enron failed. it was huge. world, failed. those businesses were liquidated in a barely short time frame? they had very serious consequences. i am not saying it is not done without pain, but enron was making the argument shortly before it was forced into bankruptcy that it would cause systemic failure. it was such an important player, but that was not true at all. what i want to emphasize is the importance of identifying what the risk is. make sure we know what the problem is before we get the solution. i know i am over your time, but can we go back to where you just guarded which is at the household level. we are not only at increased risk for large institutions and, we did it for american households. they now stand at 0.130% of their annual income in total debt. -- now stand at boeinowing 130%f their annual income in total debt. we want families more economically stable and not introducing into these high risks, high profit instruments. labonge we can deal with systemic risk with a lighter touch -- weekend deal with the syst

is probably one that we could see and for every enron, someone that put them in jail. to start from scratch the new bureaucracy that will solve these problems i think is an unrealistic expectation. i'm not saying there aren't good people that work for government. i'm saying the level of expertise that's required here that the person could have his own independent evaluation for the rest of the world and maybe serve a greater good than trying to have the government do it and there's certainly nothing wrong with having a data base. we've talked about that before we thought about that before that, you know, if you have a derivative, you filed a derivative and you lift every component of the derivative and you put that on the index that everyone can see online just for transparency and the world is, while we're registered with this and there's an implied value to that that an unwary consumer who we're trying to look out for may not understand and thank you. i think you gave me extra time, chairman. i appreciate it. >> mr. chairman, if i might comment on mr. boaz's comment.

would consider a bill that i filed that would simply turn the clock back to december of 2000 when the enron loophole was passed before these sweeping changes were made that allowed the rampant and excessive speculation in our energy markets. mr. president, i want to turn to -- madam president, i want to turn to one final topic, and that's the nomination of inez tannenbaum to be chair of the consumer products safety commission. they have faced a number of new challenges: inadequate staffing, insufficient funding, a product testing facility that was a joke. as a matter of fact, we saw a picture of it, and it was a couple of cardboard tables with all of the imported toys dumped on it when we were having that trouble with the defective imported chinese toys. and most significantly it lacked leadership at the top. so we took action last year, and we gave the cpsc new authority, new funding and a new lab facility. and so today we have to deal with the final issue, and that is the leadership. and i just want to commend to the senate that i think that inez tannenbaum is going to be that leader. she

enron and worldcom failed. these have very serious consequences, i am and not saying that this is done without pain, but this was making the argument shortly before bankruptcy, that it would cost failure, it was out there in the power industry and it was such an important player -- but this was not true at all. we said, we will have to live with a view. what i want to emphasize is, the importance of identifying the rest, before we say, make certain we know what the problem as before the solution. if i can say one other thing, to go back to where you started just now, at the family level. we did not increased as for the banks, the american household owes 130% of their income. we have been heading numbers that are unprecedented, they have never even been close at any time in history. when we reform the financial products and put some safety in so that families are economically stable, and they are not introducing into the stream of financial commerce, these high risk and high profit instruments, we turned down th

of directors, to the best of my knowledge, never brought an action against any of the directors of enron, only one action against the directors of tyco and that is because the guy was taking a bribe. for the most part, given the way state laws operate, which are not very good and frankly the staff at this committee has been urged to take a proposal to allow shareholders to ask for incorporation and a shareholder friendly state which is the next proposal. for the most part, until you can hold directors accountable, and the proposal just to throw them out, you're never going to get any action because the law-enforcement agencies literally will not touch them, have not touched them even in the most egregious cases. >> many of the directors of failed companies are continuing to serve on boards. it is flabbergasting but they're still there. >> i would counter the observations about state law. delaware is the corporate state law that i spent time studying, it is responsive to shareholders, particularly responsive to majority voting, they made majority voting easier, we have majority voting, 60

became a top priority, and yet, at the same time, we were confronted with a rash of wrongdoing, from enron to world qualm -- worldcom. we had to prioritize, and we did. today, we continue to combat the risk of attacks by terrorists. we want to protect our communities from fraud and violent crime, as well. . there are many lenses to view the financial crisis, from financial institutions that traded in risk itself, lenders and real estate professionals who sidestepped the practice, homeowners, whose purchases exceeded their pocketbooks. the rest is central in this crisis, much of what led to the financial meltdown was the result of a failure to properly invest -- assess the risks, risks to investors, risk to home owners and the economy at large. there are those who intended to defraud others. in part, the sub prime lending crisis they have been more a matter of greed. the prevailing thought process seems to be that everyone is making money, why should we miss the boat? when it did, some tried to patch the holes with tape, and bail out the water with dixie cups. the fbi plays a role in addres

