chevron deference. here is the problem. and it's a major problem. all of these cannons depend on a problematic threshold question. courts may resort to the cannons only if the statute is not clear, but rather is ambiguous. but how do courts know when a statute is clear or ambiguous? in other words, how much clarity is sufficient to call a statute clear and to end the case there without triggering the ambiguity-dependent cannons? unfortunately, there is often no good or predictable way for judges to determine whether statutory text contains enough ambiguity to cross the line where courts may resort to the constitutional voidance doctrine, legislative history, chevron deference. in my experience, and this is my personal experience, judges often go back and forth arguing over this exact point. one judge will say the statute is clear. that's the end of it. the other judge will respond, i think the text is ambiguous, manying one or another should avoid the case. neither judge can convince the other. and that'

state often focuses on reforms of formal institution structures and legal doctrines such as the chevron deference. arguably these formal constraints are only the tip of the issues regarding of individual liberty and the rule of law praised by concerns of the regulatory state. we have a distinguished set of panelist today, knowledgeable ,bout the financial industry financial regulation and the effect of the administrative state. your programs will have extensive resumes and biographies. i will give you essentially name, rank, and serial number. scott,ight, professor professor of international financial systems and the director of the committee on capital market regulations at harvard. professor scott will talk on contagion, a nicer word then panic. on economicse a run system at the heart of the 2008 dinosaur recession. -- financial recession. andthe crisis was ended using other tools and how the dodd frank legislation led to future actions by the fed. , professore arthur of law at george washington law school who describes himself as a conservative with a small c. he will discuss the need to preve

say what g, thew is, yet if anythin supreme court has gone the other way in the chevron line of cases. they have deferred to the administrative agency's interpretation of what congress authorized. and they are allowing the agencies to say what the law is. in the metlife case, metlife w on, the district court did not give the fsoc any difference. receiveddn't decide it excessive discretionary powers. fsoc's decision was arbitrary and capricious,w because it didn't consider the cost of designating metlife as something that was -- something that was actually not required by the statute. created an case opportunity for the court to consider the scope of discretion congress gave to the fsoc. this decision does nothing to restrain that growth. until the supreme court uses the authority to define where legislation ends and administration begins, the administrative state will continue to grow. thank you. [applause] entrance.ce peter speaks in his usually dramatic way. is to see if i can find some horror story that will one up his -- >> [laughter] >> explaining how there are other horrors and the administrative s