>> oh, say, freddie. an awful waste of an expensive education otherwise. >> there are some men to see you, miss. >> oh, hello again. >> pardon, mademoiselle, commander. we have come to return your hat. >> my hat. i'd wondered what had happened to it. >> this is for you, george. [music playing] [man singing] >> there is a matter of the greatest urgency i must discuss with you, mademoiselle. >> don't say you're selling something. no, with that moustache and staying at the majestic, can't be. now, what's all the mystery? >> mademoiselle, it was not a bee that flew past your face this morning. it was this. >> what is it? >> it is a bullet. >> i am damned. >> ah, miss buckley very kindly helped my friend when he twisted his ankle this morning. >> ah, yes, so he'd said. i am glad she didn't invent the whole thing. she's the most brazen liar that ever existed, you know. oh, it's quite a gift. she had a marvelous story the other day about the brakes on her car failing and her nearly being killed. all nonsense, ji

then with freddie mac since 1992 as a member of freddie mac's management committee. tom deutsch is the director for the american interrogation program. asf is a program that works to develop a consensus, a frame, thought, regulatory accounting and legislative activities with the securitization industry. represents the servicers and investors as an interesting juggling a. i point out rather interesting to hear his comments. and lastly, professor carjacker, his expertise is in mortgage in predatory lending and consumer protection and securitization. before becoming law professor, mr. eggert chair the subcommittee on consumer credit. so again, i really am grateful to all of you for sitting through the last couple of hours. i hope it was somewhat helpful and i'll say to you what a sight glass panel. were prepared statements will be part of the record. a virtue, if you could, to at least try and paraphrase your testimony for us here today and then we'll get to some questions for you. but i'm very grateful to all of you for your willingness to participate in the second hea

they are the new regulators for fannie mae and freddie mac. they wanted to know a little bit more about my point of view about how we got here. one of the problems that even elite athletes have, they know their goals but they cannot tell you where they are at and how they got to where they are and why they are not at their goal. that was the objective of the meeting. host: we will try to specifically focus on fannie mae and freddie mac the welcome the discussion of the larger issues and state of affairs. give us, please, a sense of the size of the problem with fannie mae and freddie mac. guest: a norma's problems. loss estimates of up to $700 billion. we do not know -- enormous problems. they don't know because they rely on third-party to meet their standards. that can be a very dangerous things. that and -- basically a blind date with an unknown. underlying standards are movie star but they are thinking of someone like the grid -- gregory peck character but they are getting a extract of the walking dead. -- extra from "the walking dead." , th

. >> both freddie mac and fannie magyar participants of the second loan modification program. it helps a lot of homeowners who are struggling with multiple mortgages. servicers are supposed to implement this program by january of this year. given the stories we have heard from homeowners and consumer advocates about servicesrs' reluctance to engage in second law modifications, i am concerned about the implementation of how this program is going. what roles are in place for actually that servicedrsrs participate and have your agency planned to oversee this parade -- program to make sure they are in compliance? >> the second lien program is part of the hamp program so that is administered by treasury. to the general point, this goes back to some comments that were made a few minutes ago in response to the question by senator corker. the existence of second liens has been very problematic for us in overseeing the enterprises with respect to first liens. it is quite turning things upside down to find situations, which is common, where borrowers are continuing to pay and a second m

we, fannie and freddie, don't talk. we're in the field with our servicers trying to, you know -- >> that's not a great answer here. >> there are rules -- >> why aren't you talking? >> we talk through our regulator, but we're not able to talk directly because of trust issues. >> but you talk to the regular about this? >> yes. >> and if they say no, you can't have the same processes? >> we have our own books which perform differently. once you have all the documentation in hand, you don't have to ask for another document. we think that's a best practice and one that should be adopted, but -- >> i know you don't want to violate the law here, but what if you're sitting next to him? you talk to him, and you talk to him. we'll pretend we're having a conversation together. . [laughter] >> we work closely with fhsa and all the areas where we can align as clough as possible, we do. the majority of our requirements under hamp -- >> why not outside of that in >> i think they are close. they are not identical. there are differences

lots and lots of money to to keep fannie and freddie. on life support. you know my reporting showed that fannie and freddie probably were you know took less risk and were less reckless than some of the wall street bankrolled private lenders but still they took a lot of chances and especially the end as they were trying to catch up market share trying to regain some of their market clout you know they bankrolled a lot of risky loans and now the taxpayers are on the hook for it and there are a lot of homeowners who are suffering because they ended up in bad deals bank of america they are now looking to be on the hook for these put backs of these mortgages people are talking about a multi-billion dollar problem there is that we're seeing folks on wall street and in the mortgage industry you know set up this this machine where there wasn't a lot of accountability. a small lender or mortgage broker makes a loan and then pushes it up the line to another another player who pushes up another player and on and on and on and so there are all these layers and if so

