fisa's regime. that decision reflected the fact that people in the united states are protected by the fourth amendment while foreigners located abroad are not. congress accomplished this in large part by providing electronic surveillance with the technology of the time. in the 1970s overseas communication were predominantly carried by satellite. fisa as passed in 1978 did not require a court order for the collection of these overseas satellite communications. so, for example, if in 1980 nasa intercepted a satellite communication of a foreign terrorist abroad no court order was required. however, by 2008 technology had changed considerably. first u.s.-based e-mail services were being used by people all over the world. second, the overseas communications that in 1978 were typically carried by satellite were now being carried by fiber optic cables often running through the united states. so to continue the same example, if in 2008 a foreign terrorist was communicating by using a u.s.-based e-mail servi

cause fisa on a non-u.s. person in yemen who was generally communicating with other non-u.s. persons in yemen and places around there. but we were developing these packages that proved that they were an agent of a foreign power. that was a resource drain but it didn't make much sense because they didn't have fourth amendment rights, and we thought it made sense especially from a terrorism perspective of having a more agile means of obtaining their communications when we needed to, this is an important point, use a u.s.-based service provider. we needed a mechanism under fisa to compel their compliance as well as to protect them legally when they provided that information to the government. so it was a long answer, but that's kind of the nature of the problem. >> okay. i want to shorten it. >> that's not the -- >> that's not the sound bite. i want to isolate what it is, because we're going to get to the problem of what happens when you turn off 702. i want to focus on like what's -- you know, what problem you

on the foreign intelligence act or fisa. the senate judiciary committee is and just a clarification senator ranks member is diane fi finestien. this should start in just a moment. >>> today's public hearing will be followed bay classified briefing tomorrow afternoon. this committee last held an oversight hearing on section 702 in may of 2016. since then the drum beat of terror attacks against the united states and other countries particularly our allies has continued. a month after our hearing a terrorist attacked an orlando nightclub killing 50 and wounding 53. that same month a terrorist detonated pipe bombs in new jersey and new york injuring about 30. last month great britain suffered its worst terror attack in over a decaddecade. it is at a concert in manchester. many of the dead and wounded, as you know, were children and very young people. these attacks underscore that the first responsibility of government is to ensure that those who protect us every day have the tool to keep us safe. when i said government i should

fisa's regime. that decision reflected the fact that people in the united states are protected by the fourth amendment, while foreigners located abroad are not. congress accomplished this in large part by defining electronic surveillance based on the technology of the time. in the 1970s overseas communication were predominantly carried by satellite. fisa as passed in 1978 did not require a court order for the collection of these overseas satellite communications. so, for example, if in 80asa tercepted a satellite communication of a foreign terrorist abroad, no court order was required. however, by 2008 technology had changed considerably. first u.s.-based e-mail services were being used by people all over the world. second, the overseas communications that in 1978 were typically carried by satellite were now being carried by fiber optic cables, often running through the united states. so to continue the same example, if in 2008 a foreign terrorist was communicating by using a u.s.-based e-mail servi

that's why the fisa statute itself both for traditional fisa as well as for section 702 requires that there be minimization procedures that provide for the retention and dissemination of evidence of a crime for law enforcement purposes when we happen to come across it. and as judge hogan concluded in a declassified this opinion,, because the statute requires us to obtain evidence of a crime it would be perverse if we were not allowed to similarly to the queries about the information we have to see if we have evidence of a crime. so that's with respect to the doing of the queries themselves. with respect to the use of that information, if we're going to be using any information obtained or derived from other sections of of the two or traditional fisa in a criminal case against a communicant on that communication with the statute terms and aggrieved person, that person would be entitled to note it in a criminal case. as a policy matter we put in place a department policy that was put in place i believe back in 2015 that says we will not as a matter of policy use communications to from o

fisa's regime. reflected the fact that people in the united states are protected by the fourth amendment while foreigners located abroad are not. congress accomplished this in large part by defining electronic surveillance based on the technology of the time. in the 1970s, overseas communication were predominantly carried by satellite. fisa has passed in 1978 did not require a court order for the collection of these overseas satellite communications. so, for example, if in 1980 nasa intercepted a satellite communication of a foreign terrorist abroad no court order was required. however, by 2008 technology had changed considerably. first u.s.-based email services were being used by people all over the world. second, the overseas communications that in 1978 were typically carried by satellite, were now being carried by fiber-optic cables often running through the united states. so to continue the same example, if in 2008 a foreign terrorist was communicating by using a u.s.-based email service, a trad

