that was the first set of issues on the business record fisa. so there is no cell site location data under business record fisa we're using today, period. second, if an american travels overseas and communications are collected, the chances are in that collection, we may not know that's been collected, that it's an american position. but if you collect, you'll probably get the cell site location with that. the issue would be, how many of those have been collected. the answer is we're really not looking for that. it may have been collected because they talked to, you know -- and i don't mean any of these people are bad. >> you seem to point to them a lot. >> i just want you to be careful because they're right behind you. but i am concerned, senator, that in that case, we won't know at all who are the americans and who aren't in those issues for the same reason before. but what we can tell you is i think good numbers on those that we target overseas that are americans under those procedures that we have. we can give you those numbers. 703, 4, and

under the statute to the fisa court, we call it the fisc. they ask for and receive permission under this to get records relevant to a national security investigation and they must demonstrate to the fisc it will be operated under the guidelines that are set forth by the attorney general under executive order 12333. it is limited to tangible objects. what does that mean? these are like records like the metadata, the phone records i have been describing but it is quite explicitly limited to things that you could get with a grand jury subpoena. those kinds of records. now, it is important to know prosecutors issue grand jury subpoenas all the time and do not need any involvement of a court or anybody else really to do so. under this program, we need to get permission from the court to issue this ahead of time so there is court involvement with the issuance of these orders which is different from a grand jury subpoena. but the type of records, just documents, business records, things like that are limited to the same types of documents that we c

the fisa registered statute maintain all internet metadata. not just e-mail of the data. >> i think that is correct. again, it would be limited to the meta-data in that regard. >> just make sure i can mr. cole answer. limitation would be metadata. >> you cannot be content. in the latest order of the fisa court under 215, is specifically excluded locations. the mac is going to have only you would have to show the categories that you're seeking was in fact relevant to the authorized investigation. >> mr. cole coming of talked about the legislation by senator leahy and i have talked about to have it the privacy act. we want to require criminal matters that they obtain a probable cause in access to the content electronic communication stored by a third-party provider. section 215 the u.s.a. patriot act requires government show only relevant to an authorized intelligence at best edition for two chain records. i am not talking about the more standard usage of 215. in section 215 never been relied upon to obtain the contents of stored communications

act, the fisa surveillance, increased or decreased? >> guest: yeah. it's a great question. i think it's actually been increased. when president obama was a candidate, when he was running for office, he said no more national security that spy on americans. but now that he's president i think he sees the power differently. and he felt if he can be trusted with the dragnet powers. it sounds as if the fisa court allowed actually is an expansion and there's more and more material being collected in bulk and that what is being collected under the foreign intelligence surveillance act even though on americans has also increased. i think there's a possibility for another increase. for awhile until 2011, the government was also collecting e-mail addresses, internet dresses that we visit, the fisa court authorized that. and the government actually stopped collecting all of that information in 2011. but they could do it again because they're authorized to do that. this is tremendously broad power. >> and we're talking with susan herman. this is h

it was recognized by the fisa court. that the entire collection of metadata is relevant to an authorized international terrorism investigation. -- it is asary to necessary part of the process to allow the nsa to identify phone calls between terrorists and other persons. judge pots recent opinion ,eauthorize the program terrorist programs are ultimately contained within the whole of the metadata produced. it can only be found after the production is aggregated. identifiers are used to determine the terrorist organization. is relevantoduction to the ongoing investigation out of necessity stop that out of necessity. the nsa program must also comply with the fourth amendment. this is the supreme court cost decision in smith versus maryland. telephone users to convey information to phone companies have no reasonable expectation of privacy. this is with a number of years ago. some have questioned its applicability in terms of a situation where the government retains and collect metadata and aggregated all in one place. however

engaged in bulk collection of internet meta data under the fisa pen registered statute. it suggests to me under that kind of legal interpretation of fisa the nsa could collect the same amounts of information domestically that this research suggests they're collecting abroad. mr. litt, maybe i should direct it first at you. i know the program authorized the bulk parts of internet data

the fourth amendment, that if it were relevant to an authorized investigation and could convince the fisa court of that, then,

under the statute to the fisa court, we call it the fisc. they ask for and receive permission under this to get records relevant to a national security investigation and they must demonstrate to the fisc it will be operated under the guidelines that are set forth by the attorney general under executive order 12333. it is limited to tangible objects. what does that mean? these are like records like the metadata, the phone records i have been describing but it is quite explicitly limited to things that you could get with a grand jury subpoena. those kinds of records. now, it is important to know prosecutors issue grand jury subpoenas all the time and do not need any involvement of a court or anybody else really to do so. under this program, we need to get permission from the court to issue this ahead of time so there is court involvement with the issuance of these orders which is different from a grand jury subpoena. but the type of records, just documents, business records, things like that are limited to the same types of documents that we c

