and dod was maybe not awake or present for those discussions. and so it's only now they're starting to integrate a lot of these lessons learned. and i think that is really important, and hope it's going to change. i hope when moira writes her next book, or several years from now when she does an assessment hopefully she'll be able to report some progress. and quickly on 1208 i'd say i've had some conversations about this in the wake of the niger press. i don't think you can tell me that you know what happened in niger was going on under 1208 authorities. i don't think many people including the people who work at dod can tell me. because the truth is dod often use -- they have a number of different authorities that range from security cooperation to joint training and exercises to the 1208 kind of authority that all occupies this kind of space with fuzzy lines. and often those authorities are used in conjunction, and you don't really know what activity is being done under what authority. and that's not really good for transparency. so i think we'

dod was that may be awake or present for those discussions. so now they're starting to integrate the lessons learned. i hope it will change and when he went the next book ten years from now need to reassessment you can report some progress for that very reason. i've had some conversations about this i don't think you can tell me that what happened there was happened under 12 authorities. dod often has a number of different authorities that range from security cooperation to join training and exercises to the authority that occupy the space often those authorities are used in conjunction when you don't always know what activity is being done under what authority. we have to figure it out and how to be clear before the partner nation and the american taxpayer of lower spending on what activities. i don't know what the exact answer is but the general discussion needs to be had. >> i cannot agree more some quick thoughts, i think you're spot on the best case scenarios not only to get on the best page with yourself but also at the partner would be

i think getting dod money coordinator is important. what's going to be even more important is getting some of that money out of dod and into the hands of the people who build schools and drill wells and provide healthcare and set up the rule of law, and to set it up so that there is a cooperative experience within the country. i did a trip to africa in 2009 i think it was, in which we visited a lot of different countries to try to get an idea. so how are we doing? we went to morocco and rwanda, congo, egypt, and really it very from country to country how will our government worked. a lot of it depended upon the ambassador. because if this model is working correctly, the ambassador is in charge of the country and that was something we also went to yemen on that trip, i was stuck about my trip to africa and say with a human and peoples a yemen is that in africa. yet, but we just jumped across the sea and we jumped back. but in human thought was a conflict at the time. the ambassador had a very large military presence there, and he wanted

, cot if ication of dod authorities. there used to be 120. thanks to these guys there is much more streamlined efficiency. 117, sorry. 120 is hyperbole. but the point is that it is a new trend in the u.s. government to have so many dod authority with so much money. that's what's new in the past 15 years. the reason that's of concern to some, including people who have worked at the state department and other civilians is there is so much other types of assistance provided. including the bill with over $1 billion of u.s. tax dollars, for courts, judges and police. and in many of the countries that matters for fragile states, police and dod equities do not much. so interior minister does border, et cetera. that matters, coordination between assistance prerogatives and theories and strategies that are with expertise resides in the state department and dod and u.n. for example for peacekeeping, a lot of effort and good ones at dod and other puros to improve peacekeeping and what we know about peacekeeping and they are tested

dod has the money at the end of the day. when the state department all these other people are battling to have influence over a given country, if the department of defense happens to be there in any sort of force, they are the ones with the huge pot of money. it's 55% of the discretionary budget. the other 45% is spread out over everybody else. so tendency to have dod do a whole lot of different things they shouldn't be doing. one example was given to me when i was at kenya at dinner a great argument with a young woman between the state department and two navy seals traveling with me about state department and military running country and how security is how it all started, if military wasn't doing it how would you do that. but the state department woman had a good story how this branch of the military for the u.s. had gone up and started drilling wells in this town up in northern kenya where they needed wells. so without talking to state department they just went up and did it. and pretty soon people who were either activel

of the wmd threat to underscore the need for a global strategy to combat the threat the most recent dod strategy was released june of 2014. as i have just laid out the scope and complexity of the problem has only increased this requires the dod to reassess its strategy to ensure we are postured appropriately with organization and authority in capabilities to most effectively confront this threat to mitigate existing ones to responding in the event of an incident and then to provide the subcommittee with their candid assessment as well as provide recommendations on any changes to the current approach that may be warranted. additionally the preferences to deal with the threat before reaches the shores we must be prepared to respond quickly and effectively to the wmd event in the homeland. while dod is not the lead organization in particular the national guard plays a key role to civil authorities like the fema or department of homeland security and local authorities. we would appreciate an update on planning and efforts in the event of a wmd attack on the homeland and lastly it has been o

