>> i can answer for dod. it was noted earlier that the different chains of command has been one of the fundamental problems here, because each laboratory reports to a different chain. they meet too high up in the organization. so yes i've been in place for a year, i take this very personally. >> i'm not criticizing you. in fairness you've only been there a year, you're right. you can't be accountable for what happened ten years ago. i agree with you. >> but i own it now. so i take personal responsibility to work with other people in the department to make sure these things are sdardized. and i will not recommend to the undersecretary to lift the moratorium until i'm confident that we have the proper basis for our operations and ha we achieve the right level of standardization. >> i prefectureappreciate that. if people were losing their jobs this would be standardized. doctor

but what about dod? >> so the oversight function of the lab -- i will trying to understand your question. i believe that is oversight function. >> what dr. crosse's agencies is recommending one single oversight agency that would set forth the protocols for the dispensing of these agents. and so i am asking each of your agencies if you would object to that kind of -- it would make sense to get one protocol no matter which lab is dispensing it. what is your view on that? >> thank you. my view is that it is a complex decision. there are constraints to having one standard for all procedures. >> what would those be? >> for example, with anthrax, there are many different uses of the product. dna for developing vaccines -- >> if you are sending it around you don't want it to be live. that is not something to subject to debate. if you could have one agency coming up with protocols about oversight on how you will make it not be life and dispense it you would not object to that? >> i would not object and believe t

avenger infected many of dod's 400,000 personal computers. the u.s. army first developed an offensive cyber operation capability using viruses in 1990, when the u.s. army center for signals warefare had been trying to develop malicious software concepts to use against an adversary. control system. the challenge was how to get the virus into an adversary's command and control system. the first publicized foreign hacker threat to national security began emerging in 1989. in march 1989, three west german hackers were arrested after selling western military passwords and computer codes to a soviet kgb agent. about a year later, in 1990, and australian hacker was arrested for breaking into the leavenworth lavatory in california, a nuclear research facility, also shutting down a nasser computer network in norfolk, virginia. in 1991, a group of dutch teenagers who were later arrested, hacked into defense department computers and got access to sensitive information related to the persian gulf war operations. meanwhile, another group of dutch hackers

in the wake of cyber vulnerabilities i exercise eligible receivers dod created-- dod created joint task force computer network defense under u.s. base command in december 1998 to serve as a focal point to defend dod computer networks. with added missions including offensive cyber operations in april 2001, the organization became the joint task force for computer network operations. october 2002, the disses management of us-based command the organization was realigned under u.s. strategic command. march 1999, during the nato air campaign over kosovo, the defense department launched limited cyberattacks against serbian computer networks. later over the summer, u.s. intelligence community reportedly mounted hypertext on foreign bank account of yugoslav president and other serbian leaders to bring their assets and alter their bank records. china outraged over the may 7 1999 bombing of chinese embassy in belgrade by nato resorted to a series of cyberattacks against the west the attack the department of energy interior, and the national park service, and took down the white house site for thr

citizen eight non-dod 23 dod replaced on postexposure treatment in this space yesterday.eturning to the subject of the laboratory to produce inactivated anthrax on may 29 to deputy secretary of defense strikes is dod laboratories inventory to identify any led spores. testing is now completed and results are as follows. since 2003 before dod laboratories are regulated 149 batches of live anthrax spores. at the 96 samples available to test from the 17 tested positive for presence of live anthrax. all of these originated from dugway. we know over the years 86 laboratories in 20 states from a d.c. in some foreign countries was viewed directly from dugway mac debated samples n. addition secondary transfers for the original 86 direct dreams. this brings 192 labs in d.c. in the three territories of guam, puerto rico and u.s. virgin islands. recently completed review resulted in key findings included the primary systemic issue is the lack of validation standard to guide development of protocols, processes and quality assurance measures. the resulting recommendation is three broad

