but david mann hg toing had tol you sought to delay the position as long as possible and we heard from the lord and mr. humeons of the delay? >> absolutely. what was to be very clear, you could note do it unless the military were ready to do it. it is true, i explained this morning, for a time we were worried about the visibility of all the planning were do a certain amount of planning then you reach another level when you have to make it very visible and very clear. and we didn't want to do that for fear of triggering assumption we were actually going to do military action, irrespective of what was going to be happening at the united nations. however, when, i think it was at the end of october 2002, it was said to me, we've really got to get on with this and we did. i know it was said confident that the uk military was fully ready by the time we took the military action. >> but, i mean, was that assurance given to you because they wanted to give you a few of the -- the approach, do you think -- >> no. the one thing about the military, in my experience, is they tell you bluntly, quite rightly, what their si