>> traditional fisa order. surveillance directed at -- >> let's assume for a moment the national advisory transition and the russian ambassador at the russian ambassador is outside the united states, can you collect? --foreigners abroad >> outside the united states -- >> could collect without a warrant -- >> intelligence information relative to a certification, yes. >> ok, so if he is in the united states you can only collect if you have a traditional warrant, correct? >> yes. >> is it possible to find out if if i instantly collected was talking to a foreign leader abroad? is that possible? >> senator, we would have to comply with the terms of our minimization procedures which generally restrict us -- >> mia entitled to that information? am i entitled to that information? entitled, as he united states senator, to know if my conversation with an overseas person made a request to unmask me? >> there is an intelligence report that reports on activities that include you and a foreign minister. beefault, your identi

no fisa court approval. this would provide critical production not just to look inviting -- law-abiding foreigners, but americans. when the government can target any foreigner overseas, that allows the massive collection of americans and their friends and relatives abroad. those communications then sit in huge databases where they are vulnerable to data theft, hacking, negligent mishandling, and potentially abuse. this reform is vital for the u.s. tech industry, the government's ability to target any foreigner overseas is one reason the european courts have invalidated data sharing agreements between u.s. and european countries. that is why 30 major tech companies including google, microsoft, and facebook signed a letter urging congress to limit the scope of section 702 surveillance. second, congress general part of the government to obtain a warrant before acquiring section 702 data. contrary to what mr. evans said earlier, restrictions on searches of lawfully acquired digital information or the constitutio

it would be no probable caution, no fisa court approval.this reform would offer critical protection, not just a law-abiding foreigners, but to americans. when the government can target any for a overseas, that enables a massive amount of collection of innocent conversations between americans and their friends, relatives and associates abroad. those communications then sit in huge databases where they are vulnerable to data theft, hacking, negligent mishandling and potentially abuse. this reform is also while for the united states tech industry. the government's ability to target any for a overseas is one reason that european courts have invalidated datasharing agreement between the u.s. and european companies. that's why 30 major u.s. tech companies, including google, microsoft and facebook, signed a letter urging congress to limit the scope of its section 702 surveillance along with other reforms. second, congress congress should require the government to obtain a warrant before searching section 702 data for american's communications. can

fisa's regime. that decision reflected that fact that people in the united states are protected by the 4th amendment, foreigners located abroad are not. congress accomplished this in large part by defining electronic surveillance based on the technology of the time. in the 1970s, overseas communication were predominantly carried by satellite. fisa, as passed in 1978 did not require a court order for the collection of these overseas satellite communications. for example, if in 1980 nasa intercepted a satellite communication of a foreign terrorist abroad, no court order was required. however, by 2008, technology had changed considerably. first u.s. based e-mail services were being used by people all over the world. second the overseas communication that in 1978 were typically carried by satellite were now being carried by fiber optic cables, often running through the united states. so to continue the same example, if in 2008 a foreign terrorist was communicating by using a u.s. based e-mail service, a

fisa has these titles. i'm not going to read them all, but i bolded title 7, which is where section 702 lives. title 5 is business records. this is -- everyone here is familiar probably with the section 215 of the pacherate act. that's not section 702. that lives in title 5, and we're talking about title 7. section 702 is a portion of title 7. so we kind of push into title 7 here, and we get the sections within fisa, within title 7. and again, i'm not going to read all of these other than to highlight obviously we're here to talk about section 702. notably these are other than u.s. persons. so section 702 as i suggested from the very beginning is specifically designed in relation to look at communications of people who are thought u.s. persons that contrasts with some of the other sections of title 7 which actually address the u.s. persons. so section 702 is specifically non-u.s. persons. so that's sort of historic context and a present context of where section 702 sits within title 7 and more broadly withi