the recent shipments of live anthrax bacteria from dod to u.s.nd international laboratories similar to the last your exposure to live anthrax bacteria shows multiple breakdowns with establish policies and inadequate oversight of the federal consumer laboratories it is another example of ongoing safety lapses that continue to occur often with the say in koch says prior incidents. we have been lucky so far. researchers work with high-risk biological agents that could result in serious infections that have the potential to be used with biological weapons. those to develop vaccines and countermeasures to understand the emerging infectious diseases. that also have the potential for high consequences. and to have that transmission of blood dash transmissible pathogen not only with laboratory workers but the epidemic could be triggered for consequences far beyond what we saw today. gao is currently conducting to examine the issues and the preliminary findings show dod and cdc have begun to address it to address fundamental flaw is is, reporting and trac

other cocompanieies are working on their n deals watchinhow dod wi respond. the question is whether dod has cacarefully thght through what deals it will appre to yield the e future industrial basic needs. thank you for watching. i am vagouradian. vivisit us at defensenews.com foror continuous coveragage, including e top 100 defse contractors ann-depth look at the little combat ship program and ance's plan to revamp pilot t training. if you are accident participating in our top 100 wenar,o to defensenews.com /signup. if you have comomments or questions about t the show or suggestions for future coverage, please e-mail me. i'll be back next week at the same time. until then, have a great week. [captioning perfrformed by thehe national capaptioning institute, which h is responsibible for its caption n content and accuracy. visit ncicaprg] [music] >> dr. charles stanley: what i believe determines about how i behave. and so if our children do not know the truth, how are they going to b behave? they're gointo look around and say, that's what she does, that's what h

michael: this is a large fraction of dod systems. i'm not trying to simplify by using the amount of dollars at stake is one of my metrics from the conversation. it sounds like you are talking about the wide array of systems that they manufacture. it is in the realm of discussion here. content --nt of there is no magic bullet in the sense that you inherit other how do youallenges, make sure the systems are adapting in the field and provide the kind of performance you want. there are some issues that need to be resolved in the performance, those kinds of things. we are in an environment where our adversaries are able to increase their cycle times or decrease very quickly. michael: one more question that occurs to me, the difficulty of writing good software. you are talking about a partial response or solution to that in -- it sounds like you're talking about an ability to modify and adapt and therefore not be locked into the system you started with. it can also be beneficial if you made mistakes in the original incarnation. if there we

third, there are no biological procedures standard across the dod. that's another thing that surprised me a lot. and this is partly due to the fact that the laboratories are under different chains of demand. and this is something that we have to take care of. so given these findings we obviously, as a department have a lot of work to do. we have a lot of work cut out for us. the american public expects more from the department of defense. and we expect much more of ourselves also. secretary carter has made plain to me and all the senior leadership of the department, that he expects these issues to be dealt with swiftly and comprehensively to ensure that a failure of this sort never happens again. accordingly, i am taking the following actions. i've directed under secretary kendall to first work with dod stakeholders and the cdc and all other relevant departments and agencies in the u.s. government to develop standardized radiation viability testing for all labs that work with spore-producing organisming like an flex. i'm telling them to ensure that t

dod o day or two. >> just inconveniences for folks today. jay johnson may interesting comments today about cyber security and compared the tradeoff between freedom and security that we think of in terms of our national security typically. we compared that to cyber security. a tradeoff between how secure we are and the freedoms we enjoy. speak to that. >> absolutely. we all recognize there is a first amendment, fourth amendment, all of these amendments which protect freedom of speech and our activities. there is a certain level of ined a a inadvertent. there knees to be a clear parsing of the american citizens and vulnerabilities. hackers will look at euro own information and try to figure out a way to use that to penetrate other systems. the target hack it was penetrated by a contractor that had contracts with them regarding certain functions. so we could be an inadvertent dupe to a larger system. it's clear we have to look at the individual level and the macro level. another thing -- >> tony. is the military prepared for a cyber attack? qui

