so that we could get those dcaa audits turned on and executed as quickly as possible as much as dcaaaying we don't have the information we need and we don't have that. i think that was particularly successful. but it still took my word herculean efforts to get those things accomplished in those time frames. that's one of the places that we made mistakes as we go down this process. >> general pillsbury, would you like to add to that? >> ma'am, the transition -- i believe the strategy was to go to kuwait first, obviously, because of the -- it was not in the shooting, if you will. and then, of course, after that proved to be successful, albeit protests aside, that is still very worrisome to myself and to the commanders on the ground. and to be able to put logcap iii and iv into afghanistan with relative -- relative ease. and i applaud logcap for that. it indicates to me that, yes, that is a smart strategy. now, why we didn't go as full borg into iraq it was probably a mistake not to start this earlier. >> okay. i want to ask you, general, about something that you said earlier during the