org provide dod oversight. we make sure reports are thorough and complete, and done all they should do to track leads, to interview appropriate people. we do that level of oversight. make sure reviews to they are following the rules and regulations and are adhering to quality standards. we provide that oversight. asked, whon often oversees us? we are overseen by other i.g.'s. we are also regularly overseen by the gao. that is a good thing. rep. tsongas: to you have the ability to refer a case back? how often have you had to do that? >> i don't have the exact numbers, but there are times where we do that. if we reached a conclusion that is not supported by the evidence, we refer to them for the additional work. rep. tsongas: i don't know if you would like to comment how you do your job in a way that you feel is fair-minded, given that you come out of the service you are overseen. -- you are overseeing. cidy last job, i was a commander, and i had three friends. this one, i have no friends. this one, i have no fri

>> this is much broader than the dod and cyber command. the department of homeland security is responsible for the election infrastructure in the segments that the private have been identified as critical infrastructure they are the sector lead in fact i had this conversation with the department in the last couple of weeks about what we are giving to generate insight and knowledge and help the effort and the leadership role. >> let me be appropriate and respectable and interject, please because time is fleeting. for someone who is looking out for the common defense of the country to say they've got the lead in this and that, but i'm cyber command and it's going to be a combatant command, that doesn't cut it over here. >> the challenge is we have the law and of the legal framework that shapeof shapes what dod cad cannot do. >> what do you need as the commander to say go after and punish these guys that are trying to tear apart our critical infrastructure? >> a policy decision that indicates the direction to do that and again, i would have t

that's peter dods. back in 1984, scotland won the grand slam, dods kicked the shot.hat culture into the national team. gregor townsend is perhaps gala's most famous son. as coach of scotland, townsend has beaten australia tries since the last six nations. i think scotland's unpredictable. and i think that is a great thing, because too many games now predictable. these current players are amateurs, just like they we re players are amateurs, just like they were in peter dods's day. dods was back to work on the monday, he was a joiner. and he still is.|j back to work on the monday, he was a joiner. and he still is. i went to the bakers on the monday, got my roles. —— got my roles. the bakers on the monday, got my roles. -- got my roles. what he would dearly love is a professional tea m would dearly love is a professional team to return to the borders. it would give the slides a chance to fulfil their rugby dreams, at home. —— these lads. the sprinklers are on, martin. who is going to be a six nations champion? england. you will hear lots more across the next six weeks o

it is critical to resource the dod, oig, and service and component i.g.s particularly when the dod continues to grow. in conclude, the dodoig and service i.g.s have a challenging but critically important mission to investigate allegations of misconduct thoroughly, fairly, professionally and timely and we will continue to seek to fulfill that important responsibility. that concludes my statement and i will be glad to answer any questions. >> thank you, mr. final. lieutenant general quantock? >> thank you, sir. chairman coffman, ranking member speier, thank you for the opportunity to testify on senior leader misconduct. on belaugh of the army, our chief of staff, thank you for your support of our soldiers, army civilians, families, and veterans. the army holds its senior leaders to the highest st eses s standards. the trust and confidence of the american people which is intrinsic to who we are as an army is rooted in our character and our credibility. we do acknowledge problems exist and we take senior misconduct very seriously. over the past decade, substantiated allegations against only 3% o

i look internally to the dod at-large. the good news is we are starting to see change and things are happening. >> punctuation i'm not. i can't stress that enough. over the past maybe 15 years or so, the organization in my opinion has drifted away from risk management to risk amelioration. we are trying to get risk out of the equation. i can get you 20 risk. i can afford it. we have to become true and get back to the game of managing risk. it is not going to be perfect and i don't mean to talk cavalierly. that is not what i'm talking about directly. we have to deal to quantify the risk, and manage the in order to get the best effectiveness and efficiency out of what we are doing. i think we've strayed away from madison enterprise and we need to get back there. >> any idea how to do that giving your perspective on things as an investor you are constantly managing risk in your portfolio. how is it that this industry grows quickly enough to meet the needs that we have while simultaneously being careful enough. the macbook, if

