and in particular, the fundamental change in american military structure brought by the goldwater nichols act of 1986. before that, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff was -- before that the members of the chief of staff voted, and the chairman -- and it was basically a coalition builder. he couldn't speak out unless anybody agreed. we had a ballot system within the military, and the military members, the joint chiefs, were mostly interested in more bombers, more of the -- one technique -- more soldiers, more battleships, and that's what they were going around in 1986, with goldwater-nichols. the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, for the first time in american history, and for the first time certainly within the period where we have had a big army -- began to speak for the military as a sing -- in a single voice. powell -- colin powell was the first chairman of the joint chiefs of staff who exploited -- who saw this opportunity and really took advantage of it in. in 1992 he wrote an op-ed lecturing bill clinton. you shouldn't invade boss -- bosnia, et cetera, et cetera. forget

and in particular the fundamental change in american military structure brought by the goldwater-nichols act of 1986. before that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff was -- before that, the members of the chief of staff voted and the chairman was basically a coalition-builder. he couldn't speak out unless everybody agreed. we had as it were a check and balance system within the military. and the military members of the joint chiefs were mostly interested in more bombers. more -- more soldiers. more battleships. and that's really what jostling around. and the chairman joint chiefs of staff for the first time in american history and for the first time certainly within the period where we had a big army began to speak for the military. ... president of the you of the united states what the military strategies are. >> i entirely agree with your description of what -- >> -- mcchrystal's peach, word for word, because that really isn't what he did in my view. >> well, -- >> it was in the q & a period and it was a general question between a rating approach to a complex problem in afghanist

>> well, it is a -- a perennial seam in our acquisition system that goes back now to goldwater nichols0 years or. as everybody in this audience knows, that in the main -- goldwater nichols decreed that we shall fight jointly, but you are right, that we still in the main, still acquire severally, and so joint acquisition has always been a challenge and it's a challenge in the wars. as well. in all the ways you might imagine. if there are inherently joint capabilities, that is, things that everybody needs, like some of the counter-i.e.d. enablers, all the services that are present there, that have installations there, that have personnel there, need some of the eod equipment, and it makes sense for us to buy them in one lot. that's why we have organizations like the joint i.e.d. defeat organization, as jay suggests, it's joint, -- as the j suggests, it's joint and it buys equipment for all the services. we also have to have different services take the lead for equipment that go to other services, so when joint urgent operational needs statement comes in, what's the j in juon mean, it mea

>> well, it is a perennial seem in our acquisition system that goes back now to goldwater-nichols, 30 years or so. as everybody in this audience knows, that in the main -- goldwater-nichols degree was that we shall fight jointly, but you're right that we still in the main, still acquire severally. so joint acquisition is always been a challenge and it's a challenge in the wars as well. and all the ways you might imagine, if there are inherent only joint capabilities, that is, things that everybody needs, like some of the counter ied enablers, all the services that are present there that have installation to their that have personnel there, need some of the d.o.d. equipment. and it makes sense for us to buy them in one lot. that's why we have organizations like jieddo, the joint ied, and it buys equipment for all the services. we also have to have different services take the lead for equipment that go to other services. so when a juon comes in, joint urgent operational need, it means that an army unit need some air force support. and air force needs to resources that support, and they

my model for that is goldwater-nichols. it's been mentioned a couple times this winter for those of you who may not be similar, the department of defense created after world war ii by the national surgery act of 1947 as amended, we debated it. we thought about it for years but i was a product of that environment. my service in the penn state navy, if i taken a tour outside the navy i would have been feels like for the next promotion consideration. that was the way the process was disappointed i was there for the debate. is a right, is it wrong? every service chief, every service secretary testified under oath, we pass this bill, it will ruin the united states department of defense. it was passed in 1986, signed by president reagan. we had a dustup called desert shield. every service chief in every service secretary since goldwater-nichols has said it's the best thing that's happened to the united states military. it was a radical transformation. now, here's my premise. a bureaucracy was established in any bureaucracy, you p

in understanding how goldwater-nichols worked there.inue to believe that the joint command idea, the orchestra conductor idea was a simpler way to leverage the straints of a number of agencies. it's not just the cia-dni relationship. we were very mindful and i am mindful since my district makes most of this from our office that hopefully will never be able to be produced anyone else on the planet. but leveraging those assets that so everybody wins. not just an agency has ownership over them and can use it for that agency's agenda of it is a big piece of what we had in mind. i think on balance our concept is fine. 50% law, 50% leadership. i would hope going forward that it would be implemented by the dni and future that is to not business a big pure carrot si that competes with the pieces of the of the -- which competes with what the responsibilities of the dni are, but to have something lean and nibble. we had thought the dms staff would be adequate. obviously that hasn't been adequate. not to build big new buildings, but sit as orchest

i don't know if we need a goldwater-nichols for contract that i think the gansler report and looking in terms of what occurred with on a contracting was an eye-opening experience for is that it was a significant emotional event. we can never go back to those days. so it's up to ed harrington and bill phillips with the support of shape a sod and many others in congress to make sure that we never go back to those days. if we don't institutionalize this within our army we have missed an opportunity. for my three years or whatever my tenure is here, i will work hard on that and i will make sure that it doesn't fall off the gears of our army leadership. and i would also like to say that we're getting tremendous support from the army leadership. general carelli as mr. assad has mentioned a couple times, general casey, secretary of gq, was asked me and ed harrington and others to make sure we go around and we talk on track and. another point, general casey asked me to go and talk to the division commanders and assistant division commanders in north carolina about three weeks after i came ba

