i took this from deepa's paper and have tried to do this for the chinese. there are very distant origins, gold, and tactics. i still an idea from the dick samuels paper. you had a very nice chart, i remember. the japanese schools were on an active/passive u.s. position. i tried to position my seven schools on a similar spectrum. what you hopefully can see is that the major powers are potential candidates for cooperation with the united states. the multilateralists are selective and cooperating because they have to and because they will be shamed in the international community for not cooperating. they do as well as possible but with a high profile. it is tactical. it is not philosophical. they do not buy into the western liberal agenda. you have the other schools that i would argue are not anti-u s but they are anti american. that is another way to think about these schools in policy terms. maybe i can sharpen that discussion. finally, what the policy implications to the united states if this came through? there should be three colors on the slide. the firs

i want to thank henry, deepa, gw, for organizing this project, which has been of the enormous interest and has engaged us in ways that we are delighted to report out to you. can you hear in the back now? it may seem odd. it may seem odd to some folks that we are talking about -- including japan on a project talking about rising powers. this is not the 1920's. last time i checked. and it is not in 1980's. when we were all about about japan as a rising power. it is true because japan is potentially a great power, many of the pieces to become a great power again, and of course, after the catastrophes of 3/11, the possibility that japan may be reborn again, at least reinvented yet again. so it deserves some closer analysis. that said, in a bid very japanese fashion, i start with an apology. this paper was written, for the most part, before 3/11. as we do the revisions, we will have to incorporate that. i hope that some of our comments will get to what 3/11 may need for a reborn, revitalized japan, or not. so what we have done here is right about what we call hedging. well this chart is not

i'm sorry if i gave our panel chair and henry and deepa a little scare by getting her at 9:30. the washington metro system being what it is, not as efficient as the beijing metro system, it wasn't cooperating. i got stuck between a couple of stations. so anyway, i made it. i'm here. and i'm really pleased on behalf of my colleague and co-author who is a professor at the university but for two years at least he's been seconded to the chinese embassy in tokyo which is why physically he's not here. he is, in fact, one of a kind of growing trend, something the chinese had actually learned from the united states in a positive way. that is academics like evan who go into government and then in theory come out. we'll see if you come out, evan. >> eventually. [laughter] >> i promise. >> anyway, it's the real strength of the american system, the chinese have in the last two or three years begun to adopt that as well. renchow is one or six who have gone from academia to government. and that's why he's not here but he's left it to me to present our paper. so this is difficult to summarize

it was a pleasure to sitting down with henry and deepa's paper. i commend the policy-oriented focus of this project. for those of us about were in the think-tank academic world for a while and you slipped into policy, it is easy to forget how much value there is in understanding the intellectual landscape in that particular country were looking at. i thought both henry's chapter and daivd in nice job -- did a nice job of laying out the debate and try to talk about the policy focus. i thought i would make four very brief comments about the paper and handed over to david and mike:. the paper is a great paper as i anticipated. no better people than david to do that. it is well-documented and there is a second paper in just reading the footnotes. the real virtue of the paper is when they lay out the spectrum of discourse in the chinese foreign policy community. it is a wonderful paper and i think the comments will only make it better. i will make four very brief comments. i am the chair and then i am not the discussee. while there is real value in bei

these questions that both, and david have referred to were questions developed by both deepa and me as we were wrestling with questions about ways to test a relevance and the implications of what we have been doing. do you want to make a comment or to and then we can go to a discussion? >> thank you very much, tom and david. as expected, you have both been provocative and challenging as well as giving us some constructive things to think about. let me just say a few things in response to what you both laid out. i heard tom suggesting that u.s. foreign policy, and this is partly on the u.s. side of it, but we will shift to the rising power side as well. i heard something that was basically fairly ad hoc, opportunistic, changes fairly constantly. the idea is -- i am not anarchic, but very much in a state of flux, with the way foreign policy is made. on the other hand, it seems to me that if we think about what walter said during lunch, if we don't think in terms of pure least schools of thought but rather of narrative that all of us carry around with us, because we don't obviously react