person we go to the fisa court and get a title 1 fisa order to do so. if we have an open full investigation on a foreign person in a foreign place and the collection is for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, we can nominate that person or the selector whether it's an e-mail address, we can nominate that for 702 coverage. we convey that nomination to the nsa and they pursue the coverage on their authority. >> but you would be the person that would pursue coverage for a u.s. person either here or outside the united states? >> that's correct, senator. >> you would be the fbi. >> we are the u.s. person agency, that's right. >> and admiral rodgers, senator feinstein mentioned that last year 1,139 u.s. persons were -- the phrase we're using now -- unmasked for some purpose. is that a number you agree with? >> it's in the 2016 generated transparency report. the member is 1,934. >> i misheard but -- what would the number have been in 2015. >> to be honest i don't know. i'd have to take that one for the record. i do know that we didn't start with th

section 702 is part section 7 of fisa. it allows monitoring communications of persons other than u.s. persons who are reasonably believed to be outside the united states to acquire foreign intelligence information. those are the three key requirements which relate to section 702. what i'm going to do in this presentation is give an historical context, talk about the act of 2008 which teed up the discussion they're having this year in congress, and go through the highlights, key points of section 702. apologies for quality, i downloaded this from -- this is scanned 1978 legislation, but this is the original fisa. fisa was originatlly enacted in 1978 to authorize surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. it was directed texclusively at foreign powers. another feature from the '78 legislation is there had to be no likelihood that the surveillance would contain communication in which a u.s. person is a party. from the earliest days of fisa we see this intention towards not interception u.s. person's communications if pos

in ways that bring them within fisa scope. and this is true for one category of communications and that's foreign-to-foreign e-mails that are store on u.s. soil. but the changes made by sexton 702 obviously went far beyond what would be necessary as julian was saying to address that discreet problem. the truth is changes in technology were an exhibiting the nsa's ability to conduct surveillance in the years before 702 was passed but they were making surveillance easier not harder. the reach of government surveillance in 197 was substantially constrained by technological limitations and cost constraints on electronic communication itself and on the government's ability to acquire, store and process all of these communications. over the past couple of decades, these constraints have become negligible. and the government has unprecedented capabilities today to tap-in to communications which have explode all kinds of communications and to store them in the ped i bytes and to use sophisticated computer analytics to sort through the

fisa expires at the end of this year.oming up in 15 minutes, there will be a look at civil liberties concerns with fisa, scholars and the fbi general counsel will address the topic, all that coming up a little bit later. >> we had this from politico today, james comey will testify june 8 regarding russian interference in the 20 15 election after an open session in the morning, the committee will be read further by mister comey behind closed doors, that senators richard berman mark warner leaders of the intelligence committee. so in addition to russia's efforts to influence the presidential election, much of the questioning is likely to set center around mister comey's termination which chop senators in both parties. read more at politico.can, and c-span will have live coverage of that when it takes place next week. >> look now at an earlier portion of the fisa conference. >> thank you for coming today. i realize there's probably some other country's top experts in section 702 in the room and if you are one of the people w

we call it fisa. it permits the government to monitor the communications of suspected foreign agents, including terrorists, and to find out in that communication if that foreign agent wants to hurt us. however, sometimes these individuals under surveillance communicate with american citizens, and this communication allows the conversations of ordinary citizens to be recorded, and that includes text messages, emails and the conversation itself. but what many americans don't realize is these secret communications are not destroyed by the intelligence agencies. they are kept and kept forever. in fact, the government stores this data and often goes back to that data and searches it without a warrant in violation of the fourth amendment of the constitution for information on american citizens. what we do with a foreign agent, a, it's ok. but government then takes that information they have seized on americans and then goes back and looks through it without a real warrant. that includes the i.r.s., the f.b.

that brings them to fisa score. this is true for one category of communications, foreign to foreign emails that is are stored on u.s. soil. but they were making surveillance easier, not harder. and also on the government's ability to acquire, store and process all of the communications. the government has unprecedented capabilities today to tap into communications which have exploded all kinds of communications and to store them in sophisticated computer analytics to sort through them. this is truly the golden age of surveillance and there's another aspect to this, in past decades, international communication versus purely domestic was relatively rare because it was difficult and expensive. today in interconnected world it's cheap and easy, sometimes free and it's necessary. let's have a show of hands who has communicated with a foreigner overseas at least few times in the last year? okay, i think that's everybody. what this international communication means that the amount of information about americans that the ns

