then when dimond arrived, he brought with them a set of added towards-- attitudes towards risk which in a low-key way it was time very well in the risk management culture. so, they do appear to have taken, as far as i can tell, have been topped atlanta to the j.p. morgan guys and talk to other banks to take an attitude towards risk. they were much more systematic in terms of trying to monolith and analyze it. that boren just relying on a few models. the case of ups for example eventually, they were looking at the super senior product primarily through our models with disastrous effect in using a unit dimensional way of measuring risk. it wasn't the case with j.p. morgan even though j.p. morgan had invented are. having invented it, guess it is useful but it is only useful as part of a set of techniques for measuring risk. so i think that contributed. the other key thing was about j.p. dimond was he was actually prepared to face up to the analysts on wall street and say no and that is critically important because it from 2005 onwards, actually j.p. morgan was not doing that vertically.

community value waiting for example the appropriateness of the capitol standard associated to make sure dimond standardized products, the capitol charges attached fully reflect the risk of the products. >> thank you. >> thank you. senator johanns? >> chairman gensler, let me follow up on some things that senator crapo was asking and i will be very blunt. your testimony worries me. if i have a very standardized product it's going to go through the system lightning speed, we are going to know exactly what the rules or, but if i have a little bit or maybe even significantly different product it's going to hit a barrier because you're going to have to analyze the risk. some bureaucracy is going to have to shake it and make it and figure it out and discuss it and then somebody is going to have to say it's now standardized and therefore it has got to be xy and see in terms of the cattle requirement. isn't that what kind of you are getting at? >> senator, i appreciate your concerns. what we are recommending is clear rules of the road would be put out. the regulators best at setting capital which is m

dimond he was prepared to say something to the analysts on wall street and say no and that is critically important because from 2005 and all the words actually jpmorgan wasn't doing that brilliantly compared to his peers and there was a huge criticism from equity analyst saying why are you guys lagging behind? we thought that diamond was this wonder kid who was going to basically solve all problems and in fact the revenues are not that great. now there are other banks responding to that intense pressure saying yes, we've got to try to start chasing after the credit revenues as fast as we can and there was a real kind of what people used to call goldman envy. everyone wanted to be like goldman sachs three diamond on a number of occasions actually said you know, we are not going down that road trying to beat everyone else purely through chasing after, you know, the quick and easy bnl, which again, doesn't mean it didn't make mistakes and i don't want to pay these guys as somehow perfect angels because they have made mistakes but there were decisions taken which i think it very instructive