on may 22 of this year, the center for disease control and prevention notified dod that a commercial research facility had received supposedly an activated sample that contained live anthrax spores. we quickly determined that this sample originated from utah and it was shipped through the army edgewood chemical biological center in maryland. two days later, after consultation with the cdc, all shipments of inactivated biological agents from dugway and the edgewood facility were halted. the very next day, we expanded that to include a moratorium on all shipments of inactivated anthrax material to and from all dod laboratories. on 26 may, cdc began an investigation into what happened at dugway and edgewood and three days later, i initiated a broader review of dod laboratory procedures and protocols associated with in activating anthrax spores to determine if this was a one-time procedural failure or if it was a more systematic problem in the department's biohazard safety procedures. i would like to -- i looked to frank to assemble a team. this was an expertise team that included repres

acceptable the transfer of hundred hum vees to ukraine took over a year to process due to delays at dod and state? >> if it took a year to do that that is unacceptable. i am not aware of that. >> look into that for us. and also led the delegation for the parliamentary assembly. before the delegation left before the russian delegation left in mass because of a dispute over five delegates being on the ue/eu sanctions list. the head of the delegation said that rushsiarussia's neighbors have no reason to be threatened. russia has mr. putin under the leadership has twice invaded neighbors. georgia in 2008 and ukraine last year. and we see there is a russian official investigating the legality of the transfer of crimea back in the day saying that this perhaps wasn't an innovation because crimea was never legally transferred to ukraine by the russian federation. it certains me this same official is now investigating whether the transfer of the baltic states whether the giving of independence to baltic states was also legal. perhaps that wasn't legal at all this russian official suggests and we

dod has to keep up. and keeping up means being more responsive to the needs of our military families and their children. that's our obligation. but given today's abundance of career paths to choose from we can't take for granted that military children are twice as likely as other kids to join the military. nor can we take for granted military parents inclination to recommend military service to their own children. both of those things happen. there's tremendous value in families upholding a tradition of service that is passed from generation to generation. makes our military stronger. there's no substitute for the unique potent mix of passion and mentorship that comes from a military mom dad, granddad in the case of one of the kids i was speaking about earlier today, or all of them. i recently got a letter from a fourth grader who wrote, quote, dear mr. secretary. i want to be in the military because i want to defend our country and our country's freedoms. my mom and dad are in the air force, and that is

are generally non-dangerousnon dod. given the fact that seven of these line items are non dod would you think the sequester affects would also hurt the other seven lines of effort which are critical to defeating isil. >> i would like to talk about the relationship between the two lines of effort and the dod and the other seven. from my perspective, the two lines of effort, one to deny sanctuary really, buying time and space for the other lines to work. i don't see how we can have an enduring success unless the other seven are addressed. i think the military lines of effort will set the conditions for the other seven lines of effort to be put into effect, but i certainly can't see us being successful without all of them being properly resourced. when you talk about threat finances, and the state departments efforts to negotiate to develop effective governance in iraq and syria, and those will be important to have stability in the region so we can deal with it once and for all. >> if we fix the sequester in defense, that'

so for example, the dod gets cut at higher percentages than say the irs or the epa. i'm someone who believes in significantly increasing defense spending decreasing certainly epa or irs funding, but we need to get back to strategy not this bean counting that is undermining our national security. >> so what can you do personally? what can lawmakers do? i know a number of lawmakers say they were blind side about this whole decision-making process. they didn't know it was coming. you put a hold on a dod official who was set to be confirmed. >> yes. >> where do you go from here? >> first thing we do is having hearings to have the defense officials explain what they are trying to do, explain how dramatically taking our force structure as you mentioned down to pre-world war ii levels in a threat environment that henry kissinger testified in front much armed services committee saying it's the most complex threat environment since the end of world war ii. and we're now at pre-world war ii army levels. we're going to have obama administration officials come and try to explain

