iran could quickly move towards the next stage of its enrichment activities.ould like to know what other provisions in the deal if any will mitigate this risk. finally, i have a fundamental concern that 15 years from now, iran will essentially be off the hook. if they choose iran's leaders could produce weapon's grade, highly enriched uranium without limitation. this amounts to iran being a legitimized nuclear threshold state in the year 2030. my big question is this what happens then? are we back to square one? is this deal just pushing the pause button for 15 years? i must also say that i have trepidation, barely a week after the iranians signed the deal with us there was the supreme leader the ayatollah, chanting death to america, death to israel you would think that perhaps they would keep quiet for a week or two or a month, but he went back to business as usual. how can we trust iran when this type of thing happens? so i'm looking forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses on these issues. again, i thank you for your service and hard work. and i

the enrichment will be scaled down significantly, for the next 15 years no uran i um will be enriched beyond 3.67%. to put that in context, this is a level that is appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research but well below anything that can be used possibly for a weapon. for the next ten years iran has agreed to only use its first generation center fuges in order to enrich uranium and iran further agreed to disconnect all of the advanced center fuges and those installed will be closely monitored r and d program and none will be used to produce enriched uranium. iran has also agreed to stop enriching uranium at the facility for the next 15 and it will not even use or store thissle material on the site during that time. instead it will be transformed into a nuclear physics and technology research center. it will be used for example, to produce isotopes for cancer treatment and it will be subject to daily inspection and it will have other nations working in unison with iran people in the technology ten center. so when this deal is implemented the two uranium paths iran has to thi

uranium enrichment will be scaled down significantly. for the next 15 years, no uranium will be enriched beyond 3.67%. to put that in context, this is a level that is appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research but well below anything that could be used possibly for a weapon. for the next ten years, iran agreed to only use its first generation centrifuges in order to enrich uranium. they agreed to disconnect centrifuges. those installed will be closely monitored rnd program and none will be used to produce enriched ewe rain numb. iran has also agreed to stop enriching uranium for the next 16 years. it will not even use or store thistle material on the site during that time. instead, it will be transformed into a nuclear physics and technology research center. it will be used for example, to produce isotopes for cancer treatment and subject todayly inspection. and it will have other nations working in unison with the iranians within that technology center. so when the deal is implemented, the two uranium paths iran has toward this

but i do want to emphasize that they have also demonstrated that they have enriched to 20% enrichment. 20% is the cutoff that the iaea uses for low enriched and high-enriched uranium, but the point is the amount of work needed to get to 20% is nearly all the work you need to get to 90%, which would be weapons grade. so they have the capability as i already mentioned, they already have full cascades running of the next gin ration fy times more powerful disagreement will have those dismantled at the time of implementation. so what is critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. now in terms of the breakout time again, the president was very clear and our p5-plus-1 partners were very clear that a quantitative criterion for the negotiation was there had to be at least a one-year breakout time in terms of fissile material for at least ten years. we have accomplished that with this agreement. our lab scientists are fully behind this as are those of other countries. then that will roll off and after 15 years, at some point, depe

what they did do is started cheating on the highly enriched path. and the frame work was put in patriot, and the administrations changed and the new administration came in with a different attitude, about how to approach them but with the discovery of the cheating on the h.e.u., they immediately shut down the track, and north korea pulled out of the mtp. fully pulled out. there were no inspections nothing else was happening and yes they blew up several nuclear weapons and they developed their nuclear capacity that should be a warning to everybody here. about why what we have in fact put in place is so important and out to be embraced because unlike north korea the north korea experience is what gave birth to the additional protocol. i just want you to know that p the additional protocol came to remedy the deficit of what happened with north korea. so the access we have, we never had in north korea. and i believe through the myriad of access, civil nuclear program 24/7 access to their fa salt lake cities we will know instantaneously if they try to pr

