as you are probably aware i had a conversation with donald rumsfeld that day indicating to him that if the vote went the wrong way we would not take action and we could not take action. even at that late stage in my own mind we had not unconditionally committed ourselves to using military force. >> campbell described the tenor of this correspondence from his evidence. we share the analysis, we share the concern, we absolutely with you in making sure saddam hussein is faced up to his obligations and that iraq is disarmed. if that can't be done diplomatically and has to be done militarily britain will be there. that is his combination of what the correspondents were saying. were you aware that this was the general tenor of the way the prime minister was putting -- >> that is consistent with what face up to his obligations is conditional. the conditions were his obligations to the united nations and various security council resolution that had been passed. >> you were aware that this was the nature of the exchange? >> i wasn't aware of that specific exchange. what i was aware of was the g

united states, and i wondered what contrast you saw in your role and in its execution and that of donald rumsfeld of the department of state. and how you would characterize your relationship with rumsfeld? >> well, first of all, i first worked with bill cohen, who is don rumsfeld's previous successor. inevitably individuals bring their own style to bear. i would say that probably initially donald was somewhat -- to use the right word suspicious perhaps of a labour government. he was a republican politician. he had been a congressman many years before. he had previously been secretary of defense. i don't think he was whole persuaded a labour government where he could be comfortable. but he had a admiration with the prime minister and we were able to do business. >> how were you able to allay his suspicions during that period? >> i think by being consistent. i think he was -- i think he was anxious to ensure that people did what they said that they were going to do. >> and did you feel you had a good line of communication with him? that you were getting a good picture he have what was in his mind?>

when donald rumsfeld said the lights are on it was not because of anything he did but the study generators who were across baghdad in other neighborhoods. look at what the locals do. the locals know what the solutions are. microprojects are the way to go. quick projects that are sustainable and seen and controlled by locals. some one pointed out don't hand out soccer balls. empower the local. don't make them like you. give him the soccer ball. kill or capture, you have to kill or capture a few but fewer than we think. you will not find stronger advocates of the counterinsurgency approach than people who try to kill or capture their way out of iraq and afghanistan. this is why general kristol is such an advocate. he is trying plan a and he knows it didn't work. >> i agree with that. there is the enemy centric view which focuses on the enemy. they are partially correct. we don't need to focus on the enemy at all. there is some language that says that. we have to do some of that. general david petraeus would tell you, you have to be relentless in pursuing the enemy. that can't be all you do b

you can say it was all donald rumsfeld rick only claire short have been getting along better with the prime minister at the time-- what happened was perhaps it wasn't that grip in the immediate aftermath and again i am speaking way out of my knowledge and expertise but there wasn't that grip. the invasion, the people that talk about catastrophic success and it happened very quickly, and then it became a security problem and then once they think, once al qaeda and the iranians in the way they did come alighted upon it in the way they did, a kind of lack of grip security problem became a really serious security problem and that then affected every aspect of what was going on there. again, tim cross, a lot of the concerns he talked about when he first came, i think they were real concerns, genuinely held but probably sort of bull at a fairly short timeframe, once he managed to get people who were capable of sorting. but once the security security situation developed as it did you didn't have this obviously philosophical difference in approach between the british and americans in terms of

defense secretary donald rumsfeld called the report reprehensible. dick cheney said he was offended. . called it absurd. the washington post editorialized that, quote, lately the organization has tended to save its most vitriolic condemnation not for dictators but for the united states and. it was a clear attempt to try to discredit this organization. i have followed washington politics long enough to know that when top officials attack you instead of ignoring you it is because they are scared of you. the white house's attack on the group's credibility for me at that time was a clear affirmation of amnesty international integrity and power. we are talking about look bush administration but it is important to note that president obama signed the national defense authorization act that endorses another attempt by the u.s. government to conduct military commission trial. amnesty international and irene khan are once again pushing and changing the way we see human rights. in a new campaign called demand dignity amnesty international is seeking to leave p

i had meetings with donald rumsfeld and others.he state department was completely focused on the need to get a further resolution and for the president to go the un route, as they said. but they were not clear on the ninth as to whether or not he was going to do so. i think his speech was the next day, and the united nations on the 10th. even the american administration was not clear as to what was going to be the outcome. perhaps the best example of all of the prime minister influencing the president of united states into a particular course of action. i doubt that without his efficacy of that resolution that the president would have agreed to it. it was clear -- it was not clear in the administration even the day before. >> this is an interesting line of questioning, as to whether you think the british government would have been able to take this matter any further if it had not been on move to take this back to the u.n. security council? >> to take it further? >> in terms of military action if the president had not agreed to go