there has been a lot of talk about fannie mae and freddie mac. the situation as i see it is that there was before the financial crisis began, 27 million subprime and other high- risk loans and assistance. of that number, 19 million were either the responsibility of fannie mae and freddie mac or fha and other government agencies or banks that made many of these loans under the community reinvestment act. 19 million which is about 2/3 of the total bad loans in the financial system where the responsibility of the government. fannie mae is not the only responsible party. it is actually part of a government housing policy to increase home ownership which is a perfectly good idea. the trouble is, they did it by forcing private entities and fannie mae and freddie mac or private entities though they were backed by the government and banks under this community reinvestment act, to make laws that would -- that they would not have otherwise made. that is really the underlying cause of why we had a financial crisis. when the facts come out, many people may n

i worked with a company that did a great deal of work for fannie and freddie. partly related to the quality of fannie and freddie's underwriting standards. they were considered one could say very high and you needed private mortgage insurance or something like that. actually i was involved with bringing a product to freddie which was a higher loan to value mortgage product. but the -- let's get into the definitions of the erosion of the definition quality where in a collapsing economy with a lot of free trade agreements proliferated during the bush ii administration and on the heels of nafta, on the heels of u.s. compliance with g-20, aside from the erosion of fannie and freddie's criteria in what had been considered a paper underwriting quality. what perhaps at one point was a paper is now b paper or something like that. they called it a. in order to compete with private label, they eroded the quality. and in cases where they had originated a paper, i had some acquaintance with the independent bank in the new york area which had a lot of no doc loans. but the

i worked with a company that did a great deal of work for fannie and freddie. partly related to the quality of fannie and freddie's underwriting standards. they were considered one could say very high and you needed private mortgage insurance or something like that. actually i was involved with bringing a product to freddie which was a higher loan to value mortgage product. but the -- let's get into the definitions of the erosion of the definition quality where in a collapsing economy with a lot of free trade agreements proliferated during the bush ii administration and on the heels of nafta, on the heels of u.s. compliance with g-20, aside from the erosion of fannie and freddie's criteria in what had been considered a paper underwriting quality. what perhaps at one point was a paper is now b paper or something like that. they called it a. in order to compete with private label, they eroded the quality. and in cases where they had originated a paper, i had some acquaintance with the independent bank in the new york area which had a lot of no doc loans. but the

freddy, qué diablos fue todo esto. ordenes del general negai. vamos.>> un amigo va a salir.nemos armas y no iremos con usted. no trato de detenerlos lo juro. >> la situacion es peor de lo que pensaba.>> sargento weston es indispensable y no nos intersa su hermana ni amigos.>> aquí tienen a un refuerzo. >> puede ir. >> bueno. otra cosa. me debías eso, te voy hacer pedazosw (música) eres un perro, tú que basura, eres una basura no entiendes nada de lo que digo. >> no escucha, saldremos ahora nos largaremos. >> no tienes que hacer nada. >> te cargaré si es necesario. de acuerdo oye, oye. w esta bien amigo. >> fred. que tan lejos está la prisión. >> 9 ó 10 kilómetros. >> vamos cerca. >> soldadito quién te puso al mando. si quiern salir ilesos debemos trabajar como unidad militar. lo tuvimos que haber matado. votemos.>> no necesitamos votar. (disparos). >> cuidado. cubránse. >> rápido. rapido. >> salten, salten. >> qué tal, les saluda maría eugenia payánculmina la cumbre de las naciones unidas sobre el cámbio climático celebrada en cancún, donde se aprobó un paquete de medidas pa

fannie and freddie are still costing us hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. megyn: if you want to catcher i can's show you can do so on the fox business network, it's on monday through friday at 9:00pm except on thursday when it's on at 10:00pm because john stossel decided he wanted to be on at 9:00 and eric is an accommodating guy. we'll have stossel on at 2:30 by the way. if the tax cut dilemma was not enough for you there is a new battle breaking out on capitol hill over a $1.2 trillion spending bill introduced by senate democrats. republicans are sounding off today on the close to $9 billion set aside for earmarks, you know, the pork that each lawmaker takes home to his or her constituents saying, i got you that bridge. they say the bill is full of the pork. and two gop leaders called the bill disrespectful to american people who voted for change in november. >> reporter: along the floor of the senate republican leader mitch mcconnell tauld this one last spending binge and repeat of all the practices that voters hate. >> americans told democrats last mont

fanny, freddie, no government owns all this risk today. if you do things to improve the odds that house prices will be higher in the future and defaults will be lower in the future, you will improve the overall quality and reduce losses to the taxpayer. we have to think about the financial implications to that broader prizm and we want to or encourage individual agencies to do it as well. >> thank you. i appreciate your answers to the questions. i think you are spot on. i would like to follow up on the questions that my colleague raised about non-hamp modifications. the congressional budget office is projecting only a $12 billion expenditure out of a potential 75. do you agree with that projection and is that good news or bad news? >> i think is bad news, but i think it's blow. i think it is too pessimistic. what we set aside was more like 45 or 50. they expect to spend only 12, but that is too low. we're going through a comprehensive assessment and we will probably be able to share that with you in the first quarter. >> so you are not sat

