dr. hartnett. you've written that restraint and reactive postures are not sustainable, that the united states needs a strategy that capitalizes on the unique attributes of the cyber domain. you called for a strategy of cyber persistence where we are constantly engaged with adversaries seeking to frustrate, confuse and challenge. how would your strategy calling for persistent engagement apply in the russian meddling with our election as an example and should this involve us contesting the malicious behavior at its source and what do you believe are the consequences of our failure to response to the russian election interference? number one, we've got to be able to provide attribution to where it's coming from and hopefully we've got that completed, but give me your thoughts on it. what would you say is an example of persistent engagement with regard to what wooe doe've done already and what they expect them to do? [ inaudible ] >> there we go. is it on? >> thank you. so let's think about the interne

dr. hartnett just said.or me, even just to get a little more specific, the kinds of options that i would want to be seeing presented, right, need to allow decision makers some flexibility from lower level actions like denying troll farm access to compromised infrastructure, deleting some accounts to erasing some systems if it comes to it. it's too important to take options off the table ahead of time. so as long as the options space is kept open, we can do it persistently or less persistently, but it wide range of options. butler: i agree with both michael and richard on this. i would say that we need to be asymmetrical in our response. i'm a big believer in bot net instructions as we saw with levishov and that's a symmetrical response. if you look at the research agency in st. petersburg, they're a couple to the kremlin and the counter influence cam -- campaign where you begin to cut the funding and cut the support enablers behind that infrastructure. so we need to think about things differently. it shouldn