he was present at the meeting with donald rumsfeld were discussed these issues. when you say would instructions i gave him, he was our representative, but at that stage it was the office of pose conflict planning. ? he must of been sent there for a reason. >> he was sent there to help with the process. he was a man i knew pretty well who was a brilliant logistician. he ran part of a good logistics operation in his previous position. his job was to be part of -- i was not actually in day to day contact with him. he was our representative, and how we judge that he had the right experience and abilities to help make it work. >> he told us that he was passing information back. was that getting to you? >if you knew there was a proble, what steps did you take? did you alerts the prime minister? that fatal errors in planning were made. if you were being alerted, did you inform the prime minister? >> i did not think the prime minister needed separately alerting by me. i accept that there was a mismatch in our system. the lead on civilian construction and development woul

by the way something donald rumsfeld was doing at the same time.ss now it is much more rational and much more likely to come to a good resolution. what you say about obama not having as much foreign policy experience as joe biden is right. what obama has though, is a deliver tiff gift, which -- is a deliberative gift. whether or not you agree with it they found out this process as well as they could. host: the chief of staff for vice-president biden said that "jamie was his own --chen cheney was his own office of government." has vice-president biden benefited from the vice- president cheney's expansion of the office? guest: enormously. when i was hearing this theory, i thought, when the president decided to nominate sonia sotomayor, biden interviewed all the candidates. no one had done that before, until cheney. so biden who was head of the senate judiciary had a perfectly good rationale for doing something that no vice- president had done before, until the cheney. -- dick cheney. clearly, the role that joe biden played in foreign-policy is highly

the then actually had four vetoed a bill that would have expanded the eft boy-- foia of word donald rumsfeldief of staff for ford and his chief aide named dick cheney. so the battle continues to expose government illegalities, atrocities. those people certainly have their day. they deserve to stay in jail as it was a day running the country. [applause] finally i just want to say when i went to the hampton's apartment years later and ask them, is there any thinker fred's that was personal to him that might be useful in my book? bill went down to fred's olbermann came up with this book. it was a book that fred had in it was called deep in my heart by william kunstler. fred wanted to be a lawyer, and fred believe in justice. he said, in 1969, i don't have time to be a lawyer. there is too much else going on, but fred has affected lawyers. he has been the inspiration for our office, people's law office and some of the things we did and i think what kept me going and it was the irony that here we were pursuing hukill fred hampton but it was fred hampton alive the kept us going who inspired us and

ad is part of the reason it is so provocative it is fascinating to me to see the speeches from donald rumsfeld when he was president ford's chief of staff he would say one thing but then gets to the pentagon 1975 and three year four weeks later he comes out with a doctor in a provocative weakness it is what cramer has said for years but when he left office 1977, the farewell speech was that and when he left in 2006 he said i am sorry 1/2 to go back to the same theme of 19772 not display weakness because that will invite our enemies to attack us. is a very seductive and important doctrine and maybe simplistic but that does not mean it does not have a certain kind of power. and it fits in with the view of the world that was quite realistic for kramer and general walker and others who were friends of grand morale and spent their life working as anti-communist as opposed to it today fascist and anti-communist in these were great patriots devoting their whole life. they believed more so and civilians did that this was an absolute essentials strand for american foreign policy. it had to be based on

you can say it was all donald rumsfeld rick only claire short have been getting along better with theme minister at the time-- what happened was perhaps it wasn't that grip in the immediate aftermath and again i am speaking way out of my knowledge and expertise but there wasn't that grip. the invasion, the people that talk about catastrophic success and it happened very quickly, and then it became a security problem and then once they think, once al qaeda and the iranians in the way they did come alighted upon it in the way they did, a kind of lack of grip security problem became a really serious security problem and that then affected every aspect of what was going on there. again, tim cross, a lot of the concerns he talked about when he first came, i think they were real concerns, genuinely held but probably sort of bull at a fairly short timeframe, once he managed to get people who were capable of sorting. but once the security security situation developed as it did you didn't have this obviously philosophical difference in approach between the british and americans in terms of fig