it was recognized by the fisa court. the court found that the entire collection of metadata is relevant to an authorized international terrorism investigation. it is necessary to -- it is a necessary part of the process to allow the nsa to identify phone calls between terrorists and other persons. as the judge pots recent opinion reauthorize the program, terrorist programs are ultimately contained within the whole of the metadata produced. it can only be found after the production is aggregated. identifiers are used to determine the terrorist organization. the whole production is relevant to the ongoing investigation out of necessity stop that out of necessity. the nsa program must also comply with the fourth amendment. this is the supreme court cost decision in smith versus maryland. telephone users to convey information to phone companies have no reasonable expectation of privacy. this is with a number of years ago. some have questioned its applicability in terms of a situation where the government retains and collect

it suggests to me under that kind of a legal interpretation of fisa the n.s.a. could collect the same amounts of massive information domestically that this suggests they are collecting abroad. maybe i should direct at you, i know the program authorized the bulk e-mail and other internet metadata was shut down in 2011 because it wasn't operationally useful. under the current law would the n.s.a. be able to restart the bulk collection of internet data? >> i think that if the n.s.a. and the department of justice were able to make a showing to the fisa court that the collection of internet metadata in bulk which is a category of information that is not protected by the fourth amendment if it were relevant to an authorized investigation and could convince the fisa court of that, then yes, it would be authorized. >> it was shut down before as not being operationally useful. would you have to go to the court? >> i believe we would have to. >> to restart the bulk collection of internet data, would you have to go to the court? >> i believe we would. >> mr. cole? >> yes,

we report any compliance incidents to the fisa court immediately. with respect to congress, we have reported any significant compliance problems such as those uncovered in 2009 to the intelligence and judiciary committees of both houses. documents related to those 2009 problems have since been declassified and have been released at the dnr. over the past several months, we've gone to great things to better explain publicly why the program is lawful. under section 215, there must be reasonable grounds that the records collected are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism. as both the fisa courts opinions and our own 22 page white paper explains, relevant is a very broad term. in its ordinary sense, information is relevant to an investigation. if it bears upon or is pertinent to that investigation. courts have held that large repositories of information can satisfy relevant hindered with a search of the whole repository is necessary in order to identify the critical documents. this is precisely the rationale

program, the now defunct internet metadata program and upstream collection under section 702 of the fisa amendments act. in each of these cases what we see is extraordinary but nevertheless limited authorities were secretly interpreted in ways that permitted far more extensive collection than certainly members of the general public and even i think many legislators believed at the time of passage had been authorized. this was done in part because the fisa court, which was established on the premise that it would be authorizing and finding probable cause in cases of specific and traditional targeted surveillance, instead found itself in the position of addressing broad programs of surveillance, often involving novel, legal, or technological issues. it's not clear that body was well established to consider. in the metadata cases, these interpretations took to form of an unprecedented reading of relevance that held entire databases containing information about millions of admittedly innocent americans to be relevant on the grounds that a fishing expedition through those records might ultima

the fisa court, and the two intelligence committees, that's correct. >> but the problem was the fisaas weakened a few years ago in the fisa amendment act, they took a lot of the powers away from the fisa court and we see from the court's reports that they were chastising the nsa constantly about abusing their authorities. >> woodruff: just very quickly dmitri alperovitch, general hayden we heard him say that if these changes take place, if the relationship between the tech companies and the government is prayed-- afraid, u.s. security is hurt. what dot companies feel, what do they think about that? >> well, it's very problematic because for a long time we've been sort of waiting for the government to step in in this field of cybersecurity an protect us from threats, would you never expect in the physical world for companies to defund themselves from threats from pla, from-- in russia or whatever you but in cyberspace that's the situation. and today i think the reality is the legislation on the hill that has been considered for the last number of years is the idea of information shari

in the latest order of the fisa court under 215, it specifically excluded cell site location as well. >> i was going to add only that you'd have to show that the categories of meta data that you're seeking was, in fact, relevant to the authorized investigation.

