but as soon as gadhafi was gone, the international community was gone. a vacuum of security, of legitimate authority and competing tribes regions and ethnicities, fighting for oil. as you said this is a very rich country and here also complicating this basic internal mosaic of political players a regional war by proxy that is really adding a great deal of tensions and prolonging this particular civil war that could easily plunge libya into a situation like syria and iraq. >> certainly an alarming situation there, nawaz thank you for being here. >> thank you for having me. >> while the world has focused on the deadly ebola virus, bloody campaign to create their own caliphate in the region's powerhouse nigeria. male and female suicide bombers blamed on boko haram have killed nearly 140 people just in the past month including at least 44 people at a market tuesday, 45 more in an attack on a village thursday and 48 people at a boys high school assembly on november 10th. a local politician from the ravaged village told reporters he was still searching for mot

gadhafi was our ally in fighting terror, bad guy that he was. two month later we're signing on to lead from behind in attacking libya. and the reason obama gave was that there was an imminent bloodbath in benghazi from gadhafi if we did not engage him and that we would leave a rwanda-sized stain on the conscience of the world if we did not get engaged in libya. now, there was a fellow named alan cooperman, he's a harvard guy, democrat strategist, he went in and did the math. he said, look, the surest way of knowing whether there'd be a bloodbath is what happened in misrata, the second largest city in libya, i believe. when gadhafi fought the rebels there, only 200 people died, and they were all soldiers. no women were killed, no children were killed. there's no bloodbath. why would he not duplicate that in benghazi? what was the imminent bloodbath? but, in fact, this was the same strategy bill clinton used in serbia, in kosovo in 1999. it worked then, it worked now. let's take one more question because i know these guys want to wrap up. yes, ma'

and others got rid of gadhafi a few years ago.eful democracy there that has not exactly worked out. now you're learning isis is expanding. what are you hearing? >> this is an extremely concerning development. isis is now in complete control of a major town in eastern libya. just 200 miles south of crete. they're and panelling in eastern libya, taking advantage of political chaos to expand westward up the coast to benghazi. the leader helped orchestrate this by sending a top aide to libya a couple of months ago to help build the group up there. the libyan jihadis pledge allegiance to him last week and he welcomed they will into the isis fold. and what has helped them take over is the return of up to 300 libyan jihadis. veterans of isis syria and iraq, and are outgunning others in the region. >> you and i remember, our viewers remember a few years ago the u.s. was launching dozens of tomahawk cruise missiles inside libya. they got rid of gadhafi. it wasn't supposed to turn out like this by any means, was it? >> it is unthinkable. i

we assumed it was gadhafi because it was the arab spring. how are we getting there?an't tell you wrchlt's the country? can't tell you. what's the thing? can't tell you. so we assume we would be flying off a navy ship from the mediterranean into libya and then grab gadhafi and bring hem out. they told us a couple of things like we're going to read you in eventually and said names that didn't make sense. we were talking a couple days later about this person, this person, why would they be there? it's been bin laden. they found him. we're going to go get him. >> the cia had been doing extensive surveillance on the mysterious compound and built a scale model that was an exact replica. >> we knew it was going to be a house. we were going to separate into four teams so we were able to get an idea of what the external part of the target looked like. we knew you have part of the exteri exterior. every opening, every garden, every path. how high the walls were. we practiced flying in and assaulting. the plan was to fast roll. we're going to fast roll from dash one, the first

government but from libyan leader moammar gadhafi. >> i am asking for help of arab rulers, especiallye he's known for helping those who are suffering. >> it takes nearly a year before the u.s. government has enough intelligence to act safely. there's no guarantee hallums will even be alive once they get there. but on september 7, 2005, it's go time. a daring raid in broad daylight, and the soldiers' helmet cams capture every adrenaline-fueled moment. >> i heard helicopters. and at first it sounded normal, the helicopters flying by. the helicopters started getting louder, and then it felt like they were landing on top of the house. i heard a lot of yelling and running, and then i heard somebody hitting on this door. i didn't know if it was somebody there to rescue me or trying to kill me. the door falls in. this american soldier jumps down in the room, and he points at me, and he says, are you roy? and i said yes. he says, come on, we're getting out of here. one of the special forces guys handed me a flag and said whenever we're able to rescue someone, we always give an american flag t