the dod has a piece of some of the others but they are generally non-dod. you have testified you think the effective sequester on the dod mission could be catastrophic. given that seven of these line items are non-dod, would you agree that the not -- the allowance of sequester to come back in october 1 would also hurt the other seven lines of effort that are critical in defeating iso-? -- isil? gen. dunford: from my perspective, dose: the effort that we have -- the two lines of effort that we have are really buying times in space -- time and space for those other lines to work. i do not see how we can have an enduring success unless those other seven lines are addressed and they are in the more final analysis more important. for those other seven lines of effort to be put into effect but i certainly cannot see us being successful without all of them being properly resourced. when we talk about threat finance, using foreign fighters, and the state department's efforts to develop effective governance of iraq and syria those are going to be very important acti

but dod would be required to spend money for that. on the other hand, they need money for this new gizmo or whatever it may be -- no money for that. it's dangerous in that respect. but an omnibus appropriations bill is what i hope and trust that we will finally come up with. as opposed to a continuing resolution. rachael: has leadership given you any sort of assurances that all the work you put in be to these 12 appropriation bills -- i think the senate today is finishing their final appropriations bill in committee. have there been any private assurances that this is not going to let this go out the window? rep. rogers: the leadership is determined to either pass these bills individually or past an omnibus that has most of these bills and it. they have been very good about that. daniel: have you been in any meetings -- or been aware of any meetings about the confederate flag issue? because that is the issue that is holding this up. rep. rogers: i have not myself. i think leadership has. daniel: you are from a state that was not reall

if you are asking but dod acquisitions, don't get me started.[laughter] that is a different story. >> but think about the size and the time. and what the cost could be as you have to keep repeating it. you want everybody to be doing that not just you. , secretary johnson: there are smart ways to do acquisitions in my view. not beyond our reach. i am a big believer in not necessarily going with the biggest, most expensive tool. sometimes the actor who is a little smaller, leaner, hungrier, can do the job better. i know that as a service provider. we, you know, my department is only 12 years old. in many respects, we are far too stovepiped, the way the department of defense used to be. then they had goldwater nichols. in 1986, almost 40 years after their creation. i am trying to get dhs to a place where we, and a more collaborative fashion, function in terms of our acquisition decisions and budget decisions. in a more centralized way early in the cycle, earlier in the process. now whenever 13th year, not wait 40 years. that is what our unity of ef

and conclude the association's "principal motive in doing so was to align apa and curry favor with dod that is the department of defense. among the leading officials it implicates are the director of the apa ethics office, stephen behnke. after the apa received the hoffman report, behnke reportedly departed his position last wednesday. it is unclear whether he was fired or resigned. he has now hired former clinton fbi director louis j freeh to defend him. we invited a representative from the apa to join us, but they declined. meanwhile, the guardian reports the new details could provide grounds to file ethics charges against members of the apa. recommendations for reform are expected to be made ahead of the apa's annual convention in toronto next month. for more we are joined by two guests. in boston, dr. stephen soldz is a professor at the boston graduate school of psychoanalysis and co-founder of the coalition for an ethical psychology. earlier this month, he was invited to address the apa's board of directors with steven reisner on the organization's response to the anticipated hoff

now surpasses dod in the total number of cases filed with osc despite the fact that dod has twice the number of civilian personnel. i know that secretary mcdonald and his team are working to change the culture at the v.a. yet complaints keep coming. more must be done to change the culture at the v.a. to improve the system so that there is aggressive action against those who retaliate against whistleblowers. the question i have for you is but i would also like to hear what ms. halliday have to say is what specifically do we need to do to change the culture here? >> i think there are several steps that we can take. there are no easy fixes. there are important stacks that the v.a. can take. we have to keep working to change the culture to embrace whittle -- whistleblowers. changing the culture begins with an understanding that we need employees to come forward and report health and safety issues. we don't shoot the messenger, we reward them. we give awards to people who identify problems. deputy secretary gibson came into our public servant of the year ceremony last fall where we honor d