they can get through there and nuclear enrichment and uranium enrichment. that, they can do. do we have sufficient capacity knowing their commitments for nonproliferation, knowing their requirements of the additional protocols. is that going to be adequate to prevent iran? do we have a sufficient enough breakout time that if iran tries to become a nuclear weapon state after the time period that we have sufficient tools to prevent them from becoming a nuclear weapon power? these are questions we need to have answers to. before we can make our judgments. now, there are other areas. i wanted to be reassured that the united states still has the flexibility to impose nonnuclear sanctions on iran for the support of terrorism, human rights abuses, and against a ballistic missile program. no one expects iran's bad behavior to change on implementation date. we know who we're dealing with. will we be able to use the powers we've used in the past and build upon them to take action against iran, particularly in light that they'll have additional resources? can we do that? and can congres

a level of enrichment for what remains is 3.67% a long way from the 90% enrichment it would need to occur to achieve a weapons-grade material. centrifuges would be reduced from 19,000 to a little over 6,100 for ten years. there would be no enrichment and only centrifuges permitted for use would be older first-generation centrifuges. plutonium, the iraq facility will be reconstituted so it can't make weapons-grade material. materials that do exist there today would be sent out of the country entirely. number four iran may try to build a nuclear weapon in secret. mr. secretary of energy, i would ask you through robust monitoring and verification and inspections, the deal would allow inspectors access to inspect any suspicious sites. i heard critics of this plan say, well that's why because of the 24-day period, it's like a police officer calling a drug dealer to say that we're going to raid your apartment in 24 days, so they can clear all the evidence. would you speak to that, within the context of physics and talk about the half life of both uranium and plutonium? >> i'll start with the la

they could get to nuclear enrichment, uranium enrichment. do we have sufficient capacity, knowing their commitments for nonproliferation, knowing the requirements protocols, is that going to be adequate to prevent iran? we have a sufficient enough reg out time that if iran tries to become a nuclear weapons state after the time period that we have sufficient tools to prevent them? we need answer to these before we can make judgments. and there are other areas. i want to be reassured that united states still has the flexibility to impose on nuclear sanctions on iran for its support of terrorism. no one expects iran's bad behavior to change when implementation begins. we know who we are dealing with! will we be able to use the powers we have used in the past and build upon them to take action against iran particularly in light of additional resources, can we do that and can congress work with the administration to strengthen those tools without violating the jcpla? i want to know how the administration is updating its regional strategies agains

then we go to enrichment facility. iran has agreed to enrich below 5%.to make nuclear bomb from enrichment facility, you need to enrich about 90%. as long as you are enriching below 5%, it is impossible to make nuclear bomb. second, iran has agreed to the current stockpile to 300 kilograms for just domestic needs. iran has agreed to convert the second enrichment site [indiscernible] and also two thirds of centrifuges would decrease for at least 10 years. and the confidence building measures. therefore, on the transparency also, iran has agreed to all practical arrangements at the maximum level within the international rules and regulations, which is safeguard agreement, which is -- finally, is additional protocol. internationally, on transparency and inspection, we don't have anything more. iran has accepted all three. therefore, iran would be the most transparent nation on its nuclear program. in iran has given the confidence building measures, has accepted measures which no other member of in pt has ever accepted yet like enriching below 5%, like what

remember that two years ago when our negotiation began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20% at a facility that was secret and buried underground, and they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium, they were building a heavy reactor, that could produce one to two bombs a year, and experts assessed that the breakout time as a result, the integral required to produce one nuclear weapon was about two to three months. if this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. accept that the diplomatic support that we have built with all of these other countries, that we have accumulated would disappear overnight. let me underscore, the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what i have seen some ads on tv suggesting, it isn't a, quote, better deal? some sort of unicorn arrangement, involving iran's complete capitulation. that is a fantasy, plain and simple, and our own intelligence community will tell you that. every single department of our intelligence community will reinforce that. the choice we face is ensuring that iran's program is limited, rigor

iran used to reduce uranium at 93% enrichment. that was brought down to 20%.ow landmark is this deal? how much of a breakthrough is it? >> this deal is adequate to make sure the build weapons, in my opinion. emily: what does it mean? what can that power? edward: that is ordinary reactor fuel in most countries of the world. almost every other country has that as the normal enrichment for nuclear power. emily: yet you think the most important words in the deal are what? edward: take the enormous document and look at article 15. it says that iran will allow the iaea to monitor online enrichment measurement and use electronic seals. those are the most important words. we can look at every one of these in the system and look at the enrichment going around in their separation cascade. emily: jordan, i wonder from you, there will be huge pressure to survey a their activities. will we see more of those kinds of files? jordan: it is interesting, certainly there will be less incentive on the u.s. part to pursue destructive cyberattacks. because there is this deal in pla