gadhafi. every time you have to establish a new relationship, what we wanted to do, which is what we did in this conference of switzerland, look into the practices. what are then also important lessons? i just give you another example. the timing of mutual legal request is absolutely essential. if you send it too early, you may wreck your case. if you send it too late, you may not even have a case. so, you really have to choose the right moment. how do you do that? all these lessons, put them together, we put together a document we will send next year to the conference, i hope with all the countries involved, especially the world bank, it's a bit like asset recovery 2.0. what is the next die mention? how can we really now make it even quicker, more efficient because i think these remain the main challenges. i fully agree with the examples that the two of you mentioned. of course, we have to go through judicial proceedings. we have to get better because it does fay too much time. >> you introdu

we assumed it was gadhafi because it would be arab spring. how are we getting there? can't tell you. what's the thing? can't tell you. we assumed we would be flying off the navy ship from the mediterranean and grab gadhafi and bring him out. they told us a couple things, they said a few names that didn't make sense. a few of us were talking a couple days later about this person, this person, why would they be there. it's bin laden. they found him. we're going to go get him. >> the cia had been doing extensive surveillance on the mysterious compound and built a scale model that was an exact replica. >> we knew every single part of the extoor yor, every opening, over path, how the walls were. we practiced flying in and then assau assaulting. we practice the hit, practice leaving and do it all again. >> what's it like training for something so hard, so intensely, when you don't think you're going to survive the mission? >> well, it was worth it. because this is it. we would have moments we'd joke around and laugh and then it would hit you again and like, all right, get s

the country has fallen into chaos since the 2011 uprising that deposed leader gadhafi.ince the regime was forced out of power, rival brigades have defied the state's authority. consecutive governments have appeared weak, divided and unable to restore law and order. in fighting and attacks among groups have become common. some groups even seized oil plants. so far there has been no sign of reconciliation, and it's unlikely the supreme court's decision will do anything to change that. >>> we are joined by an international relations professor. >> the problem is you have bifurcation. politically the country is divided. so you have contested legitimacy. so the question of contestation will continue. practically you have chaos. it's a the unknown for libyans and libya. ideally you have some dialogue. maybe tunisian way, if possible so they go back to negotiation. maybe the elders from the different tribes, you have got like the south, the east, and the west, because really prick tickly now libya has been divided. it's almost like a de facto dismember of libya. you have two go

little between those who think former gadhafi officials should be able to hold office and those who do not. we can see why certain tribal and religious groups have stacked up in the way that they have. this is something that can be mediated? the international criminal court says it won't investigate an israeli raid on a turkish raid several years ago. israeli soldiers may have commit war crimes but ever ruled the case is beyond here remit. nine turkish advocates died in 2010. the vessel was in international waters carrying humanitarian aid bound for the gaza strip. >> these alleged crimes include notably willful killing, willfully causing serious injury to body and health and committing outrages upon personal dignity, however after carefully assessing, i conclude the cases likely araising from an investigation into this incident would not be of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the court. >> meanwhile, the israeli army says a suspect has handed himself in after a van ran into three israeli soldiers in the occupied west bank. they were all wounded, one seriously. the attac

kicked out the legs under several leaders, even unattractive ones like saddam hussein or moammar gadhafire chaos. when president obama, for example, did not follow through (?) on certain threats or commitment is in syria. that sends the message that the united states is not to be relied on or feared. it's a mixture of things we've done over several presidency and see things we haven't done. liz: and at the same time we're not cheering or supporting israel as we should. netanyahu has felt almost ignored or rejected by the united states on several levels. as we look at what's gone on in the middle east, and that one particular democracy, you could arguably shift what's going on in russia. you know, i asked netanyahu once about vladimir putin. he said i can't get into that because his problems are more significant when it comes to those terrorists. let's talk about vladimir putin. at europe's periphery, it was the first, but will it be the last of putin's push. >> i'm not sure we've seen the end of what he's doing in ukraine. he seems to be increasing the pressure. several years ago we saw

