rescuing became an exxected norm. there are zero entities out there, presumably credit holders' equity holders that are supposed to be regulating these firms. the creditors, who did not experienced the upside, were the ones that had the most to lose. it is not a large stretch to think that they were failing in that role because they felt they were a point to be guaranteed a return regardless of what happened. >> i think you're right that all financial systems have this risk of moral hazard, this expectation in the extreme event that it is possible the government will act. that is the job of oversight, policy, and government, to make sure that because of that risk, you have tough, well-design constraints on leverage that are enforced across the system ahead of the crisis none of us run the system, and no country runs the system on the expectation that market discipline alone is adequate to constrained rest- taking. all companies -- all countries restraint risk. some do better than others in some parts of the system, bu