secretary johnson: from my dod lawyer days, my view is that when you are talking about overseas acts, when you are talking about state actors, it is less significant whether we characterize something as an act of war. more significant is the response being proportionate. not necessarily of the same kind, but proportionate. that is a basic law of war tenant. so i don't know that we necessarily need to put a label act of war on something in order to respond proportionately. but, i do believe that appropriate responses are important. mr. o'keefe: we have time for a couple more. do you have time for two more? secretary johnson: sure. >> i had the privilege of working when they created the whole it thing at the dod. what is your relationship to cyber command at the nsa? does it affect all government, or just you? in the defense department, we were buying computers, aircraft carriers. secretary johnson: my acquisition reform is for thdhs. correct you haven't done it for all government? secretary johnson: i'm not all government. collects i get that. but the question is so much a part of -- s

if you are asking but dod acquisitions, don't get me started. [laughter] that is a different story. >> but think about the size and the time. and what the cost could be as you have to keep repeating it. you want everybody to be doing that, not just you. sec. johnson: there are smart ways to do acquisitions in my view. not beyond our reach. i am a big believer in not necessarily going with the biggest, most expensive tool. sometimes the actor who is a little smaller, leaner hungrier, can do the job better. i know that as a service provider. we, you know, my department is only 12 years old. in many respects, we are far too stovepiped, the way the department of defense used to be. then they had goldwater-nichols in 1986, almost 40 years after their creation. i am trying to get dhs to a place where we, and a more collaborative fashion, function in terms of our acquisition decisions and budget decisions. in a more centralized way early in the cycle, earlier in the process. now whenever 13th year, not wait 40 years. that is what our unity of effort in

white house announced the establishment of a cyber security sprint team comprised of omb, nsa, dhs, and dod personnel to conduct a 30-day review of the federal government's cyber security policies, procedures, and practices. on a re-prioritized basis, we are deploying teams to assess the highest value systems across the federal/civilian government and hunt for and remove adversaries identified in the system. this response to the opm breach is part of a much broader federal cyber security effort that has been underway for some time. there is a great deal that has been done and is being done now to secure our networks. we do in fact block a large number of intrusions, including those by state actors. but we can and must do more. as i've said before, congress can help. by law, each head of the federal department or agency is primarily responsible for his or her own cyber security. the department of homeland security has overall responsibility for protecting federal civilian systems from cyber threats, helping agencies better defend themselves, and providing response teams to assist agencies du

dod's working this. literally said that, a version of that in august of 2014 and in june of 2015. did it take the department of defense a year to come up with a strategy to defeat isis? >> i'll take that. first of all, thank you for your conversation. thank you for everything you're doing, especially with respect to our asia pacific strategy senator. very grateful for that and your travels there and your leadership. we just spoke yesterday at the pentagon with the president about his strategy. and the strategy is the one -- >> you laid out. >> i described today. >> so he can't -- >> by the way he described eight or nine months ago. and that doesn't -- and this is important. it involves us, and we have an important role. >> right. >> but it involves other parts of the government as well. that's one of the reasons to keep laboriously citing nine lines of effort. there really are nine lines of effort. we don't directly, for example try to interdict self-radicalized americans. the fbi does that. we don't do that. but we've got to do that while we're working on these difficult problems

. >> in the dod. >> right. >> why, and i don't want anyone to lose their job. >> i'm with you. don't mention other areas. >> why the troops as opposed to the civilian personnel? >> excellent question. i'm with you. we have more civilians now in the pentagon in dod tan we did during the high watermark of the cold war. it's completely insane. i and others and members of congress have head, you can safely cut through attritions i experienced if '87 in the reagan draw down, he did cuts successfully without diminishing our ability. >> when reagan was in office. >> exactly. he had a planl. they were executing that plan based on the strategy. we don't have a global strategy. so we can safely cut certain areas, you point out. civilians are the prime target. they should be reduced. >> that is a safe area. generals staffs, generals should be cut. we don't ice as many as we did back in the cold war. >> let's talk about what comey said. he didn't have the tools that he needed. we the united states, the most technolookically advanced nation the most powerful nation, allegedly, supposedly, h

