xi jinping as the most powerful president since deng xiaoping, probably. so, we've got two very different positions for the leaders and much more complex agenda. ji jinping wants to develop what he calls a new great power relationship, and this is something that makes president obama and america in general feel fairly uneasy. i wouldn't be hugely optimistic that president obama's leverage in this context is going to be very big. i'm sure xi jinping will be polite, will roll out the red carpet at the apec summit, but i don't think this is the situation where president obama is going to be successful. >> so much has changed since obama was last there. on the one hand, we have a tremendous shift in the real power relations between the united states and china, but even more of an impediment is china has kind of arrived and does no longer, as deng xiaoping once counsel the chinese to do, to keep their heads down and buy their time. there is a bit of an attitude problem in china that shifted dramatically. a lot of the old toolkit that united states normally brin

carter had a real lovefest with deng xiaoping. now, this might be the bitter progeny of 1989. the political differences in our systems and values continue to mitigate against us really feeling comfortable with each other and affording each other the kind of respect, which i think china historically has worked tremendously hard to attain and for whom it matters a great deal. >> is it possible that the president will say, look, i may not be able to do much domestically, but certainly there is a whole range of foreign policy challenges and opportunities. >> yes, i do think that, but don't forget that the central plank of president obama's foreign policy, perhaps his legacy, the thing that he most wants to be his legacy, is the asia, whiche -- secretary of state hillary clinton announced in his first term. see this as a thinly veiled u.s. strategy of u.s. containment, and xi jinping has been more explicit about seeing it as such. part about president obama skidded to asia, it's not just shifting military resources to , but it's alsoc the economic initiative. there is the transpaci

after its own definition, but because deng xiaoping saw china falling through the cracks. he initiated a policy called opening up. 3 million chinese have been pulled up out of poverty. often people ask me how can we trust china? and i say we don't have to necessarily trust china, but we can trust the process. the process that's made it in the self-interest of nations like china to open up their markets and compete with others. the principle of arbitration is also very old principle. this picture is the treaty peace of westphalia of 1648 in which the idea maybe, maybe, hmm, how about this? instead of nations warring with each other to advance their interests, maybe they could arbitrate their differences and that would be a better -- not only a more moral way of getting along in the world but actually a more profitable way of getting along in the world. the peace of westphalia, but the formation of the modern united nations is the culmination of this age-old dream that predates this u.s. by 125 years something like that. but the united states has an equivalent of it. i like

and it does no longer as deng xiaoping bid them to keep their heads down and bide their time so, there is an attitude that has shifted dramatically. which means a lot of the old tool kit that the united states usually brings to bear in the relationship such as pressure, is not operable any more. and i think really what's missing despite all the protestations on both sides that there is much common interests shared, and we really should find a way to get together, to wit xi jinping's notion of a new kind of big power relationship. i don't detect a tremendous amount of willingness to really hunker down, man-to-man in a congenial way to solve problems. we see much more sort of suspicion about the motives of each. and so i would have to say that the climate is not terrific for the kind of breakthrough that i think people are very nostalgic for on both sides, from the days of kissinger, nixon and even jimmy carter who you will recall in 1979 engineered the re-recognition of china and the normalization of diplomatic relations. >> rose: i want to come back to both those points. and point out

as deng xiaoping told his inner circle, "we are not afraid to shed a little one. you carry these things out, you see, and the westerners forget." i think ultimately he was only partly right. the world is not forget. it simply remembers what it wants. thank you. [applause] >> ok. now those who probably intended to defect from the beginning have defected. [laughter] we can have an opportunity -- i'm sure many of you have questions or comments. if you will raise your hand and please identify yourself, it will be easier for us, and it will certainly be better for the filming. please go to the microphone. >> hi. i'm from the university of north florida. i've written extensively on american policy in poland. i want to thank you all for your insightful comments. i never want to follow mel leffler f g talks -- after he talks to read it was wonderful. i'm also very happy that dr. engel reminded us of the two things that happened on june 4. there are two options -- there is the polish option, successful elections, and then there is the tiananmen option. in washington, they