and i think it's important to note that weaknesses in space deterrence can undermine general deterrence, because nato and the u.s. in particular are the most reliant on space assets for our military operations. there are some good stuff in iran study in terms of how to address space deterrence. just very quickly, international norms, enhancing collective space security capabilities, enhancing the resilience of space architecture, which involves sort of redundancy and potentially using some new technologies where we don't have these very expensive satellites that have everything in them, we can put up a constellation and more of a network approach. and i also think we need to have a deterrence policy, a declaratory policy for space that people actually understand and that adversaries and allies alike understand that includes concepts of proportionate escalation that are not just limited to space. and then thirdly, new areas that i think are worth considering, as the world is changing so quickly for deterrence tools. one is energy. it's possible we'll see a crisis in the future in the pac

always lessons to be learned in terms of deterrence. deterrence has worked. just imagine four years the taliban back in power in kabul. would they do the same they did before giving safe haven to al qaeda and risk again distraction? probably not. in that respect, what happened is a lesson in deterrence. where we've not been able to be effective is in the region of powers surrounding. pakistan was mentioned before. >> i asked you to repeat that because we are often up on the hill hearing about the alliance and many concerns about the question harlan raised, political will, political support. when you make the argument we've been fighting a war in the middle of asia for more than a decade with tens of thousands of european forces by our side, a scenario we could little imagine. and at the height of the strain on the alliance military forces, exacerbated by one of the worst economic crisis on the continent, the political will was still mustered to launch operation in libya and we sustained or force necessary kosovo. there are ways to look at this. that was an im

nuclear deterrent really extends. the other deterrent is the conventional attack on europe. what are the components of the terms? capability, will, both individual and collective, your track record, and your messaging . everybody knows -- nobody has a doubt that nato can and will respond. the flipside is that we are not deterring anything else. we are not deterring the taliban from attacking us in afghanistan. an or inot deterring ir north korea -- or north korea from pursuing a nuclear weapon. for those things, deterrence is not working. what do we see on the horizon? this is where we need to bring in the planning question. we are cutting defense budgets. we are withdrawing u.s. forces from europe. about, in talking abouts ways, what to do crises outside of european territories. what to do with iran. we talk about defense. we do not talk about against whom. erodingn the process of the capacity. what we project to the rest of the world -- we are projecting an erosion of oil. -- will. this has implications for our ability to keep the deterrence up. i'm not worried about nucle

extended deterrence, deterrence, strategic, all of these with them a set of meetings that almost take you immediately to nuclear. the question is, in the reali realities of the world we live in and i know we want to like all normal humans live in denial to some extent. in grand strategy, what's really being said in the u.s. and in nato and europe and other places and the world is that we do not have the financial means for the aspirations that we have for our national security. it's just not matched up. we can't afford as the united states the standing army that we currently have to keep them standing forever, number one. number two, the recap talization of the nuclear force that we have today in a form that is exactly like it is today is unaffordable. so we've got to come to some understanding collectively about what aspirations actually are and what of those aspirations are realizable and that's been a difficult discussion. there's another piece from a conventional standpoint, we in the united states have been a global power, forward based and forward operating, more and more countr

i would contend to close out the main point that cyber deterrence is, obviously, working. people that say that it's difficult or impossible are focusing on the technical or they are focusing on these day in, day out incidents. maybe they are focusing on espionage, but for disruptive attacks, especially the most strategic cyber conflicts, i would contend the facts show, the history shows, here's where i hold up the book, the history shows, $9.99 on amazon, the history shows that cyber deterrence is clearly working. because we've been talking about a cyber pearl harbor since 1991, over 20 years since -- i'm sorry, over 20 of the years we've been talking about a cyber pearl harbor for 20 of the 70 years since the actual pearl harbor. clearly, there's a different dynamic going on. so what we see is that countries willing to spying one another, they are willing to have proxies that can conduct attacks on others. they are willing to maybe have low-level cyber attacks on one another, but we haven't seen a big nation use real cyber, really destructive or disruptive cyber capabilit

