a dozen times a fisa judge said no to a fisa warrant, okay? since 1978. now, if you have a mechanism to get a fisa warrant to do these activities, and you choose not to do them okay, even you must believe something is wrong. because judges, these are handpicked courts, handpicked judges who always say yes. >> and we heard first panel this morning that some of the standards have been relaxed. congress has moved back but maybe one of the answers is that we need -- we need to get our legislators engaged. i would like to sort of bring it to a close by asking you to look at a couple of trends. and talk first of all, about capacity and the potential for abuse and then talk about what the final -- >> capacity. a couple of -- i think three or four years ago i read while he was away nsa was building a place in utah for storage. they went in for a requisition to build a another storage facility here in ft. mead. they're collecting a lot of data. i think the panel was on to something very important this morning, which is going to -- i wasn't following al

the government certifies to the fisa court would have no interest in any particular known u.s.es on the data using the names phone numbers and e-mail accounts of particular known u.s. persons. this is called backdoor searches. the nsa and the cia did approximately 2,000 of these searches in 2013. according to the privacy and civil liberties oversight board, the fbi does these searches routinely. routinely searches databases containing section 702 data when it investigates americans or even performs assessments. which means no factual basis for suspicion at all. so you know warrantless surveillance. warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance has absolutely become a domestic law enforcement tool. >> catherine, i don't know if you have anything to add or if you're seeing -- if this is a concern you're seeing in some of your cases as well, you've seen? >> i think that is a concern. i think we sort of in how we sketched this out previously we see two concerns, right? the large data collection programs being data culled and being used in prosecutions and other sort of technologica

that limitation was incorporated into the fisa, the form and intelligence events at back in 1970. that limitation was jettisoned by congress in the patriot act and now foreign intelligence collection only as a significant purpose of the collection which means that the primary purpose can be gathering evidence for domestic criminal prosecution. on its face the statute provides some protection here in that it prohibits the government from deliberately targeting a particular known person in the united states. particular non-u.s.

let me begin with fisa.he three provisions that are going to expire on june 1 our first the roving wiretap authority. this provision enables the government to maintain surveillance on a dark when he or she switches phone numbers or e-mail addresses without seeking a new court order. the second is the lone wolf authority, which enables the government to conduct surveillance of a non-united states person engaged in international terrorism without demonstrating that they are fla with a particular international terrorist group, such as isis or al-qaeda. and the third is the business records authority which carries with it section 215 of the national security administration. this enables the government to obtain a court order directing the production of quote any tangible thing end quote that is relevant to an authorized national security investigation. can you describe for us the importance of these three provisions, and what would be the operational impact if the three were allowed to sunset in june? >> thank y

in the fisa court but there is judicial review for this. it is an important part of techniques we have used with the war on terror as the other two provisions that we have mentioned. but i do think with respect to fisa there is so is the ability to make sure the most effective way to affect privacy i know that is what you have spent a great deal of time on as well as the intelligence committee and we will continue those discussions. as with fellow most position we have to examine carefully the recent events underscore the importance of this with the war on terror i is hoping we can afford with any proposed changes to fisa with the complete understanding of the risks that we're still face the if any changes need to be made with the intelligence committee and the discussions we need to have to make sure we could provide law enforcement with the tools that they need. i believe the court order provision is effective as we gather data from all types of sources. i am open into discussions about how they can be best modified if we need to consiste

this was different, became section 702 of the fisa, of fisa. and yahoo under threat of a fine of $250,000 challenged a directive that the government issued to yahoo saying that they had to turn over information pursuant to this program. that did not operate and did allow for disclosure of content. and the last thing to mention that gives me hope is encryption. the idea that people can encrypt their data to make it so the bad guys can't get it. and if they do get it, they can't use it well. and the strong protection that encryption can provide and the ease, the increasing ease with which we can encrypt our data. >> wonderful. thank you for those optimistic observations. and also, your sense that the 24/7 drone surveillance in public would violate the fourth amendment because the court in jones rejected the government's claim that individuals have no expectation of privacy in public. justice waynestein will be the final vote. well, the lower court gets affirmed if it's a 2-2 split. >> you'll have to make a decision. >> no, the moderator has no op

