and expanded darpa. indeed, some of the last year with an entire panel on how we thought this is going to rule it and let the implication of that was going to be. there was a major supreme court decision which a lot of people stand up as one of the most consequential supreme court, which kept intact injunction against the implementation of darpa and expanded darpa. and then our precious years we are going to college is green lack of clarity. essentially, this is a panel to discuss the legal and political fallout from the supreme court's agenda in texas. and to inform this debate, extraordinary people for the last panel. david schooley and i'm a further strike is a deputy counsel at dhs whose job is to put off a small fire is out at dhs to a pie made on major policies. before he had the job, he was the chief counsel at the emigration on u.s. house of representatives. both administrations of lawmakers respective to this debate. steve legomsky considered as the field as he can find. he has that emeritus pro

give us background of what your office does. >> the intelligence community's darpa. we fund advanced research and research, colleges, businesses, ngo, serving a variety of ic technology needs. one way of thinking about it is precommercial invest men. many of our programs by the end of three to five years, research might be commercially ready for in-q-tel, our investment or early stage research. gw, 300 other universities and colleges receive funding from us. we're probably best known for work in high-performance computing, our funding of advanced research and machine learning and also in human judgment. but we span everything as one of our staff members puts it, everything from ai to zika. so we have sociologist, psychologists -- >> the two aren't converging. >> not yet. we're trying to keep it that way. >> a little bit in terms of the requirements. how does that all work? is it blue sky? are you defining what some of the tech needs are? do you have clients and customers defining that? >> so we look at the national intelligence strategy, national priorities framework

and in 2007, they won the darpa challenge, the first time an autonomous vehicle traveled from los angelesbeen running autonomous vehicles in pittsburgh through carnegie mellon for years. over the course of the past year and a half, we've been partnering with uber, and now it's time to take it to the public. >> an uber engineer in a quote called pittsburgh the double black diamond of driving. is that a good thing or a bad thing? >> well, i guess it's if you like a little challenge, it's probably true. yeah, it's not just the topography. pittsburgh's a very hilly terrain. it has all four seasons. but you know, it's a city that was built in the 19th century, and it wasn't really designed for automobiles. so, as one of their engineers said to me, if we can prove we can do this in pittsburgh, we can prove we can do it anywhere. >> so, mayor, my understanding is that there is going to be a backup driver in each car and that these initial rides will be free, once people agree to actually try out these autonomous car routes. but how do you see this evolving over time? and what's really in it for

government, denise jones, deputy director of strategic technology program, previously an advisor to darpa and also worked with u.s. industry and software space and an expert on technology innovation, also robert robert manning, a senior fellow here at the atlantic council coming from the dni, the state department policy planning office and regional issues. with that, let's dive into the conversation and i will welcome our panelists to come up and we will begin the discussion. >> i thought we would begin today first by talking about very briefly the four main pillars of chinese cyber and i would like to look at economic end social motivations as well as the geo political foreign dimensions, the military aspect and domestic information control. these are all overlapping but very important pillars of the way that the chinese leadership is thinking about it cyber strategy. i wanted to first begin with the topic that is timely as ambassador mentioned. we are coming up on one year anniversary after the obama cyber agreement last year. my colleagues here will has done a lot of excellent work loo

denise, deputy director of csi strategic technologies program, previously an advisor to darpa and an expert on cyber security. and robert manning, a senior fellow senior fellow here at the atlantic council. he comes from the dni, the state department policy planning office an expert in asian experts. so let's dive into the conversation. i welcome the panelists to come up so we can start our discussion. >> i thought we would begin today first by talking about very briefly the four main pillars of chinese cyber strategy. and we can use this opportunity to dive into each of these pillars looking at economic and industrial motivation for chinese cyber operations as well as the geopolitical form policy dimensions, the military aspect, and domestic information control. these are all overlapping but important pillars of the way that the chinese leadership is thinking about it cyber strategy. so i wanted to first begin with a topic that is timely as a basket or huntsman mention. we are are coming up on one year anniversary after the cyber agreement last year. my colleague, will has to work l

bear in mind the internet began as a project, a darpa project. there were four computers, four separate locations, four teams. they built this open source network. it moved to commercialization. ican came about to assign names and numbers. it has been housed in the commerce department. for us to give up control of this will allow a multistakeholder process. it will be tied with the u.n. i'm concerned about the international telecommunications workers weighing in on this and then other countries being able to weigh in on our access, on priority and value of content, on what we receive, when we receive, how we reseat of it, neil. i think it's a very dangerous infringement of our free speech and our rights. neil: you know, congressman, i don't know whether those at the u.n. have the power to do this sort of thing but there was an idea bandied about there years ago, i can't exactly remember when, a global internet tax. >> right. neil: to advance whatever the cause de jure is. i don't know whether that is part of this but it worries me. could you help

if you look at dod, for example, which i know a little better, there are examples where darpa funds, so you have government funded research and technology development that is of particular interest in the department and then you've got industry funded research and while the industry funded research is almost necessarily independent there are conversations and there are dialogues and there are things like the defense science board and there are for ra in which there is conversation to help to increase the probability that what research the government is funding and what research private industry is funding dovetail and complement each other and work together to help to create greater technological capacity to support the shared mission. so technology development and research is one area that comes to my mind. another area very different is on the question of liability and protection from liability. again, using dod just by way of example, they have something called 85804 authority which many of you might be quite familiar with where the government can provide indemnification to indust

denise zheng, deputy director of cis strategic technologies program, previously advisers to darpa worked with u.s. industry, cyber security and cyber innovation. robert manning, senior fellow atlantic council coming from dni, state department's policy planning, an expert in asia regional issues. with that let's dive into the conversation. i'll welcome panelists to come up and we good begin the discussion. >> so i thought we would begin today first by talking about very briefly the four main killers of chinese cyber strategy. i thought we would use this opportunity to dive into each of these pillars looking at economic and industrial motivations for chinese cyber operations as well as geopolitical foreign policy dimensions, military aspect and domestic information control. these are all overlapping but important pillars of the way the chinese leadership is thinking about its cyber strategy. so i wanted to first begin with a topic timely as ambassador huntsman mentioned, one year anniversary after the obama cyber agreement last year. my colleague has done lots of excellent work looking at