if we bomb nataun, fordo and heavy water reactor. at some point we would probably have to have another negotiation down the line. but i cannot see the united states succeeding in containing iran if we're not willing to use force and be credible about it. i just -- i say this with the greatest respect because i respect president obama, of course, i think he needs to say that in the middle of this debate to reassure the congress, reassure the american people, reassure people like me that is a credible threat of force. i haven't seen the speech he just gave. perhaps he said it in that speech. >> thank you. one last question, mr. chairman, for mr. levitt. you describe in your testimony that major secondary bank sanctions will be retained under the agreement. you note that's a good thing. if congress does not reject the deal, are there ways the treasury should be using these bank sanctions in a morrow bust way to mitigate the problems you've identified with the deal? >> thank you for the question. the secondary sanctions, as we've all sai

all the iconic nuclear facilities would talk about today, natanz, fordo, arak, these are all once covertacilities. so we don't trust that all else being equal to iranians will not do things in secret because they've done things in secret before. which is why the president has emphasized his deal is not about trust, it's about verification which is why we believe there's never been an agreement in history of arms control and nonproliferation, ma a negotiated agreement that more intrusive inspection of nuclear programs than the one that we got here because it's not only 24/7 coverage of known nuclear facilities, natanz, fordo, arak, those facilities but also greater access to uranium mines and mills and send it is production and enrichment facilities. for those who want to know why that matters, if you want to build a secret enrichment site five years of malcolm it's not just about drilling a hole in the ground. you've got to do with stuff, centrifuges, scientist, uranium, natural source, just to convert it into gas and what this deal does know the deal of time has in the past is great sur

uranium. 5 to 20%, remore and restore two-thirds of the centrifuges, terminate all enrichment at the fordolear facility and render inoperable the key components of its iraq plutonium reactor. all the steps must be completed to the satisfaction of the international atomic energy agency. it's difficult to imagine that a serious military campaign against iran would set back its nuclear program as much as this deal does at its outset. your first objections are about the inspections and sanctions. you argue that the inspections are not anytime, anywhere and have a 24-day delay that is troubling. but all of iran's known nuclear facilities would be subject to anytime, anywhere monitoring. as for new suspicious sites, what opponents of the deal have done is add up all the time limits and claim that the inspections will occur only after a 24-day pause. this is simply not true. should the u.s. intelligence community catch the iranians red-handed it might be that the iranians would drag things out as long as possible, but in such a case the game would be over. in that scenario, senator schumer, you a

for the declared facilities, iraq, fordo and the tons, the iaea has 24/7 aspect every day of the week, 365 days of the year. >> the military sites? >> if the iaea believes there's justification for them going to a site the additional protocol allows them to give 24 hours' notice to get into that site. if the country, in this case iran, says actually we think you should go to this site or you should have this document, under the additional protocol they're allowed to suggest an alternative. however, under the additional protocol, that debate about what the iaea can do can go on for quite some time. so what this agreement did, different than any other arms control agreement ever negotiated we put a clock on that debate. we said that if the iaea under the additional protocol wants to go to a site, it has to have access to that site. we said you can debate with iran for two weeks. at the end of those two weeks, the joint commission which is made up of all of us, looks at that. if we believe on day one of the seven days we have to consider the situation that they ought to give access, if f