they can get to their uranium enrichment. that they can do. do we have sufficient capacity knowing their commitments for non-proliferation, knowing the requirements of the additional protocols, do we have a sufficient-enough break-out time that if iran tries to become a nuclear weapons state after the time frame, there will be sufficient tools to prevent them from becoming a nuclear power. these are questions we need answers to. i want to be reassured that the united states still has the flexibility to impose sanctions on iran for its support of terrorism, human rights abuses and a ballistic weapon's program. we know who we're dealing with! will we be able to use the powers we have used in the past and build upon them to take action against iran particularly in light that they will have additional resources? can we do that? and can congress work with the administration to strengthen those tools without violating the jcpoa. i want to know how the administration is updating its regional deterrent strategy against nefarious activities. the chairm

the amount of enrichment, the capacity for enrichment. all of the many factors that come into it. it's a complicated formula. and everybody is in agreement as to where we are. >> it also includes capacity to rebuild all the infrastructure they are taking out. i might just add beyond the 15 years where there are very severe constraints in terms of visibility, for 20 years there is still the containment and surveillance activities for any centrifuge sensitive parts manufacturing. they'll all be tracked, labeled, tracked, et cetera. and for 25 years the iranian transparencey transparency. it's like follow the iranian and the centrifuges. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> the president was really clear in year 13 there's zero brack breakout and begin industrialization at -- >> i never heard that carc characterization, mr. chairman. >> i hope you'll take these questions in the spirit they are given. i've been supportive of these negotiations. i commendio all for the hard work that's been done. there's some disagreement here with the text of the agreement as we read it and the expla

them to enrich.if i could -- >> but -- >> senator menendez. >> thank you mr. chairman. let me start off by saying that i appreciate the enormous work and arduous quest you have been in pursuit of. and i think that no one would want to be applauding you more than i who has been following iran since nearly 20 years ago. and as one of the authors of the sanctions regime that are recognized to have brought iran to the table. but the deal enshrines for iran and commits the international community over time to assisting iran in developing an industrial-scale nuclear power program, complete with industrial scale enrichment and while i understand that the program will be subject to iran's npt obligations, i think it fails to negotiate iran's history of deception and violations of npt, and it will in the long run make it harder to demonstrate that iran's program is not in fact being used for peaceful purpose, because iran will have legitimate reasons to have advanced centrifuges and an enrichment program. we

is the cutoff that the iaea uses for low enriched and high enriched uranium. but the point here is that the amount of work needed to get to 20% is nearly all the work you need to get to 90%, which would be weapons grade. so they have the capability. and as i've already mentioned they are already have full cascades running of the next generation five times more powerful. this agreement will have those dismantled at the time of implementation. so what's critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. now, in terms of the breakout time, again, the president was very clear and our p5+1 partners were very clear. the quantitative criterium for the negotiation was there had to be at least a one-year breakout time in terms of fissile material it ten years. we've accomplished this. our lab scientists are fully behind this, as are those of other countries. then that will roll off. and after 15 years at some point, fendingdepending upon what they do, then we may revert to the current kinds of breakout times for

. >> allowing them to enrich. senator menendez? >> thank you mr. chairman. let me start off by saying that i appreciate the enormous work and arduous quest that you have been in pursuit of. and i think that no one would want to be applauding you more than i who has been following iran since my days in the house international committee nearly 20 years ago. as one of the authors of the sanctions regime that are recognized to bring iran to the negotiating table. however, i am concerned that the deal enshrines for iran and in fact commits the international community over time to assisting iran in developing an industrial scale nuclear power program complete with enrich. while i understand the program will be subject to iran's npt, it fails to look at iran's history of deception in its nuclear program and its violations of the npt and it will in the long run make it harder to demonstrate iran's program is not being used for peaceful purpose because iran will have legitimate reasons to have advanced centrifuges and enri

