all right, the gses, 13 billion. now, i had admitted to me afterwards when i went up to him and talked to him that he thought he was being a little too conservative because he didn't include all the pls security losses. i have to redo the numbers but i don't think it's going to be much more than double. even if it doubled that, just listen to what i just told you. 449 billion -- by the way, portfolio lend erps in the country lost 218 billion. so we're talking about -- excuse me, i made a mistake. 12 billion was the first three years. the whole seven years, it was 129 billion. so my point is, realize losses are actual losses. that's what causes crises. not how many loans of this and how many loans of that and delinquencies. they don't always turn into losses. and you said to mark, i'm going to get back to you? i would love to hear your explanation for this? i'm done. >> yeah, mark and i have exchanged e-mails. i disagree with misnumbers. but the whole point here is you have to understand that this was a market that wa

with the gses, $13 billion. he admitted to me afterwards when i went up to him and talked to him that, in fact, he thought he was being a little too conservative because he didn't completely include all these pls securities losses. so he said i have to redo the numbers, jim, but i don't think it's going to mean much more than double. even if it doubled that, okay, just listen to what i just told you, okay? $449 billion. by the way, portfolio lenders in this country lost $218 billion, all right? so, we're talking about -- excuse me, i made a mistake. $12 billion was the first three years. for the whole seven years it was $129 billion. sorry. so, anyway, my point is, realize losses are actual losses. that's what causes crises, not how many loans of this and how many loans of that and even what delinquencies are. delinquencies always don't turn into losses. so, you said to mark, i am going to get back to you, mark, after looking at this. and did you ever get back to him? did you ever look at this table? i would lov

with the gses, $13 billion. he admitted to me afterwards when i went up to him and talked to him that, in fact, he thought he was being a little too conservative because he didn't completely include all these pls securities losses. so he said i have to redo the numbers, jim, but i don't think it's going to mean much more than double. even if it doubled that, okay, just listen to what i just told you, okay? $449 billion. by the way, portfolio lenders in this country lost $218 billion, all right? so we're talking about -- excuse me, i made a mistake. $12 billion was the first three years. for the whole seven years it was $129 billion. sorry. so anyway, my point is, realize losses are actual losses. that's what causes crises, not how many loans of this and how many loans of that and even what delinquencies are. delinquencies always don't turn into losses. so you said to mark, i am going to get back to you, mark, after looking at this and i'll tell you. and did you ever get back to him? did you ever look at this tab

the gses, 13 billion. he admitted to me afterwards what it went up to him and talk to him that, in fact, that is being a little too conservative because he didn't completely include all these jealous security losses so as to reduce the numbers but a doping will be much more than may be doubled or even if it is double that, okay, just listen to what i just told you, okay? 445 billion -- by the way, portfolio lenders in this country lost 218 billion, all right? so we are talking about comics use the by the way, i made a mistake. 12 billion was the first three years. for the whole seven years it was 129 billion, sorry. so my point is realized losses are actual losses. that's what causes crises. even what do liberties are. delinquent is always don't turn into losses. so you said to mark, i'm going to get back to you, mark. i can look at this. together to back to him? i would love to your explanation for this. >> yeah, mark and i have exchanged e-mails. i disagree with these numbers but the whole point here is

but i do think that, you know, he tried on the prime mortgage regulation and on gse and new york fed tried on bank leverage a bit. the message to me from all of this is that regulation is politically very hard to do. so you have to be willing to consider interest rates as a way to push back against bubbles. >> i would take the conclusion you have to be willing to do regulation better. [laughter] and more view to systemic risk what happens if a big institution or very interconnected institution goes down. that was what no one really anticipated that what would happen if a layman would have -- went down. come to a different subject for just a minute, though -- come back the bush tax cut of 2001. i was personally really mad with the that, but he knows that. and i was curious distinct can you talk about it a bit. >> it was because in some ways you know alan green emerges into that status and political acceptance in washington with crystallize in 1993 when he endorsed the clinton budget package which raised taxes to reduce the deficit. . always been anti-deficit. >> always be anti-deficit

