that said they do have some comments about the fisa court. a growing trend to rely on minimization as the solution for everything generally the court does not see a problem with over collection as long as minimization follows the touchstone of all decisions and the case law developing suggests they're not sympathetic to arguments for prior judicial review so effectively we are in the world of collect everything and figure out the rule later if it is reasonable is okay so over the next couple years the advocates will figure out the problem to this approach to collect that quantity of data outside the framework is too tempting a resource for the government to dip into whenever they want not just the back door search loophole but we have vast collections of data and they argue the case since 2008 to the attorney-general of a united states with the court asks what the harm was and how they could be affected by surveillance could the solicitor general said that is right there is no database so whether that was true or not at the time it is not tru

>> fisa was passed in 1976. the transparency staff alex has been working on a something that's happened over the past couple of years. if you look at the history of surveillance, the history of political abuse. what you see his father is, but that's not true. our experiences in this moment in time. but the story of surveillance is a story about a collection of political abuse. i am not optimistic that things aren't going to change. we've had problems, but those problems could get worse. one of the biggest problems we have is the amount and the kind of things we rely on for accountability and for fairness that are discretionary within the executive branch in secret. as long as you are relying on discretionary secret things i let the people of the microphone >> thank you. i'm an investigative journalist. i would like to pose the question or the problem of incentives that are built into -- >> can you speak closer to the microphone. >> i would like to pose the question incentives built into the problem of accountabi

either from those fisa optic cables abroad. in the huge bond swap is not covered by fisa and the reason for that architecture for the phone systems and net internet era and that last session high this down here all the time. and with that reform with the rise of the internet. one of the wrinkles is that is the awareness that agencies who were sharing a broad data with each other. they have not had privacy protections yet with irrelevant personal details. it used to be the some fbi would disseminate that elsewhere or a process that. after 9/11 there was a desire to tear down the barriers and that would have the redacted so in the world of fisa there was an effort that is known to go to the four agencies of the national counterterrorism center and to talk publicly how there has also bent an effort for those procedures collected to share with the cia and fbi we don't know what those rules will be at but they said did in february was imminent. what is the problem? >> i think we're on the road to getting something. >> as their benes

fisa. and you guys have heard from fellow panelists about fisa and about section 702. hopefully about section 215. freedom act and so on. fisa and i think patrick was talking about this briefly but during the mccarthy era when that was passed, it was better than it was today, i would say. you could get a warrant if the primary purpose was to gather foreign intelligence. now, all you need is saying purpose. if you look at congressional liftry on what that actually means in practice you can listen to senator hatch i think in 2002 after the change in the law had occurred in 2001 after 9/11, he made it clear that even if your primary purpose was to do a criminal investigation so long as its significant purpose was to gather foreign intelligence, that's okay. that's exactly what the fisa warrants were not supposed to do. they were supposed to be focused only on situations where a criminal investigation wouldn't work, where you are targeting foreign folks with foreign intelligence and now it's being used against u.s. citizens for potentially criminal investigations or primar

fisa. and you guys have heard from fellow panelists about fisa and about section 702. hopefully about section 215. freedom act and so on. fisa and i think patrick was talking about this briefly but during the mccarthy era when that was passed, it was better than it was today, i would say. you could get a warrant if the primary purpose was to gather foreign intelligence. now, all you need is saying purpose. if you look at congressional liftry on what that actually means in practice you can listen to senator hatch i think in 2002 after the change in the law had occurred in 2001 after 9/11, he made it clear that even if your primary purpose was to do a criminal investigation so long as its significant purpose was to gather foreign intelligence, that's okay. that's exactly what the fisa warrants were not supposed to do. they were supposed to be focused only on situations where a criminal investigation wouldn't work, where you are targeting foreign folks with foreign intelligence and now it's being used against u.s. citizens for potentially criminal investigations or primar

it has to be from the fisa court. the fisa court has to look at the information and decide whether or not it's okay. and then when faced with the question of whether or not the companies should be let off the hook for not insisting the first time faced with the liability that could have run into the billions, congress blinked. a number of members, this is a central issue in the passage of the statue is whether congress would give liability to the companies and the in essays concern was if they didn't give protection, the companies would refuse to participate going forward and we could bankrupt the american telecommunications industry. many members to vote against the statue did so because they thought if you let the companies off the hook at this time you will let them off the hook for ever going forward. so eventually they said okay, yes, you get a pass this one time but they're still liability going forward. fast-forward again to edward snowden. we now have a statute on the books the says u.s. company give over info