will it remain in the enriched uranium beyond the 300 permitted kilograms. the radiance has said no. we have said yes. you choose which one you believe. we will see what the outcome is i'm not. we also have an open question about what happens to the enriched uranium at 20%. what's going to happen with that? maybe it will be resolved but we are told it hasn't been resolved as of yet for at least before the last round of negotiations. for those three reasons all of which the saudis are aware of, there is no credibility for four extending the breakout round. we may fool ourselves that we may fool the american public, but we will not pull the other gulf countries. i was in the uae earlier this year. let me say the sense that the united states is having abandoned the region, the lack of credibility of the administration is palpable. they hold us in contempt. they hold american policy and the same. let's face it for what it is. that is the message and our performance in the negotiations is one measure of that. the other one mentioned is failing to respond to the r

on enrichment, iran agreed to confidence-building measures on nondiversion of iranian enrichment facilities because iran agreed to enrich below 5%. as long as you're enriching below 5% it's impossible to make nuclear bomb. iran has agreed to reduce 8,000-kilogram of stockpile enriched uranium to 300-kilogram. iran agreed not to have enrichment activities. ty would say all measures assuring iranian heavy water facility and enrichment facility would not direct toward -- all are agreed though all measurers are beyond npt and iran has agreed to measure beyond npt as good will and objective on non-diversion. the problem is with excessive demands far far beyond additional protocol or npt. >> rose: you're opposed to the framework agreement? >> yes. i was listening to what mr. mousavian had to say but the reason iran is put to the additional tests is because iran has a lengthy record of deceiving the international community. fordow as president obama announced in new york several years ago was a secret facility until revealed by western intelligence sources and secret facilities before brought to l

locking in their enrichment level. so in exchange for the things we have required them to do, which by the way are genuinely extensive. they have to undo piping and their electrical. they have to move things there's a huge amount of work. >> when that is done, i don't know whether it will be since months or a year, but when it is done, we lift the fundamental component of financial embanking sanctions that were the heart of what brought them to the table. the point is that everyone is for the agreement, this will prevent them from having a nuclear weapon, and the ayatollah is saying the opposite. >> the ayatollah, and you are intel community, i urge you to connect with them,no decision. what he is doing is protecting his domestic turf. >> he is saying the opposite, he is saying that this is not true that this duh not stop us from acquiring a nuclear weapon. that troubles us. zarif said the same thing in march, when you came out with your statement, they were saying the opposite, it troubles us -- it troubles us that im

. >> allowing them to enrich. senator menendez? >> thank you mr. chairman. let me start off by saying that i appreciate the enormous work and arduous quest that you have been in pursuit of. and i think that no one would want to be applauding you more than i who has been following iran since my days in the house international committee nearly 20 years ago. as one of the authors of the sanctions regime that are recognized to bring iran to the negotiating table. however, i am concerned that the deal enshrines for iran and in fact commits the international community over time to assisting iran in developing an industrial scale nuclear power program complete with enrich. while i understand the program will be subject to iran's npt, it fails to look at iran's history of deception in its nuclear program and its violations of the npt and it will in the long run make it harder to demonstrate iran's program is not being used for peaceful purpose because iran will have legitimate reasons to have advanced centrifuges and enri

then we go to enrichment. on enrichment also iran has , agreed to confidence building measures on non-diversion of uranium enrichment to facilities. iran has agreed to in ridge below 5%. as long as enrichment below 5%. iran has agreed to reduce. iran has agreed not to have enrichment activities. therefore, i would say all measures assuring that uranium iranian heavywater and enrichment facilities would not direct toward weaponization. although all of these measures are beyond npt, and iran has agreed to measures beyond npt as a goodwill. the problem is with excessive demands, far beyond protocols. charlie: you are opposed to this deal as you know it? bret: yes, i am. the reason why iran is being put to these additional tests is because iran has a lengthy record of deceiving the international community. you remember that announcement in new york several years ago, there was a secret facility until it was revealed. secret facilities before they were brought to light by the international community. the internatio

