the sec and cftc. no single regulator in our view has the ability to see the risks that may arise across the system because of fmu activity. there is no required coordination between agencies that have a role in overseeing fmu's. there are no consistent risk- management standards. if regulators provide different standards, as we have all painfully learned, leaving gaps in the regulation. again, i say to my colleagues, i think this is an important area. i know the house has rejected having title 8, but i would say, and again i'm hesitant to say this because you have to hear from the other members, this is one of these areas where we have a lot of consensus. so we would like to work out with our house counterparts an area that we think it's critically important. i have taken a long time and i apologize going through all that. i see mike warner, my friend from virginia, is here. -- i see mark warner, my friend from virginia, is here. you have been so instrumental, along with bob corker, in this, and of co

be consistent with the ford contract exclusion that is currently in the commodity exchange act and cftc established policy on this subject. physical commodity transactions should be -- should not be regulated as swaps as that term is defined in this legislation. this is true even if commercial parties agree to, quote, look out to deliver obligations of the ford contract. now, for those who are not familiar with terminology, a bookout is a second agreement between two commercial parties to a ford contract that finds themselves in a delivered chain or circle who agree to settle their delivery blakeses by ex-- obligations by exchanging a net payment since the initial forward contract was ever entered into. bookouts reduce transaction costs that savings consumers money. can the chairman clarify this for me? mr. peterson: the gentleman is correct. my interpretation of exclusionary provision of the definition of swap that you mentioned is that the exclusion would apply to transactions in the party's delivery obligations is booked out, as you described. the fact that the parties may agree to s

second the respect we reject the house proposal regarding cftc and the federal energy regulatory authorityerving language many colleagues believes it provides more clarity about the authority of these two agencies. third day we rejected the number was lower provisions some colleagues believe will weaken the cftc whistle-blower protection program and rejected the house offered for what is known as the lynch amendment imposing strict ownership caps on dealers and other investments and clearing houses and related entities. requiring regulators to write rules to mitigate conflicts of interest which may include numerical limits on control and ownership of clearinghouses, exchanges and other entities and also add the language requiremenns that requires the regulators to consider any complex that may arise th a single investor now other proposals which three rejected of maurer are technical in nature. title seven over the last couple of years was possibly the most complex of all of the titles we grappled wh. the financial reform bill at many colleagues have spent countless hours grappling in deal

second the respect we reject the house proposal regarding cftc and the federal energy regulatory authorityreserving language many colleagues believes it provides more clarity about the authority of these two agencies. third day we rejected the number was lower provisions some colleagues believe will weaken the cftc whistle-blower protection program and rejected the house offered for what is known as the lynch amendment imposing strict ownership caps on dealers and other investments and clearing houses and related entities. requiring regulators to write rules to mitigate conflicts of interest which may include numerical limits on control and ownership of clearinghouses, exchanges and other entities and also add the language requirements that requires the regulators to consider any complex that may arise with a single investor now other proposals which three rejected of maurer are technical in nature. title seven over the last couple of years was possibly the most complex of all of the titles we grappled with. the financial reform bill at many colleagues have spent countless hours grappling

financial reform legislation help to solve this problemm where did treachery, the fdic, the sec, and the cftc expect to find these super-regulators who are competent to call out systemic risk that others have missed? even though systemic regulators have timely call about risk, how will they convince other regulators, the global financial -- the global financial community and congress that the worries are significant and could be a great cost to taxpayers and the financial community? why it former federal reserve chairman paul volcker in an interview state that the resolution authority provided in the proposed financial package is a "workable proposition for anything short of the biggest banks." does chairman volcker believe it will be all but impossible to liquidate in an effective manner? does he believe that tarp, too, will be required? why did treasury released a press release and pine that the tarp program has been profitable, -- implying that the tarp program has been profitable, even though the congressional budget office expects taxpayers to lose approximately $109 billion. why it had

some of my colleagues believe these will weaken the cftc was a lower production program. fourth, we rejected the house offer on the lynch amendment, which imposed strict ownership caps on dealers and other investors in clearing houses and related entities. we strengthens the base text language to require legislators to -- regulators to write rules to permit -- prevent conflicts of interest, including limits on the control and ownership of clearing houses, exchanges, and other entities. we have added some language requirements to require the leg relators to consider any -- the regulators to consider any, but that may arise. i would also add there are other proposals which may be rejected, but i wanted to provide -- highlight at least those that . title vii is possibly the most complex of all of the titles we grappled with. the financial reform bill. many of our colleagues have spent countless hours grappling in dealing with this very esoteric area of the financial- services sector. i want to commend them for doing so. it is a very difficult job. they have spent hours to in

financcal reform legislation help to solve this problemm where did treachery, the fdic, the sec, and the cftc expect to find these super-regulators who are competent to call out systemic risk that others have missed? even though systemic regulators have timely call about risk, how will they convince other regulators, the global financial -- the global financial community and congress that the worries are significant and could be a great cost to taxpayers and the financial community? why it former federal reserve chairman paul volcker in an interview state that the resolution authority provided in the proposed financial package is a "workable proposition for anything short of the biggest banks." does chairman volcker believe it will be all but impossible to liquidate in an effective manner? does he believe that tarp, too, will be required? why did treasury released a press release and pine that the tarp program has been profitable, -- implling that the tarp program has been profitable, even though the congressional budget office expects taxpayers to lose approximately $109 billion. why it hadd

