ferling, and that involves the bottle of monomouth and charles lee's performance in that battle. i've grown through my readings to dislike charles lee, of course; a foreign officer, one of those dr. ferling's already mentioned who did not like washington. and there are those accounts, i have looked at those accounts who defend lee to some extent saying that washington never flushed out his orders to charles lee at monmouth. but, of course, we know later during the course of the battle washington fires him. my question is with regards to the vigor and the way that he carried out washington's orders. i think washington was justified, but what is your take in it, dr. ferling? in the sake of brevity, i'll hang up to listen to your response. thank you very much. >> host: thank you. >> guest: sure. i'm one of the few historians who really likes charles lee, i think. i admire lee as an officer. he was a british officer who left the british army, resigned his commission, and he moved to virginia, and he settled in what is now shepherdstown, west virginia, not too far from mount vernon, a

i think in the early part of the war washington had a good relationship with charles lee. he regarded him as the best military mind in the continental army at the outset of the war. t to a 12 grew to be disappointed in washington and body was too indecisive to be a good general. at monmouth which is one of the few operations during the revolutionary war it is a battle but unfolds in the summer of 1778 the british had occupied philadelphia and are giving it up and the british army is marching from the philadelphia back to new york and washington is trailing that are being. he is in possession of an army that has been retrained and rebuilt at valley forge and washington wants to use that army in some way and he convenes his generals as congress ordered him to do what was called the council of war and asked the council what should i do with the army? how should i attack the british? the council recommended the the washington not absurd to much. france was coming to an allied air and a french fleet was expected to arrive shortly added did about 10 days after monmouth park gs o

charles: lee, this has been rocking. >> you will pay for that. it is pretty expensive and p.e. is about 32 far higher than the rest of the markets. i like mcdonald's. can't get much more american than that. this is not a recession story. they have been cranking the past five years delivering 20% each year and forecast is great. the fund manager says it is the press price in 10 years. >> it is americana. i don't eat there personally but it tough to go wrong and they make more overseas. charles: appreciate you guys giving me an easy time today. i want to talk t

his only rival as a celebrity captive was general charles lee. and thanks to his recent showing of the battle of poorhouse lee was in disgrace. the timing also helped his reputation in the phil's of his book. even though the abuse of american prisoners was not news by 1779 noam before alan had given the reading public a full length firsthand blow by blow account when it was like to be caught and held by the enemy. how more than anything else and i think the distinctive popularity of allen's book reflected the distinctive contribution that made to the robust tradition of captivity narratives real and imagined it known to every literate american in the final decades of 18th-century. the jews in egypt, christian martyrs, john smith and virginia, robinson crusoe, glover, the locutions, the black hole of calcutta, the list goes on and on, it's a very long one. ninety-two captivity in one form or another, not simply stores about captivity was a very real part of ethan allen's world. think of imprisonment for debt, the practices of indentured servitude

his only bible as a celebrity captive was general charles lee and things to his recent showing at the battle of monmouth courthouse league was in disgrace. but timing also helped allen's reputation on the sales of his book even though the abuse of american prisoners wasn't news by 1779 no one before allen had given the reading public a full length firsthand blow by blow account of what was like to be caught and held by the enemy. more than anything else i think the distinctive, the popularity of allen's book reflected the distinctive contribution that it made to the robust tradition of captivity narrative, real and imagined known to every literate american in the final decades of the 18th-century. the jews in egypt, christian martyrs', john smith and the virginia, robinson crusoe, bolivar among the lilliputian, poland and in the hands of king philip, black calcutta, the list goes on and on. it's a very long one. to captivity in one form or another all simply stories about captivity was a very real part of ethan allen's world. think of imprisonment for debt or the practices of indentur

i have gene to dislike charles lee. he was a foreign officer, one of those that dr. ferling mention who had did not like washington, and there are those accounts who defend lee to some extent, saying that washington never fleshed out his orders to charles lee, but of course later on during the course of the battle, washington fired him. my question is, with regards to the vigor and the way he carried out washington's orders. i think that washington was justified, but what is your take on that, in the sake of brevity i will hang up and listen to your response. >> host: thank you. >> guest: i'm one of the few historians that really likes charles lee. i admire lee as an officer. he was a british officer who left the british army, resigned his commission, and he moved to virginia and he settled in what is now shepherd's town, and when it appeared that the revolutionary war was going to break out just in the last days -- i guess it was actually even after lexington and concord and it was clear that a national army would be formed, lee came to mount vernon and besearched wa

and people like charles lee or horatio gates, they were just out of the picture altogether because they had been professional british officers. and congress was in to go there. congress wanted a native born american to be the commander. and you look at who is around. i mean, people like john sullivan, who had been a lawyer in new hampshire and whatever. i just don't see anyone who would have fit the bill. and i think you have to look at the total picture of washington. he is a pretty good administrator of the army. the officer corps was blindly loyal, by and large, the washington. he worked extraordinarily well with state governors and with congress. so he i think made up for some of his deficiencies for lack of experience as a soldier with other qualities. and so in the end, i think the country was fortunate to have had him. in fact, i sometimes say that i think the country was fortunate to have had washington and a lucky to have survived. [laughter] >> i read that hundreds of american prisoners died in the halls of ships of new york harbor. what prevented the british and the americans

high ranking generals and the army were at that point involved in the court-martial of general charles lee. even though this was pretty insignificant command but raised a lot of hackles among lesser generals, brigadier general some particular than a foreigner who had only been in the country less than a year should be given such a distinguished come and command washington largely to keep peace within the corps had to -- had to back off and had to deny steuben his demand for a permanent field command. it was something that -- something balad trinkle steuben a great deal especially the months immediately in seven. on the issue of authority, a product of steuben's prussian upbringing, although he sympathized with representative government and although he initially at least had a very high regard for congress, a re that would steadily deteriorated as the war went on and down to virtually nothing by the time that the war was over, he didn't see how democracy fit into army command. that in times of national emergency like war, officers simply had to put aside their ego for the good of the servic

charles, let's start with you. why would lee on panetta pull the plug on the program?> e use predator drones to killed a cade da leaders. >> it is the sovereignty of allied countries. there are all kinds of practical you r. issues, though i do agree that the real scandal here is after eight years we do not have a program of targeted assassination. after all, what objection is there? as you say, we have a predator program, which is extremely effective and nobody objects to it ethically. if anything, a targeted assassination is more ethical because there would be a lot less collateral damage if you have a hit squad on the spot, and if the issue is disclosure, what we know is this program had never happened t had only reached a point of perhaps the beginning of training, and under the statute that establishes the c.i.a., the disclosure requirement is only for operational activities. this was not operational. this is a non-story, a non-scandal. it is a way to retroactively protect nancy pelosi and her charges about the c.i.a. lying. bret: when you talk to people on the hil