the fisa court has authority over all those. the oversight mechanisms built-in. all things we learned about an hour ago were all part of this hard-fought compromise where these groups, this is not like a law that was shoved down the throat by one party over the other, given the nature of the executive branch in congress. to me that that's important as you think about the current state of play. and i guess one point to make i think in response is that it'll think, my own sense is when to talk about the critics, i don't think there really is much real debate about the fundamentals of 702. maybe i'm wrong, maybe i'm naive or hopeful, but the value of it and the sort of core principles of how it works, i don't think, i think there's general support for that. there's obviously some critics of the law on some of, on some aspects of it but i think those aspects are on the fringes of how its use as opposed to the the core of not requiring the government to get probable establish probable cause for non-u.s. persons overseas to collect foreign intelligence. that seems to m

it's part of the foreign intelligence surveillance act, fisa. which is the legislation that was passed after the various allegations came out of misconduct by the government in the 1970's. passed in 1978. it authorizes the government to go to this court, the fisa court, and get approval to do wiretaps, either on phones or email or electronic communications. of agents of foreign powers. people outside the united states who are a threat, external foreign threat to the united states, national security of our country. obviously a lot of that surveillance is done against foreign terrorist groups and the problem that arose around the time of 9/11 or that sort of came to a head around that time was that given the change in the technology and fiber optic cable all around the world, that the original statute was written in a way that required or at least arguably required the justice department to have to go in and get an individual authorization from the fisa court, a 100-page document, to surveil somebody who was outside the united states, talking to a

fisa never required that. it was never intended to require that. the idea was if the person is outside of the united states, you don't have to go to the fisa court. because the fourth amendment doesn't apply out there. with the change of technology, we had to do that more and more, and as a result, we were not able to cover a lot of those actors that were out there and that's why we got hit on 9/11. so that statute, we revised that statute in 2008, to allow the justice department to do that, or the intelligence community to do that surveillance without having to go into the fisa court. it's been tremendously helpful. it's allowed us to cover a lot of these foreign terrorist targets that we weren't able to cover before. every intelligence agency has talked about it being one of the most important tools in the terrorism toolbox. and it's absolutely critical it be reauthorized this year. there are questions raised about it, i advise congress to take a hard look at the statute. at the end of the day, i believe congress will pass it. but i believe it's

the one institution that's perhaps in the best position is the fisa court and the fisa repeatedly questioned the good faith of the nsa and fbi. two sentences of the most recent opinion of a few weeks ago. the court nonetheless concerned about the fbi's apparent disregard of minization rules. the improper access seems to have been the result of deliberate decision making. you can find sentences like that throughout the opinions related to this. for me, the biggest scandal is not failure to comply with the processes that we have but the bigger scandal is permissive in permitting, you know, wide collection of u.s. persons' communications. you know, the capture that julian pointed to aluos the nsa to collect in a warnless fashion and i think it is in fact warnless and almost any foreigner could be the valid subject of surveillance under 702 because the requirements are extremely minimal. think need to be a foreigner a broad and expected of having information about the foreign affairs of the united states. that could cover journalists. human rights activists, the colleagues you may work with inte

person, we go to the fisa court and get a title 1 fisa order to do so. if we have an open, full investigation on a foreign person, in a foreign place, and the collection is for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, we can nominate that person or that as we he refer to it internally the selector, whether it's an email address or that sort of thing, we can nominate that for 702 coverage. we convey that nomination to the n.s.a. and they pursue it under their authority. senator blunt: you would be the person to pursue coverage for a u.s. person either here or outside the united states? director mccabe: yes, senator. we are the u.s. person agency, that's right. senator blunt: and admiral rogers, senator feinstein mentioned last year 1,139 u.s. persons were -- the phrase we're using now -- unmasked for some purpose. is that a number you agree with? admiral rogers: it's in the 2016 odni generated transparency report. from memory the number is 1,934 from memory. senator blunt: i misheard. what would the number have been in 2015? admiral rogers: to be h