are very much like the accounting work done by some of the accounting work from arthur andersen for enron. they appear to play by the rules but the objective is to help corporations, frustrate regulators in prevail in litigation. we see it over and over again in this case. will talk a little of that how this works. i tried to write about several groups but one works extensively for the tobacco industry for them in places where it felt it could not expose themselves saying it is these about good doing it pops from their marketing material asbestos, a tobacco, pharmaceuticals we are all next. let it is a good thing that it happened to tobacco amd asbestos but chemicals should have presumptive in this end that innocent until proven guilty and their the defense attorneys for the chemicals to make sure they're not found guilty. this is the example of one groups website until i started writing abroad in the "scientific american" and they pulled the case study but fortunately i kept the screen shot. those of you who follow the fda know that it essentially force is a drug off of the market for on

the bluecross board in maryland was making more than the enron board. who stepped in? the maryland general assembly. so we have private insurance that was to be a non-private tool that needed the requirements of either a general assembly or state legislature with backbone to step in or a governor who wanted to ensure and protect the people. so now we're back on track in maryland and i'm very proud with where the police are going, but what did that mean? it meant that the blues, could or could not be a tool that could go one way or the other and so when we go the non-profit route, we have to go how non-profit route goes. let's look at how they go in the 60s. we knew we could not pass again a uk way and nor did we want to go that way, but we wanted to pass something to protect seniors who were terrified that if they went into a hospital they would go bankrupt. so we passed medicare and we also passed medicaid to be a safety net for people who could not afford private insurance. the same argument we're hearing against medicare are the same arguments we are hearing now. th

and yet at the same time, we were confronted with a rash of corporate wrongdoing, from enron to worldcom, to qwest. we have to prioritize, and we did. today we continue to balance the risk of terrorist attack, as evidenced by the plan to talk attacks against a growing risk to our economy and our communities from financial fraud and violent crime as well. unfortunately, we do not have the personnel to investigate every criminal threat. we must focus our limited resources where we have the most impact. in los angeles or miami or example we might shift resources to combat gang activities. in chicago to organized crime, for corruption. and here in new york we have shifted resources to address white-collar crime. we have moved from a quantitative to a qualitative approach, and we are using intelligence to pinpoint the greatest threats to each of our communities and working hard to prevent those threat from becoming reality. turning to the fbi's role in combating white-collar crime, there are many lenses through which to view the financial crisis. from financial institutions that traded in ris

the blue cross board of maryland was making more than the enron board. restricted? the maryland general assembly. so now we have private insurance that was to be a long private toole that needed the requirements of either a general assembly or state legislature with backbone to stand or a governor who wanted to ensure to protect the people. so now we are back on track and i am very proud. but what did that mean? it meant the blues could or could not be a tool they could go one way or the officer when we go the nonprofit group we have got to know how the nonprofit roots go but that let's look where we were in the 60's a. we knew we could not pass again, the u.k. way, nor did we want to go that way. but we wanted to pass something to protect seniors who were terrified if they went into a hospital day would go bankrupt. so we passed medicare and we also passed medicaid to be the safety net for people who could not afford private insurance. the same arguments we are hearing against medicare. are the same arguments we are hearing now. the same arguments against medicare

are very much like the accounting work done by some of the accountants at arthur andersen for the enron companies. the appeared to play by the rules but their objective is to help corporations frustrate regulators and prevail in litigation. we see it over and over again in this case. i am going to talk a little bit about how this works. the one group, tried to write about several of these groups. one group worked extensively for the tobacco industry in places where the tobacco industry did not feel like they expose themselves so that the weinrich group to it. this is what they are marketing material asbestos pharmaceutic kurds, we are all mix. they will go to the company and say look what happened was best is, look what happened to debaca. it is a good thing those things happened in my view of course, and the thing they stress is the chemicals should have presumptive innocence, that they should be innocent until proven guilty and they are the advocates, the defense attorneys for the chemicals and they will make sure they are not found guilty. this is an example, this was on the wonder g

