does our -- is our countermessaging having an effect? we talk all the time about the messaging of isil and the social media, et cetera et cetera. is our countermessaging helping recruit those that will be in the fight with us? >> the honest truth is that at the moment our countermessaging is the truth. we don't have particular ways of getting on social media and prop fwandizing the way isil does and i don't think you're suggesting that we should do that. >> no i'm asking -- you mentioned countermessaging earlier, i'm just asking you what that looks like. >> exactly. and i understand the drift of your question. and the critical form of countermessaging by america gets back to the word the chairman started with which is leadership. when we accept up and indicate that we're in the game we're not substituting for the game but we're in the game whether it be here or anywhere else, i was just in southeast asia last week, there is a hunger for american leadership. we've played that role for decades in many parts of the world, same thing is true

that countermessaging works at the speed of government. it is -- as you understand, it has constraints in that i think the real secret is going to be to broaden that overall countermessaging and include those folks outside of the government to participate in that process. >> i would make two comments. first, this committee has been very clear to me in my role that the core customer for the intelligence we do is state and locals and we have worked very hard in the last year to try to transform how we approach the dissemination of data to state and local partners with our ic colleagues and with the fbi and others and nctc but specifically focusing on getting relevant information out quickly to our state and local partners. i don't know how many joint intelligence bulletins we've done this year but i think it's a record over last year. so that is our commitment to move this information and get it into the hands of our first responders at the state and local federal tribal and private sector. when we talk about our foreign partners, you mentio

and finally, countermessaging or defeating d.a.e.s.h. as an idea. >>> john alan in doha.hting has continued in iraq. 38 have been injured. they have a large oil refinery, baiji, and has been the site of fierce fighting between i.s.i.l. and iraqi forces. >>> rescuers in china are considering raising a cruise ship to find 400 passengers. another is drilling holes in the hull. "eastern star" was carrying mostly elderly tourists. 18 are confirmed dead. 14 have been rescued. droip sends this update -- adrian brown sends this update. >> this is where the weary rescuers come to rest - police, fire crews and divers working in shifts around the clock in treacherous waters. the currents in the river, in this part of the river are very strong indeed. rescue officials discuss two options of reaching those. they still believe they could be alive. they are thinking of drilling three large holes into the upturned hull. the other plan under consideration is to try to lift the vessel. we saw two large barges beside the eastern star with cranes on either one, that's an operation that could

and finally countermessaging or defeating d.a.e.s.h.ing as an idea. >> let's talk to the former arabgue envoy to syria he's joining us lie to the veb u, thank you for -- venue. thank you for joining us. the last three points that general john allan made is disrupting the flow of fingerprint. what will do you make of the points seeing that you have written in the past that the security response is not only insufficient it's useless. >> exactly. well i think that definitely there are good steps that have to be taken. there's another step which is a measured one, and the real way to fight d.a.e.s.h. is to succeeded. it's not there yet, we do not have to accept from the beginning that iraqi people who accepted to have a political process and the occupation there were other iraqis that took arms against the occupationment those are not involved. even all the efforts now, with the people from national reconciliations after the problem in the parliament. my contact date day. >> a momentous task. from your experience you headed to the damascus office. this is a task you are talking about. >>

-- secretary carter, rather most of them are nonkinetic, such things as intel and messaging, countermessaging and that sort of thing, but, general dempsey, you said the other day that with regard to ramadi that the city itself is not symbolic in any way. so the question is what factors on the ground would change? and this is a question for both of you you can volunteer each other on this it, but what would change on the ground in iraq that would change our strategy, particularly in a more kinetic way? >> the -- there is in one's thinking a -- the question what if a multi-sectarian iraq turns out not to be possible? i think the chairman addressed that. i just agree with what he said earlier, it was in response to what congressman smith asked. that is an important part of our strategy now on the ground. if that fails then if that government can't do what it's supposed to do then we will still try to enable local ground forces if they're willing to partner with us to keep stability, but there will not be a single state of iraq. at the same time we're doing that i think the other nine lines of ef

and timely countermessaging or defeating d.a.e.s.h. as an idea. >> let's cross to an author and expert on u.s. relations with the islamic world, joining us from the conference venue. so you heard john alan speak. what stood out for you, and what was offered that was different from the coalition strategy over the the past 10 months or so. >> for me, what stood out, i thought it was an optimistic sentiment over how well the opposition is uniting around the goals. what he see on the ground and in the messaging space is not as rosy a picture as what was depicted. >> what needs to be done. what is it that needs to be done? clearly john allan, as you describe is optimistic. how do you translate that into practical steps on the ground? >> it's a difficult problem. in terms of the united states involvement we seem to have committed to a long-term low intensity involvement. i think high intensity shorter term would be better for us. the coalition - it would be better because the regional partners need an opportunity to acknowledge, and by takin