for those who don't know what goldwater-nichols says, it was the law that eventually created in dod join miss or joint duty and what is often referred as the color purple. i'll let mike mcconnell and others who have lived that part explain it in more detail perhaps on the panel. but here's the problem, the tension lies in that what was given to the secretary of defense, there was no secretary of intelligence in which an operational way he could execute this model of a goldwater-nichols approach. so the real questions are, is the dni able to implement information sharing, drive the innovation of foreign and domestic information, allocate intelligence expenditures against the highest future challenges of our nation and continue to enhance analytic trade craft in this model? i personally believe we can. let me digress with a little story. it's a story taken out of genesys in the bible chapter 32. and there is a would-be patriarch, not a pitcher at that time, jacob, who was about to reconcile with his brother esau. the night before, in that chapter, the story goes that a stranger shows up fo

you talked about goldwater- nichols, which separates the joint staff from the service staff, and general hayden, you mentioned the command aspect. would anybody care to take that analogy a step forward and say, is the chairman of joint staff model to emulate in some respect, and if so, what authority and leadership should we take to make it more real? >> there are difficulties transferring coldwater nichols as a model. number one, you do not decide one cabinet department. number two, and this is missed by a lot, but it is important. the department of defense is divided between combat and command and military departments. these guys train and provide. these guys operate. the intelligence community is not organized that way. nsa, cia, etc. as i suggested earlier, the only thing that seems to transfer is title 4, which is the personnel model, and i think that transfers nicely, but the rest of it does not, so we cannot simply brought it and throw it here and expected to work. one thought has come to my mind. it is related, and that is the chairman of the joint staff and so on. i have thought

i can't answer your question that i don't know if we need a goldwater-nichols for contracting. i think the cancer report on what came out of iraq and a particular kuwait in terms of what occurred with army contracting was an eye-opening experience for us but it was a significant emotional event. we can never go back to those days. so it's up to ed harrington and bill phillips in the sport of mr. assad and many others in congress to make sure that we never go back to those days that if we don't institutionalize this within our army would've missed an opportunity. and for my three years or whatever my tenure is here, i will work hard on that and i'll make sure that it doesn't fall off the ears of our army leadership. i would also like to say that we're getting tremendous support from the army leadership. general gorelick, as mr. assad as much in a couple times. general casey, secretary mchugh, who is asked me and ed harrington and others to make sure that we go around and we talk contracting. another point, general casey asked me to go talk to the division commanders and assistan

i was there for the debate of goldwater-nichols. was it right or wrong? every secretary testified under oath that you pass the bill, it will ruin the united states department of defense. it was passed in 1986. it was signed by president reagan. we had desert shield and desert storm. every service chiefs and secretary said it was the best thing that ever happened to the u.s. military. it was a radical transformation. here is my premise. a bureaucracy, once it is established, will fight to maintain itself to the point of redefining reality in its own self-interests. that is true of any bureaucracy. without interests of oversight -- interests of oversight of forces beyond the control of the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy will refuse to change. -- without intrusive oversight or forces beyond the control of the bureaucracy, the barack receipt will refuse to change. i use my beloved navy as my model. virtually every change in the navy was forced from the outside. there's a long history there that we do note i wod like to as if you want to follow-up on that issue.

and so in if my hierarchy it's citizen first -- you affiliate, even today with goldwater/nichols and as much as we have a joint task force and so on, people still will identify with their parent organizations, which is not a bad thing. .. blonden nonpenal goebel conversations >>> all this month, see the winners of c-span studentcam did you documentary competition. middle and high school students, 45 states submitted to use on one of the country's greatest strengths or challenge the country is facing. watch the top winning videos every morning on c-span at 6:50 eastern just before washington journal. and at 8:30 during the program meets the students who need them. for a preview of the winners, visit studentcam.org. >>> now, news corporation chairman and ceo rupert murdoch interviewed by former "meet the press" anchor and harvard professor speed. from the national press club in washington, this is one hour and 15 minutes. [applause] hello, welcome to the national press club and another addition of the kalb report and the guest tonight is rupert murdoch the subject of the making of a mo

i was there for the debate over goldwater/nichols. every test defect -- every secretary testified under oath that if you pass this bill, it would ruin this department. it was passed by ronald reagan. every service chief and every service secretary said that it was the best thing that has ever happened to the united states military. it was a radical transformation. here is my premise. the bureaucracy, once established, and the bureaucracy that you pick -- any bureaucracy that you pick will fight to maintain itself to the point every defining reality -- of redefining reality. intrusive oversight or forces beyond the control of the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy will refuse to change. that is my premise. some might agree, others might take issue. that is an older gentleman observing the issue for a long time. . . >> is your job in defense of the constitution to let the facts speak for themselves, not to twist the facts to fit some policy objective, but let the facts speak for themselves. the closest analogy we have is the director for the

i think that the reform, which was modeled after goldwater- nichols, we wanted to set up a command structurecross 16 agencies was to -- was designed well. the original bill was introduced by democrats on the house intelligence committee. i was then the ranking member. it had to change in order to get through congress. it was based on recommendations of the joint commission on intelligence which was a bipartisan and bicameral effort met urgent effort -- bicameral effort. it was also based on recommendations from the 9/11 commission which came after us. the joint command structure was supposed to be a flexible and nimble and -- coordinator across these agencies. coordinator is not a strong enough word. orchestra conductor is closer to what we intended. we had to make compromises to make the bill go through. you remember the opposition donald rumsfeld. the chairman of the house armed services committee, as well. we had to make compromises in order to get the bill through. in spite of that, we were courageous as struck the final compromise. we have had three dni's since then. i would say we stil