host: what about the fisa court? guest: fisa court has gotten a bad rap. ys, this is not a rubber stamp. more transparency would help. people say cases are rarely turned down by the fisa court. you have gone through so many lawyers by the time you get to fisa. your own department lawyers, the justice lawyers, they will send the case back if it is not strong enough. they will ask for more information and insight. host: have you ever worked with the fisa courts? guest: indirectly, yes. host: can you explain? guest: i am in another country and i see an american and a funny place. a place where there are not a lot of people, a battlefield. you say i wonder what the american is up to -- gunrunning or drugs. you take a picture of him and you come back and say, hey, can somebody find out about this guy for me? that triggers 11 million protections. you have to go through multiple lawyers who say do you have reasonable grounds? you say, i just had a bad feeling. a that feeling does not cut it. you need a good strong case to go to pfizer. -- goio to fisa. talking to

you don't have that in the fisa court.e article 3 judges but you don't have a back and forth in the same way you did this court. so i think the district opinion last week, which found the program of metadata collection unconstitutional is meaningful. i think there's still a very, very open question whether or not that will stand on appeal. at the intermediate court of appeals and ultimately the supreme court, which i think will see this, and hear this case in the next year or two. >> that's your prediction, the supreme court. and do you have a view on how they'll rule? >> i think it's likely they will hear it. i think there is an excellent chance judge leon's opinion will be overturned in the court of appeals. and despite the fact that judge leon relies very much on justice sotomayor's concurrence, they're going to be hard-pressed to find five votes at the supreme court to overturn this case. and frankly, i think legislation will change before then anyway. >> interesting. michael leiter, i know you've got a lot of experien

setting aside any techny logical limitations, would the fisa pen register statute authorize you to obtain all internet meta data, not just e-mail meta data? >> i think that is correct. again, it would be limited to the meta data in that regard. >> if i could just add on that.

we also know that the nsa engaged in bulk collection of internet meta data under the fisa pen registered statute.

under the fisa statute, i think you would have to get court authority just like you would under 215 to be able to do that. and that would only last for a period of time. it would have to be renewed periodically. there's no active authority for it right now.

let me focus on fisa court reforms. i wonder if you could tell me implementing on some type of adversarial process . >> i would step back and say in cases where you have something that is an authority envisioned targeted to acquisition of records of some nexus to espionage suspects, the appropriate move if it is believed that some kind of -- is to return to congress and not to leave the decision in the hands of the fisa court. >> the fisa court should not be making law. it will be better to have congressional authorization. what we can see from some of the that it would benefit the courts proceeding to have some kind of adversary or raise opposing arguments, but to have technical expertise. a tricky constitutional wrangle to intercept internet metadata where you do not have just a phone call and the content, but layers of metadata and content. --a constitutional advocate >> a technical advisory capacity of some kind would be useful. the most difficult questions about the ways the intercept in surprising ways. >> thank y

particularly in dealings before the fisa court. speed is very important in terms of the collection of information to stop potential threats against the united states. i believe that having a privacy advocate may make sense with respect to the formulation of the fisa application. there is a lot of give and take that occurs with respect to the, putting together the fisa application. perhaps even having the advocate be able to go talk to the attorney general who must approve every fisa application. that makes sense to me to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of individuals. i'm a little bit worried about how introducing this privacy advocate might affect the ability of the united states to move forward and gather intelligence in the speed that is necessary to protect our interests. >> you supported warrantless wiretaps when you were a white house counsel under bush and there is a confrontation when john ashcroft was in the hospital and it was decide that had he had an objection and was prepared to resign over it. looking back

they add for background, the fisa court that hears appeals and when the intelligence community wants to go for warrants, and other investigative tools, to look into potential terrorist threats or security threats they go to the fisa court, the supreme court says the fisa court has on 35 different occasions authorized, what this lower court has today. the man at the center of the controversy, edward snowden, a secret program authorized by a secret court when exposed to the light of day found to violate america's rights, the first of many. in the view of edward snowden there will be many court cases like this that will strike down what the nsa, president obama hosing some heavy hitters from the technology world tomorrow including the ceos of apple, netflix and others, what technology problems that has had. the issue with surveillance and the technology involved. remember the judge in the case today cited the almost i don't remember wellan data, some has authorized has been outed and the technology has changed considerably and that's the basis of his ruling now. >> mike viqueria from wa