it has to be from the fisa court. the fisa court has to look at the information and decide whether or not it is okay. and then when faced with the question of whether or not they companies should be let off the hook for not insisting, the first time, based with the liabilities that they could have run into the billions, congress blank. a number of members of congress, this is a central issue in the passage of the statute, was was not congress would give liability to the companies and that the nsa is concerned was if they didn't get the protection to the companies, the companies would refuse to participate going for it and we could bankrupt the american telecommunication industry. many members voted against that statute did so because they thought if you let the companies off the hook this time you will let them off the hook for ever going forward. so eventually they said okay, yes, we will, you get a pass this one time but they're still liability going forward or we are putting that in. fast-forward again to edward sn

most of what the nsa does overseas is not regulated by statute or by the fisa court. sharing of that information with the more domestic agencies is primarily a function of executive order, 12333. what the fbi can do in terms of investigative group, the hypothetical i gave, demanding we need to go after these groups because they are all tainted by muslim extremism, that's very discretionary. there's good reason for that actually. we wanted to have fbi officers have a good deal of discretion in these threat assessments of lower-level investigation. we wanted to loosen up some of that information sharing. those high walls were a problem for counterterrorism. so we have done these things and we put in place civil liberties officers like i was, general councils offices, inspectors general. we've had more transparency, so we counterbalanced some of that with checks and balances. but what i worry about is what i call the trump factor. does that kind of civil liberties protection, which is based on a certain degree of adhering to basic norms, does that function in a trump adm

we've had numerous filings from the lawyers who have gone to the secret fisa court and have said you nothing we told you in the brief last year, turns out we were wrong. we just misunderstood what our technologists were telling us. so here you have an example of a real failure to communicate that has ended up, resulted in surveillance programs that are a much more massive than they probably should have been. >> host: what can congress do policy wise in your view to make this more smooth? >> guest: right. i mean, where should we begin, right? there's of the electronic communications privacy act which relates to a lot of what we've been talking about. here you have a law created in 1986 which still is the foundational law that governs when the fbi can read your e-mail. nothing is in dire need of updating. there has been bills and several consecutive congresses that would make some sensible fixes and changes. congress itself could get better on size. congress could create better offices to hire scientists to give them advice the way they do with the congressional research service at thi

it just says government shall make public, so it has raised a question about whether fisa court opinions that were enacted between 1979 and 2015, must also now be made public in a summarized forum. the obama administration-- if there's a new culture of transparency what is the justification rationale for not to say yes? >> i won't get into the legal discretions regarding that particular cause, but i can't say generally it's our intent to go back and look at all of the opinions and that's something happening. whether or not it's a statutory, it is something that is an issue right now. one of the points i was making any different form is when you look at transparency there are different reasons to provide information to the public. summer-- you mention the freedom act, so we must comply with the usa freedom act and that active prioritization mechanism on what it is we do. another one is the freedom of information act and once that goes into litigation you have to follow the force of that litigation and there will be court deadlines and orders that you have to comply with. under the executi

guess who we have had numerous filings from the lawyers who have gone to the secret fisa court and said he know that thing we told you about last year turns out we were wrong. we have misunderstood what her to knowledge as were telling us that you have an example of a real failure to communicate that has ended up resulting in surveillance programs that are much more massive than they should have been with the law. >> host: what can congress do policywise in your view to make it more smooth? >> guest: there is the electronic privacy act which relates to a lot of what we been talking about. here you have a long period of 1986 which still is a foundational law that the fbi can read your e-mail. that is in dire need of updating and there have been bills in several consecutive congresses that would make sensible changes. congress could get better at science too. congress could create new

and that's where you have to go to fisa court.data in the south side of the united states basically a fair game for nsa as long as they're not intentionally targeting a american citizen and there's a ton of data all over the world these days. so -- you know, it's still a little bit screwy yes, you know matt did jobs that modernize fisa in certain ways but screwy how presidents law treats databased on sensitivity of that da it or whether it is being, you know, what the purpose is. but based just on physical location of the data and globalized world that sort of doesn't make a lot of sense. so -- >> susan you talked about 702 and intelligence community perspective rich repository of information that is useful that saves lives it also compromises a significant portion of the president's daily briefing we've been told. president-elect trump in a lengthy interview with chris wallace on fox news sunday if you haven't seen this worth going back to look at because he talked in great detail about a number of national security areas talked

that is why you have to go to the fisa court there are these , oversight methods. the other, much less oversight as long as they are not targeting u.s. citizens. there is a time data all over the world these days, so, you know it is still a little , screwy. yes matt did a lot of jobs to in certain ways but it is still screwy have a law treats data not , only sensitivity or whether it is based on physical location of the data. in a globalized world, that doesn't make a lot of sense. >> you made the point of 702 providing the intelligence community rich repository of information that could save lives. it also comprises a significant portion of the president's daily briefing. we have been told. president-elect trump in a , lengthy interview on sunday with chris wallace on fox news sunday, which is worth looking at talks in great detail on a , number of national security areas. talks about the fact he will -- has only received the briefing about three times. and gave explanation for that. he said he doesn't need the same facts over and over, which implies there were so