nuclear deterrent extend? the other thing we're deterring is a conventional attack on european members. there, i think, what are the components? the components are capability, will, both individual and collective, your track record, and your method. these are all lined up perfectly on an attack against nato territory by conventional means. everybody knows nato can and will respond to that. now, flip side is we're not deterring anything else, not the taliban from attacking us in afghanistan or overthrowing the government or assad from killing his people or nuclear weapons or deterring north korea from pursuing the nuclear weapon or deterring terrorists from attacking us wherever they can. those things, deterrents are not working, and what do we see on the horizon now? this is where you have to bring in the planning question. we are all cutting our defense budgets. we are withdrawing u.s. forces from europe. we are not talking about, in serious ways what to do with crisis outside european territory where it's li

but i call that a deterrent. it is that triad and rebalancing of your strategic forces and general purpose forces and special operations. >> that's an interesting point you make about the third triad using special operation forces, i'm wondering if there's a way the alliance could bind its chemical nuclear biological weapons brigade with the nato response force, citing almost a wmd way to secure wmd when necessary. >> the likelihood -- the most important thing is to bring your border and internal police into close coordination and understanding, common picture, with your special operators and have special operators trained and equipped to handle nonproliferation, counter proliferation, wmd type scenarios. that for each nation state is critical but then for the region and alliance is going to become critical activity. >> stepano -- >> thank you, my question will be -- a more general question, an issue with this panel has been circling around. the remark about iran, what we could expect from iran is not -- from ira

is deterrence not a cold war concept? do

i think the core of nato nuclear deterrence remains the u.s. strategic nuclear deterrent. it's also true of the british and french forces, both of which are committed to be modernized though there will be debates, at least in britain, about on what scale. it's always a pleasure to agree with evo and i am also one of those who has real reservations about the military utility of the dual capable aircraft in europe. if we got into a condition which the nuclear weapons, given a choice between the submarines with an essential -- and other systems with an essentially 100% assurance in reaching the target and very high precision, would we reject them in favor of air breathing airplanes with pilots in them that may have to be refueled on certain missions, dropping gravity bumps. on the assumption that the russians or somebody else, it's hard to imagine targets other than the russians, irrelevant in this context, that the russians would be pacified by the fact that the airplanes came from european bases and not from american british/french platforms. that said, i think the central

i just wish it had been said by the defense and deterrence program or defense and deterrence posture review what's going on. because one of the things that was very apparent during that time was the silence from -- and i know that you as ambassador could probably not say what you said now, but from an american perspective, there was very little said to actually push the europeans in that direction you just outlined. i can say this because i'm a european. i think without the americans taking the lead, and quite frankly, lecturing and pushing the europeans on issues like this, there's not going to be movement on the nuclear front because there are so many holy cows buried in the nuclear issue that will prevent the alliance from taking that step that i think is necessary. and you saying euphimisms, quite frankly, referring to the life extension program, calling the nuclear -- nato's nuclear weapons must be safe, secure and deficient, which everyone knows means spending that $10 million or $10 billion that you were referring to. i think what is needed on nuclear weapons issues to take th

thank you. >> i think that falls more to public deterrent. first of all, i think you're right that enlargement was a great deterrent. when we enlarged, we claimed that we were serious about the disruptive. and. the fact that we stumbled over georgia kind of gave a green lig light. th then. both of us have kind of run out of steam so that talking further, talking about is going to raise questions about your commitment. are with really going to extend our defense guarantee to more countries and more territories when we're cutting our military forces, we're pulling back from operations. is that really credible? >> we have a lot, i think, of homework to do as nato itself to rebuild some of the deterrens. it would be better to say we're moving forward and it's as iron-clad as possible. start talking about our desire to get there, to countries that are interested in that. we have to back that up a bit. >> let's close our session by proposing to our panelists one last question, and they have some closing arguments to our audience. >> what wou what w