and that created like enron. and when he brought with him a set of attitudes toward risk in a strange kind of way or a lucky kind of way timed very well a lot of the existing risk management culture that was there against the old jp morgan guide and so from 2005 onward, they do appear to have taken as far as i can tell on the jp morgan guys they took a risk that was like their competitives. they were systemic and analyze it. they just weren't analyzeing on a few models. i mean, the case of bbs, for example, where essentially they were looking a model with disastrous effects using a very unidimensional way of measuring risk. it wasn't the case of jp morgan even though ironically jp morgan had invented it. and saying yes, it's kind of useful but it's only useful as a part of a set of techniques measuring risk. so i think that contributed to the risk they took. and the other about diamond he was actually prepared to face up to the analysts on wall street and say here. that's critically important. actually jp morgan

my amendment would vice president stopped the next enron before it starts. unfortunately, my attempt to prohibit this activity was denied. i can only ask why. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from california. mr. waxman: madam speaker, i yield to the gentleman from new jersey, mr. rush, for the purpose of a colloquy, one minute. -- excuse me, mr. rush holt. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for one minute. mr. holt: madam speaker, i thank the chair. energy, climate and environment are principal subjects that i have spoke on and worked on for decades before i came to congress and since. the principal reason is why my constituents sent me to congress. i admire the skill and his efforts to reduce the release of greenhouse gases. but i'm concerned the bill does not include the research funds necessary to reach the target of 80% emission reductions set in the bill. we must transform the way we produce and use energy. we cannot meet this goal with today's technology. and this bill, as written

the market manipulators of enron corporation may have bankrupted their company, ken lay may be gone but they are truly embodied in this legislation. the speaker pro tempore: for what purpose does the gentleman from arkansas rise? mr. boozman: i ask permission to address the house for one minute. the speaker pro tempore: without objection, the gentleman is recognized for one minute. mr. boozman: thank you, madam speaker. i rise today to honor the life of martin renic, a gracious contributor to the third district of arkansas who unexpectedly passed away last week. marty was a philantropist, a preservationist and above all a friend who knew him. he spent the last 12 years as an arkansan. although he was a relatively new resident, you could never tell because of his passion for the community. marty is being described as a visionary and traveling in northwest arkansas you could see that vision come alive. his love of historic preservation transformed eureka springs. in 1999 he and his wife bought the 1905 basin park hotel and then the 1886 crescent hotel and spa. the renics restored these hi

but then they change disastrously and i treated disasters like enron. then one diamond ever i'm he brought with him a set of attitudes toward risk. in a strange kind of way or lucky can avoid the time the very well when there was a lot of existing risk management culture that was there amongst the old jpmorgan guys and from 2005 onwards they do appear to have taken as far as i can tell having talked at length to the jpmorgan guys and other banks, it took an attitude toward risk that was a different from their competitors, they were much more systematic in terms of trying to model its and analyze it, they were just relying on a few models. the case of ubs for example where eventually they were looking at the super senior products primarily through models with disastrous effect in using a very one dimensional way wasn't the case in jpmorgan even though ironically jpmorgan had invented it. they said it is kind of use will but it is only useful as part of the set of techniques measuring risk. so i think that contributed to the stand it. the other key thing

morgan had clay a-- towards risk but then they-- summon disastrously and that created disasters like enron. then when dimond arrived, he brought with them a set of added towards-- attitudes towards risk which in a low-key way it was time very well in the risk management culture. so, they do appear to have taken, as far as i can tell, have been topped atlanta to the j.p. morgan guys and talk to other banks to take an attitude towards risk. they were much more systematic in terms of trying to monolith and analyze it. that boren just relying on a few models. the case of ups for example eventually, they were looking at the super senior product primarily through our models with disastrous effect in using a unit dimensional way of measuring risk. it wasn't the case with j.p. morgan even though j.p. morgan had invented are. having invented it, guess it is useful but it is only useful as part of a set of techniques for measuring risk. so i think that contributed. the other key thing was about j.p. dimond was he was actually prepared to face up to the analysts on wall street and say no and that is