secretary flournoy, and answering mr.skelton's question, you have a definition is victory as the point at which afghanistan has the capacity to assert taliban safe haven, which really seeks in my mind to prioritize the need to get the functioning, security forces. the "new york times" yesterday quoted a pentagon report, which said that the most significant challenges is the fielding of qualifying-- and i know mr. ortiz touch on this earlier but again, the story list of the fact that nato and u.s. agreed to 5200 trainers last january. there are 2700 there today. all but 300 are u.n. and secretary gates has been working hard to try and extract the bodies that were committed. but at the same time we are flowing 30,000 forces, and clearly this is so important, to have the trainers there. i mean, at some point it seems that we should just do it and stop sort of waiting for that commitment to materialize, and why a are you, and? >> the decision to deploy the additional u.s. forces as a bridge mechanism is the cause of the immed

secretary flournoy, and answering mr.skelton's question, you have a definition is victory as the point at which afghanistan has the capacity to assert taliban safe haven, which really seeks in my mind to prioritize the need to get the functioning, security forces. the "new york times" yesterday quoted a pentagon report, which said that the most significant challenges is the fielding of qualifying-- and i know mr. ortiz touch on this earlier but again, the story list of the fact that nato and u.s. agreed to 5200 trainers last january. there are 2700 there today. all but 300 are u.n. and secretary gates has been working hard to try and extract the bodies that were committed. but at the same time we are flowing 30,000 forces, and clearly this is so important, to have the trainers there. i mean, at some point it seems that we should just do it and stop sort of waiting for that commitment to materialize, and why a are you, and? >> the decision to deploy the additional u.s. forces as a bridge mechanism is the cause of the immed

secretary flournoy, you in answering mr. skelton's questions had a definition of victory as a plan which afghanistan has capacity to exert solvency and denied taliban safe haven which really seems to in my mind prioritize the need to get the functioning security forces. "new york times" yesterday quoted a pentagon report which said that the most significant challenges to fielding the qualified afghan security forces is a shortage of institutional traders. i know mr. ortiz touched on this earlier but again, the story listed the fact that nato and the u.s. agreed to 5200 trainers last january. this 2700 today. all but 300 our u.s. and obviously secretary gates i know has been working hard to try to extract the bodies that were committed. but at the same time we are flowing 30,000 new forces and clearly this is so important to have the trainers. at some point it seems we should just do eight and stops short of waiting for that commitment to materialize and i just -- when you comment? >> the decision to deploy the additional u.s

flournoy, i'm reading a book called the bear went over the mountain. it's supposed to be about tactics. but what is disturbing about is, it seems to me the same ambushes in the same places, going over about a 10 or 12 year period, and they talk about training up an afghan army, they talk about training up a national pleased that the window for years after they left the public government they set up was gone. now, i appreciate the general. he got to be a joke by being a can-do guy. i appreciate you going to work in the department of defense. but what realistically makes you think the outcome is going to be any different this time? >> what makes me think the outcome will be different is the fundamental objective of the mission and focus of the mission is different. institutions built under hostile occupation don't have -- tend to have longevity and credibility with a population. institutions that are built with the support of the population -- >> man -- >> have a lot more chance to succeeding. that's what we're trying to do with this nsf. >> and i apprec

as secretary flournoy printable we are starting to see conditions we believe are necessary for success and afghanistan. most important of the conditions is having the right leadership and strategy in place. in 2009 after assuming command of ideas to get general mcchrystal conducted an assessment of the situation in afghanistan. he developed a campaign plan that was designed to provide a secure environment that would enable and improve governments and diplomat in afghanistan. at the heart of the campaign plan are four requirements colin code to protect the afghan people, to enable afghan security forces, to neutralize and malign influence is and to support the extension of government. general mcchrystal has gone to great lengths to ensure all of our operations in afghanistan are directly tied to achieving these games. the central tenet of the campaign strategy is to protect the populace. we are fulfilling this bipartisan efforts to provide security and extend governance and high density population areas on the insurgent groups currently operate and by reducing civilian casualties. the r