the fisa court is going to take care of it. the fisa court is going to oversee everything. declassified when judge bates and walton had the opportunity to speak, they, in effect, said them consistently mislead to the point there wasn't a system of rules at all. you had general alexander, for example, say at one point, you can see it on youtube, we don't hold data on u.s. citizens. andrea, i consider that one of the most false statements ever made about u.s. surveillance. >> before i let you go, congratulate you on what is expected if everything falls into place. max baucus, chair of the finance committee will be nominated ambassador to china. you would be next up to chair the committee. how will things be different? what are your top priorities? >> andrea, i'm going to certainly wait for speaker reid to make any official announcement here. i'm going to continue my long-standing interest, bipartisan pro growth, you've seen work with senator greig, coates, begich, medicare reform, tackling a chronic disease. this is an opportunity to show medicare in 2013 is very different th

fisa court warrant 30-879. dellinger: danny marwat.translator who worked for the military until he was accused of collaborating with the taliban. he hired the law firm lockhart/gardner to defend him. so that's why we're following all these lawyers? hopkins: just two lawyers: alicia florrick and diane lockhart. and we've only gone back two years in the bit bucket. so we have a warrant for this person of interest, marwat, he hires two lawyers and we've been listening to their calls for two years. i don't see the problem. well, these lawyers also represent chumhum. yeah. this firm's all over the map. the problem is, they're suing us. these lawyers are? yeah. but not for marwat. for chumhum. (goat bleats over speakers) (both bleat) okay, don't do that again. so, you want to know whether... does our warrant restrict listening to a law firm in active litigation with us for a non-terroristic action? sometimes i can't tell if you're the stupidest people in the world or the smartest. we're the smartest. okay, i'll check with counsel, and in the

and i hope that comes through. >> everybody loves a good fisa joke. for 2013. we end with people who make this show possible and crazy. happy new year, everybody. >> happy new year. >> happy new year. honestly, my kids are hard to impress... so i got the windows nokia tablet. it's, well, impressive. it's got the brightest hd screen, super-fast 4g lte, so my son can play games and movies almost anywhere, and it's got office for school stuff. but the best part? i got the lumia 928 for my daughter for free, with the best low-light smartphone camera this side of the north pole. dad for the win. mm! mm! mm! ♪ honestly, i want to see you be brave ♪ that's a good thing, but it doesn't cover everything. only about 80% of your part b medical expenses. the rest is up to you. so consider an aarp medicare supplement insurance plan, insured by unitedhealthcare insurance company. like all standardized medicare supplement insurance plans, they could save you in out-of-pocket medical costs. call today to request a free decision guide. with these types of plans, you'l

there have been rulings before, though, or at least arguments on this subject before the fisa court,efore a secret court, right? >> that's right. the secret surveillance court, known as the fisa court or the fisk, has repeatedly authorized this one secret program going back to the bush administration. that court looks very different than this one. >> in terms of the way that those court proceedings would have been different, what's the difference, i guess procedurally, between this regular u.s. district court ruling today and what would have been argued before the secret court in the past? >> well, both involve article 3 judges, but the way the fisa court works is only the justice department, only the government is allowed to come before the court and make arguments. it all happens in secret, and the court hears the government's point of view, doesn't hear the adversarial point of view, and then rules. and if it rules in favor of the government, there's no one there to appeal. so, it's a very stacked procedure when you're talking about these large programmatic surveillance programs l

host: what about the fisa court? guest: fisa court has gotten a bad rap. this is not a rubber stamp. more transparency would help. people say cases are rarely turned down by the fisa court. you have gone through so many lawyers by the time you get to fisa. your own department lawyers, the justice lawyers, they will send the case back if it is not strong enough. they will ask for more information and insight. host: have you ever worked with the fisa courts? guest: indirectly, yes. host: can you explain? guest: i am in another country and i see an american and a funny place. a place where there are not a lot of people, a battlefield. you say i wonder what the american is up to -- gunrunning or drugs. you take a picture of him and you come back and say, hey, can somebody find out about this guy for me? that triggers 11 million protections. you have to go through multiple lawyers who say do you have reasonable grounds? you say, i just had a bad feeling. a that feeling does not cut it. you need a good strong case to go to pfizer. -- goio to fisa. talking to joh

court, you said the fisa court's raised some questions, that may be true, but they've rubber stampede of these thicks that the administration, both the administrations have asked for. and this, again, is one of the prices we pay for the patriot act. much too broad, much too much leeway for the government to do what they want in violation of the fourth amendment. martha: there are a lot of questions about whether or not this program is effective, and you can talk to the top experts who report on homeland security in this country, and they'll say there's a number of things that led to the thwarting of these attacks, and i know that's going to be debated -- >> well, martha, one point, one point about that. do you think the obama administration was inclined to keep this program in place? no. but they did, and they did because they found it to be valuable. now, the court, you'll notice that judge leon was very specific in his language. they haven't shown us any instance of where it thwarted an imminent attack. the administration has, both the bush administration and obama administration h