nato has always been a deterrence alliance. but in the last few years, it became a nato of reliance. in 2011, nato was involved in six operations on three continents and more than 150,000 men and women under nato command. we had a counterterrorism operation in the mediterranean and continue to have a very significant deployment of troops in the balkans that included not only nato countries but also partners from as close by as switzerland and austria and as far away as morocco. there are 200 more balkan troops serving in kosovo. we had thirdly an operation in the gulf of adden to support operation ocean shield which links to not only the european union but countries like china and indonesia and russia. in order to provide for security at sea, we had an air policing operation in the baltics as well as over iceland, and iceland in the future will see the participation of non-nato members, finland and sweden, and of course we had our operations in afghanistan and libya. let me spend two minutes on those operations and the lessons

we have found ways to bolster deterrence. across the board, and i know this will be an issue discussed in the next panel but the deployment of missile deafens is not just a promise. it's a real fip exists today. it's part of a commitment that the administration has made to nato to take the u.s. deployment of u.s. missile defenses to defend the u.s. from europe in to deployment of nato missile defense to nato to defend nato. that was the fundamental shift that occurred in september of 2009. to take system that was able deploy against possibly ten incoming missiles and put in place a nato system under nato command and control put the deference of nato countries. that is the kind of commitment to deterrence that we put in place. we put in place contingency plan to make sure that every nation that is a member of nato has a plan to be defended. that was an important contribution to deterrence. we just completed this month -- this week, last week. the first major article r5 last exercise. the alliance was conducted in the last ten

monad provides capability for deterrence. third, there are a variety of diplomatic methods to assure allies besides expensive nuclear weapons capabilities. lastly, states seek nuclear weapons to the extent they do for reasons other than security, including sth and domestic political concerns. nuclear guarantees do nothing to prevent proliferation motivated by these concerns. declining military utility of nuclear weapons makes them vulnerable to budget cuts. this is especially the case when austerity threatens other military spending priorities and heightens competition for resources inside the pentagon. , militaryse times --vice meters may see leaders may see nuclear missions as an area to cut, to preserve other core capabilities they care more deeply about. consider for example the pressure that the navy's ssbn modernization program is imposing on the other services. the navy expects to spend $77 billion to develop the 12 ssbn x boats. cbo puts the number around $87 billion. the navy's annual shipbuilding budget in this time

that was an important contribution to deterrence. we just completed this month, this week, last week, the first major article 5 live exercise, the alliance has conducted in the last ten years. many of the countries that participated in the exercise had never participated in an article 5 exercise and we just completed that. those are the kinds of steps that really matter for collective defense. far more than how many nuclear weapons you may have and what country. particularly when the cost of modernizing those nuclear weapons runs into 10-plus billion, and the cost of modernizing the aircraft to carrying the nuclear weapons runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars, it is those kind of strength of deterrence that ought to be the the focus of our effort ask using arms across disarmement and cooperative security more broadly as a means to enhance nato's deterrence and defense posture. >> the announcement of the so-called pivot to asia led to a lot of discussion among nato allies and europeans for what it meant for them. you just sai

extended deterrents. deterrents. strategic. all of these have with them a set of meetings that almost always take you to nuclear. and the question is, in the realities of the world we live in, i know we want to kind of like all normal humans, live in denial to some extent, but in grand strategy, what's really being said in the u.s., in nato and europe and other places in the world is that we do not have the means or aspirations we have for our national security. it's just not matched up. we can't afford as the united states, the standing armies that we currently have, to keep them standing forever, number one. number two, the recapitalization of the nuclear force that we have today in a form that is like it is today is unaffordable, so and, we've got to come to some understanding collectively b about what our aspirations are and what of those are realizable. we in the united states have been a global power. forward based, forward operating. more and more countries, mostly all countries, do not want large american armies on thei

to that extent the deterrent is there. and even though there aren't weapons there anymore, we have taken some actions, like the recent flyover with the b-2, to make it very clear we're committed to this extended deterrence. >> if we went down to sear flow terms of nuclear weapons in europe, would we have to change our conventional force structure any way? >> very interesting question. i'd have to say -- i mean, live in my world of strategic deterrence. i don't venture out much into the conventional side. so that would be a conversation for a larger group. but it depends on how strong one would believe the deterrence is. in other words, would the extent of the deterrence be strong enough if everything were pulled back to the u.s., that it would be equivalent. if it were not seen as equivalent of the forward deployed deterrence, then you would probably have to do something on the conventional side, but if it was equivalent, probably know. >> the truth is in the eye of the beholder, but from a purely military standpoint, my o