which is to manufacture and to enrich uranium for power stations 3.4% enrichment and to be able to enrich to 20% which is for this which the americans turned down and blocked in 2010 upon agreement of iran and brazil to be provided with this. so achieving the nuclear processes. and some concerns they are going to close 10,000 center fuges and that doesn't mean anything because they forfeited the right to manufacture fuel for power stations and russia will have to do it for iran and therefore if they close the center fuge that doesn't mean much and doesn't need them any more and then after 5 1/2 years of negotiations iran has been enriching enriching uranium and we are going to send it to others and therefore it's a good bargaining chip and they have now their fuel for the research reactor and 20% rich and for the power reactors 3 1/2 percent so to me i understand it. it is a great step forward for iran and the world and iran persistently and major negotiator managed to get this agreement and after following the program for 40 years since i was in rack in 1974 and now i am convinced and th

just look at whether north korea had an enrichment facility. that debate was only result when the north koreans invited an american scientist to come to the enrichment facility. they showed it in operation. .1, we won't know -- point one we won't know. even if we know, what's the likely response going to be. it has taken years for us to get to the point to declare that russia is in violation of the inf agreement. it took years to get the iaea board of governors to vote on iran violating its safeguard agreements. even more years for the security council to react. this notion that 12 months is meaningful in the context of a response is simple fallacy. third, even if you assume that we would know, and even if you assume the international community would respond in an effective way, we don't have the baseline knowledge to be able to assess whether that 12 months is credible. we don't know what progress the iranians have made. they have stonewalled us on that. they have stonewalled the iaea. they have identified with 12 activities possibly associate

it addresses the enrichment and plutonium and uranium enrichment. and i would loik to make that the loosen parameters are maintains -- not weakened, but strengthened in the final agreement. this means restricting the number, type and location of centrifuges, dialing back the r&d program and reducing the enriched stockpile from 12,000 to 300 kilometers of uranium fluoride and producing any fissile material and material is reduced from baton and fordow. and the one year brokeout time for accumulating highly enriched uranium. and something that we have not stressed but i want to add, at the end of the ten years iran will have far fewer than 19,000 centrifuges because they acknowledge the breakage rate if you like, and they will not have a large replacement capacity because of the agreement. in addition, iran will have no source of weapons great plutonium and the iraq reactor is transformed under international oversight and participation to produce far less plutonium than the current design and no weapons grade plutonium in normal operation and immediat

for example any attempt to enrich to highly enriched uranium at any time must earn a sharp response by any means. a steep response must be clear from the start for any violation of the agreement. the blocking the covert path i should emphasis will always rely of course on the work of the american intelligence community and those of our friends and our allies. the deal is based on science and analysis. because of the deep grounding in exhaustive technical analysis cared out largely again by the highly capable doe engineers i'm confident this is a good deal for america, for our allies and for our global security. this is nicely summarized in the recent letter to congressional leadership by seven former u.s. ambassadors to israel and under secretaries of state individuals dedicated to strengthening the bonds between israel and the united states. and i quote briefly, this landmark agreement removes the threat that a nuclear armed iran would pose to the region and to israel specifically. we see no fatal flaws that should call for the rejection of this agreement and have not heard any viable

iran has 10,000 kilogram of enriched uranium. that 10,000 can be turned to 300, 98% of it's going to be gone. iran has been spending time obuild a react orin arak, the city of arak. two-thirds of the enriched uranium is going to be stored somewhere. iran is getting a lot of restrictions on its nuclear program. the price of that is lifting of sanctions. >> the example is that the u.s. treasury uses when talking about effective ways to deal with governments that they don't li like. they have been very effective. tell us about this. the banking sanctions mean, if it's medicines or spare parts or automobiles, money to purchase these things to sell in iran cannot be transferred to other businesses. >> you know one of the sanctions that we got two years ago almost, was we could not use the swiss system. >> the international banking transfer system. >> transfer system. so no matter what we wanted to buy we couldn't. because we couldn't transfer the money. and in reality, the iranian banks were cut off from the international banking syst