under fisa, n.s.a. can only target the communications of a u.s.on with a probable cause finding under a specific court order. >> miller: a judge in the fisa court, which is the court that secretly hears the n.s.a. cases, and approves or disapproves your requests, said the n.s.a. systematically transgressed both its own court-appointed limits in bulk internet data collection programs. >> alexander: there was nobody willfully or knowingly trying to break the law. >> miller: the n.s.a. says their analysts use highly technical systems under increasingly complex legal requirements, and that when mistakes are made, they're human errors, not intentional abuses. the snowden leaks have challenged n.s.a. officials to explain programs they never intended to talk about. so how did an obscure contractor and computer specialist pull off the most damaging breach of secrets in u.s. history? few have spent more time thinking about that than rick ledgett. how long have you been with the n.s.a.? >> rick ledgett: for 25 years. >> miller: how many television interview

next, the new public advocate at the secret fisa court. this has been suggested time and time again. when it's told it wants to conduct surveillance there is no one there on the ground of civil liberties, a so-called public advocate. and finally the new nsa director should be a civilian. committee. here is leahy on the senate floor. >> the negligence is very clear. it's coming from every branch of government from every corner of our nation nsa, you've gone too far. the bulk of collection of data . these are simply recommendatio recommendations, and the president does not have to adopt them. >> to weigh in cybersecurity wih the atlantic council, good to speak with you. first of all, what do youthere . this is more than i was expecting. >> it indicates what, they take a serious the programs that they would critique them. i'm surprised what they were able to come up with. >> one was to end the storage of so-called metadata. does this make it more difficult now if it's accepted by the president for the nsa to cross reference or rrs in nsa'se l

nsa and my own research, i have written on fisa for quite a long time.ber stamp doesn't capture. if i think that the judges have clearly chastised the nsa in the past before they had as good a compliance program as they have now. but at the same time i think there's something in the fisa court we thought would be useful. one is more transparency, not having a secret court opinions as much if we can avoid it. the other thing we say is to have a public interest advocate. having somebody whose job is to really push and really say here's the questions and here is the worry, that is our adversary system. and we suggest ways to build that into the system so there is a stronger presentation of the privacy and civil liberty as approach. >> jeffrey-- geoffrey stone, there is so much in this report but i do want to ask you about the spying on nonamericans. because that is a big part of what you wrote about. you're also suggesting that the u.s. government has gone too far in that regard. but my reading is that you're less specific about exactly, precisely what you'

under fisa, nsa can only target the communications of a u.s. under a specific court order. >> reporter: a judge in the fisa court, which is the court that secretly hears the nsa cases and approves or disapproves your requests, said the nsa cystmatically -- systematically transgressed its own limits. >> there was nobody willfully or knowingly trying to break the law. >> so john, we now have this recommendation from this panel suggesting that there need to be sweeping changes. does general alexander appreciate that, that there is a real movement out there to change the nsa, including shifting from military to civilian leadership. >> i think what general alexander is grappling with here is he believes that the threat of terrorism is going up. there are all these foreign fighters, many westerners who are in syria now who are going to be coming home. you have the situation in syria, in egypt, across the region. he says this is not the time to start rearranging the deck chairs or particularly to take away the tools that they develop after 9/11, to st

when we reported that a federal secret fisa court had ordered verizon to turn over to the nsa all telephone calls of all americans that use verizon. and we later discovered that it was all telephone companies who were subject to similar orders. so to have a federal court less than six months later say that the program our reporting revealed is a violation an abuse of the core libts of american citizens is -- liberties of americans because that's what it's all about. >> law did you hope to accomplish with your stories? >> i hoped first of all to make my fellow citizens in the united states and people around the world aware that their privacy was being rapidly and aggressively eroded by this system of surveillance beyond their knowledge. and secondly to hope to trigger exactly the kind of global debate that has been triggered over whether people want to live in a world like that, the value of internet freedom and individual privacy and the daifntion of -- dangers of state secrecy, to inform people about what they should know and to trigger meaningful debates which a healthy democracy needs to

according to the fisa court the nsa exceeded the scope of authorized acquisition. not just once or twice, but continuously during many of the years the program was in operation. again, another reason why we should have a lot more oversight and a lot more open oversight than we do have. the problems were so severe the fisa court ultimately suspended the program entirely for a period of time before approving its renewal. but once we knew the government asserted this collection was important for an intelligence tool, which is the claim it makes now of the section 215 phone records. but then in 2011, the government ended this valuable tool, as they call it. this internet meta data program. because as director clapper explained, it was no longer meeting operational expectations. it's important that the administration does not believe there's any legal impediment to restarting this bulk internet data collection program. if it or a future administration wanted to do so. the legal justification of this internet meta data collection is troubling. as with the section 215 pro