which is administered by dod. are there things we can do before people take that uniform off that can help them in the long run as far as guidance, counseling, on the track to a profession, you know, rather than va and what you do being reactive later, what can we do more on the front end? >> that's a great point. and that's one of the goals we have and one of the things we strive for is contact the veterans upstream, even as they are separating. we have a program we call excel where we work directly with the national guard which is big in cincinnati, army national guard, work directly with them with the veterans separating to help them with their resume l the culture change they are going to see from a military unit to civilian office in terms of everything from the direct feedback you might get in the military that you might not get in the civilian workforce. went to the basics. but we continue to see underemployment is a big concern. so we help them take the experience they have in the military and be able to c

i note that while dod is not necessarily the lead organization for the homeland response mission, id, in particular, the national guard place a key role in the unique support to civil authorities like the federal emergency management authority and local author i tis. we would appreciate a update on the d.o.d. planning and fulfi fulfillment of the vital mission of defending an attack on the homeland. lastly, one year since the unified campaign plan has identified socome with the respon responsibility for the d.o.d.'s mission which includes drafting a new plan and establishing intelligence priorities and encountering global d.o.d. operations. general osterman, we look for you for the the update of what they have done to combat this vulnerability, and any steps that have been taken and any challenges for cocom to execute this important mission. we thank you for being here this afternoon, and we look forward to the testimony on this important topic. i call on the ranking member to make his opens statement. >> one of the -- when all else fails. improvise. okay. okay. how's that [ laughter

this is borne out by the data on page 66 of a dod inspector general report on, quote, top dod management challenges, unquote, is a finding of a 13% i crease of complaints alleging misconduct by senior officials from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2017, from 710 to 803. an increase in substantiated rate increase from 26% to 37%. the most common allegations involve personal misconduct including improper relationships, improper personnel actions, misuse of governmental resources, and travel violations. in my time on this committee i've heard over and over the importance of the chain of command and how it leads to better justice outcome. but many senior leaders who should be the essential core of the chain of command are not being held to the same standard as the rank and file. this core rupts fairness, justice, and morale. to illustrate the severity, i want to highlight five cases of senior misconduct from just the last few years. as you will see, these senior leaders committed serious crimes and rule violations, yet received only light, administrative, not judicial punishment. most got no

questions and i think they are a yes or no answers that the mission on national mission teams under dod cyber strategy against the united states have quote significant consequences. is that accurate? >> yes. the russia's -- >> although, if i could, i would phrase it, that's an accurate for cyber, we don't have to down to the team level but i understand what you are saying sir. >> to steal information from candidates legal parties and misinformation and social media to break into state election board networks of significant through national security? >> certainly successful. yes. >> do you agree with the d dnicoate testimony that they will continue with strategic objectives unless they face clear repercussions? >> yes, sir, that's my testimony as well in the hearing. >> is russia interfering with public elections? >> i believe they are. >> i aside from a presidential finding are there any other organizations other than the cyber command cyber mission forces that have the authority and capability to disrupt russian election hacking operations where they originate? and does the fbidhs or s

you asked us what role dod could play to protect the u.s. elections, and i think simply dod, working with congress, has got to demand a whole of government strategy to fight against this the enduring disinformation and influence operation. we don't have a national strategy. unfortunately, modernizing our nuclear forces will not stop a russian influence operation. that's where we are missing a grave threat that exists in the american people's palm of their hand and on their computer screens. it is vital that we start talking publicly about this threat and educating the american people on a bipartisan basis. tragically, the russian campaign has already deeply polarized our country which only serves the kremlin's interest as one of the most trusted institutions in the united states, the department of defense must leverage that trust with the american people to mitigate russian influence. simply put, the department of defense has to model the bipartisan and fact-based action and behavior and awareness that will help reduce societal division. thi