they obviously enrich. germany, brazil, afghanistan i'm sorry argentina holland japan, we are putting iran into that group a bad actor like iran what -- the option that i see is doubling down on the sanctions that got them into the table in the first place we know it was crushing their economy, we know it was having an impact on the regime, my question t is, is that not a viable option to the deal itself? >> senator, i think the reason the sanctions have had the powerful effect is that they are not just u.s. sanctions they have international sanctions. that requires keeping a coalition together. we've gone back and forth with the congress saying, if you do more and it keeps other countries out we are then doing less. we've come to a good place to grow the coalition in the world. if deal the rejected, the other partners will not be of like mind. >> i understand the nuances of the categories of that cash, how much is that relative sanctions on other countries dealing with iran versus eu. i understand. i am tr

and they will limit their enrichment to one facility. and again, we know their different pathways to weapons will be cut off. we know that's in place and we know that verification measures are in place to see if they are violating that deal. what we don't know is how iraq will evolve in these 15 years. if it will stick and be worth doing, if iran can sustain that in 15 years, we also know that a deal makes it more likely that iran will have an incentive to evolve in a different direction. we are not counting on that, charlie. that's what the deal is all about. charlie: let me just understand that. critics suggest that after 10-15 years, the iranians will have a chance to go build a nuclear weapon, that they want to do which they've given up the right to do in the initial agreement. ben: charlie, absolutely not. in addition to the limitation and the stockpile limitations for 15 years, there's a permanent prohibition from iran ever having a nuclear weapons program under their international obligation. if they try to weaponize, they will be

what iran has at the moment is 12,000 kilograms of low enriched uranium. that low enriched uranium. it's a percentage around 5%. you have to enrich that up a significant amount to get it up to sort of weapons grade, 90%. so that 12,000 kilograms you reduce to a smaller amount by enriching it up but the amount that you're left with from that original 12,000 kilograms is enough we understand to build that weapon plus of course a heavy water reactor plant making weapons grade plutonium enough each year to make one or two weapons there. the agreement to reduce that stockpile from 12,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms, that's a 98% reduction, and that 300 kilograms of what we're told is 3.6, 3.7 low enriched eweuranium, that's a level of enrichment you need for nuclear power stations. you would need to take that 300 kilograms and reduce it massively to enrich it up to weapons grade. there simply isn't enough to the 300 kilograms to make a bomb. that's the sort of numbers we're talking about here carol. >> nic robertson, many thanks for that. you know i always like to deal in facts. thank you

in the president's own words to stop iran's enrichment capability. they have no right to enrich it.hey have enriching capability and testing new centrifuges and advanced research and developing they are mastering the process to develop the nuclear weapons. it doesn't matter if it happens now or eight to ten years from now. this is a gamble in homes iran is going to change. to show how unlikely it is iran was trying to kill me and my soldiers in iraq. we were lucky, but others were not. >> we understand. now owe i have said on the show before we thank you for it and iran's activities and what seems terrorism around the world is part of the deal. let's listen to the president and hear why he says it premise of these negotiations which was, even in israel's mind to keep them from getting a nuclear weapon was achieved. >> we are measuring this deal. that was the original premise of this conversation including the premise for netanyahu. iran could not get a nuclear weapon. what i'm going to be able to say and able to prove is that this by a wide margin is the most definitive path by whic

what are you going to do when iran does start to enrich. which they will feel they have a right to if we walk away. what are you going to do when the sanctions aren't in place and can't be reconstituted because we caulked awalked away from a deal that our five fellow nations accepted. i heard ask that the vienna agreement would somehow legitimate iez iran's nuclear program. that is non sense. under the agreement iran's leaders are permanently barred from pursuing a nuclear weapon. and there are permanent restraints and access provisions and inspection provisions to guarantee that. and i underscore, if they try to evade that obligation we will know it. because a civil nuclear program requires full access 24/7, requires full documentation and we will have the ability to track that as no other program before. the iaea will be continuously monitoring their centrifuge production as those centrifuges cannot be diverted to a convert facility. for the next 25 years the iaea will be continuously monitoring uranium from the point it is produced all t

and they start to enrich. now, to be clear, if congress rejects what was agreed to in vienna, you will not only be rejecting every one of the restrictions that we put in place. and by the way, nobody's counting the two years that iran has already complied with the interim agreement. and by the way, complied completely and totally. so that we've already rolled their program back. we've reduced their 20% enriched uranium to zero. that's already been accomplished. but if this is rejected, we go back to their ability to move down that road. you'll not only be giving iran a free pass to double the pace of its uranium enrichment to build a heavy water reactor to install new and more efficient centrifuges, but they will do it all without the unprecedented inspection and transparency measures that we've secured. everything that we have tried to prevent will now happen. now, what's worse? if we walk away, we walk away alone. our partners are not going to be with us. instead, they'll walk away from the tough multilatera

