on the 12th of january 945 the red army launched a major offensive in east prussia. at 4 45 am the sky turned as prices day as up to $378.00 guns per kilometer along the front opened fire on the german positions. red army cameraman filmed the apocalyptic scenes as the vam off lines of defense rapidly collapsed. over the previous years german forces had waged a campaign of destruction against the people of the soviet union the nazi ideology painted as racially inferior. now the war on the east front was shifting onto the territory of the rush many germans feared the soviet red army would exact a terrible revenge. to mention how much. they were simply afraid they had been told that the subhuman russians are coming and they were afraid of the red army that of course they also knew about the atrocities the german forces had committed in the soviet union because that was known of an islamist to that extent it was a mixture of prejudice against the russian subhumans a realistic assessment that the red army would not be squeamish and its advance and a clear recognition of t

on the 12th of january 945 the red army launched a major offensive in east prussia. at 4 45 am the sky turned as bright as day as up to $300.00 sub it guns per kilometer along the front opened fire on the german positions. red army cameraman filmed the apocalyptic scenes as the v.m. off lines of defense rapidly collapsed. over the previous years german forces had waged a campaign of destruction against the people of the soviet union the nazi ideology painted as racially inferior. now the war on the east front was shifting onto the territory of the rush many germans feared the soviet red army would exact a terrible revenge. to mention how much. they were simply afraid they had been told that the subhuman russians are coming and they were afraid of the red army that of course they also knew about the atrocities the german forces had committed in the soviet union because that was known of an islamist to that extent it was a mixture of prejudice against the russian subhumans had a realistic assessment that the red army would not be squeamish and its advance and a clear r

on the 12th of january 945 the red army launched a major offensive in east prussia. at 4 45 am the sky turned as bright as day as up to 300 solve it got its perky dahmus and on the front opened fire on the german physicians. red army cameraman filmed the apocalyptic scenes as the vam office lines of defense rapidly collapsed. over the previous years german forces had waged a campaign of destruction against the people of the soviet union the nazi ideology painted as racially inferior. now the war on the east front was shifting onto the territory of the rush many germans feared the soviet red army would exact a terrible revenge. dimension how much. that's had a people who were simply afraid they had been told that the subhuman russians are coming and they were afraid of the red army that of course they also knew about the atrocities the german forces had committed in the soviet union because that was known of and it's us on a mission to that extent it was a mixture of prejudice against the russian subhumans had a realistic assessment that the red army would not be sque

the soviet offenses had smashed their way deep in, overrunning exposed provinces of eight east prussia and the coastal province of pomerania. seizing the german capital first was thus extremely unlikely for the western allies, short of a miracle. that it was also a highly risky operation that i would argue is foreign to eisenhower's sober sense of strategy. eisenhower does take his share of risks in the war, but by and large the operations on the map is not what you would consider nic andn it -- napoleo the chances they take and the risk they are willing to court. there's a 19 67 book by stephen ambrose, one of the fathers of this museum along with nick miller. eisenhower in berlin, 1945, the decision to halt at the elba. not driving for berlin but halting here, where the americans would eventually stop. was one of the first to make a sustained argument in favor of ike's decision not to go for berlin. or to risk 80,000 or 90,000 100,000 men in a senseless fight for a city that was going to be divided among the allies anyway. that is the contour of ambrose' argument in eisenhower in ber

but soviet defenses had smashed its way into the reich itself, overrunning east prussia here and the coastal province of pomerania and came to rest here on the rivers. seizing the german capital first was unlikely for the western allies but also a highly risky operation that was foreign to eisenhower's sober sense of strategy. eisenhower does take his share of risks in the war but by and large the operations on the map are not what you could consider napoleanic in the chances they take, in the risks they're willing to court. that's a little 1967 book by steven ambrose of sainted memory. steven ambrose, of course, is one of the fathers of this museum, along with our own nick mueller. he wrote a book called "eisenhower in berlin in 1945: the decision to halt at the albaa," where the americans would eventually stop. he was one of the first, i think, to make a sustained argument in favor of ike's decision not to go for berlin, not to risk, oh, i don't know, 80,000, 90,000 or 100,000 men in a senseless fight for a city that was going to be divided amongst the allies anyway. that's essenti