and we have had numerous filings from the lawyers who have gone to the secret fisa court and have said, you know, that thing we told you in that brief last year, turns out we were wrong, we just misunderstood what our technologists were telling us. here you have an example of a real failure to communicate that has ended up, resulted in surveillance programs that are much more massive than they probably should have been under the law. >> host: what can congress do policy wise, in your view, to make this more smooth? >> guest: right. i mean, where should we begin, right? you know, there's the electronic communications privacy act which relates to a lot of what we've been talking about. here you have a law created in 1986 which still is the foundational law that governs when the fbi can read your e-mail. that thing is in dire need of updating. and there have been bills in several consecutive congresses that would make some sensible picks and changes. congress itself could get better on science itself. congress could, you know, create new offices to hire scientists to give them advice the

after we started the trash and surveillance, we started writing up our affidavit for the fisa court.reign intelligence surveillance act allows national security organizations to conduct surveillance to detect foreign governments spying on the united states or committing terrorism. it's a court, much like criminal court, so in order to get the ability to monitor somebody's telephone, you have to have a warrant. and in it, it explains that i believe chi mak is committing espionage for the following reasons. >> after five months on the case, we got authorization to tap his telephone lines. and to go inside of his house and do a covert search. we were listening to every phone call that came in out of that house. >> which led us to learn about a trip he was taking to alaska. >> when we found out chi mak and rebecca were going to alaska, i believe the first thought in everybody's mind was, he must be going operational. potentially meeting a handler to give information. that's very typical trade craft for a spy. >> so we took the safest course and sent agents along with them who would watch

word paid that means if i had this eighth cool scrap the idea we could do that quickly the wasn't fisa to process like mitt romney campaign because making stuff up in the middle of the night. we word burning up laptop computers so maybe the trump campaign did something different. no with live streamed video. >>. >> he is left out of all of these. i which is comparing the clinton campaign. and not only how they use facebook but also fund-raising. i hope was in and minimizing the importance of technology despite spending money on the democratic side. >> what does it say in 2016 barack obamacare showed up at south by southwest? >> i do agree one -- obviously if they come look at what you are known for. in b did not perceive the crowded republican primary as a petri dish and with the tools and techniques and approaches donald trump was doing something very different but that was not a different set of innovations but these two operations we didn't see those models play out. if elizabeth warren had been there or others had been there in the campaigns would have looked downstream from their

constitutional limitations as julian mention that apply domestically if you think about the debate over fisa and that patriot act. they're sort of been international groups who have been engaged and vocal on these issues but these issues have it necessary to play the financial issues have necessarily played a major role and executive branch or congressional policymaking on surveillance. that all changed after 2013 in the snowden revelation. when the u.s. came under increasing scrutiny in other countries especially in the eu for the surveillance activities, in the eu in particular there is a strong history of privacy protections, independent enforcement authority by regulators in each of the member countries. and traditionally these data protection authorities have focused a lot of their attention on the action of private companies. but the prism program provide for the european court a clear link between actions of companies that collect and transfer personal data and the surveillance activities of the u.s. government. it didn't help that section 702 under which prism was authorized specific

balls next to the tree is a life le size figures of joseph mary mar three kings fisherman and a fisa priest.prie. beautiful. the vatican started its tradition back n in 1982. >>> and a very special reunion at george washington university hospital. ivvicterims who suffered life-threatening injurieshrea returned to say thank you to the doctors and nurses and thets ho aspital staff who helped save their lives. fox5's photojournalist jacknalik frame takes us inside the veryer emotional ceremony.on take a look.oo >> i'm not even like -- i'm ab-- i haven't absorbed whatord happened to me yet because it >> ?? >>> it's hard, you know. like for so many years somebody comes like takes that view.vi >> i'm grateful for theteful service you done gave us, gaveds me, a chance to be here againgan 'cause it could have -- if ite wasn't for them i wouldn't be here. here >> i remember the day after my surgery, um, i didn't reallyn' asked my surgeon, the firstheirt question was will i be able to e walk again and they said mostidm likely not.like not. i started therapy up in in baltimore a week ago andago

privacy and civil liberties oversight court report, which describes surveillance under section 702 under fisa and has a the scope ofion of upstream surveillance and how upstream surveillance is different from other forms of surveillance. i can refer to other pages of that report. that report is quoted in sections of our complaint. >> as i understand it you have to show that the government is surveilling substantially in all of the relevant communications in this case. at least the allegations that i think are entitled to some truth is that the government is surveilling around approximately seven chokepoints and there are others so how do you get around the fact that except for wikimedia and the exception of this case. how do the other plaintiffs show as a plausible matter that there communications are being substantially reviewed? >> i want to emphasize that plaintiff wikimedia is in a different position and has a different set of claims. it is setting aside that first theory and addressing the second theory which i understand your honors focused on. there are a number of supporting allegatio