person, we go to the fisa zoucourt and get order to do so. if we have an open full investigation on a foreign person in a foreign place and the collection is for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, we can nominate that person or as we refer to the selector or e-mail address or that sort of thing, we can nominate that for 702 coverage, we convey that nomination to the nsa and they pursue coverage under authorities. >> we are the u.s. person agencies, that's right. >> and admiral rogers, senator feinstein mentioned that last year 1139 u.s. persons wer were -- unmasked for some purpose, is that a number that you agree with? >> it is in the 2016 report from memory, the number is actually 1,934 from memory. >> i could be for. >> what were the number in 2015? >> i don't know, i have to take that one for the record. i do know and we did not start director coats, do you have any information on that? >> well, i have seen the number and i don't recall what it was. you can take this for the record is was there an increase in 2016. did you ha

you can survey of them without a fisa. we had to do that mourn more and as a result we weren't able to cover a lot of terror suspects who are out there leading up to 9/11 and sure enough we got hit. that statute, we revised for congress revise that statute in 2008 to allow the justice department or the intelligence community to do that surveillance without having to go to the fisa court. it has allowed us to cover a lot of these foreign terrorist targets that we weren't able to cover before. every agency had this talk about its being one of the most it not the most important tools in the counterterrorist toolbox and it's critical that if you are authorize this year there are questions raised about her concerns raised about it. i advise congress to take a hard look at the track record. there is no intentional abuse in the statute. >> frank can i get your perspective on this? >> i very much shared ken's views and obviously fisa is some setting and it's imperative that congress may be look to some potential reforms but i thin

person we go to the fisa court and get a title 1 fisa order to do so. if we have an open, full investigation on a foreign person in a foreign place and the collection is for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, we can nominate that person or that as we refer to it internally the selector, whether it's an e-mail address or that sort of thing, we can nominate for 702 coverage. we convey that nomination to the nsa and they pursue coverage under the nsa authority. >> but you would be the person to pursue coverage for a u.s. person either here or outside the united states? >> that's correct, senator. >> with the fbi? >> we are the u.s. person agency. that's right. >> and admiral rogers, senator feinstein mentioned that last year, 1139 u.s. persons, the phrase we're using now, unmasked for some purpose tp is that a number you agree with? >> it's in the 2016 odni-generated transparency report. from memory, the number is 1,934, from memory. i could be wrong, but -- >> i misheard -- what would the number have been in 2015? >> to be honest, i don't kno

person, we go to the fisa court and get a title i fisa order to do so. if we have an open, full investigation on a foreign person in a foreign place, and the collection is for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence, we can nominate that person or that, as we refer to it internally, the selector, whether an e-mail address or that sort of thing, we can nominate that for 702 coverage. we convey the nomination to the nsa and they pursue the coverage under their authority. >> you'd be the person who would pursue coverage for a u.s. person hereto here on outside of the united states? >> that is correct, senator. >> you or the fbi. >> we are the u.s. person agency. that's right. >> admiral rogers, senator feinstein mentioned that last year, 1,139 u.s. persons were -- the phrase we're using now -- unmasked for some purpose. is that a number you agree with? >> it's in the 2016 odni-generated transparency report. from memory, the number is actually 1,934, from memory. i could be wrong. >> i'm sorry. i misheard. what would the number have been in 2015? >> t

we can get a fisa warrant. so on the reverse targeting, 50 would be white or you just target a foreign entity that that u.s. person talks to? then you get all the insight you want on the u.s. person but youl will have bypasses the court process. you have bypass the entire legal structure. seven if you specifically reminds us we cannot do that. we cannot use 702 as a vehicle to bypass of the laws or to target u.s. persons. >> can you come last question, can you please clarify for members and for the public what's meant by incidental collection? >> incidental collection, and the statute itself, if you read the law, the statute acknowledges that in the execution of this framework we will encounter u.s. persons. we call that incidental collection. that happened under two scenarios. number one, which is about 90% of the time, we are monitoring to foreign individuals and those foreign entities talk about or reference a u.s. person. the second scenario that we do, that we encounter, what we call incidental collection,