>> you can argue that probably -- some argue of dod and doj and the standing authority in that regard. >> but the teams at the origin of the attacks have the authority to do so? >> granted the authority. they don't have the day to day authority. >> are you would have to be .irected by the president >> have you been directed by the

that's peter dods. commentator: peter dods, with this vital conversion kick... for a team filled with borderers. in the border culture we are fighters. you could put us into a dogfight and the strongest dog wins. i think that culture is still there. i think with gregor townsend being the coach now, he will bring that culture into the national team. he's there, gregor townsend. perhaps gala's most famous rugby son, now the coach of a resurgent scotland team. under his guidance they've beaten australia, home and away, with exciting attacking rugby. commentator: hugh jones trying to make it... the maths? in england there are nearly 400,000 registered rugby players. in scotland, 49,000. you are by far the smallest nation and yet you are able to beat australia twice, you're able to go into the six nations with real belief. how come? this is a good question. i believe being small has its advantages. it has its advantages in that you can recognise and identify players quicker that are maybe standing out. small means we can work together closer. well a coach can only pi

that's peter dods.811, scotland beat everyone. five nations grand slam. dods kicked the points. in the border culture we are fighters. you could put us into a dogfight and the strongest dog wins. i think that culture is still there. i think with gregor townsend being the coach now, he will bring that culture into the national team. gregor townsend. famous son of gala, now the coach of a resurgent scotland team. exciting, attacking, they've recently beaten australia twice. commentator: huw jones trying to make it... yet scotland do this with just two professional rugby clubs. how? this is a good question. i believe being small has its advantages. it has its advantages in that you can recognise and identify players quicker that are maybe standing out. small means we can work together closer. well a coach can only pick players who are fit and injuries are everywhere. as wales completed their preparations here they can think of a dozen players they could have had in their squad, but they are out injured. ag

some combination of dod or doj understanding authority in that regard. >> that the mission teams at the origin of these attacks so. >> i don't have the data day-to-day authority to do that. if granted that. >> have been directed to do so given the strategic threat that face the united states and the consequences you recognize are ready? >> no. i would be glad to grant more detailed in a classified session. i have directed the national mission forced to begin some specific work that i will not want to publicly go into that. >> is inherent ability of the commander to prepare a plan that you need the direct authority of the president to do some specific things. >> there's something that have the authority. >> essentially we have to take it out the russians yet. watching them intrude in our elections, spread misinformation, become more sophisticated, try to achieve these objectives and were just sitting back and waiting. >> i don't know if i would characterize as sitting back and waiting. but i don't want to get into the classified area. it is fair to say that we have not opted to engage in

that's peter dods. commentator: peter dods, with this vital conversion kick... grand slam. dods kicked the points. in the border culture we are fighters. you could put us into a dogfight and the strongest dog wins. i think that culture is still there. i think with gregor townsend being the coach now, he will bring that culture into the national team. gregor townsend. famous son of gala, now the coach of a resurgent scotland team. exciting, attacking, they've recently beaten australia twice. commentator: huw jones trying to make it... yet scotland do this with just two professional rugby clubs. how? this is a good question. i believe being small has its advantages. it has its advantages in that you can recognise and identify players quicker that are maybe standing out. small means we can work together closer. well a coach can only pick players who are fit and injuries are everywhere. as wales completed their preparations here they can think of a dozen players they could have had in their squad, but they are out injured. against scotland, wales will have to be exp

the dod, this inter-agency review led by the dod has received a lot of attention, and deservedly so. it is especially important that we continue this discussion here today. we need to better understand the underpainting -- underpinning and analysis and strategy that went into the npr. where to interject about general hyten ended. we have such a rich group of interagency participants, experts, this is a phenomenal opportunity for us to all benefit from this. i am very pleased to say that we and as many other agencies departments do, we have a very rich in turn program -- internship program. i will emphasize many of the points that the distinguished speakers before me have made, but they certainly bear to be repeated. first and foremost, the fact that while there are certainly changes in the nuclear posture review, there is much continuity. i want to emphasize 5 points with you today. first, the 2018 nuclear posture withw is fully consistent several decades of u.s. and allied thinking regarding nuclear weapons policy impostures. -- policy and postures. for anso prepare uncertain future

the homeland sustaining american advantages in the western hemisphere as key priorities even as the dod focuses on the rising challenge of great power competitors. as we have seen from increasing economic and military efforts by china and by russia to gain a foothold in the americas and the boundaries between great power competition and unconventional threats are increasingly blurred. i think that's one reason why general dunford made the observation that we have -- that we're using our qualitative and quantitative edge on china and russia. general robinson, you are tasked with addressing the missile and nuclear threats that we face and while i'm encouraged by recent efforts to bolster our homeland missile defense system, more needs to be done to address the ballistic and cruise missile threats. particularly recently we've observed others gaining at that timents that we were not convinced that we had in southcom, you are on the front lines and networks and smuggling drugs and weapons and mono destabilized every koibtcountryg the way and we face involvement with external actors that pres