then in may and freddie mac underwrite half of them to the tune of -- and in may and freddie mac underwrite half of them to the tune of $1.50 trillion. that is why my clients in -- send paper work in two and three and four and five times with certified mail. that is why that occurred. people have paid three months, six months, nine months. they say after paying the trial modification or nine months, we do not modify. next thing they know, they have sale notice tacked to their door. i challenge this committee and congress to do this. i think this will be a telling statistic aspect. i know my time is running out. fannie mae and freddie mac talk about how many houses they have sold. this is true. in between, you can buy a beautiful house for $10,000 or $15,000. someone needs to compare the numbers of how much money was paid to the bank versus how much money was made from those homes. in michigan, it would be an outrage. we are bailing out the banks. it is a silent bailout with these guaranteed mortgages. there is no incentive to work with the borrowers. thank you. >> thank you. >> representati

the unlimited bailout of fannie mae and freddie mac by treasury and the purchase of $1.25 trillion of gse guaranteed mortgage-backed securities and the secondary market by the federal reserve under it's first quantitative easing program no doubt benefited t.a.r.p. recipients and other financial institutions. [no audio] from the tarp recipients themselves to the taxpayers. costs should be thoroughly evaluated when considering the tarp. the panel offered this. the government's action in recueing a.i. g and no shared sacrifice among a. i g's changed the relationship between the government and the country's players. the treasure would committee taxpayer pay any price to prevent the collapse of american's financial situation and ensure repayment to the creditors for doing business with them. with them. as long as this remains the case, the rescue the marketplace will linger. the panel offered the following observations in it's november 2010 report. again quoting treasury is claimed that based upon evidence today, mortgage-related problems currently pose no danger to the financial system. -

the unlimited bailout of fannie mae and freddie mac by treasury and the purchase of $1.25 trillion of gse guaranteed mortgage-backed securities and the secondary market by the federal reserve under it's first quantitative easing program no doubt benefited t.a.r.p. recipients and other financial institutions. [no audio] >> greater portion of the cost of the t.a.r.p. than the t.a.r.p. recipients themselves to the taxpayers. cost such as this should be thoroughly considered for the value adding to t.a.r.p.. with respect to the aig, the panel offered the following observations in the june 2010 report. and i quote, the government's actions in rescuing aig continue to have a poisonous effect on the marketplace. by providing a complete rescue the call for no shared sacrifice among aig's creditors, the federal reserve and treasury fundamentally changed the relationship between the government and the country's most sophisticated financial players. the aig rescue demonstrated that treasury and federal reserve would commit taxpayers to pay any price and bear any burden to prevent of the collapse

do you believe that fannie mae and freddie mac should ride down in the participation in the fda's short refinance program? >> there are, you know, we have a principle reduction program in our treasury housing programs, and we, and the fha's what's called in shorthand, short program, both those things we think have a lot of benefits and we can use a pretty good economic case for fannie and freddie to participate in those programs, and we're in the process of talking to the fha about those, about the merits of those programs, about their concerns, and i can't say at this point whether they're likely to adopt them or not. again, we want to understand their concerns, and they have a different set of objectives and in some ways different constraints, but i'm hopeful they find a way to participate in as many as these programs as possible. >> okay, i need to finish up. if you are successful in helping them, and i think they are pressured, what is your objective cost of doing this, riding down those loans? >> there's two ways to think about the costs in this. remember, fannie and freddie an the

his first at bat, second, third, giants second baseman freddie sanchez. how about the giants' backup catcher, had a memorable home run against none other than roy holiday, eli white size. [applause] in game four, he hit a home run, and that pretty much did the rangers in. he is the capture of the giants. buster posey. [applause] how about giants infielder ryan rohlinger? ryan. in game four of the national championship series, this was one of the great post-season games ever played in major- league history and one of the great games of this post season. he cut down the phillies' carlos ruiz with an incredible grow, outfielder aaron rowand. [applause] i do not think any giants fan is ever going to forget that night. rockets were in san francisco. gimenez were on the mound, and his mad-to help win a critical game, outfielder darren ford. ladies and gentlemen, i have only one phrase for the next giants player -- the beard. brian wilson. [applause] fear teh beard. how about the youngest left- handed pitcher in the history of the world series. eight shut up ser

there has been a lot of talk about fannie mae and freddie mac. the situation as i see it is that there was before the financial crisis began, 27 million subprime and other high- risk loans and assistance. of that number, 19 million were either the responsibility of fannie mae and freddie mac or fha and other government agencies or banks that made many of these loans under the community reinvestment act. 19 million which is about 2/3 of the total bad loans in the financial system where the responsibility of the government. fannie mae is not the only responsible party. it is actually part of a government housing policy to increase home ownership which is a perfectly good idea. the trouble is, they did it by forcing private entities and fannie mae and freddie mac or private entities though they were backed by the government and banks under this community reinvestment act, to make laws that would -- that they would not have otherwise made. that is really the underlying cause of why we had a financial crisis. when the facts come out, many people may n