>> i don't see anything wrong with putting in additional checks and balances on the fisa court alonghat have been suggested. you know, fareed, the main thing i look for in the program is whether actual harm was done to an innocent american by the program. has anyone lost a job, been harassed by the fbi, been barred from doing something as a result of the program. any innocent american? the answer is no. none of those have come to light. all of the concern is about the possibility of misuse of this information by the national security agency and the intelligence community. my experience is that information is not misused and that having it available to efficiently check to see whether a foreigner who has been identified as a potential terrorist has called an american phone number is a useful check and has helped us thwart some attacks. >> senator widen says that it is clear now that the phone logging program that nsa uses, the big data mining program, did not in fact stop any terrorist attacks. the advisory panel's report makes that clear. your reaction? >> i think that's incorrect. i

. >> this program by the way is fully overseen not just by congress but by the fisa court. it's been carried out consistent with the constitution and rule of law. >> jon: see? it turns out it wasn't so much rule of law consistent as rule of law add -- adjacent. the n.s.a. has been routinely breaking privacy rules. >> jon: rules are made to be broken. sorry, wait that is no precious moments figures. those are knead be broken. rules are made to be followed. even though they said repeatedly these programs are only used to catch bad guys. >> reports surfacing that some employees are tracking their love interests. >> using the enormous power of the government to eavesdrop on their significant others or people they would like to become their significant others. [ laughter ] >> jon: hey, i just met you and this is crazy but here is your number of your bank account and social security so call me or i'll continue to mon tour your activities. [laughter] i feel like at this point our intelligence community is pretty much even owning the fact that they are getting nefarious. last week

and not without the specific permission of the fisa court for that query. that is different from where the andrnment holds the data can query the data on a reasonable suspicion. the government did that 200 times last year. communityntelligence has to tell the president is how much of an operational impediment it will create in intelligence analysis. >> it will be collected but with restrictions on how it can be used. let's look at leadership. on collectingarry the phone call records of foreign leaders. >> sometimes. is the only logical possible sustainable answer. that this kind of activity will be reviewed at the highest levels of the government. i think this will be conducted in the national security council staff. through. go intelligence gain isn't the only one. due respect and deference for foreign leaders. i suspect we will do this less often. we will still do it and when we do it, it will be an american choice. >> will angela merkel be happy -- >> i think she will. said we will not do this to you. the president can't say we won't do this to any chanc

we have no further comment at this time, but they add for background purposes that the fisa court, the secret court in the center of the controversy that hears appeals when the intelligence community wants to go for warrants and other investigative tools to look beau potential terrorist threats or security threats, they go to the fisa court. they say on 35 separate occasions they have authorized just the sort of telephonic metadata collection the court aaddressed today. the man at the center of this controversy, edward snowden, has released a statement that reads in part, today a secret program authorized by a secret court was when exposed to light of day found to violate americans' rights. it's the first of many in the few of edward snowden. there will be many more court cases like that strike down what the nsa has been doing and what he's fighting against in allowing leaks to go forward. we should point out one other item to the agenda here. president obama is hosting heavy hitters from the technology world tomorrow including the ceos from apples and netflix and others. they talk abo

the court also called for reforms to the fisa court, an advocate to argue against the u.s. government. it recommended creating an approval process including signoff for spying on foreign leaders. and it suggested a civilian director for the nsa rather than military personnel. that last recommendation has already been rejected by the white house. while it is unclear just how many suggestion they will act on, they cheered the panel's finding including chair of the judiciary committee senator pat leahy. >> the message is very clear. the message to the nsa is now coming from every branch of government, from every corner of our nation. nsa, you've gone too far. >> on the other side of the aisle, senator rand paul asserted the panel's findings made it clear director of national intelligence james clapper who famously told congress the nsa did not wittingly collect phone records should resign. >> clapper more injuryious to our intelligence capabilities than anything snowden did because clapper damaged the credibility of the entire intelligence apparatus. i'm not sure what to belie