the recent shipments of live anthrax bacteria from dod to u.s. and international laboratories, similar to last year's potential exposures of cdc personnel to live anthrax bacteria shows multiple brake downs in compliance with established policies and inadequate oversight of high containment laboratories. this is another example in an ongoing series of safety lapses which continue to occur often with the same root cause as for prior incidents. we've been lucky so far. researchers in these labs work with high-risk biological agents that may result in serious or lethal infections, and in some instances have the potential to be used in biological weapons. these labs do important work with pathogens to develop vaccines and countermeasures and to understand emerging infectious diseases. however, the pathogens handled by these laboratories also have the potential for high-consequence accidents. if this were to have occurred with high contagious element, we could have had consequences far beyond what we've seen today. gao is conducting work with this com

it does tell them they have within dod policy anyway the authority to do that. >> reporter: the pentagon says there are more than 7,000 u.s. military facilities that are not on base or other areas where restrictions on access provide a basic first line of defense. those facilities include recruiting stations rotc units and recruiting centers. but the pentagon doesn't want well meaning defense to show up outside military facilities to protect the civilian force. we ask that civilians do not stand guard at recrueltying offices. it could unintentionally create security risks. one point, it's not clear when someone approaches a military facility with a gun, whether they're a friend or foe. the pentagon wands to see other upgrades such as better physical procedures and tighter facilities, and better mass alert system so everyone is noiferred right away of a threat of -- notified right away of the presence of an active shooter. he's given facilities until august 31 to get back to him with a plan. erica. >> thank you, jamie. >>> dr. martin luther king, jr. was once a pastor at the ebb ebenezer

property. >> that's correct. >> so you think that this gun-free zone thing that's going to stop, the dodgoing to be forced to change that policy? >> we would think that i don't know whether you have a president that doesn't admit that something is terrorism, which this happens over and over again. >> he have to admit this is terrorism. how do you see this? do you see this as mr. guilliams does as defining moment in american terrorism? >> i do, bill. there there is t. serns me this is talk lone gunman on domestic terrorism. this is a probable isis attack against the united states. more precisely a probable attack by the global jihad movement. this idea that we don't know whether this gunman was inspired or directed by isis that's a distinction without a difference. we know right now isis's strategy is to promote the global jihad movement by inspiring or directing these attacks. this guy is isis inspired. >> what if it turns out the fbi is scrubbing his machines, finding out who he was in contact with what he posted, what he said. what if it turns out like the boston marathon bombers that

if you're asking about dod acquisitions, don't get me started. that's a different story. >> think about the size and the times and for people to understand what the costs are going to be as things get better and you have to keep repeating it. >> there are smart ways to do acquisition in my view. i'm a big believer in not necessarily going with the biggest and most expensive tool. sometimes the actor who is a little leaner can do a better job. my department is only 12 years old. in many respects we are stove piped. ask a final question. anne: i have experienced both systems. you mentioned gateways and how people tried to intrude upon various gateways. there are numerous attempts at spearfishing. >> if they're not, they probably should be. that's the answer to the question. >> thank you very much for being with us. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] >> on the next washington journa

. >> in the dod. >> right. >> why, and i don't want anyone to lose their job. >> i'm with you. don't mention other areas. >> why the troops as opposed to the civilian personnel? >> excellent question. i'm with you. we have more civilians now in the pentagon in dod tan we did during the high watermark of the cold war. it's completely insane. i and others and members of congress have head, you can safely cut through attritions i experienced if '87 in the reagan draw down, he did cuts successfully without diminishing our ability. >> when reagan was in office. >> exactly. he had a planl. they were executing that plan based on the strategy. we don't have a global strategy. so we can safely cut certain areas, you point out. civilians are the prime target. they should be reduced. >> that is a safe area. generals staffs, generals should be cut. we don't ice as many as we did back in the cold war. >> let's talk about what comey said. he didn't have the tools that he needed. we the united states, the most technolookically advanced nation the most powerful nation, allegedly, supposedly, h