that was an important contribution to deterrence.we just come pleaded this month, this week, last week, the first major article five live exercise, the alliance conducted in the last 10 years. many of the countries that participated in that exercise have never participated in an article five exercise. we just completed that. those are the kinds of steps that really matter for collective defense. far more than how many nuclear weapons you may have in what country. when the cost of modernizing those nuclear weapons runs into 10 plus elion dollars, when the cost to modernize your aircraft to carry those weapons runs into the many hundreds of millions of dollars. it is those kinds of strengths and deterrence that ought to be the focus of our effort and using arms does -- arms control, and cooperative security as a means to enhance nato's insurance and defense posture. >> when you are serving out of brussels, the president's announce all that's announcement ,- the president's announcement for what it meant for them, you just said today so

and threat deterrence. that is the first level. where can we have better systems that are interoperable, international and promote environment for detection and attribution. the second would-be, internationally one could very much think all the problems we have coming up with international agreement between governments, starting with cybercrime convention, and between allied countries for law-enforcement purposes, and that doesn't make major players in the space. could be more easily resolved by the private sector in the governance models that would say if you want to operate in this platform with this hardware or these protocols internationally the governance model has private sector emergency readiness teams, search and seizure, data and stabilize the situation in a way to get the detection attribution that can be used for some penalty on the adversary that did that might be blocking some people out of the system, might be turning it over to the government, may be civil lawsuits, in gauging shame campaigns, whatever the issue is.

we shift towards threats deterrence. as part of the element of the national power that we have all grown to view as government centric condit nomadic information, military, economic and law enforcement the private sector has some of those capabilities as well using the government institutions whether it is to better enable them to do civil losses and a tradition that feeds into the law enforcement system, whether it is a name and shame campaign that can impact the economy of the nationstate and viable companies that are benefiting from stolen intellectual property we have to start thinking that way. >> i think that you have something to add to that? >> i think you're right because all of this sounds like government centric. there are five approaches that have been taken. new institutions are needed, new procedures are needed to get this. you have to limit the disclosure of certain information to other entities. the privacy concerns but all of these are governmental focused. none of them transfer the power agency to priva

after awhile there are break ins we should threat deterrence. we have alarm and camera and alarm and camera do nothing to make the environment less penetrable. they do is shift the burden away from the victim. they make information sharing about going after the bad guys. the alarm is for early detection. the video for atry -- atry biewtion. the idea we know you can get in. now it's about you. why we haven't made the realization. we have to different what we protect and figure out how make sure we there threat deterrent model and deep doing what we're doing on the vulnerable mitigation side. the same extent with locks on doors, band aids. we are hemorrhaging right now. it cannot be the case when you come and see the place of business. completely raided maybe your integrity of your products are changed. what is my patch management strategy. and the penalty it will require. >> okay. so i had some more questions about band aids. i think maybe we should since steve has raised a very interesting and important topic now i would like to get less leonard

nato has always been a deterrence alliance. but in the last few years, it became a nato of reliance. in 2011, nato was involved in six operations on three continents and more than 150,000 men and women under nato command. we had a counterterrorism operation in the mediterranean and continue to have a very significant deployment of troops in the balkans that included not only nato countries but also partners from as close by as switzerland and austria and as

how to protect it, have threat deterrent models as predominant. keep doing what we are doing on the vulnerability mitigation side the same extent locks on doors, vitamins, band-aids and the like. we are hemorrhaging right now. it can to the be the case when you come and see your place of business completely raided, maybe your integrity of your products are changed, you might not have availability, that the first question is how do i clean this up, what is my patch management strategy? the question has to be why is someone coming after me and what are we going to do about that? i think to myself of the "godfather" movie. you come home one day and find a horse's head in your bed. your immediate reaction is not how am i going to clean this up? so that's what's happening here, right? it's quite preposterous. why is this happening and how are we going to change this? what i hope changes over the next few years is that we really need to stop victimizing, further victimizing victims, increasing their costs to really no metrics of success and short shifti

