implement both the cfats and immoan yum nitrate problems. establishment of a regulatory framework and has annually engaged stakeholders in an annual security summit. the memorandum contains information that raises questions about the content received in those presentations. the information memorandum states that millions of dollars of training contracts have resulted in no compliance inspector training. the information technology systems are insufficient to meet iscv needs and that regional and headquarter locations invested in unneeded capabilities. the information memorandum identifies a series of institutional flaws such as a lack of a system for tracking the usage of consumable supplies, pay grades not aligning with job requirements and weak leadership providing the appearance of favorites, cronyism and retribution. and here's what's really disturbing. the fact that dhs raised none of those points. instead, presenting the appearance of an ongoing regulatory program. while the undersecretary has testified he was not aware of the scope of

and then give us your experience with how the employees were hired for cfats program. what is the history from your point of view? >> i think i'll start with your -- the second part of your question first. i have probably been around longer than any of the nppd leadership at the inception of the cfats program in hiring the inspectors. we were originally detailed from the fps workforce. so i did attend that initial class one day of a week-long course for the initial group of inspectors. and i think that was the initial what can now be be looked at as a setback. because the focus was ultimately compliance and ultimately law enforceme enforcement. fps inspectors were lured away from their federal law enforcement careers with the promise, with the lure of a -- of building a new agency regulating chemical facilities. and unfortunately for those inspectors, the program was apparently misguided or labeled as misguided and changes occurred along the way. many fps inspectors came back. and the ones that could tolerate the loss of their federal law enforcement career stayed. and

cfats can work as conceived. it will take leadership, communication and communication beyond what we have seen recently. dhs and this subcommittee can make this work. we have taken a proactive approach to security and we are working with dhs from the beginning. remembers aggressively sat down to make significant investments in security. industry does not want to waste this effort by starting over. a accis ready to take on the challenge as an equal stake holder and fully implement. we need dhs to meet this challenge with a common mission and goal. we ask that you separately address internal issues in dhs and reauthorize the cfats legislation to continue the efforts. thank you. >> thank you. now mr. wright is recognized. >> chairman lundgren, ranking member clark, my name is david wright, president of afge local 918 and i'm an inspector with the federal protective service, component, i am here to talk about this critical homeland security mission and work with and tp as i expressed to senior agency leaders. i have

cfats can work as conceived. implementation will take leadership, communication, and collaboration well beyond what we have seen recently. dhs, industry, and this subcommittee can make this work. acc has consistently taken a proactive approach to security, and we have work in good faith with dhs from the beginning. our members have aggressively stepped out to make significant investments in security. industry does not want to waste this effort by starting over. acc is ready and willing to take on the challenge as an equal stakeholder to finish the task and fully implement cfats. we need dhs on the team to meet this challenge with the common administration and goal. acc asks that you simply address the internal issues in dhs, and that you reauthorize the cfats legislation so that we can continue the efforts that are already under way. thank you. >> thank you very much, mr. scott. now mr. wright, recognized for your statement. >> chairman lundgren, ranking member clark, and member of the subcommittee, my name is da

when did npd management first become aware of problems with the cfats program and what problems were brought to its attention at this time? >> as we have briefed this committee and others at the point in time that the -- that i asked for this report, there have been three different pieces of information or problems that have come to my attention, which the committee's have all been briefed on. the first was related to locality pay. the second was related to the slowness of the authorization of the site security plans and the third was related to the tiering mistake that occurred within the program. those three items represented and the last item came to my attention in june of last year. those three items and a report that i together with assistant secretary kyl had commissioned in december of 2010, formed the basis of wanting to make sure that we had a real thorough scrub of the program and that's what resulted in the report. >> okay, challenges described in the iscd memorandum raised questions about whether iscd is positioned to make progress, implementing the cfats program, especi

first, the cfats or chemical facilities. yes, we did a candid internal review because we were not satisfied that we were achieving the results that we need to achieve which is the safety and security of our chemical facilities, and their possible of security issues with them. we now have a very aggressive corrective plan in place. be happy to brief you or your staff on that. we have been approving is site specific plans not at final approval, they just about are, but that process is really moving forward with great alacrity. so we've learned a lot from cfats and we are fixing those problems. we've put new people in charge, done all the things one needs to do to make sure that a program moves it forward effectively. with respect to cyber, this is an area where our deep concern is that the nation's core critical from structure on wilfarmers depend and small business depend and everyone depends on is very susceptible to attack. and the attacks can occur in a variety of ways. and we are seeking some means to, a, basic performanc

we do have lessons learned from cfats no doubt, but those lessons have been learned and those lessons give us greater confidence that we can administer this properly. >> last if i could, concerns about privacy and bringing the public into this conversation. i think it was senator lee who previously asked about future attributes, screening technology and its development, something i'd be happy to get a briefing on about its trajectory. recognizing that a lot of what's going on in the dialogue between the administration and congress about the cyber threat, is occurring in secure briefings and that a lot of the information that at least i and i think many other senators have received, it makes it clear to us just how big a threat this is and how much loss there is of intellectual property and how much potential risk there is. most of that critical information is shared with us in a secure setting. my concern is that this committee previously legislated on intellectual property threat through the protect i.p. act and comparable committee and the house legislated, some argue overreached in