. >> we -- especially the countries who played a role in getting rid of gadhafi, first of all should have played a far bigger role than they v they haven't. today they have a huge responsibility in getting libya on the right side. i don't see the situation where libya -- forget being useful and helpful for the region, but libya could be a huge ticking bomb for the region. >> so do you think the u.s. dropped the ball there? >> i don't want to mention one country or the other, but the entire coalition had a bigger responsibility, which unfortunately they didn't live up to? >> let me talk to you about iran, your neighbor just across the persian gulf, now it's coming to a head on monday, this nuclear deal, what are your thoughts, concerns got that deal? >> the question that us in the region will ask more than what that deal will contain or not is what's our role going to be the day after? we wake up tuesday morning, and everyone -- i mean most of us ask the question that what iran is going to get out of it, not on the nuclear front, but on the regional front, we would wish, obviously, th

we assumed it was gadhafi because it was the arab spring. how we get there, i can't tell you.e country, can't tell you. what's the thing? can't tell you. so we assumed we would be flying off a navy ship into libya, then we would grab gadhafi and bring you out. they said a few things that didn't make sense. a few of us were talking a couple of days later, this person, this person, why would they be there, it's bin laden and they found him. we're going to get him. >> the cia had been doing extensive surveillance on the mysterious compound and built a scale model that was an exact replica. >> we were able to get an idea what the external part of looked like. every opening, every path, how high the walls were, we practiced fliering in. we're going to fast rope all the guys from the first helicopter right in front of that main house, dash two would drop some guys outside of the north end for extra security and put the rest of us on the roof. once we were on the roof, we would take it from the top and bottom simultaneously. we would practice the hit, then we would practice leaving a

he just actually made a decision to go in and take out gadhafi. what did we get, benghazi? look at the mess we're in because of iraq. it was manufactured by the bush administration. >> do you put some of the blame for this, though, at the feet of your own leadership? the republican leaders before the election said the president has the authority he needs right now to fight isis. we don't need another authorization of military force. >> absolutely. i blame our leadership. i will give you another quick example. after president obama bombed libya, i drafted a house resolution, and it would not have to go to the senate, for the house to debate saying if a president without provocation y bypasses congress to bomb another country, then we will debate the impeachment of that president. i was just trying to give a debate war powers. i sent it to the subcommittee chair from california, who is a goodfellow. i even wrote a letter saying, trent, please hold a hearing. i wanted the experts of war powers to be at the hearing. he got back with me maybe six or seven weeks later saying the

violence and rivalries have deeply split people in tripoli since the uprising that deposed gadhafi.ival brigades have defied the state's authority. consecutive governments have appeared weak, divided and unable to restore order. some brigades even seized oil ports and deprived the libyan government of its main source of revenue. none of the rival groups fighting for power has shown any signs of reconciliation. >>> well let's take to an international relations professor at qatar university here in doha. in terms of the wider constitutional impact, where does this leave libya politically? >> great question. i think the problem is you have bifurcation. the country is divided, and you have contested legitimacy. so the question of contestation will continue. it's the unknown for libyans and libya. >> where does this leave the fighting, say, this benghazi, the renegade general has the backing the tabrook government that has now been declared illegal. >> well, you have the factor of internationalization, so this is really a problem that has been deepened in libya. everyone has got basicall

they gathered at the airport in triply in june. 300 rebels from the brigade that overthrew gadhafi inritish government says the libyan authorities would vet their recruits. they didn't do a very good job. they sang the loyal to tribes. >> they would go around to set things on fires. they attacked the local shop on the base. they broke in, went into communal areas, they destroyed laptop own the furniture. they destroyed the whole thing. >> they were more interested in drinking than military drinking. >> the majority of recruits responded positively to the training. and it was regrettable that there were some serious disciplinary issues. >> at first you know they were enthusiastic and trying to get involved and talked sense into them. they were just basically stand there silent and watched them gone on with it. >> they sang libyan songs as they rode around the base. the women were reportedly scared because the libyans didn't understand that touching or taking pictures without permission isn't acceptable. it proved impossible to keep them within the perimeter. the british soldiers might

she led the way in toppling gadhafi in libya, dragged secretary gates against that. chaos, militias, revenge killings and spilling over into central africa. neil: americans are scared ralph, and you know the argument that the democrats don't want to look like they're soft on terroror soft on bad guys, and she's trying to show she can be tough on terror and lean left when it comes to anti-corporate views. >> well, the former won't work, you don't fight terror with state terror. you don't fight terrorism in ways that creates martyrdom. al qaeda has offshoots of isis. neil: how would you counterit? >> security comes from justice, you don't back dictators in foreign countries that repress people and produce revolts and slaughter. that's where they stand. neil: isis is running around the world beheading people and doing this other stuff, how would you deal with that or advise the next president to deal with that? >> i wouldn't have spent billions of taxpayer dollars training iraqi armey and allowing it to be taken over by cronyism. neil: fair enough, fair enough. that's t