this is what is called deterrence theory. it seems like common sense.e famous example is in 1970 the police in montrÉal went upon straight for 19 hours. in that 19 hour period, montrÉal descended into babylon. because the cost of disobedience was zero and people started robbing banks and their work on battles in this case. i mean, this is canada that were talking about. i didn't even know people had guns in canada. the problem with this idea is there are all kinds of cases that does not explain our behavior. a simple one would be, look at people whether the decisions people want to make about panic taxes. the most common example of law-abiding behavior that anyone in the developed world has to go through. well, they're huge different as her one country to the next and how honest people are on tax day. if you go to greece or italy, the cheating on tax day is rampant. the size of the underground economy is enormous. if you come to a country like this, there is very little cheating on taxes. this is probably americans. we are more honest on tax day than an

is there something about the mechanics that don't equate to actual deterrence. thank you. >> can i try that one, first? >> the debate in the u.s. hasn't caught up to the larger international debate. >> i think it is. >> i'm sorry, igor, i take it all back. discussion in the u.s. hasn't caught up to where the international discussion is. in part because it's normal diplomatic stuff and classified. they would be useful if the state department were a little more transparent. i think they are trying. but the issues you raised deal directly to how people are beginning to interpret the laws of our own conflict as they apply to cyber space. and the first is can we define what an actual attack is? yes, we can and it's consistent with the definitions we have and this grows out of the estonian experience and others, there has to be damage or casualties or death. there are areas of ambiguity, but this is an attack that would justify a military response. there's a desire to see this carried out and the provisions of the u.n. charter and the things applying to self-defense.

that is our top nuclear stra teaming irk deterrent follow-on. the fact of nat ter, it's on continuing resolution. because we want to grow that program in '14, we're $500 million off in '14. so that comes to roost in the schedule of that and we're heel to toe. other ship building, we'll lose a virginia class submarine, literal combat ship and float forward staging base and a lot of costs to continue. the forward carriers werks need about $500 million to finish that carrier and by spring we stop work on it which is not very smart because it's almost done. thank you. >> thank you. general amos, can we continue the kind of of temporary actions we took fy '13 into '14. >> there's no more money in carry over. we were 99.8% obligated at the end of '13. there's no money to bring over. we're going to live with what we have and 14 other continual resolutions. we've taken measures in the past. civilian hiring was frozen two years ago. we've already gone through our travel accounts. our reserves have been taken off active duty to reduce the t.a.d. costs. th

to take those things together to send a message of deterrence and proper exacting of the penalty and given the magnitude of the activity and insider trading conduct, this seemed to us to be as we said in our letter, steep by fair. yeah. >> [ inaudible ]. >> what has happened today is very substantial and important thing. it is a rare thing for any entity to be held to account as an entity and that has been true for a number of years now. it's been more rare for that entity to plead guilty to everything charged with but not only rare but unprecedented to have a criminal fine and penalty of the magnitude we have described. as i've said a number of people have been charged and convicted and the investigation remains ongoing and we are not shy in retiring people. these folks aren't and these folks aren't either. we're not unaggressive. we bring cases when we have proof beyond a reasonable doubt we can convince a jury unanimously of someone's criminal guilt and when we get to that point with respect to anyone, whether it's at the top or bottom or in the middle we bring the case at that ti

this is the deterrence theory. it makes common sense.it is a famous example and in 1970, the police montrÉal went on strike for 19 hours and then they descended into this because the costs of disobedience were zero. people started with gun battles in the street. this is canada were talking about. i didn't even know people had guns. is late the problem is there are kinds of cases where the theory doesn't explain our behavior. so a simple one would be to look at whether the decision people pay their taxes or not. that is the most common example of law-abiding behavior that anyone has to go through. and there are huge differences from one country to the next and how honest people are on tax day. if you go to greece. if you go to italy. the cheating on tax days is rampant, the size of the economy is enormous. but if you come to a country like this, it's not cheating on taxes, this is probably -- as americans we are honest, probably more than anyone else. but the question is if this theory works, that would suggest the penalty is for cheating