. >> reporter: for model beverly johnson, one of the two dod women who have accused bill cosby of sexually admission is a relief. >> i am very happy for the women. i see that a lot of them are relieved and feel vindicated and validated, and that's good. perhaps maybe we can all start a healing process. >> reporter: last night a sealed court document was made public stating the embattled comedian said yes when asked under oath if he purchased quaaludes to give to women he wanted to have sex with. a lawyer asks him you gave them to other people? cosby answers yes. when you got the quaaludes, was did in your mind that were you going to use these quaaludes for young women that you wanted to have sex with? again, cosby answers yes. the seeming admission released after a judge released the deposition from a 2005 case brought against him by andrea constand accusing him of sexually assaulting her in his pennsylvania home. cosby settled case in 2006 for an undisclosed amount but we were told that the only reason he settled is because it would have been embarrassing in those days to put all those wo

bringiging technologies from isel that will be managed with thee dod iorder to make surure that we ean erate e as aocal american company iorder t buil a nice base. what is nice about the usa it is definitely a territoryryhat we can continue to proeduce for a nicece group but will a assist us in our business plans going forward. vago: whenen you look at that activity incncludi what you're progmming,g, whaare the specific market areas and oductsts that are going to have particular appeaeal to the peagon?? >>e are very strong with the sensor part of the busess. radars and her technologies that we are leaeaving in the state-of-the-art solututions in thworld. we a focusing o u uav and bt solulutions. my philosophy is thatnything that can be on grant will be unmannnned ithe future. cilian and comommercial a aviatioion is n not excxcluded fromhis finition. i thinwe a are presently working onon this edition, a we see ourselves as the greater player in this area moving forward. vago: tell l us abo your globa grow plan. you hahave a built-in handicap in that there is a lot of arab countries yo

this dod directive issued in 1992 and then re-issued in 2001 is the rope -- reason why. i mans military personnel who are not deployed and training with weapons, from carrying firearms at work, unless their duties include security or law enforcement or if there's an immediate threat to life or dod property. today a number of politicians and former marine corps colonel oliver north are saying the law northeasts to change. >> if you're at the white house right now sign the executive order, releasing that regulation that goes back to 1992 and say everybody in a military base with a firearm can carry it with them. >> there have been more than 20 shootings at military installses since the mid-1990s when the law went into effect. the worse mass murder at a military baseas to forthood in 2009 when major hassan. and a navy veteran shot and killed 12 people at a washington navy yard. when it comes to suggestionses that military personnel should be armed at work the army chief of staff is urging caution saying, quote, we have to be careful about overarming of uses. he is not talki

how often do you talk to her and say, hey, susan, you guys should charge for dod? vod? od -- chad hurley: we trade e-mails from time to time, but she has done a great job at google, and i am sure she will do a great job at youtube. we have had a chance to meet from time to time. i had not been to the youtube offices in a while. i went back for lunch. i was surprised they are continuing to expand their offices. it is always a treat to see that, but just to speak with her in person, she is focused on the right things. i have told her the same things i have told you -- i think you have to go back to your core. it is about providing tools to your creators. it is about supporting the community. some of the reasons i left -- i felt like i didn't want to stick around to be the token founder. it's actually about creating tools and opportunities for people to create better content. emily: you recently sparred with mark cuban online, who claimed youtube couldn't get anything right, so you tweeted, knowing -- registering domain, $20, selling domain, $1.65 billion. knowing mark cub