you need to go to a fisa court to get the information in the fisa court is secretive, has to see nationalurity at risk and if you can include a u.s. person who is not the target of the investigation, you have to mask their name. if you start unmasking people's names, you are violating their constitutional rights by doing so unless there is a national security risk at heart. susan rice unmasked general flynn without any national security risk whatsoever. purely political reasons. >> eboni: we don't know that. >> eric: you could have a president who wants to unmask everyone. >> eboni: you are right, my answer is to reevaluate the standard. you might be right about susan rice ben hur political motivation with a problem that's from a legal standpoint, simple issue, you might have an issue. criminally there is no crime because all she has to say as she felt the need to know. >> katie: i have a question on the legal aspects. if susan rice is going to the fisa court and sing i need this person unmasked because national security is at stake, but her real motivation is political purposes, isn't th

we go to the fisa court and get a warrant. in reality, the nsa is capturing in real time the digital version of every telephone communication, land line and cell, every text message, every e-mail, all data produced in the united states or transmitted in the united states on fiber optic likes 100%,24/7 without exception. they can't review all that. it's there for them to access it when they want it. they will never acknowledge that publicly. what they also won't acknowledge publicly and i was very disappointed that admiral rogers and director coats, a severe admonition, some called it a condemnation by the fisa court itself, which is practically owned by the nsa, grants 99.9% of all nsa applications, harshly critical of the nsa's abuse of section 702, accusing the nsa of spying on a great number of americans without authorization. >> shepard: so this a dog and pony show going on? >> a dog and pony show. 702 was created to give the american public the false impression that the fisa court would regulate nsa. in reality, nsa pursu

with fisa, the ability to listen in on foreign nationals.mportant thing for the intelligence community to be able to do. if they are rinsing to a call of a u.s. elected official in his business dealing with a foreign leader, i think that gets into an area that's different than if you or i were calling a buddy in per rise or caracas. i'm a big civil liberties guy. i want to make sure there are checks and balances on the intelligence community. if you look at this 702 situation. there was a bad isis guy that was swept up because of this and we were able to share that information with western intelligence services and we interrupted some really bad stuff. kennedy: obviously those are the intended targets. and that's where the law is useful. unfortunately there is not a lot of transparency. and the agencies have not been transparent or completely honest with us. and there are innocent americans who can get swept up in these conversations. and the president knows that all too well. some this cam opinion operatives were contacted. >> when the nsa

fisa, recent reports indicate up to 5% of fisa court applications, upstream information-gathering during the last previous administration was actually used against american citizens. in section 702 of the code allows us to use fisa, it orders that american citizens be masked, wherein those citizens' identity might have been accidentally associated with a foreign intelligence target. because why? we don't know who's called whom, a wrong number or for entirely unrelated methods or reasons. in in fact this is the case and that shakes of confidence of people like my colleague from california and myself in fisa, does that also run the parallel risk of undermining our intelligence-gathering operations and stymieing our ability to. >> i don't know enough about the fisa 702 regime. >> do you have any opinion on that? >> i would degree with robin on that. >> i would submit for the record if we weaponize foreign intelligence surveillance act processes that have existed in this country since 1979, for over 38 years against americans, that people like myself and other who is are reasonable and appre

does the president support section 702 reauthorization of the fisa and expanded authority? >> absolutely. >> everyone? >> full sport. >> full support there? did the president ask or was he given any side effect intelligence or info concerning the russian active measures in the 2016 presidential election? was he briefed on that? did he ask for that briefing or is it an automatic briefing that you give? >> admiral rogers. >> all that took place before i was. >> il say yes he was briefed on the results of the assessment. i was part of that in january prior to his assuming his duties, he and i have discussed as well as the specifics of that assessment subsequent to after he became the president assumed the duties. >> let me just say just in finishing up, i just would hope that you all with your expertise and all of your knowledge would help us put closure to this sooner or later. we need your help and assistance. we really do. this is a committee that i think will take the facts as give them to us and decipher that and come up with some appropriate action and a final report whi

fisa, to talk about recent reports indicate up to 5% of fisa court applications, upstream information-gathering during the last previous administration was actually usedagainst american citizens. in section 702 of the code allows us to use fisa, it orders that american citizens be masked, wherein those citizens' identity might have been accidentally associated with a foreign intelligence target. because why? we don't know who's called whom, a wrong number or for entirely unrelated methods or reasons. in in fact this is the case and >> i don't know enough about the fisa regime to enter. >> any opinion on the? -- on that? i would submit to the record, if we weaponize he foreign intelligence act that has existed or 38 years against americans that people like myself and others who are reasonable and appreciate the bill of rights, specifically the fourth amendment, might rail against the use of those techniques. if we rail against those intelligence gathering techniques, i argue we would gather less intelligence and be less effective in stopping the next attack. i would submit that perhaps the blood