both the dod and others. dealing with cyber issues. so, we look at this as one of our most important jobs to protect american citizens, protect wherever they might be. and innovating, rather than regulating is the real difference between this administration and the previous administration. we believe that we'll come up with innovation rather than just government regulating and putting another law on the books. you're going to see some really, i think, leading edge innovation. we have the biggest super computing capability in the world in the united states, five of the fastest super computers belong to the department of energy. so, you will see our data analysis being a great deal of this as well as we move towards the scale model and doe is right in the middle of all of that. ainsley: will you explain what this means in layman's terms? are repreventing hacking or preventing nuclear plants from being attacked and what is a super computer? >> anxiously, all of the above. when we talk about protecting the american citizens from a cyber at

the first audit in dod history will reveal how we can be better stewards. the department is transitioning to a culture of performance and affordability that operates at the speed of relevance. we will prioritize speed of delivery, and tenuous continuous -- adaptation, and frequent modular upgrade. with your critical support, we will shed outdated processes while adopting american industry's best practices. if current structures inhibit our pursuit of lethality, i expect my agency heads to consolidate, eliminate, and restructure to achieve the mission. one of the key elements of the 2018 national defense strategy is to ensure america's military provides a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. last january, president trump directed a nuclear posture review to ensure the u.s. nuclear deterrent is robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies. i recently received a letter from senators concerned that the 2018 nuclear posture review would undermine the existential threat posed by nuclear

dod is going to prioritize r&d funding for missile systems. he tells what options you are looking at -- can you tell us what options you're looking at? i'm just looking for a little more insight on the r&d program. gen. hyten: it is important to say that the npr does not summering crews launch missile. everything from surface into summary, different -- into submarines, different types of submarines. the president's budget has requested us to go look at those platforms, and we are going to walk down that at. when you look at the other capabilities that we're talking about for defensive systems, where looking at multiple options for defense. eric, ground, c, where looking at a number of different options where, ground, sea, looking at a number of different options. will have a ground-based element -- we will have a ground-based element, a sea-based element. we have not made any commitment to any of those at this point. we are just recommending to the president's budget that we begin to explore this technologies -- these technologies. >> the npr

we saw this in demonstrated in dod's support to the states and territories affected by hurricanes, wildfires an floods in this past year. we thank you for that. you also dual hat at commander of the north of north american defense command, norad, opportunities with canada to did heter and defend against threats to our nation. you're also responsible for the operation of our homeland ballistic missile defense system. we look forward to hearing about your priorities for further improvements to the ground-based missile defense system this is particularly important in light of the growing threat from north korea. lastly your relationship with the military leadership in mexico along with your collaboration with admiral tidd and other federal agencies is crucial to promoting security along our southern border. a number of problems at the border originate in the southcom area of operations and efforts to address those problems require a whole of government approach. admiral tidd, you are on the front lines of the significant threat facing our nation, the opioid crisis n 2016 we saw 64,000 deaths fr

this is a real issue for dod.you can argue about climate one way or the other but you'll have to have your making sure your lives of your citizens are protected. dod i think this is a case where they can't call things climate related. you're going to put up a request to congress for money from this administration that has a climate line but there are things you have to do a normal operations and maintenance to protect yourself. i think you'll see some of that going forward. i have seen today a disturbing report on a huge -- for clean energy which relates to this so i think this is an area where there's a conversation to be had on capitol hill about how the president's budget is treated once it reaches them. >> all right one more question. right there. >> good evening a lieutenant colonel in the marine corps it. given the current administration's restrictive trade policy's the weakening of the dollar and the rollback of regulations on banking and finance how will this affect the economy a year or two from now? >> a

the dod just asked for another $18 billion to put into things like artificial intelligence and machine learning. weapons will have decisionmake capability. they're defensive in nature. the patriot system, the aegis system, antimissile systems, but more and nor offensive weapons well sort of sneak up on the decisionmaking capable. right now the defense of defense says a human will always be in the loop -- or on the loop or at least watching the loop. but war will be so fast that humans willing become irrelevant, and we may actually slide into a case of decisions being made by machines and not even really know it. weapons will go to a target area, decide who to kill, and take action. they might seek permission first. they might not if there's no communication. these things are good. don't get me wrong. drones and all of these technologies, to make our soldiers better, are good. they keep the soldiers out of harm's way but need to come with a little bit of thinking. enhancements. i talk in the become about soldier enhancements. there's a yuck factor involved in this. exoskeletons to help