and they did understand that and i think some more than others and it's fair to say that under donald rumsfeld's name mentioned a few times of this committee and i think there were times when you thought he could maybe have bought a bit more about the impact of public statements and other countries but -- >> again, almost exactly a month after your september by reentry you note iraq is still tricky and just wish the americans would do more to put over a proper message to the world. did you have -- were you able to put this through? >> i did, and to be fair they were always very -- i go back and actually i would like if i can i would like you to see the papers we did our around kosovo in september 11th that developed in this way because i think there was the basis and those relationships were very good. i spoke most days we had a system whereby if any of us felt difficult requiring immediate attention happened any of us could instigate a confidence call at any time. >> what are the aspects of american presentation that you found disturbing were unhelpful? >> i suppose -- the have a very different

administration had for detail a bill that would have expanded to include intelligence were a fellow named donald rumsfeld chief of staff, and his chief aide, named dick cheney. so the battle continues to expose government illegalities, atrocities. those people certainly had their day. pages are a day in jail, as was a day running the country. [applause] >> finally, i just want to say when i went over to the hamptons apartment years later, and asked them is there anything here of trantwo's that was personal to him that i could, might be useful in my book? bill went down into fred alderman came up with this book. it was a book that fred had and it was called deep in my heart that it was by william cussler. fred had wanted to be a lawyer. and fred believed in justice. he said, in 1969, i don't have time to be a lawyer. there's too much else going on. by fred had affected lawyers that he has been the inspiration for our office, people's law office, and some of the things we did. and i think what kept me going and it was an irony that here we were, pursuing who killed fred hampton, but it was fred hampton a l

in case of the hijacking, no norad commander or air traffic controller could respond, unless donald rumsfeld could respond. of course, on 9/12, he changed the directive. i have met many commanders who said this is an outrage. i was at the hearings. if this directive was not changed, 9/11 may not have happened. host: admiral james loy? guest: i do not know if i have an opinion about the issuance in the cancellation a few days later, nor on the responsibility of secretary rumsfeld and the defense department. those events become extraordinarily ad hoc depending on what you are dealing with in the moment. my sense is we have totally reorganized our structure as a nation to cope with this notion of terrorism, having as one of its favorite targets commercial aviation. one of the ways we deal with it today offers the traveling public better security than it did before 9/11. host: admiral james loy was the tsa administrator from 2002 through 2003. the secretary of homeland security from 2003 to 2005. what are you up to today? guest: i am a senior counselor at the cohen group. we are trying to solve

and i had meetings with donald rumsfeld, but i also had meetings with armitage and i think colin powell dropped by in the american phrase, and the state department were completely focused on the need to get further resolution. and for the president to go the u.n. track, as they said, but they were not clear on the ninth as to whether or not he was going to do so. and i think his speech was the next day and the united nations on the 10th. so even the u.s. administration was not wholly clear, our parser, as to what was going to be the outcome. again, back to sir roderic's question this morning, perhaps the best example of all the prime minister influencing the president of the united states into a particular course of action. because i doubt that without his advocacy of that resolution, that the president would have agreed to a. it was clear real doubt inside the u.s. administration as to whether he would even the day before. >> we've asked this question of another witness, quite the light of this question, but it's an interesting one. as to whether you think the british government would

by the way, something donald rumsfeld was doing at the same time.f you look up the process now, it is much more rational and much more likely to come to a good resolution. what you say about obama not having as much foreign policy experience as joe biden is right. what obama has, though, is a deliver tiff gift, which -- is a deliberative gift. whether or not you agree with it, they found out this process as well as they could. host: the chief of staff for vice-president biden said that "jamie was his own --che cheneys his own office of government." has vice-president biden benefited from the vice- president cheney's expansion of the office? guest: enormously. when i was hearing this theory, i thought, when the president decided to nominate sonia sotomayor, biden interviewed all the candidates. no one had done that before, until cheney. so biden, who was head of the senate judiciary, had a perfectly good rationale for doing something that no vice- president had done before, until the cheney. -- dick cheney. clearly, the role that joe biden played in

they were saying in 2002 a general and donald rumsfeld and asked the rich to join -- asked thebrits toe war. they said they could not because they had to have a vote for the house of commons, but were very concerned because they knew that saddam hussein had been shooting down the pilot and no- fly zones. he had already developed a long- range missiles which were mobile. the other problem they believed was that they were trying to prevent a surprise attack on the u.s. which would of been worse than 9/11 because it would have been chemical, biological. host: are you familiar with this guest: i am familiar with the inquiry under way in the united kingdom, not with all the details. what the caller was nothing there takes us back to the very difficult decision at the time. saddam was a threat to international peace and security. one dozen u.n. resolutions said so. there had been efforts to shoot down u.s. and u.k. aircraft in the no fly air zones. it was a dilemma at the time. we will face further hard choices and dilemmas ahead. i would hope that the debate over iraq would rise above simpl