under fisa or under title iii 01. emily: what about dragnet?eneral alexander: this is the 215 program, let's go over that. the meta-data program. emily: this is information you collect, right? general alexander: this is information the government compels them to provide, only numbers, no content. it has the duration of the call. it has the two and from number. the date and time. your name is not in their. no content is in there. i will repeat no names, no content, just numbers. what that is used for, let's say the earlier case, there was actually a number in that communication, f b i told nsa that was the number. and we now know he was talking to al qaeda. under the rules, one of 35 people could look into the database and go out three hops to see who he was talking to. there were able to see one of the people in new york had downstream connections to other terrorist. all they saw were numbers, and that resulted in numbers overseas. nsa gave the number to the fbi fbi with a security letter could look that up. so you see, nsa's job was to connect

chairman mccaul: yeah, i mean, you will have this law take place before pfizer reform -- before fisaorm. if there is any overall strategy, which is kind of hard to find in congress these days i think the idea to tackle this piece before fisa reform comes down. is that the cart before the horse? the ideas we do cyber security first and then tackle that, but your point is well taken. >> good morning. i'm from the rand corporation. many of us regarded the sony attack is something quite new in the sense it was an attack by a nationstate directly on our constitutionally protected liberties. i'm wondering if you have any thoughts about proportionality of response in light of this attack and when it happens again? chairman mccaul: i completely agree. i think sony -- look, we had attacks in the past, but sony really captured the american people's attention and curiosity because it involved hollywood. let's be honest. and it involved free speech. you are right it was a direct attack on our constitution, free speech. and in addition to being a nationstate threat and it was very highly destruct

general alexander: if you are talking to the nsa -- under fisa, the government would require a warnso track your communications. think of these are the case which is public this is the guy that was going to blow up the new york city subway, what nsa had to do, under the 702 program was get a court order to allow them, which is a 702, to get information on the communications going home and to a zogby. that is what the program is geared towards. nsa was before inside, not domestic. the perception that nsa was reading your e-mails this false, unless you are talking to a terrorist who is overseas. domestic, it would be the same thing with the fbi, they have to have a warrant or some reason of probable cause to go after you. emily: what about dragnet? general alexander: this is the 215 program, let's go over that. emily: this is information you collect, right? general alexander: this is information the government compels them to provide, only numbers, no content. it has the duration of the call. your name is not in their. no content is in there. no names, no content, just numbers. what th

i think the idea to tackle this piece before fisa reform comes down. is that the cart before the horse? the idea is we do cybersecurity first and then tackle that, but your point is well taken. >> good morning. i'm from the rand corporation. many of us regarded the sony attack as quite new in the sense it was an attack by a nationstate directly on our constitutionally protected liberties. i'm wondering if you have any thoughts about proportionality of response in light of this attack and when it happens again? chairman mccaul: i completely agree. i think sony -- look, we had attacks in the past, but sony really captured the american people's attention and curiosity because it involved hollywood. let's be honest. and it involved free speech. you are right, it was a direct attack on our constitution, free speech. and in addition to being a nationstate threat and it was very highly destructive with the -- what they did. you go into your office, turn the computer on, there is a skull and cross bones, and all the hard drives were completely, completely dest

that limitation was incorporated into the fisa, the form and intelligence events at back in 1970. that limitation was jettisoned by congress in the patriot act and now foreign intelligence collection only as a significant purpose of the collection which means that the primary purpose can be gathering evidence for domestic criminal prosecution. on its face the statute provides some protection here in that it prohibits the government from deliberately targeting a particular known person in the united states. particular non-u.s. person because of course if the government were targeting a particular known u.s. person for surveillance for criminal prosecution purposes it would need a warrant. here's how that looks in practice. the government certifies to the fisa court would have no interest in any particular known u.s. person, clicks the data, then run searches on the data using the names phone numbers and e-mail accounts of particular note u.s. persons. this is called backdoor searches. the nsa and the set a data privately to thousand of these in 2013. according to the privacy and ci

i mean people have this law take place before fisa reform. and i think that's part of if there is any overall strategy, which is kind of hard to find in congress these days, i think that has a good ending to the. the idea to tackle this piece before fisa reform comes down. now, is that the cart before the horse? i think they just want the idea we do cybersecurity first and then tackle that. but your point is well taken. >> good morning. i'm from the rand corporation. many of us regarded the sony that as quite new in the sense it was an attack a nation state directly on our constitutionally protected liberties. so i'm wondering if you have any thoughts about proportionality of response in light of this attack and when it happens again? >> i completely agree. i think sony, look we've had attacks in the past that sony really captured the american people's attention and curiosity because it involves hollywood. let's be honest. and it involved free speech. you're right, those are direct attack on our constitution, free speech. and in addition to b

the editor-in-chief of fisa magazine announced he was stepping down. this discussion was moderated by former media critic for msnbc. this is just over one hour. >> good evening. long gone are the days with two daily doses of news. at night, the families cuddle around for the evening broadcast will stop now in the age of advanced technology and social media, news is reported and constantly consumed. americans are turning to online sources for information on major events and issues in our world. this age of new news is driven by web seats -- websites such as gawker and buzzfeed. although these organizations are young they have a dramatic impact on how our generation understands the worlds around us. we have a distinguished panel. we have max reed editor-in-chief of gawker. without further ado, please find me in welcoming tonight's panel. [applause] >> a lot of the audience knows organizations but i wanted to start by asking you how you would describe the mission of your organization. let's start with gawker. what do you see as the mission and what functi

