i personally view chancellorsville. at chancellorsville, lee have taken an army that was outnumbered almost two to one. he then splits the army in the face of the enemy, flights that army almost destroys joseph hooker's right flank, and then at the height of his success, he loses jackson, it slows them down for a second, reinforcements are coming up into history. he splits his army a third time, beats off that attack and returns in time to chase took her back across the river. you look at that, you couldn't script that kind of thing. this is not the kind of story you make a. people would say it's unbelievable. others were sheer willpower, able to win what other people said it was impossible. outside richmond in 1862 when lee fights the campaign against mcclellan, he manages over the course of a week to chase mcclellan all the way back from the gates of richmond to the james river, fights a series of battle. he only wins one. he loses the others, sometimes pretty badly, and he still managed to win the campaign. at the sa

sharpsburg involved a lot of movement but not as much as subsequently chancellorsville. second manassas, though, was a masterpiece. it's directly attributable to jackson's execution of the joint plan that he and lee had crafted. and it certainly contributes mightily to the success of the confederacy. there's a very interesting quote from lee that pertains to all of this. and that is in the fall of 1862 when the confederate congress finally authorized the creation of lieutenant general's rank -- northerners never did get that far. they created corps legally officially and lieutenant generals to command those corps. lee proposed that jackson and longstreet be given the two lieutenant general billlets and the two corps commands in the northern army of virginia. in acknowledgement of jackson's failure although the public didn't recognize it, everyone in the army did, jefferson davis inquired of lee, are you sure that jackson deserves this? now, davis's letter to lee saying that does not survive so far as i know but it can be interpolated from lee's response which was ever si

chancellorsville, second manassas. does the federal army completely dissolve? >> no. >> no. all right. it's at times -- especially in the case of second manassas it's in terrible shape, but it's not like he walks into washington n unopposed. all right. he mauls the federalists tremendously, but he still -- that's why he always needs to follow on victory. that's why you have the antietam campaign shall that's why you have the gettysburg -- he wants the follow-on. you need the three, all right. but let's say he wins at gettysburg, all right. what does he do? i mean so what, right? he wins at gettysburg and he loses a third of his men in the process. he still has the logistical problem. he still has all these sorts of issues. and this is an argument against lee and one that should be considered and part of it relates to -- part of it also relates to how plausible you think that gettysburg and that -- whether or not he really could have won many gettysburg or antietam. >> i think the problem is is strategy -- i personally don't think it's his strategy, but what was needed for th

but a couple of weeks before chancellorsville there's good evidence that the two of them met at prospect hill, just above hamel's crossing, looking down toward the lower crossing of the rappahannock near smithfield and the burner place down there. when they met, they climbed off the horse, took their gloves off, shook hands and talked in a warm fashion and so on. so they had somehow come to terms with that, to at least some extent. the origin is august of 1862 and the end is april 1863. anyone else? we're just about right on time. yes, sir. there's one more. >> will you comment on what jackson thought about the jefferson davis during 1862 and possibly vice versa? >> what thomas jackson thought of jefferson davis in 1862. jackson had a low opinion of davis. there are a number of episodes that make that abundantly clear. jackson's world view was that things were supposed to run according to the manual, and davis not only had accepted way out of channels complaints about jackson during the romney campaign that not only did not go through jackson, which is the way the book's supposed to be,

chancello chancellorsville, second onassis. does the second army completely dissolve? no. it is especially in the case of second moe nasz, it is in essential shape but not like he walks into washington on the post. he malls the federals tremendously and still, that's why he always needs to follow-on victory and why you have the campaign and the gettysburg and he wants the follow-on, that you need the three. let's say he wins at gettysburg. what does he do? so what? he wins at gettysburg. he loses a third of his men in the process. he still has the logistical problem. he still has all of these sorts of issues. this is an argument against lee and one that should be considered and part of it relates to -- part of it relates to how plausible you think that gettysburg and that whether or not he really could are have won gettysburg. >> i think the pro be is i personally don't think the strategy followed. it was fine in what was needed for the south to win, but i think the problem goes back to his positive trait was also another one of his weaknesses was aggressiveness because he

on the one handobviously, like at chancellorsville, he could have a driving, aggressive personality, where he could enforce his will on a much greater foe and emerge victorious. orbit when he was dealing with his men, if one of them did something he didn't like, lee would very rarely confront them directly. he would make suggestions. he would say in public -- if they failed too often, he simply compiled them to the western theater, and that did wonders for three a certain extent because he would get rid of the people he wanted to get rid of, but it meant that the confederate western theater was a dump ground for all of these eastern commanders who had shown they weren't up to snuff. and over in the western theater, of course, they're dealing with grant, sherman, james bird eye mcpherson, and if you're second your dregs to take care of grant, and a lot have that had to do with lee's personality and the way he handled problems. >> host: you refer in your book to his savage moods. what did you mean? >> guest: lee had a huge temper. he was sort of like his idol, george washington. washin

you just look at his record and the victories he wins, second manassas, he routes pope and at chancellorsville the same thing to hooker and at the seven day the federals are how close to richmond? close enough to hear the church bells, literally on the outskirts of richmond and if richmond had fallen at that point in the summer of 1862, potentially probably would have happened to the confederacy, of course that's all henry and donaldson and after new orleans and actually also not talked about in your readings but also important. lee turns the tide. he wins those very large and very important victories. now, why is lee also criticized for his aggressiveness, though? >> he lost early. >> yes. >> wasn't the type of war they could afford to fight. >> exactly. so, okay. all right. explain. >> a lot of the stories i think shelby foote was saying he theorizes that the confederacy should have fought a guerrilla war campaign similar to america in the american revolution. >> not necessarily foote but there are a lot of arguments lee should have engaged in something more like partisan operations, and it

at chancellorsville he does the same thing to hooker. at the seven days, the federals are how close are they to richmond? close enough to hear the church bells. they are literally on the outskirts of richmond. and if richmond had fallen at that point in the summer of 1862, what, potentially probably would have happened to the confederacy, remember, that comes after ft. henry and donaldson. it's not talked about in your readings but is also important. lee turns the tide. and he wins those very large and important victories, all right. now, why is lee also criticized for his aggressiveness though? mr. rau? >> he lost very early. >> yes, mr. mcdaniels. >> wasn't really the type of war that they could afford to fight. >> exactly. you want to get in there? >> no, sir. >> all right. explain. >> a lot of the historians -- was it shelby foote was saying he theorizes they should have fought a guerrilla war campaign similar to the american revolution. >> not necessarily foote but there are a lot of arguments that lee should have engaged in partisa

and what's left of them all the way back to the hill, and the back story of that is that at chancellorsville, the germans ran away, but the politically well-connected commander of the 11th corp., native born, did not listen to the german subordinates. they warned him they were hanging out, that they needed to do something to watch that flank. stone wall jackson was going to show up, they didn't know that, but they were professional soldiers. you got to watch the plank. howard refused to listen. on their own initiative, a number of his so subordinates and other picket the flank. if they had not been waiting there, and the 11th corp. would have been far, far worse. the 26th wisconsin stood there, and they say they made a stand for at least an hour, maybe two full hours, and he's trying to get them back. say, you got to pull back or you'll be completely annihilated. he's a brave guy, but sees confederates around him. they don't want to leave their dead and wounded, and they are ordered back, and they do a fighting withdrawal, 50% casualties, and what does the newspaper headline say? all the ger