i think it is fair to say under donald rumsfeld same it's been mentioned a few times that this committee and i think there were times when you thought he could have maybe thought about a bit more about impact in public statements of other countries but -- is back again almost exactly a month after your september intrigued you note iraq is still tricky just wish the americans would do more to put over a message to the world. you have those you were able to focus two? >> i did and to be fair they were always very -- when i go back and i actually like if i can i would like you to say that he persuaded runge kosovo september 11th that developed in this way because the was the basis and those relationships were very good. i spoke most of today's we have a system whereby if anything -- if any of us felt difficult for equating immediate attention any of us could instigate a confidence call. >> with the aspects of american presentation that you found disturbing war on helpful? >> i suppose they have a very different political system, you can't choose the leadership of another country. but it's j

in case of the hijacking, no norad commander or air traffic controller could respond, unless donald rumsfeld could respond. of course, on 9/12, he changed the directive. i have met many commanders who said this is an outrage. i was at the hearings. if this directive was not changed, 9/11 may not have happened. host: admiral james loy? guest: i do not know if i have an opinion about the issuance in the cancellation a few days later, nor on the responsibility of secretary rumsfeld and the defense department. those events become extraordinarily ad hoc depending on what you are dealing with in the moment. my sense is we have totally reorganized our structure as a nation to cope with this notion of terrorism, having as one of its favorite targets commercial aviation. one of the ways we deal with it today offers the traveling public better security than it did before 9/11. host: admiral james loy was the tsa administrator from 2002 through 2003. the secretary of homeland security from 2003 to 2005. what are you up to today? guest: i am a senior counselor at the cohen group. we are trying to solve

communications, and they did understand that, i think more than others but i think it's fair to say donald rumsfeld's name has been mentioned a few times in this committee, and i think there were times you thought he could have maybe thought about a bit more about impact of public statements on other countries. >> again, almost exactly a month after your september diary entry, you don't iraq is still tricky, tv just wish the americans would do more to to put a proper message to the worker did you have a american interlocutors who you're able to posture to? >> id. and to be fair, they were always very, going back, i if i can, i'd like you to see the papers that we did around september the 11th when they develop in this way because i think that was the basis. those relationships were very good. i spoke most days do, we had a system whereby if anything, any of us felt untoward or difficult, that would cause immediate attention anyone of us could instigate a conference call at anytime spent what was the aspect of american presentations that you found disturbing or unhelpful? >> i suppose, they have a ver

by the way, something donald rumsfeld was doing at the same time.f you look up the process now, it is much more rational and much more likely to come to a good resolution. what you say about obama not having as much foreign policy experience as joe biden is right. what obama has, though, is a deliver tiff gift, which -- is a deliberative gift. whether or not you agree with it, they found out this process as well as they could. host: the chief of staff for vice-president biden said that "jamie was his own --che cheneys his own office of government." has vice-president biden benefited from the vice- president cheney's expansion of the office? guest: enormously. when i was hearing this theory, i thought, when the president decided to nominate sonia sotomayor, biden interviewed all the candidates. no one had done that before, until cheney. so biden, who was head of the senate judiciary, had a perfectly good rationale for doing something that no vice- president had done before, until the cheney. -- dick cheney. clearly, the role that joe biden played in

you can say it was all donald rumsfeld rick only claire short have been getting along better with the prime minister at the time-- what happened was perhaps it wasn't that grip in the immediate aftermath and again i am speaking way out of my knowledge and expertise but there wasn't that grip. the invasion, the people that talk about catastrophic success and it happened very quickly, and then it became a security problem and then once they think, once al qaeda and the iranians in the way they did come alighted upon it in the way they did, a kind of lack of grip security problem became a really serious security problem and that then affected every aspect of what was going on there. again, tim cross, a lot of the concerns he talked about when he first came, i think they were real concerns, genuinely held but probably sort of bull at a fairly short timeframe, once he managed to get people who were capable of sorting. but once the security security situation developed as it did you didn't have this obviously philosophical difference in approach between the british and americans in terms of