how many veterans are getting oust dod are homeless in the first five years or so? >> i honestly don't have the answer to that. do you have a quick estimate? >> i don't have an estimate, but we have a work group that works with dod, vpa and others looking at the transitioning members and following them down and assessing homeless rates, but we are very early in that process. >> you are in the process. i think it's a key number to figure out. what is the problem here. why does this occur? it kind of reminds me, you see situations of a child who presents the emergency room every three weeks or so with a cough. you treat the cough and they get a little better. three weeks later, they are back with the same cough. at some point you want to go into the home and figure out why they are getting the kouchlt you find there is a mold growing or whatever the case may be. this is an important information because it's current and it's now. this goes back to what we want to do or consider doing in the transition process. if the majority of people are homeless in the first three y

we have the dod with current clearances and those types of things that would be helpful. that tends to be longer. i think the all-in-one hiring is helpful, but expanded ability to waive would be good. >> i wanted to make the committee aware we have ongoing work currently looking at the challenges that apartment is facing in terms of border patrol agents hiring and we anticipate reporting on that later this year. one thing i would caution is that it's important to understand the root causes both in terms of what's presenting-- preventing you from hiring the right people in the need to balance the goal of hiring additional agents and making sure we are not in some way compromising the quality of the agents we are getting and i know that is something that you are well aware of, but i think it's important to the size having a goal to hire more is one thing, but a process to hire the right people is a totally different thing i want to make sure that balance is not lost in the rush to hire additional agents. >> i don't think there is anyone at the table that would disagree. >>

current ts dod with clearances as well. ishink the all-in-one hiring really helpful, but expanded ability to waive would be good. work do has ongoing personally looking at the challenges the department is facing in terms of border patrol agent hiring and we anticipate hiring -- reporting on that later this year. one thing i would caution is that it is important to understand the root causes us to what is preventing you from hiring the right people and targeting them initially, but also the need to balance the goal of hiring additional agents and making sure we are not in some way compromising the quality of the agents we are getting. i know that is something we are well aware of, but i think it is important to emphasize the having a goal to hire is one thing, but having a process to make sure you hire the right people is another thing. sen. lankford: i don't think there's anyone at this table who disagree with that. if there is a specific need that you see -- >> we are doing some work that is identifying limitations in the

we've got to have federal help from the dhs or the dod. the head of our cyber command, admiral rogers, a dedicated professional says he's not been given any directive to do that from his commander-in-chief and superiors. >> the pushback you'll get is we don't need direction, we do so much every day. just because the rest of you have woken up to the reality, doesn't mean the intelligence community, the dod and pentagon haven't been all over this for a long time. do you believe that's a fair pushback? >> i don't believe it's fair. i don't think admiral rogers believes it either. i said, look, we failed as the u.s. was humiliated by a foreign adversary. i said the u.s. government failed to protect the u.s. democracy. i asked admiral rogers what was the source of that failure. he basically cited two problems. he said, first, we didn't view the electoral system as critical infrastructure. we protect the electricity grid, we protect financial institutions, but the government wasn't protecting the electoral system. the second thing he said, and t

[laughter] i think i have in fact talked about the dod model as being effective in encouraging people to come forward voluntarily and identified, that is how we find lucy identified, that is how we find the. we want to find the before we are victimized. generally, yes. there must be cases you have in mind where you thought there was a white hat hacker that was prosecuted. i would need to know the facts but as a general model yes, we do think that is a effective model. encouraging people to come forward in a constructive way when they identify a flaw. not trying to abuse or misuse it. in order to commit intrusions or infiltrations. >> hi, amy, access now. i wanted to ask the flip side of ed's question. which is, not only will other countries essentially abuse any capability the us has but other countries are now using conversation happening in the eyes and this is been going on for the last few years. to justify implementing measures into their own laws where whether it is brazil, australia, the uk, china. that would limit the amount of security that companies offer their customers. an