but we used the goldwater/nichols act as the template for this bill. not because we think public health or medical capability should be aligned along the dod axis, but it did identify in the goldwater/nichols act the idea of having joint operations, putting somebody in charge and creating a kind of command structure overall. so with that, a position was created at the health and human services department for the assistant secretary of preparedness and response. regrettable in the crisis at hand you don't hear much about that office but it was their function to do the necessary things to align not only the u.s. government's efforts in this space, realizing that in some ways it's not only hhs, dod and va that have significant assets to bring to the fight but also this idea that to basically align the state and local authorities who are, if you wishlgs the front line soldiers in this kind of activity. we can argue that was effective or not. i think the story will be written. but i do hope that as a result of this ebola event, somebody will have the wisdom

to the project project to that of general grey was involved in in his career, but we used the goldwater nichols act as a template for this bill, not because we think public health or medical capabilities should be a line along the dod axis but it did identify in the goldwater nichols act the idea of having joint operations putting somebody in charge and creating a kind of command structure so with that a position was created at the health and human services for the assistant secretary of pyramids and response. -- preparedness and response. .. we talked about it before these proceedings. that really did assess why did things fail, it'd that case desert one, because what they identified in the blueprint day late and a vision they left was one that over two decades went from the point in time when we had a tremendous failure in the iranian hostage rescue to the point in time that we can also put the demise of osama bin laden. that didn't come overnight. that didn't happen because somebody just said let's do it. it literally took decades and commitment by the special operations community to do for

economic reference to project that general grey was involved in in his career, but we used a goldwater-nichols act as the template for this bill, not because we think public health or medical capability should be a line along the dod access but it didn't identify in the goldwater nichols act the idea of having joint operations, putting somebody in charge, creating a kind of command structure over all. with that division was great at the health and human services department for the assistant secretary of preparedness and response. regrettably and the crisis as hand you don't hear much about the office but it was their function to basically do the necessary things to align that the u.s. government's efforts in this space, realizing in some ways it's not only hhs, dod and va that assets to bring to the fight, but it's also this idea that basically outlines the state and local authorities who are the front-line soldiers in this kind of activity. we can argue if it was effective or not but i think the story will be written. but i do hope that as a result of this able event someone will have the wis

but we use the goldwater nichols act as the template for this bill, not because we think health or medical capabilities should an lined d.o.d. access, but it did identify in the goldwater the idea of having joined operations, putting creating a large and command structure overall. so with that a position was created servicesalth and human department for the assistant secretary of preparedness and response. in the crisis at hand you don't hear much about that. but it was their function to do thees in things to a line not governments -- it's also this idea that to the state andn local authorities who are, if you will, the front line ofdiers in the kind --rorist who were soldiers in this kind of activity. ofo hope that as a result this ebola event, somebody will have the wisdom that they had in the 1980's to commission a holloway report that general and we talkedof, about it before these proceedings. did assess why did things fail. that case, desert one, because what they identified in blueprint they laid and the vision they left was one that decades went from the point in time when we had a

interestingly enough, making reference to a project general gray was involved in, we use the goldwater/nichols act as the template for this bill not because we think public health or medical capabilities should be aligned along the dod access but it did identify having joint operations, putting somebody in charge and creating a command structure overall so with that the position was created with health and human services for the assistant secretary and response. in the crisis at hand you don't hear much about that office but it was their function to basically do the necessary things to all line with the u.s. government in this space realizing in some ways it is not only hhs, dod and va that significant assets to bring to the fight but this idea that to basically all line state and local authorities who are if you will the front-line soldiers in this activity. you can argue that was effective or not. the story will be written but i do hope as a result of this ebola event someone will have the wisdom that in the 1980s to commission a holloway report that general gray was part of an talked-about