locking in their enrichment level that can't produce a bomb. in exchange for all the things we required them to do, pitt senator, are genuinely extensive. they have to undo their piping. they have to undo their electrical. they have to move things. there's a huge amount of work -- >> i guess -- >> when that is done, i don't know if it's six months or a year, but when it's done we lift the fundamental component of financial and banking sanctions that were the heart of what brought them to the table. >> but i guess the point is, is that everybody that's for the agreement, yourself included are saying this will prevent them from having a nuclear weapon and the ayatollah saying exactly the opposite. >> no. the ayatollah has actually -- and the intel community i urge you to connect with them. there's no decision whatsoever. what he's doing is protecting his dough necessarytic turf. >> he's saying the opposite. he's saying this is not true. this is not stop us from acquiring a nuclear weapon. that troubles us. zareef was saying the same thing in marc

using the facilities to enrichment uranium. it will reduce storage by 96% and will move or modify the core of the heavywater nuclear reactor in iraq so that it no longer -- billions of dollars in international sanctions relief. the negotiations were long and arduous. >> the relief among the negotiators was tangible. after a decade of negotiation deadlines to contain iran's deep in her program, a deal that many are calling historic. >> this is very much needed in these times. >> as someone who has been part of this for 10 years, the german prime minister said i am happy we have reached a point where an agreement has been reached that will make the middle east and the yen to her a bit safer. >> it is a step away from the specter of conflict and toward the possibility of these. >> the agreement is to ensure tehran is not able to build atomic weapons. one allowing for the domestic use of nuclear power. stocks of enriched uranium are to be reduced and inspectors from the atomic agency are to be granted full access to all power plant

. -- enrichment.senator shaheen: that's not my understanding based on secretary moniz. mr. nephew: from years 10 to 15, the iranians will be constrained with respect to their research and development activities, as well as the iranian stockpile. further the iraq plutonium path will be more closed down because they can't do any of that. my understanding as of year 15 we'll still be in that six to eight months time frame for uranium breakout. but years and years away from a plutonium base bomb. senator shaheen: you agree? chairman zarate: i was referring to uranium enrichment. not plutonium. senator shaheen: there has been some suggestion that one of the challenges with relying on the iaea is that the u.s. wouldn't have inspectors on the ground as part of those activities. are there other agreements that we have entered into where we have inspectors on the ground and can you describe those, mr. nephew? mr. nephew: i am aware of some. things for instance bilateral arms control with the soviet union. had

a civil nuclear program or's -- requires enrichment at 5% or so. if you start to enrich higher, around 20%, you're talking about the tehran research reactor and a few other things, but there is no rationale for richmond -- for enrichment above that. we would have insight to that enrichment program that would instantly know if they would be able to go some -- if they were going to go somewhere else. red flags would be everywhere and we would be able to respond. the fact is the breakout team never goes down to a level below which we have an ability to respond. sen. cardin: thank you. >> mr. chairman, man just ask -- may i just ask -- what could be a collateral benefit of this agreement is, going to the uranium supply chain -- the safeguards -- i just want to add that this is something the iaea really wants to have much more broadly. this would be a first in moving towards cradle-to-grave safeguards. >> i might add that there are other parts that we cannot talk about relative to some of their procedures, which i alluded to. i would say to mr. secretar

what are you going to do when iran does start to enrich. which they will feel they have a right to if we walk away. what are you going to do when the sanctions aren't in place and can't be reconstituted because we walked away from a deal that our five fellow >>> we'll reconvene. and i want to thank the witnesses for their patience. and i'm sure they understand that from time to time we are required to vote. so i want to thank the witnesses for being here. and general dempsey your statement has been completed. and is there any other statements that would line to be made? we'll begin with questions and we'll have five minutes. secretary carter, the issue has arisen that there is side agreements that have been made between the iaea and iran that apparently the congress has not been made privy to. and could i ask that since these iaea agreements side agreements have do with -- with the weapons programs of the iranians and the inspection and verification of those programs will we in congress receive the information concerning those side agreemen

