it has existed at significantly lower levels in the organization before but not since the goldwater-nichols act of 1988 which created a tndyambings l as an entity, not since then has occupied ganization

goldwater nichols changed that staff-wise fairly significantly. and enhanced the chairman's power so much that he was a true, if he chose to execute it, was a true primary member of the national security staff of the president of the united states. colin powell who was the chairman at the time had the wherewithal to exercise that power. because as you may know, he had been a national security adviser, had been military aide to secretary of defense weinberger, served on the budget committee somewhere. and he had been a force com commander for the army. he was one of the ideal people to be in that position. everything changed between my previous experience at the pentagon and where i was going here. the other major thing is i got to the pentagon two days after saddam hussein invaded kuwait. my immediate reaction to that was i called to see how i could get back into -- back in the field. the answer was look, we have about a thousand colonels just like you making that request. you're staying where you are. so the position i walked into that i didn't k

good thing about goldwater nichols, we now had the power in the chairman to look beyond that, who had a chair, a seat at the table where something beyond those issues could be argued. that's where we went. i was fortunate enough because of my experience to be kind of picked as one of the senior planners that got to meet with general powell and a couple of other senior officers, mainly colonels, some lieutenant colonels, used to sit down, say how are we going to do this, how are we going to get the best built advice we can get, despite the bureaucratic stuff from the cia, dia, from the state department, people in state department knew things, military, more than the chairman did, and the normal bureaucratic politics associated with this kind of thing, and because of the expertise and experience of general powell, he was able to lead the way instead of following all of that bureaucratic stuff. so that was what i was involved in for my first, since i got there in august until the war was over in february. >> wow. that must have been a huge undertaking. >> got one day off. but i didn't co

but this has existed at significantly lower levels in the organization before but not since goldwater nichols act of 86 which created technology and logistics as an entity not since then has the are and e organization occupied statures since it has been 32 years since the enactment of goldwater nichols and since we have had a major reorganization of the department, i think we can expect this particular substantiation to remain for a while as well. i am the first occupant of the office at the undersecretary level but i think we could expect more and my primary purpose is to get things started off right. so what ought we to be doing and why? and for that i have to go over some history because with mutual understanding i will start by saying in the united states we have been on holiday 25 years and maybe a little more since the fall of the berlin wall and shortly thereafter the collapse of the soviet union at that time china was not a great power. russia was devolving from a great status into a fractionated regime putin had not risen to the top and at that time it would have been unimaginable fo

since it's been 32 years since the enactment of goldwater-nichols, since we've had a major reorganization of the department, i think we can expect this particular instantiation to remain around for a while as well. so i'm the first occupant of the office at the undersec retare -- at the undersecretary level but i think we can expect many more. and my primary purpose is to get the thing started off right and set the proper tone for what we ought to be doing. so what ought we be doing and why? for that, i have to pull on a little bit of history, some of it recent, some of it of longer standing. i'm going to start by saying in the united states we've been on holiday for 25 years, maybe late -- a little bit more, since the fall of the berlin wall and shortly thereafter the collapse of the soviet union. at that time, china was not a great power. russia was devolving from great power status into a much more fractionated regime. we had not seen, putin had not risen to the top. at that time it would have been really unimaginable for someone to stand up and say that the dissolution of the soviet u

you said perhaps we need to look at statutory process changes that were outlined in goldwater nichols. can you talk about what you mean by the dod needing greater agility in adjusting to the new operating environment, and any statutory changes you would like? >> yes ma'am. it's clear to me that some of our potential adversaries are innovating with systems that we need to catch up on. in some cases. or advance the gap we might hold over them the ability to purchase equipment's and turn them quickly into capability for our soldiers and coast guardsmen is ponderously slow. anything that allows us to innovate, permits us to fail occasionally, will be incredibly important. i'm concerned about china's pursuit of hypersonic's. that is one area we need to get after quickly. some help on the acquisition side would allow us to innovate more quickly. sen. hirono: i would be very interested in statutory changes you would ask us to consider for baa -- nvaa. continuing with the north korean issue, hawaii went through a false alarm relating to what we thought was a missile coming from north korea. y

said that perhaps we need to look at some statutory processes, changes that were outlined in goldwater nichols. can you talk about what you mean by the d.o.d. needing greater agility to adjusting to the new operating environment and any statutory challenges you would like that would foster that agility? >> yes, ma'am. it's clear to me that some of our potential adversaries are innovating with weapons systems that we need to catch up on in some cases or advance the gap that we currently might hold over them as well. the ability to purchase equipment and turn them quickly into capability for our soldiers, sailors, marine and coa coast guardsmen is slow. so anything that allows us to innovate a little bit, permits us to fail occasionally, will be incredibly important. i'm highly concerned about china's pursuit of hypersonics. that is one area we need to get at quickly and some help there on the acquisition side would allow us to innovate more quickly. >> i'd be interested in any statutory changes that you would ask us to consider for the next ndaa. continuing with the threat of north korea issue,

previously the legislation among other things included provisions to retain critical personnel from goldwater-nicholswhat steps to each of you recommend that we take to congress to help the navy attract and retain the personnel required to cooperate -- corroborate a fleet and thank you for the decision of destroyers. this will give us 300 ships much earlier but we must also accelerate the end strength of the four so if you would discuss that and we will begin with you mr. secretary. >> thank you senator and starting with 355 and working down you know who you will there. we have told you we will get there and did not doverwood came to a coalition on this we said there were a couple of plans underway. you see the extension of the tbg los angeles class. we also have other plans were working on so standby and we also realize we have to drive the ample in order to work everywhere he can to find the resources necessary to do that. when that we do sign-up for new platforms i.e. ships putting my business have on that is just one column of the resources needed. we also need the maintenance column and we need