congress created the authority to address an intelligence originatedgap in the years after fisa became law in 1978. the gap allowed foreign terrorists to benefit from the legal protections enjoyed by american citizens. a republican representative of arkansas proposed a bill to permanently reauthorized section 702 without modification. the trump administration supports his bill without condition. that foreign intelligence surveillance act hearing will be at 10:00 a.m. today on c-span, c-span3, and on the c-span radio app. thursday, people will be watching james comey testified in front of that hearing. a lot of networks will show the hearing, but we will show you it gavel to gavel without commentary. you can make your thoughts known during that on our twitter or facebook page. that will be 10:00 on thursday. let's go to james in texas on the republican line. james, good morning. caller: i want to make a comment not theat it is usually immigrants in the country that perform the terror attacks. it is our own citizens that will do these things who need psychological help. it is just really

you've heard about fisa warrants and the fisa court. there's also specific national security rules and law about that. that stuff fisa stuff tends to be handled through the eastern district of virginia. so national security focus. national security and intelligence focus in particular. on paper, because of that, it makes sense that if these cases around the trump russia investigation, if they get consolidated they would be consolidated there in virginia. it makes sense on paper. makes sense in theory. in practice, though, it is a little weird because the u.s. attorney in the eastern district of virginia, the prosecutor who runs that district, is somebody who's kind of famous now, right? it's dana boente. remember that dramatic night in the second week of the new administration and president trump fired salary yates? they announced a new person appointed to be the acting attorney general now that yates was fired. the new person trump appointed that night to be the new attorney general is dana boente. the acting attorney general until the

today's hearing is scheduled to focus on the reauthorization of the fisa. senators will delve deeply into the controversy and the russia probe. america's top intelligence official dan coats set to testify today amid washington post reporting that president trump asked coats to intervene and ask the fbi to back off the probe of michael flynn. two days after then fbi director comey confirmed the potential collusion of the trump campaign and russia. this after cnn reported that president trump asked coats to publicly deny the existence of evidence supporting the probe and a conversation coats declined to comment. >> i don't feel it is appropriate to discuss. >> reporter: coats is one of several officials set to face a grilling today over encounters with president trump. including deputy attorney general rod rosenstein who will answer questions pbly for the first time about the circumstances surrounding the letter he wrote recommending comey's firing. the administration pinned the president's decision to oust comey on rosenstein's letter before conceding he had

burr has said he wants to figure out if they can make it about fisa and renewing fisa which expires at the end of this year, but he knows this will be a wide-ranging hearing. what will be interesting, i think in terms of coats. he used to be on this committee, right? how do republicans treat him? it's one thing for republicans to treat comey a certain way and essentially try to undermine his credibility, but this is a member of the -- was a former member of their club, right? the senate club. so it will be interesting to see how they engage with coats and whether or not they try to stay on fisa in talking to him. so that will be something interesting to watch, as well. >> in terms of rod rosenstein and manu said this is the first time he publicly expresses this and who told him to write the memo, the white house completely changed their narrative within 24 hours and first using the memo for justification for firing comey and now he's going to say what it is. >> he's probably want thrilled with the way the white house used his memo. i think he's clearly going to stand by what he said. i

simcox: i just know enough about the fisa 702 regime to answer. >> mr. hughes, do you have any opinion on that question mark >> no. >> i would submit, if we weaponize foreign intelligence surveillance act processes that have existed in this country since 1909, some for 38 years against americans that people like myself and others who are reasonable and appreciate the love rights, specifically the fourth amendment might then rail against the use of those particular intelligence gathering techniques. and if we rail against those particular intelligence gathering techniques, gather we would gather less intelligence and therefore be less effective in stopping the next attack. so i would cement the preps the blood of americans who were victimized and attacked is missed because the priority administration or individual determined it was reasonable and worthwhile to completely subvert the intent of the foreign intelligence surveillance act and bus congress acted appropriately to defend the legitimate privacy expectations but thatan citizens entity or actor migh