it's actually about deterrence rather than any particular enemy. so what does that mean in today's world when we have nonstate actors, global powerships, disconstructive power. nato just concluded on november 8th they concluded a major exercise, a multinational exercise involving 6,000 troops from 28 nations called exercise steadfast jazz. this was one of the the most important exercises the alliance has done in recent years. it raises the question of what type of exercise, what type of deterrence is this alliance preparing for for the future. to get us into this conversation, we have four terrific panelists. barry pavel is the vice president and director of the scope center. barry will update you on the work we have done and laying out a new concept for the alliance. he joined the atlantic council after a long career in the pentagon also having served as a special assistant to the president for defense policy and strategy at the white house. and played a heavy role in strategy issues at the pentagon. to his left is the newest atlantic council seni

we're seeing the government crackdown on hacktivists, and do you think this is going to serve as a deterrent, or lead it more of this type of activity? >> i don't know, it certainly started from a little bit of online activism. and let's be heard, not all hacktivism and activism are the same. >> explain the difference real quick. >> online hacktivism is protest, and it doesn't have to be a crime. >> it's a cyber sit-in? >> basically. nobody is harmed, and there's no crime. and it's effective. that's online activism. they were all online activism, where you start committing crimes, you become hacktivists, and they're cracking down on everybody. >everybody. >> should the fundamental right to demonstrate be extended? >> well, you know, this debate is about tactics, and we might have the same disagreement about where direct action and things that are perhaps illegal have a place, both in the streets and in cyberspace. so i don't draw those distinctions on what's ethical or not at this given time. but what i would say is particularly interesting about the hammond case and what it represents, it's

we have to maintain our forces there for deterrence, crisis response, building capacity of our partners and friends. the rebalance is never cast as a pivotal way away from middle east to asia. it was a relative increase in our attention to asia and to the fundamental changes that are half thing there and adapting our posture to those changes while we still stay engaged in a key region like the middle east. iraq asy we came out of we are reducing our posture in afghanistan, the number of ground forces will be changing. our air and naval presence ari to those keyments countries and should not and i they will change my expectation. what are the conflict scenarios in either the middle east or east asia? what is a relation of american defense posture to those scenarios? asiae middle east and east , i have concluded that i do not believe the u.s. needs to prepare its self to conquer, occupy, and hold large land areas on that land mass. that does not mean it may not need military capabilities, but the notion that the u.s. would prepare for a land invasion of china and holding large territory i

they can be abused just like in the us so that's not an argument it's a double standard against deterrence he's i time the culprit is now then in the wild leading brand consultancy into the ground the feds that they don't own trademark is just as strong this plant with an estimated value of thirty nine billion dollars as the gas giant accounted for almost call of the combine a full planet in a study. on russia's state news kinetic energy coal price and also tom has won a contest to build enough play the finest that power plant in georgia and the time bidding done every ounce of productive lot of the wild sun since it is all stuff to pounds. in twenty eight f. and. i stay with us in business center now we're going to do it all mr schoen thomas he plays the russian stock market with company cash my favorite part of the show so a good book a must die what have you been up to how trading indeed well the trip was great to the trading that not so much things this week whether it's a technological glitch or something it's just not going the way it should go to yeah that's what we were in overall

first of all, investment in our nuclear deterrent has not ceased. we are taking all the necessary steps to make that decision possible. also we've had the alternative of study which i don't think came up with a convincing answer but i have to say, mr. speaker, i feel i wouldn't satisfy and how my honorable friend even if i gave him a nuclear submarine to park off the coast of his constituency. [laughter] >> i rather fear that's true. [laughter] having known the honorable friend for 30 years. >> is the prime minister aware that according to the economist, britain is now 150 night the lowest in the world in terms of business investment, just behind molly, paraguay and guatemala? >> candy therefore please tell us -- candy therefore please tell the house when, under his esteemed leadership, and that of the chancellor, now is expected to catch up with mali? >> i can only conclude that the right honorable gentleman has spent a night out on down with reference laws. and mind altering x-out taken effect. [shouting] the fact is in the first six-month of this

