credit and complicated by a capital market including securitization market that can complement the classic role of banks. we are somewhat unique in that design of a financial system. and making sure that works over time requires the type of reforms i laid out to make sure the incentives are better and securitization market and the design of capital requirements and things like that are more evenly applied and better calibrated to take into consideration the risks of the extreme crisis in the future. but i think those are achievable reforms. i think it's pretty clear what we got wrong in the basic securitization market. and there's i think a lot of consensus on changes that w

cdo came back and told us number one, you've got to change the tax treatment of health care. and economists from almost every philosophical perspective said that is the case. because you're encouraging overutilization. number two, they told us you've got to change the payment methodology. you've got to quit paying for procedures, and you've got to move to paying for health care outcomes. third of they told us, you've got to put in place some ongoing mechanism to get the ideas that work in terms of bringing down costs, getting them implemented. and so we put in place this whole new institution to try new things. and if they work, to implement them nationally. i'm sorry, did you want to add a point to that? >> the only point i mentioned, this is not a position of the organization, but having spent a fair amount of time on this, i think one thing you want to look at is, because we now have all player data systems in a bunch of states which means we have a much better sense of what is driving the cost of health care. and it has to be done for everybody. one of the things i'm conc

additionally, the report notes that cds were credit default swaps were essential to the creation of synthetic cdo squares, products that have been -- that i have been very concerned about, and which amplified those losses from the collapse of the housing bubble, and were just one example of the interconnectedness that brought down the system. i realize that the members of the commission released three reports in total. but many have pointed to the similarities amongst the three, rather than their dissenting views. i hope the commission's findings will help this committee with its work, and congress with its work. and i look forward to hearing from other witnesses as i yield back. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i would like to recognize the gentleman from california for one minute. >> yes, mr. chairman. economists have already pointed out that the -- that there's little mention of the major role in all of this, of this fed in setting interest rates too low, setting negative real interest rates for four years running, caution very cheap money and massive speculation, one out of three homes were being

constitution they had no idea that people would be able to borrow $9 trillion, as we are now, and cdo's numbers put us up to $24 trillion. if the founding fathers had known that that was possible, they would have put a limit on that end of the constitution. i think they also would have said that the majority of the debt needs to be long term, -- maturity of the debt needs to be long-term, because we make ourselves it riskier by adding a short maturity for the debt. i am very concerned by the fed's policy of quantitative easing work is buying up government debt. this is a huge new role for the federal reserve that should be wound down without delay. finally, tax reform is critical. i advocate putting a permanent extension of the existing tax rate into the baseline so that there can be an actual process where growth-oriented tax reform could be produced by congress. with a slight the way is right now, many of the attack -- with the baseline at the way it is right now, many of the tax rates the way they are, it is too high a hurdle to come up with tax reform. we have had a very severe rece

non-transparent cdo's, that sort of thing. how do we realize securitization and stop getting into trouble the way it got into trouble in this crisis? >> my view is that we should make -- we should preserve a financial system in which banks are substantial source of credit, but not the only source of credit, and their roles complemented by a capital market, including a securitization market, that can complement the classic role of banks. we're somewhat unique in the design of a financial system. making sure that it works over time requires the type of reforms i have laid out to make sure that the standards are better in the securitization better in the design of capital requirement like that are better calibrated to take into consideration the risk of the extreme crisis in the future. and i think those are achievable reforms. it is pretty clear what we got wrong in the basic securitization market and there is a lot of consensus on changes to make a big difference. i would not support trying to create a system where banks are th