>> you will have -- this will take place before fisa reform. that is part of the remedy overall strategy kind of hard to find in congress these days with the idea to tackle this piece in the reform. now, is that the cart before the horse? the idea is to do the cyber security 1st. but your.is well taken. >> good morning. many of us regarding the sony attack is quite new in the sense that it was an attack by nationstate directly on our constitutionally protected liberties. i'm wondering if you have any thoughts of a portion of response in light of this attack and when it happens again. >> i completely agree. we have had attacks in the past. sony should the american people's attention and curiosity. let's just be honest. it was a direct attack our constitution and free-speech in addition there was a nationstate and it was entirely destructive. you going to your office and turn the computer on and there is a skull and cross bones. similar kemal of the hard drives are completely destroyed information stolen. so that was a very sophisticated attack o

president for almost a year and a half now has been calling on congress to enact important changes to the fisa act to better safeguard our civil liberties while keeping our nation safe and the president is clear that he believes we should end the section 215 metadata practice by creating an alternative mechanism to preserve the capability without the government being responsible for holding the bulk data. now i can tell you we are gratified that some of those reforms are included in a recent piece of legislation that has bipartisan support in both the house and the senate. and we're going to continue to review the text of that bill before we render a final judgment on it but it is encouraging that democrats and republicans in both the house and the senate that share the president's commitment to implementing those reforms have cod codified that into legislation. the deadline to renew the patriot act is coming up in about a month. we are hopeful that democrats and republicans can work together to articulate the changes that the president believes are necessary while at the same time preserving

senator leahy and others have taken a broader look, not just focusing on section 215, but also on other fisa authorities that have been used to collect communications, meta data in bulk. so we've been encouraged and supportive of the usa freedom act, which was introduced, i think in 2013 and gone through several different iterations. but would address other authorities under which communications and metadata has been collected in bulk or could be collected in bulk. we're very much looking forward to that debate, which is going to happen soon and hopeful to come to the right result as far as that goes. finally, let me just address one topic which is not so futuristic. and how we are going to deal with government access request, vis-a-vis the internet of things. there are a lot of fundamental questions around the types of rules that ought to apply. and it isn't entirely clear as a threshold matter whether the electronics communications privacy act does apply. i would submit that for remote computing services like google in many respects, it will. that the type of information that is collected

i shouldn't say it's current form but the fisa court's interpretation of it. >> i love what's3witájjtlevel when itx÷ comes to privacy.s virginia has beenr of that. we've been reading about your work on sting rays for example. i think state constitutions are some of the most exciting plays to go. idv be happy to work with you or talk to you about that offline. i don'tçó actually think a constitution doesn't mention the third party doctrine and it's awkward to figure out how to reject itsso3 application in wording. but it's very interesting. a lot of stateñ supreme courts have rej third party doctrine. could build off of. i really like this because i think it's an alternative view. it can create a workable world to the federal regime. it may not address the national security issues,úit could address a lot of the local law enforcement issues. i think showing that you can have a an/v alternative system, what we should acknowledge are legitimate law enforcement needs while safeguards civil liberties is really useful and so, i've been very excited by what i've seen comes out of the state le

this is not the patriot act or fisa. the body will debate intelligence gathering collecting sharing and using at some point in the future but today is not that day. i know those rightly concerned with government surveillance like myself would like to use this rule for that purpose and underlying measures as a platform to debate it but i urge them to refloodplain. -- refrain. we'll have that debit but today's focus is on the thousands of cyberthreats american businesses face every single day. let the attention be on north korea, on iran, on the countless enemies of the yoits who want to destroy this nation. today we speak with a united voice that they will fail. we declare with one voice that american companies have the right to protect their own. to protect and defend their own networks. to share techny information with appropriate agencies on a voluntary basis if they so choose. i thank the intelligence and homeland security committees and their staffs for their tireless work they have done to ensure that we can protect