it's more of a deterrent when you see police officers walking around, engaged with residents, engaged with business owners. it really helps to change the environment overall. so, yes, we do have issues of crime just like any part -- any other part of the city. i'm just really happy that it's not what it used to be and i think it's a manageable thing. and we just have to deal with it more and add some more academy classes, but also look at programs like sf faith which helps people learn to take care of themselves and each other as neighbors. we have to make sure we're providing opportunities to perpetrators of these crimes and making sure we're prosecuting people who are committing crimes. but more importantly, that we provide these opportunities before they get to the point where they are committing crimes. >> you mentioned the issue of homelessness as a big issue in your district. how will you deal with the folks that hang out on haight street and the issue of homelessness? >> well, i think that's a real -- i mean, it's a city-wide issue. and i think part of what we have to do is wor

should not shy away from holding institutions responsible when it is justified and necessary for deterrence and accountability. >> sac capital advisors pleaded guilty to five charms, and agreed to pay $1.8 billon for on insider trading scheme. six former sac traders pleaded guilty and are cooperating. two others are fighting the charges. the agreement provide no imupty for any individual. including cowan, the owner, who faces a civil lawsuit from the securities and exchange commission. his firm will no longer be able to manage money. >> this comes amid reports that federal prosecutors are on the verge of a $13 billion agreement with jpmorgan chase. both change the notion that some wall street firms are too big, too powerful and important to the economy to pros kout. >> some analysts say criminal charge would be better. >> being too big to charge, like citibank, bank of america, jpmorgan et cetera. if you had one of those banks charged criminally, it would limit their ability to transact business - you'd have massive lay offs and a problem for the economy. >> the fines topped the 157 million

we cannot maintain peace without a viable deterrent to war.stand united for our men and women in uniform. let us stand proudly, and never forget the sacrifice of those who have served, those standing amongst us, and those who have fallen in the line of duty. let us constantly be reminded of the importance of this very precious commodity we call freedom, and the very high price we must pay to maintain it. the men and women it remembers. thank you, and best wishes to each and every one of you. to the veterans among us, thank you for your service and sacrifice, to the families of the veterans, thank you for your everlasting support, may the sacrifices of your departed loved ones never be forgotten. we salute you for your ultimate sacrifice and gift of freedom to us. god bless america. [applause] >> thank you mr. fritz. please welcome the honorable mr. eric k. shinseki. [applause] >> mr. president, welcome. thank you and the first lady, and the vice president for your leadership and unwavering support for the veterans and their families. veterans

but in addition to accountability, i think, we are deterrence. factual statements oftentime, here you have a guilty plea, of the fully civil only kinds of settlements, you have an acknowledgment of facts oftentimes. think as we think of how best to resolve these types of ways we are looking for that would change behave your as demand accountability. >> one more question. give us an update on the discussions with j.p. morgan chase. expecting a settlement to be announced quickly. there appears to be sticking points. us what they are and what the prospect of resolve it soon? what time frame were you expecting? >> soon, soon. that's an operative phrase. he associated attorney general has been leading our side in connection with the conversations. they are ongoing. been k they had productive. to get into the nature of what we were talking about other than to say that i xpect one way or the other, we will resolve this soon. we will have an agreement or we will be filing a lawsuit. perhaps tony could elaborate. >> we're not in a position to announce any

it's not a deterrent. it never has been.you know, in england in the 18th century, pick pocketing was a capital offense, and they used to hang the pick pockets every saturday in the town square, and while they were doing it, people would be going through the crowd, picking the pockets of the people watching the pick pockets getting hanged, so i think the british caught on early, that capital punishment was not a deterrent. and when you look at the biggest proponents in the world of capital punishment, the three biggest are iran, the united states, and china. why do we want to be lumped in with them barbarians? i can understand, you know, people wanting justice. i just don't understand vengeance. it's much, much tougher on a guy if you give him -- put him in a 3x6 cell for the rest of his life, rather than sniff his life out with a lethal injection in a matter of seconds. but, of course, how they're putting these people to death, i want to remind you, rachel, that a few years ago down in florida, they were having trouble with