we assumed it was gadhafi because it was the arab pring. how we get in there, i can't tell you. the country, i can't tell you. what's the thing? can't tell you. so we assumed we'd be flying off a navy ship from the mediterranean in libya, then we'd go in there, grab khadafy and bring him out. they told us -- they said a few names that didn't make sense. a few of us were talking a couple days later about this person, this person, why would they be there? it's bin laden, they found him. we're going to go get him. >> the cia had been doing extensive surveillance on the mysterious compound and built a scale model that was an exact replica. >> we knew it was going to be a house. we were going to separate into four teams. so we were able to get an idea what the external part of the target was going to look like. we knew every opening, every garden, every path, how high the walls were. we practiced flying in, the plan was professional. we're going to fast rope all the guys from one, the main house out of both sides. dash two at the same time would drop some guys outside of the north en

gathered at the airport in tripoli in june, 300 rebels from the brigades that had overthrown colonel gadhafi in 2011. the british government said the libyan authorities would vet the recruits. they didn't do a very good job. they sang the national anthem, but remained loyal to their regions and tribes, with no interest in becoming a disciplined national force. ♪ >> they would go around building by building to break fire alarms, to set things on fire. they also attacked the shop, the local shop on the base. they broke in. they went in to communal areas. they stole laptops. they destroyed the furniture. they sprayed the whole place with fire extinguishers. >> reporter: they took pictures of themselves in the gym. although more than one source told me they were more interested in drinking than military drilling. the ministry of defense said in a statement today that the majority of recruits responded positively to the training, and it was regrettable that there were some serious disciplinary issues. but those on the base said things went out of control very quickly. >> the british soldiers woul

as more moderate and adding to a situation that has grown increasingly chaotic since the fall of gadhafi2011 with rival brigades and appeared powerless to restore any semblance of law an order on a national basis. one of the most powerful led by the general came control of the eastern city of benghazi and areas around it. rejecting the general national congress of tripoli and also not formally supporting the government in tabrook and the u.n. support mission in libya is not taking sides saying only that it has taken note of the supreme court decision. >> the mission reiterated its commitment to libya sovereignty and independence and territory and adding the u.n. has to under score to act responsibly and not exist the polorization or lead to further deterioration of the situation. >> reporter: those rejecting the supreme court decision made clear that the decision itself is just one more polarizing factor, mike hanna, al jazeera. >> defunct had the backing and tripoli says u.n. needs to reassess the situation in libya. . >> translator: i call upon the u.n. envoy to to read the situation a

we figured it would have been moammar gadhafi in libya, because that was the time of the arab spring, and we figured they wanted us to go get him, so we started training, well, not training, but getting our gear prepared for that sort of environment. we were briefed more and more. they told us they would give us the brief in a couple days and we asked who was going to be at the brief or the read-in, as they called it. and just some of the names they mentioned didn't make sense for that part of the world and we sort of figured it out. >> there were bin laden experts, in other words? >> yeah, from different agencies, different parts of the world, just not that region. and then we did go down to a different training area. they gave us the briefing. they did say this is as close as you've ever been to osama bin laden. >> man. >> and that was quite a feeling. it wasn't -- there's no cheering, there was no high-fives. it was a more, okay, we're ready now. should we go? today. >> talk about being in that black hawk headed towards abad abad, what the mood was in the chopper. >> well, the mood

the united states said let's kill gadhafi and now egypt, mubarak is left and replaced with turmoil until another military general took over. i know you said it is imperative that assad be removed as well. but what replaces him? >> well, that is the problem we have, aaroerin. there is no plan out there. if assad were taken out with a rocket tonight, who would take over as the leader in syria? nobody can answer that question. and i think that is a -- that is a -- not under underlying problem, it is a very overt problem that i hope in the new discussions the president has now said he will have that he will tell them, look, guys, we have to develop a leadership plan for syria if we are going to go after assad. and certainly we should continue to. so let's just hope there is somebody inside of syria that is capable of taking over who can do so in a way that does not propel the bad guys to leadership roles. >> and of course, i don't know if what you are saying, if that is questioning democracy, but when i hear that, it makes me think of what happened in egypt where it was a democratic election