none of these loans to align knowledge are sold to did gse. so when we look at some problems in particular that is called the hybrid warm where it explodes at two or three years to the libor rate or whenever of 3% or 11%, those loans and the horrible option are bad and better the fifth year 60% default rates -- 50 or 60 default rates to show how these others and even came close to that. we look to very carefully. so here is the big problem. there is the big difference between that high-risk loan they are but not extraordinarily high risk loans not entirely but almost all that were purchased by wall street. by the way one of the reason why they could not buy them them, why did the market share goal 55 percent down 35% blacks not because they are incompetent but they were caught with their hand in the cookie jar with the accounting scandal or all of the executives that were paid bonuses to hit certain parks and housing goals were one of them. but that was not the biggest. they literally were caught by their auditors 2003 so the regulator said we

did try it tried as i said on subprime mortgages and alan greenspan tried to push back against the gse penny and freddie. host: talk about that because that was a place where he was really worried and testified and talked and made very clear that he was worried about the highe leverage at fannie mae and freddie mac. in the end he did not push it very hard to. guest: he went and testified in congress i think more than once and he said that these institutions were lending too much in their should be a limit. he had an alliance with the bush administration at the time, which was on the same page as him and they were pushing, ith think, as hard as they could to get regulation on the gse. the day before one of the follow-up congressional hearings on this topic an ad appeared on tv and at the ad showed a hispanic couple saying to each other, oh, we went to buy a new house, but now i hear congress is going to clamp down on mortgages and we won't be able to get a newto house and that is bad because the politicians are preventing us from having the american dream, so essentially this was fannie

alan greenspan tried to push back against the gses, fannie and freddie -- >> host: yeah. let's talk about that, actually. >> guest: okay, yeah. >> host: because that was a place where he was really worried. testified and talked and made very clear he was worried about the capital and the high leverage at fannie mae and freddie mac. in the end, he didn't push it very hard. di >> guest: well, he testified in congress i think more than once, and he said that these institutions were lending too much, that they should be capped from the size of the portfolio. he had an alliance with the bush administration at the time which was on the same page as him. and they were pushing, i think as hard as they felt they could, to get regulation on the gses. now, what happened was that the day before one of the follow-up congressional hearings on this topic, an ad appeared on tv, and the ad showed a hispanic couple saying to each other, oh, we wanted to buy a new house, but now i hear that congress is going to clamp down on mortgages, and we won't be ablen to get our new house. and that's

which the fed did try on the sub prime mortgages and alan greenspan tried to push back against the gse. >> host: that is a place that he was really worried and testified and made it very clear he was worried about the leverage in the end he didn't push it very hard. >> guest: the institutions were lending and should be capped and he had an alliance with the bush administration at the time that was on the same page as him and they were pushing i think as hard as they felt they could to get the regulation. what happened was that the day before one of the follow-up congressional hearings on the topic and had appeared on tv and showed a hispanic couple saying to each other we want you to buy a new house but now we hear that congress has been turned on our mortgages and we won't be able to get a new house and that's bad because the politicians are preventing us from having the american dream. so essentially it is a fannie and freddie putting members of congress on the morning that if they kept the portfolio sizes, they would face a barrage of ads, so it is a limit to what the regulators cou

we are currently in a debate that is largely incomprehensible about the future of the gse's. despite the the fact that he has made how many public appearances about describing the horrors, they are in place more or less as they were the first time we had this debate. there is this debate about what to do with them that has been going on for a long time. children have been born and grown up while this debate has been going on and nobody knows, outside a handful of people, nobody knows what this is about. it is completely incomprehensible. here's what it's about. it is very difficult without some kind of guarantee to maintain a large-scale market for a 30 year fixed rate mortgage. who is willing to take the duration risk associated with that. there aren't enough people willing to do that on a naked basis to support the u.s. mortgage market as the american public has come to demand it. then the question is, who gives the guarantee? who pays for it? who benefits from it, how is it managed? in the 2000's, they were set up with the government as a guarantor, the beneficiaries in th

it is true that the gse, as peter said, had policies that were ancient. they went back to the new deal of buying only essentially prime loans or what the gse called conforming loans. these policies were in place substantially until the early 2000. they were not removed at the time that the goals for purchasing low and moderate loans were put in place in the '90s. they were not removed when those goals were increased. they were removed in 2004 and 2005. the gse went on a buying spree in 2004 and four and 2005. what did they buy? they did not buy whole loans. they bought securitized, interest and securitized pools. it's very importantly to look at peter slide. i'm not sure if you can go back to it, but if you look at that key slide that peter was arguing about, the slide the composition of who held the creditors, understand its who held the credit risk, not who held the loans. the loans were in previously secure type pools. the subprime market exploded, in the sense of grew, not collapsed the subprime market exploded in the early 2000's. what drove what dro