dod has the twice number of civilian personnel. i know that secretary mcdonald are working to change the culture but complaints keep coming. more has to be done to change culture at va and -- to improve the system so that there is aggressive action against those who retaliate against whistleblowers. the question i have for you is -- that i would also like to hear what she has to say what to change culture here? >> there are important steps that the va can take. we have to keep working the embrace with the blowers. changing the culture begins with an understanding that we need employees to come forward and report health and safety issues. we don't shoot the -- that's great. i understand the secretary tries to meet with whistleblowers when he goes and visits facilities, that's trerr -- terrific. after he leaves, they have to be told to recognize and support whistleblowers. they need to keep meeting with whistleblowers, listen to them and praise them and repeat it until it gets hold. they could do more training. they are training now.

dod has the authority. they have a workaround for a number of international standards for specific areas like a rock and afghanistan. >> you spoke of landrieu delays -- land route delays. what if we should have something like this that should happen again, with such a large footprint, can you foresee a time we would need to reduce the footprint and streamline to be more effective? we now have 5500 personnel. if this happens again, what do we do about that? >> if i could say does good things. that's if i could say two things -- if i could say two things and the instance this would happen again, we are working very hard. we would fall back on creative logistics. your question in principle, will be look to draw down the mission. we are looking at a variety -- how effective is the team being? what we might be up to do on the economy -- >> i do not underestimate the complexities of the problem. my concern is we are seeing a turn -- we're seeing a pattern where we have become so cumbersome with it. it comes cumbe

in that document the dod sought to transition out of iraq and afghanistan into an era of rerelative stability. the new documents he''s a campaign against nationstates an violent extremists. joing us are our guguests. gentlemen, welcome to the program. andy, let me start with you. talk to us a little bit abobout how markedly different this document is from the last one. the president of the united states just a couple of years ago was talking about getting off an eternal war footing. tell us ho big of a shift this is in certain intellectual aspects. >> i think it is quite d dramatic. the lt one talksks about transitioning from a decade of war to preparing for challenges to come. this document lays oua very different context. it is clear abou the threats we are confronting. it highlights objectives we need to meet. but this is not about transitiononing from war to preparing for the future. this is about an era in which we are going to being gauged continuously for years to come. >> i agree with that. it is a great transitional document in setting up the world. where it fails is in following up

doesn't mean that that's what the services will ultimately decide, but it does tell them they have within dodolicy anyway, the existing authority to do that. >> the pentagon says it does not want civilian forces protecting the units. >>> sheila macvicar spoke to some insiders who say this jet is not ready to take off. >> reporter: what does it mean if the marine corps declares ioc? >> it's a sham. >> reporter: tom christy is a former high-ranking pentagon official. he was the senior advisor to the secretary of defense for the testing of weapons. the sham as christy calls it is a decision by the marine corps to declare its version of the f35 fighter plane ready for combat, or in military speak, ioc. >> the program has been embarrassing and they are just at the point to say we're going to take whatever we get. >> reporter: a recent assessment by the pentagons own director the office christy once occupied, has identified safety problems with the marine's f35, some so severe they could have flight-critical effects. >> let's look at why this airplane is so dangerous. >> reporter: pierre is an engi

first of all, if i may say, i don't know that report and clearly many of them must apply to dhs and dod, however, on the transformer question, if you look at our energy review published in april, we do identify emp as a risk to transformers and we're beginning to try to work up a response to that. >> so again, why did this deal -- my point being -- will provide a number of questions on the record to make sure we start taking action to provide some protection. we have heard 50 billion to 100 billion, 104 billion, that in our terms doesn't seem like that that much but it's 13% of iran's economy. if for example, the american economy had an interjection of 13% of our economy, that would be $2.4 trillion. so this isn't chump chang chang -- change. but what this deal does is it interjects tens of billions 13% up front of iran's economy into the economy of the largest state sponsor of terrorism, so when the senator said, you know, we have them right where we want them, i agree. we certainly didn't want them with centrifuges but this strengthens their hands, and from that standpoint i'm highly