the picture in libya has not been pretty after moammar gadhafi was toppled. so the thinking had been for a while, we would give a wink and nod to assad and say, we don't want you in place, but we're going to use political and diplomatic measures to try to remove you. and then focus our military activities on isis. but if that is changing now, it's a really different map for the united states and the threat of a slippery slope into a much more deeper engagement. >> sure, and our involvement. let's consider this scenario. say the united states is eventually successful in getting bashar al assad to leave power. is it up to the united states to find a replacement? >> well, there are lots of different scenarios here. i'm sure that various parts of the syrian civil society will have to come together and argue about that. the problem is, can those moderates really prevail over much more ferocious and ideologically extreme elements within their society. i think that many of the realists in the region say that while assad may go, you may still want to have someone fro

i don't know how many governments they had since the downfall of gadhafi. so each time you have to start a new relationship. what we want to do and that's what we did in this conference with switzerland, look into the practices. how do you do that? and what then are also important lessons? i just give you another example. it's the timing of a mutual legal assistant request is absolutely essential. if you send it too early you may wreck your case. if you send it too late, you may not even have a case. so you really have to choose the right moment. how do you do that? all these lessons, put them together. we put together a document that we will submit next year to the conference, i hope with the help of all countries involved and certain lit world bank. and then to see -- it's a bit like asset recovery 2.0. what is the next dimension? how can we really now make it even quicker, more efficient? because i think these remain the main challenges. and i fully agree with the examples that the two of you mentioned. of course we have to go through judicial proegd. be

airman or pilot who got shot down during the ousting of gadhafi. to support him he had opened up an american school or an american speaking school for libyans and the ambassador ambassador came down to do a ribbon ceremony for that individual. >> host: you two were not on the ambassadors personal team, correct? >> guest: no. >> host: did you see him while you were there in benghazi? goes go. >> guest: the ambassador to come by and visit us. he was the ambassador of libya and he came by the day before and had lunch and of course he is going to come and meet with our chief of base. he won't meet with the security team personally but will come in and give a talk. this is what's going on this with the state department is doing. it's more of a meet and greet to say hey thanks guys for assisting us and a chance for them, we have better food than they did so at the chance for them to come in e at our facility. >> host: what was the security threat at that time? >> guest: benghazi itself was a lawless city. it was part of the country that had a government

gadhafi. each you have to establish in the relationship, that's what we did. look into the practices. that's the timing. they get the case. if you send it too late, you may not have a case. you really have to choose the right moment. how did you do that? they put them together. we put together a document that we will send them to the conference and i hope with the help of all the countries involved. and then to see it's a bit like the recovery 20. how can we make it quicker and more efficient. i think these remain the challenges. i agree with the examples that they mentioned. the whole credibility of it relies on that. but we have to get better. it does take more. >> you introduced this thing, but let me ask you this. how much resistance have you felt from the banking community whether in switzerland or otherwise? they talked about putting on banks in the preventive context. to engage in the peps in the field. >> certainly i heard this in the way they experience the banks and saying look, day these are good guys and the countries that were supposed to be doing

what it did but many of those the aftereffects were done -- the genesis was really under moammar gadhafi. so we're confronted with fractured states, iraq, syria, libya, the hollowing out of security structures. we don't have sufficient partners weapon don't know how to operate in those environments to says natural we trying to deal with nonstate actors, tribes,th anything mill lit ya, and the question is what does the future contured of thieves states going look lining? i think it can best be described as a hybrid security environment where you have very hollow, corrupt, notional state institutions working alongside paramilitaries, tribes, sectarian mill lit ya and this is the future. how does the u.s. as a state power that is used to dealing with ministries of defense, ministries of interior, how does it insert itself into those very fractured states? i completely agree with much of what was said here about the absolute corruption of many of our allies and the fact that we're working for centralized regimes that are fueling the very extremism that they purport to be fighting. and this i

intervention and what it did with many of those aftereffects of that were done the genesis was really under gadhafia number of states in the region. iraq is the rea, in jenin, libya we have the hauling out of the security structures. we don't have the sufficient partners. we don't know how to operate in those environments, so it's natural that we try to deal with non- detectors, tribes, ethnic militias. the question is what are the future contours of the states going to look like? i think it can be described as a hybrid security environment where you have the very hollow, corrupt notional state institutions working alongside the paramilitary tribes, sectarian militia and this is going to be the future. how does the u.s. as a state power that is used to dealing with ministries of of defense, of interior, how does it insert itself into those very fractured states? i agree with much of what was said about the absolute corruption of many of our allies and the fact we are working through the regime's that are fueling the extremism that today purports to be fighting. and this is a problem that isn't goin