at the same time, central to any effective countermessaging strategy, though the credibility of the messengerly undermined if government is involved. so how can we assure that there are independent voices that can counter extremists' messages without compromising the independence that gives their statements weight? >> sir that's aexactly some of the outreach efforts that we're trying to make with regard the community advising piece. it is also -- i mean it's a question of establishing processes by which people will be able to feel free they are able to have the tools to do that kind of countermessaging. the challenges that we have again, is there are still trust definites that need to be overcome. as you said we need to find intermediaries who are willing to take up that effort. >> for the panel before my time runs out, social media platforms play a prominent role in all of your testimony. obviously, can you describe the relationships that each of your agencies has with the private operators of these networks? are these relationships institutional or more based on personal relationships? what

#7 >> i -- at the honest truth is that at the moment our countermessaging is the truth.particular+++g answered aqft÷ couple of"iÁ÷çg6times, but when i was in iraq with! [ congressman molten and he asked the question he asked today and it's a compelling question. when one of the -- there was quite a bit of optimism when we were there in february. it was -- had to doyb primarily with the fact in june there would be an operation in mosul and so forth and so on. one of the factors, but much has changed since>á@ then obviously and you've addressed that. one of the -- for me)rwm2g1çád+d and what i reported back to nebraskans was that i saw the emergence of,yq to some degree leaders in the arab,osgz countries who were ready tow^Ñ stand up and try toçj unify these groups in a less sectarian manner. and congressking abdullah of jordan was one of those. and it was very, to me at least, someone who is new to this very optimistic kind of a report. he talked about his idea+ztí of bringing sunni leaders together. i think in that time in april or so. andd>mx to -- sentenceince that tim

we look at social media and how violent extremist propaganda is spread we must look at ways to countermessageth sides of the aisle are engaged in an examination of the president's countering violent extremism strategy. the department has a vital role to play in carrying out that strategy as evidence by the fact that there is a dedicated coordinator, david bern seen it working. mr. chairman, at this time i request that this committee have an open oversight hearing where we can take testimony from dhs coordinator about the department's role in implementing the cde strategy. furthermore, we know that more work remains to ensure that our foreign partners are willing to engable to stop and identify foreign fighters at their borders. last friday, the u.n. council issued an unprecedented statement urging countries to enforce border controls that allow suspected terrorists to travel across international borders. the director of the nctc also stated at our hearing that there was work to be done in this area, and i know that the economy has a task force that is examining this issue and we should be rec

secretary carter: the honest truth is that at the moment, our countermessaging is the truth. we do not have particular ways of getting on social media and propagandizing the way i saw dollars. i do not think you're suggesting we should do that. >> you mentioned counter messaging earlier, i am asking what that -- secretary carter: exactly. i understand the gist of your question. it gets back to leadership. when we step up and indicate that we are in the game, we are not substituting for the game whether it be here or anywhere else -- i was just in southeast asia last week. there is a hunger for american leadership. we have played that role for decades in many parts of the world. same is true in europe. i think the best message we can give against all of these threats to our friends and allies is one of resolve and steadiness. i made an earlier reference the continuity over time. i think that is important as well. the steadiness of american leadership. it gets that to all things we said earlier. the budget we need steadiness there as well. that is the -- and getting our friends

we hear talk about countermessaging. well here's something every american can help with. news stations, stop putting isis recruiting videos as b roll on your news casts. replace it with crosshairs and explosions of their defeat or show the world their acts of barbarity instead. stop using their images and their propaganda for furthering american news casts -- newscasts. americans, write your local news stations and tell them to stop it. iran, here's the cold reality. and its impact on isis and middle east unrest. lifting sanctions on iran will introduce tens of billions of dollars into these war-torn nations land destabilize the entire region. mr. president, do not lift the sanctions on iran. they must show good action before we show goodwill. finally, we must go back to the drawing board on this so-called strategy of half-heartedness. using american warriors should mean backing them with the full weight and might of this republic. and, mr. president, do you not realize that our enemies hear you loud and clear when you say you will not sign the defense authorization? secr