security is about good visible deterrent. and i think having an armed presence, not every tsa officer armed, but an armed presence at the airport at the vulnerable areas is a good security measure, a preventative security measure. >> mr. loy, should the tsa be armed? >> i've never thought that was the case. from the very beginning when we stood up the agency and i think all the way to today, the notion of a kind of a cascading a multiple layer security system is the design purpose of what tsa provides to the airport together with. and i emphasize the word together with, the collaboration necessary with all the other law enforcement elements in the airport. and so the notion of collaboration being the key word here, what i heard from both police chief representing the airport police and the lapd police chief indicated that there was very strong collaboration. and i agreed completely that the training held three weeks ago just happened to be the last time they did it. my guess is they were doing that quite routinely. because at

so it's hardly a deterrent to a future fraud. >> as part of this settlement a johnson&johnson subsidiary pleaded guilty to a single m misdemeano misdemeanour. >> doctors and nurses working with the u.s. military have been complicit in the abuse of terrorism suspects. that's according to a 2-year study by military health experts. they were accused of designing torture and treatment of detainees. >> nepal is making an attempt to make a post-war constitution. voters will decide on a constituent assembly. the first assembly was dissolved last year. many are skeptical that they'll get their act together this time either. >> in the district of this small town, temporary police recruited for the elections celebrate the completion of their training. this is the second time nepal is erecting an assembly. the assembly erected in 2008 was resolved. the town has been caught up in the campaign. just a few hours drive away in the village, people are frustrated. this man has voted many times >> translation: it is our duty to vote. but our leaders have done nothing. i promise you there'll be no constitu

$4 million is a drop in the bucket compared to that and honestly the really important thing is deterrence for this kind of behavior going forward, not policing of past behavior. the policing even when aggressive as this action is, only goes so far to righting the wrongs. we just don't want it to happen any more. we don't want the government to be extracting fines after the fact. >> before we get to whether we're doing good for the future, it was said today that this is going to mean that other banks will have to pay up. what do you think of that? >> well, i think it definitely means other banks will have to pay up. jp morgan's payment is based at least in part on the acquisitions of two forms. washington mutual , and bear sterns, and they were not good actors in all this, but there were others who were every bit as bad, bank of america acquired countrywide, and some of the mortgages that country wide was making was toxic. you have to believe that there is more money coming forth. >> one of the things that, quoting today's settlement is a major victory in a fight to hold those who caused t

priority of kim jong regime this year is simultaneous pursuit of economic development and nuclear deterrence. and second is ending the political isolation. they can normalize the relations with other countries, but the problem is, and the point is this is all about tug of war over preconditions. the u.s. has been very firm about their position toward north korea. to make matters worse, as you said, north korean security authority took into custody 85-year-old american, and this situation impedes more any efforts to improve north korea and u.s. relations. probably north korea did this in order to get washington's attention. this is typical north korean tactics. however, it cannot be an independent variable to change whole picture of deadlocked nuclear talks. washington is likely to deal with this issue separately from nuclear issue. so, therefore, overall judgment or prediction about the possibility of resuming the talks is not very positive at this moment. >>> former italian prime minister silvio berlusconi lost his seat in parliament following a conviction for tax fraud. members of the sena

i think it will probably have a very variable deterrent affect. if they have to sacrifice earnings from gains on the stock, in theory, they may pressure the board to hold people accountable and remove ceos. that's how shareholder dem mockemoc -- democracy is supposed to work. >>> still ahead, what is at stake for consumers and big businesses to require all genetically modified foods to be labeled? >>> president obama met with the chef executives of some of the nation's biggest come pae ppaniy with immigration reform. the economic benefits of legislation that already passed in the senate but facing a tough challenge in the republican controlled house. >> we know that the senate bipartisan bill that already passed would grow the economy by $1.4 trillion above and beyond the growth that's already taken place. we know it will reduce our deficit by $850 billion. >> the president says the senate passed a bill that would secure the nation's boarders and provide a road to citizen ship for 11 million immigrants already in the u.s. but initially entered ill