. >> the gse fannie mae and freddie mac are throwing roughly $15 billion a year in cash to the treasury. that pays a lot of bills. >> reporter: housing is likely low on the president-elect's to do list. the recovery is bumpy but not broken. so why jump in to try to fix it. i >>> investors are trying to figure out how a trump presidency may impact the media sector. as julia boorstin reports, for digital video companies, the stakes are higher than ever. >> facebook, twitter, snapchat, they're all doubling down on video, saying it's key to their future, a range of companies counting on streaming video to drive subscription and as ver advertising revenue. many of their stocks under pressure in the wake of the election as president-elect donald trump is expected to threaten the fcc's net neutrality rules, which mandate broadband providers don't discriminate against different types of content running on their pipes and prohibit internet providers from charging video companies such as netflix or youtube for faster service to users. >> the cable companies have complained that under obama the fc

and with the dnc -- gse one of those clearances on the topic in then to clampdown on those mortgages. preventing us from having the american dream. and then to face of a barrage. to what those regulators could do. >> a thing that is true. as the of lobbyist fannie and freddie. that alan greenspan was sorry about fannie and freddie and with those private financial in situations? gimmicky had a recent to be more worried because there was a government and it looked more obvious because the taxpayers for of the book and then the crisis but they regretted that so you are right those private banks that were engaged, but i do think that he tried doc and the aegean seas size with the one beverage before me that regulation politically is very hard to do you have to be willing to consider interest rates at those low close. >> c. have to me you willing to do regulation better. there is more systemic risk. to be very interconnected. what if it went down? and then to come back personnel was mad at espousing that but that was a curious incident. >> guest: in some ways to have his emergence with his

. >> you are accurate, allison much those are geese.re gse >> i won't even say on the river because it might not be the be river. >> i live in the moment where i canin the actually correct stevn something.ing >> it happens a lot.. >> wise. you are never wrong, sir.r wrg,s >> that is very untrue. untru >> all right. there's are canadian geese. thes are duckucy did thing where they g, did you see them? >> now, they're ducks. duc >> i said they did the duck d thing. >> um-hmm. >> any way that's pretty shot.po i'm not sure where that is but t that's really pretty.llpret okay. to cyber monday, we've now comem on giving tuesday. tsd this is the fifth year of theeat popular social media movementovm that kicks off the season ofeaso giving. ay season, p.m.n, folks give to charities.hariti in fact up to 40% of donations t by individuals are made in the final weeks of the year. y for ideas on how you can give cv back to your community visit giving tuesday.org and what is t so funny, sir? sir >> we were showing all dallasala cowboys highlights and this is i not the time you want to showho good in

i said this the other day in testimony to the gse. days, article 50 has not been triggered. the timing of those plans and the point at which firms would need to put them into action is still some way off. greater time to develop clarity around the endpoint and the path. we fully recognize that these issues are just one piece of a much bigger puzzle that the government has to weigh. there are broad range of issues around defining that new relationship and only the them up andan weigh balance them and prioritize them and execute them. the second part of your one impact,, related to the to summarize it on the impact on , and itf this process is important to recognize that the united kingdom is effectively the investment banker for europe. and than half the equity debt raised is raised in the united kingdom by firms based in the united kingdom quite often to investors based in the united kingdom. markets,important derivative markets, interest rates, credit derivative markets, foreign exchange markets, the vast majority of those transactions take lace here. -- place here. these a

. >> yeah, you know, diandiana, something else you and i haven't talked about in a long time, the gses fannie mae, freddie mac, the stock has been moving up i have no idea how it goes from dealing with the conservatorsh p conservatorship. i noticed the dividend payment was made recently from fanny to the treasury again. any feeling on where things may go? >> i've talked to a lot of people and the consensus among everyone is they are paying billions of dollars back to the treasury and republicans in the house and senate are not eager to lose that money that they're getting. we've seen plans from hensarling, et cetera, but it doesn't look to be a big priority in the first year or so when they're such cash cows. why would they want to give up that money? >> yeah, it's like $188 billion. >> and every quarter it's billions more. >> diana, thank you. diana olick. >>> when we come back dakota pipeline generating more controversy. we're going to head to north dakota to find out why. plus, former fdic chair sheila bair will sit down with rick santelli. russell 2000 just hit first all-time high