financial reform legislation help to solve this problemm where did treachery, the fdic, the sec, and the cftc expect to find these super-regulators who are competent to call out systemic risk that others have missed? even though systemic regulators have timely call about risk, how will they convince other regulators, the global financial -- the global financial community and congress that the worries are significant and could be a great cost to taxpayers and the financial community? why it former federal reserve chairman paul volcker in an interview state that the resolution authority provided in the proposed financial package is a "workable proposition for anything short of the biggest banks." does chairman volcker believe it will be all but impossible to liquidate in an effective manner? does he believe that tarp, too, will be required? why did treasury released a press release and pine that the tarp program has been profitable, -- implying that the tarp program has been profitable, even though the congressional budget office expects taxpayers to lose approximately $109 billion. why it had

we must continue to ensure that the effective coordination between the sec and the cftc continues. i also believe that clearing houses and exchanges should have emergency access to federal reserve money in the case of parket disarray. we also need to ensuue that banks are not speculating through derivatives activities. i hope we can approve the amended on proprietary trading. provisions are improved on the title line senate bill. we have worked to make sure that these are harmonized and effectiie in preventing the excesses of the credit-rating agencies. i want to commend chairman could george p. -- senate kajorski. we have to ensure that there is an effective consumer watchdog. there is the presumptions that somehow this will interfere with business. my sense is that consumer protection is good business. if we can provide good consumer protection, we will enhance business. we have a lot of work to do, mr. %+airman. i look forward to working with you and my colleagues to make sure that this legislation is a significant step forward. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i believe that conclud

we must continue to ensure that the effective coordation between the sec the cftc continues. i also believe that clearing houses and exchanges should have emergency access to federal reserve money in the case of parket disarray. we also need to ensuue that banks are not speculating through derivatives activities. i hope we can approve the amended on proprietary trading. provisio are improved on the title line senate bill. we have worked to make sure that these are harmonized and effecte in preventing the excesses of theredit-rating agencies. i want to commend chairman could geor p. -- senate kajorski. we have to ensure that there is an effective consumer watchdog. there is the presumptions tha somew this will interfere with business. my sense i that consumer protection is good business. we can provide good consumer protection, we will enhance business. we have a lot of work to do, mr. %+airman. i look forward to working with you and my colleagues to make sure that this legislation is a significant step forward. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i believe that concludes the senate p

this conference report includes the tools we authorize and the direction to the cftc to mitigate outrageous price spikes. the house agriculture committee spent time considering the role of derivatives in the collapse of the financial markets and debating different approaches to regulating these financial tools. in the end, it was the agriculture committee on a bipartisan basis that embraced mandatory clearing well before the idea became popular. clearing is not the only means -- not only a means to greater transparency to the derivative markets but should reduce the risk that was prevalent throughout the out-of-control market. the conference -- market. in crafting the house bill, we focused on creating a regulatory approach to have end users to continue using derivative, whether it is an energy exploration, manufacturing or commercial activity. end users did not cause the financial crisis of 2008. they were the victims of it. now that -- now that has been some concern and frankly, misinterpretation of the conference report's language regarding capital and margin requirements by some who wan

regulatory gaps and streamline our regulatory structure, yet we still have the fed, the fdic, the sec, the cftc and the occ, and most of them will expand in size, power, and scope because of this legislation. these bills add new letters to the alphabet soup. so much for streamlining. more often than not, this reflects a series of deals made by the executive branch, along with the financial existing regulators who failed to do their jobs during the last crisis. the bill i think we are considering is filled with undefined terms, leaving us with failed regulators to ddtermine whether a company is "a threat to the financial stability of the data states" or or is "in danger of result" and is eligible for of the special proceedings. these are just two of the vague and undefined terms. the most egregious example of why this legislation has to do with absolute neglect of any serious treatment of the government-sponsored enterprises as we know fannie and freddie, the of gfc's were integral players and the collapse of the housing market that precipitated fear, panic, lack of trust, aaa ratings, and the f

where did treachery, the fdic, the sec, and the cftc expect to find these super-regulators who are competent to call out systemic risk that others have missed? super-regulators who are competent to call out systemic risk that others have missed? even though systemic regulators have timely call about risk, how will they convince other regulators, the global financial -- the global financial community and congress that the worries are significant and could be a great cost to taxpayers and the financial community? why it former federal reserve chairman paul volcker in an interview state that the resolution authority provided in the proposed financial package is a "workable proposition for anything short of the biggest banks." does chairman volcker believe it will be all but impossible to liquidate in an effective manner? does he believe that tarp, too, will be required? why did treasury released a press release and pine that the tarp program has been profitable, -- implying that the tarp program has been profitable, even though the congressional budget office expects taxpayers to lose approxima