i started the guy going after iranian enrichment program.they are not relinquishing this capability. >> you are going to run out of time. address the idea the idea if there is an alternative to what we are doing now. we have to to consider that if we don't agree with this deal, do we have an alternative question it. >> if if we don't agree, they are going to start with more centrifuges and we get back to the table we are going to be dealing with 30,000 centrifuges. >> will sanctions unilaterally have impact? >> i do believe it would stop their program permanently. >> senator i think u.s. financial power and influences is enormous and would have an influence. would it stop the program alone? i don't think so. i have argued a long time power and influence have to be part of a broader strategy of influence in strategy against the regime to get them to stop movement toward a nuclear program. >> you are experts in this, both of of you. do you believe they have to have enrichment capability in able to have a peaceful nuclear program in iran? >> ap

what are you going to do when iran does start to enrich. which they will feel they have a right to if we walk away. what are you going to do when the sanctions aren't in place and can't be reconstituted because we caulked awalked away from a deal that our five fellow nations accepted. i heard ask that the vienna agreement would somehow legitimate iez iran's nuclear program. that is non sense. under the agreement iran's leaders are permanently barred from pursuing a nuclear weapon. and there are permanent restraints and access provisions and inspection provisions to guarantee that. and i underscore, if they try to evade that obligation we will know it. because a civil nuclear program requires full access 24/7, requires full documentation and we will have the ability to track that as no other program before. the iaea will be continuously monitoring their centrifuge production as those centrifuges cannot be diverted to a convert facility. for the next 25 years the iaea will be continuously monitoring uranium from the point it is produced all t

speaker, on enrichment it is welcome that iran has pledged to remove 90% of its stockpile of enriched uranium and two-thirds of installed centrifuges. there's been much discussion of the numbers and at the time scales involved. as the foreign secretary said some parts of the stay will remain in place for five years such as the arms embargo. other restrictions for 10 to 15 years, and other transparency measures will stay in place permanently. he explained the rationale for this time scales and one the government is satisfied that they are sufficient or would he also agreed that while we should be positive about implementation of this agreement we must also go into it with our eyes open works if there's a lesson to be drawn from the collapse of the agreed framework we negotiate with north korea in the 1990s it is that the success of these agreements should be judged not over months but in years. so it is right some sanctions and should be removed gradually and only as iran owners the commitments it has made. were iran to violate the terms of the agreement is government set aside the pro

using the facilities to enrichment uranium. it will reduce storage by 96% and will move or modify the core of the heavywater nuclear reactor in iraq so that it no longer -- billions of dollars in international sanctions relief. the negotiations were long and arduous. >> the relief among the negotiators was tangible. after a decade of negotiation deadlines to contain iran's deep in her program, a deal that many are calling historic. >> this is very much needed in these times. >> as someone who has been part of this for 10 years, the german prime minister said i am happy we have reached a point where an agreement has been reached that will make the middle east and the yen to her a bit safer. >> it is a step away from the specter of conflict and toward the possibility of these. >> the agreement is to ensure tehran is not able to build atomic weapons. one allowing for the domestic use of nuclear power. stocks of enriched uranium are to be reduced and inspectors from the atomic agency are to be granted full access to all power plant

uranian enrichment will be scaled down significantly.t 15 years, no uranium will be enriched beyond 3.67%. to put that in context, this is a level that is appropriate for civilian nuclear power and research but well below anything that could be used possibly for a weapon. for the next 10 years, iran has agreed to only use its first generation centrifuges in order to enrich uranium. iran has further agreed to disconnect nearly all of its advanced centrifuges and those that remain installed will be part of a constrained and closely monitored are in the program, and none -- r&d program, and none will be used to produce enriched uranium. iran has also agreed to stop producing uranium at its -- facility. it will not use or store fissile mrs. material on that site. in set, it will be turned into a physics and technology research center. it will be used, for example, to produce isotopes for cancer treatment, and it will be subject to daily inspection. and it will have other nations working in unison with the iranians within that technology cent