that is the basic split on gse's. right now they have been a punching bag and not done everything correctly, but by and large most of the time they're being faulted for that whatever setup to do. if you're going to attack them as to their fundamental purpose, let's do that and be honest about it. the other suggestions that are coming to the floor are what to do instead of this? some of the suggestions have been let's forget about government subsidy mortgage finance, let's go to private mortgage rates. my colleague did some work on going back and saying let's look at what was being done when we have a purely private mortgage finance and let's look at the rate of homeownership and the luxury its -- and a luxurious rates people were having. when we look at this and our own expectations as participating in the economy, that we do not like that world. we come down to a notion we're if we had the gse's do something we did not like, let's move them in the direction we like, but not get rid of them altogether. >> there is a n

the gse part of the program is better than the t.a.r.p. part of the program. of this 520,000, approximately or 540,000 of ongoing permanent modifications, more than half of those are attributable to fannie and freddie and the gse. it's about 230,000 modifications that are actually t.a.r.p. permanent modifications. there is activity over there. we detail in our report, we break these numbers down,rom gse to nongse, including the money they've reported that they've spent on the modifications. >> the bottom line is, there is approximately $70 billion that has been appropriated for this type of program, the hamp program, 70 billion, not 45, 70 billion, and 1 billion is all that went out the door for a program that's hurt people it's suosed to help an in your definition, remarkably disspiriting program, what i would call a colossal failure. is that accurate? >> yes, i understand your frustration and share your frustration. i hope the easury can hear what you're saying and come up and be honest about where this program is going, i it's going anywhere. >> i got 15 se

the gse part of the program is better than the t.a.r.p. part of the program.is 520,000, approximately or 540,000 of ongoing permanent modifications, more than half of those are attributable to fannie and freddie and the gse. it's about 230,000 modifications that are actually t.a.r.p. permanent modifications. there is activity over there. we detail in our report, we break these numbers down, from gse to nongse, including the money they've reported that they've spent on the modifications. >> the bottom line is, there is approximately $70 billion that has been appropriated for this type of program, the hamp program, 70 billion, not 45, 70 billion, and 1 billion is all that went out the door for a program that's hurt people it's supposed to help and in your definition, remarkably disspiriting program, what i would call a colossal failure. is that accurate? >> yes, i understand your frustration and share your frustration. i hope the treasury can hear what you're saying and come up and be honest about where this program is going, if it's going anywhere. >> i got 15

the gse part of the program is better than the t.a.r.p. part of the program. of this 520,000, approximately or 540,000 of ongoing permanent modifications, more than half of those are attributable to fannie and freddie and the gse. it's about 230,000 modifications that are actually t.a.r.p. permanent modifications. there is activity over there. we detail in our report, we break these numbers down, from gse to nongse, including the money they've reported that they've spent on the modifications. >> the bottom line is, there is approximately $70 billion that has been appropriated for this type of program, the hamp program, 70 billion, not 5, 70 billion, and 1 billion is all that went out the door for a prram that's hurt people it's supposed to help and in your definition, remarkably disspiriting program, what i would call a colossal failure. is that accute? >> yes, i understand your frustration and share your frustration. i hope the treasury can hear what you're saying and come up and be honest about where this program is going, if it's going anywhere. >> i got 15

the gse part of the program is better than the t.a.r.p. part of the program. of this 520,000, approximately or 540,000 of ongoing permanent modifications, more than half of those are attributable to fannie and freddie and the gse. it's about 230,000 modifications that are actually t.a.r.p. permanent modifications. there is activity over there. we detail in our report, we break these numbers down, from gse to nongse, including the money they've reported that they've spent on the modifications. >> the bottom line is, there is approximately $70 billion that has been appropriated for this type of program, the hamp program, 70 billion, not 45, 70 billion, and 1 billion is all that went out the door for a program that's hurt people it's supposed to hel and in your definition, remarkably disspiriting program, what i would call a colossal failure. is that accurate? >> yes, i understand your frustration and share your frustration. i hope the treasury can hear what you're saying and come up and be honest about where this program is going, if it's going anywhere. >> i go

gse's. one thing that i would appreciate which is uniquely to treasury, most of us here in washington who have been business have tried to convert to pay-as-you-go accounting. treasury is different. i began seeing the accrual system of reserves come into pleay. you had reserves. you had a stated value. you stated them, restated them this year for the previous year and they got worse. however, in this year, they got so much better that there is this $154 billion swing. maybe you can clarify this to where we understand this in a simpler way. it is important because as i understand it, those numbers reflect on the anticipated deficit and other figures we look at. i think all of us want to know the true deficit. to know it, we would like it not to exist but we would like to have the accurate numbers. lastly, today we have been talking in net dollars. before we talk again, like the committee to have source material that preferably you two agree on. in the way a normal business would do it. meanin

housing programs and let me just note, it's not $70 billion for hamp, our portion of hamp, there is a gse porti, our portion of hamp is 29. we've done a number of other housing rograms. so there's $45 billion allocated for a variety of housing programs. there's still a very small amount that's committed for the public/private investment partnership. basically, we're no longer making new commitments. we're no longer doing new programs. our focus now is getting the money back, and we've gotten, as i say, a lot of it back, and i expect we will get a lot more of it back, and essentially all the program programs leaving aside the housing programs, all the programs considered as a whole, will result in a very little cost or essentially even a profit, because we will get all the funds back. >> can you make a blanket committee here today that those unobligated funds will not be spent? >> congressman, i can make a blanket commitment to you that we will make no further commitment of funds. we do not have that authority. but let me make clear, there are funds that are obligated that may be spent. th

a removal of the major government role we had in the gse's and a rethinking of mortgage contracts that provide better insixteen to his on capital reform, rather than just saying hold more, more, more, the desire is to think about what do you want capital to do is a discussion of a familiar proposal of economists on how to develop and design practically capital requirements that move over the business cycle. and then finally on systemic risk, really focus on the elephant in the room which is a credible end to too big to fail. while that's featured in a lot of discussion of dodd-frank it's largely silent in the actual law. let me just mention quickly and we can come back to it in q & a if you'd like. one area we also talk about in the book is energy policy. and this is an area, too, where i think there's a wonderful compromise from an economic perspective between what republicans have argued in energy policy and democrats. and here the goals is to reduce the damage from oil price shocks and also recognize externalities in oil consumption. many people focus on environmental externalities.

it did -- we should have an accurate estimate of what the for the gse's. 40th as long as we ignore the cost of these foreclosures, we are pushing the crisis off into next year and the year after. most of this deficit reduction compensation is going to be pure academics if we cannot get the rudder seriously back in the water on the economy. a couple of other things we could do is we could reprogram some of the dollars allocated toward theh.a.m.p -- the h .a.m.p. program. there are a number of programs, such as the hardest hit fund. it was allocated about $10 billion. here is -- no, the hardest hit program has a dollars billion allocated toward it. there is a special fha refi program that has close to $10 billion allocated to it. i think we should consider reprivatizing some of those dollars. what would i reprivatize them on? i would agree prioritize them on the -- what would i reprioritize them on? i would reprioritize them on programs for other social services which housing and foreclosure and let communities figure out how best they can solve their own economic and housing crises from