of haqqani. many instances of -- not military, paramilitary force, one of the generals who commanded the force said to me, -- i'm fine with time dnr said to me, in many cases, the frontier kept him -- remained inside the fort. they were told they -- they were given specific information the haqqani operatives were on the other side. ... for many palestinians pakistan army is as much an enemy as the americans or the indians and in one case a lot of the first cases were palestinians were arrested some of the terrorists and they were interrogating th them. the time for the monthly prayers that muslims perform there was a call for prayers. he said to the commanding officer where's this coming from? are you muslim? of course we are muslim. it's a pakistani army. oh i thought it was fighting in indian army. again there are many such instances so there's this regional lack of preparation. in many cases the earlier attempts made by pakistan they have not given any proper briefings in the area so i am now

friendly towards the haqqani group but they were scared of the haqqani group.here were many instances and this is not military. this is a paramilitary force and the generals who commanded this for so to me -- i'm fine with time? in many cases the frontier corps cap themselves remaining inside boards. they were given specific information that the haqqani operators are moving on the other side. they didn't have the weapons nor did they have the capability nor the training. for pakistan the tribal area was also -- the first unit that landed in 2004 learned for the first time and there was a major at that time in the pakistani intelligence that told me when we landed there and realized in the province which is mainstream pakistani province you can talk to the people and they will respond to you. however the tribal areas people cannot speak in urdu and the pakistani military was seen as an outside force. they had no one who could communicate to the people in that area. for many pashtuns in the tribal area of pakistan is as much an enemy as the americans were the ind

we always talk about the haqqani group. the group is providing logistics, a change of thinking about military intelligence. they provide logistical support, dismantling the training center and the beneficiary and taliban so something has to be done about the analytical capability of the government and civilian military. >> with the absence of the capture or killing of these leaders still remains a very open question. go ahead. >> thank you very much. is a unique experience to see the three distinguished experts. one reason about -- and the pakistan american league and observation, other than recently in pakistan. i found them totally -- they had -- they were really speaking to with one voice. sometimes you see because of the politicians' statements and other things but other than that, they are working together, as well as working closely with the administration, we are going to win that war, and which we don't but this is done terrorism. he doesn't draw any battle lines and even the superpowers generally face in this terri

complication of haqqanis being part of this, that's right. >> it is also true the haqqani network isstate department as a foreign terrorist organization? >> that's right. we didn't negotiate with haqqani >> okay. i think that is a subject we'll want to discuss more if we must in the classified session but i -- >> i want to make sure the record's clear. we engaged the qataris and they engaged the taliban. now if haqqanis were subcontracting to the taliban or whatever that relationship is, you know there is the pakistan taliban and the afghan taliban, there's a difference there. so we get back into definitions of who has responsibility for whom but i just want to make sure that's clear on the record. we can go into a lot more detail. >> i think that you just pointed out some of difficulty making categorical statements that we don't negotiate with statements when at least for some period the haqqanis were the ones who had him. let me ask about one other thing and that is the five detainees that were released. you said that there's always some risk associated with releasing someone from

haqqani group is now employed in any sanctuary, however, haqqani group has not been delicately targeted. there is skepticism about some policies. i think the new military leadership that is not working around one person, but around four or five people who previously related to the chief of staff. they were the ones who are the architects of the south waziristan operation. i think they are very clearheaded and dedicated. however, what concerns me the most is there is no comprehensive policy. the pakistani police officers have, and i say it with some responsibility, even the leading police officers in these provinces have not been given any major briefing. they are not part of this overall operation. the consequences of this operation will be seen centers.-- let's say they are incompetent. he should be on the same table when these things are discussed. i mention this to my political friends and military as well. they say we are very incompetent and corrupt. are they not having the same food as you are? the real battle against pakistani terrorists and militants will be fought by the civili

to verify as i understand people have said clearly it was the haqqani network that kept it. >> be haqqanidid have him through periods of time. this was another complication or five-year period he was moved around. .. >> i want to be clear. we engaged them and they engaged the taliban. if the haqqani network was subcontracting to the taliban or whatever the relationship is you know there is a pakistan and the afghan taliban and there is a difference there. so we get back to the definitions of who has responsibility for whom. but i just want to make sure there is clear on the record and we can go into more details. >> i think that you pointed out the difficulty in making categorical statements that we don't negotiate with terrorist when the haqqani network were the ones that did. let me talk about the five detainees released. you said there is also a risk associated with releasing someone from guantanamo bay but you said they haven't been charged with attacks on the united states. i have unclassified summary of evidence before the stating review tribunals. for example, for one of them it sa

luckily both abdullah and haqqani and some of the others as well, they are joined together as a hopeful future of afghanistan. on the opposition side for taliban they said they don't believe in democracy and arrogance elections. in this case there was a lot of work by the police and intelligence as well as american intelligence. there was a lot of support that kept some of the taliban away. i was talking to one of the gentlemen who is was doing research on this and who is actually sitting here. if you look at all the -- the number of terrorist acts have not declined. there they're not as big attacks but we know from happened in some of the attacks recently but the overall percentagewise those attacks have not declined so if we are to have a successful election we still have to see -- and if the crisis continues and i think the credit should go to secretary kerry and others who were able to bring and president obama to abdullah and haqqani telling them that they have to reconcile and figure out how they will build a national unity government. if the crisis continues it can be days that y

you said they were not stopping the haqqani group. that is a pretty serious allegation. is there any evidence of shelling? >> four months ago, the number 2 was accompanied by the agents when he was caught on the way to u.s. special forces and then taken -- hamid karzai created help for the u.s. to release transparent forces and constantly supplying so what evidence can there be that the number 2 man soon after is that, so other than that, living awkwardly, the head of the tee tee pee is not accepted but if he ever shows up in this area in this area. dep haqqanis are different, they are facially and structurally different from the other afghans. and the idbs, it was clearly evidence from what was happening on the ground. they are in camps close to the border and everytime that comes in, where exactly is coming from. obviously the haqqanis across the border. >> i don't think the iran national army is taking them to heart. as part of the idea i am under no illusion -- i just want to go back to what was said about another factor. particularly in difficult areas and a helicop

the hut connie group --haqqani group, in one case i asked him, the only one allowed to mention, what i was doing in 2009 and i asked him why the pakistani group, and he said to you know something, we have lost hundreds of thousands of army officers. you think i can face my soldiers -- killing the pakistani army and he said i will not be able to face my soldiers. thank you very much. in 2009 he said he had no difference whatsoever on the group's which for to be saved or not to be saved. but those who realize the difference between the military operations of the pakistani military and intelligence, the pakistani intelligence office was not in secret or coordination with or cooperation with the main street and that is the main point which shows some insights into this issue so the haqqani group, people in pakistan, not that they were sympathetic or friendly, they were scared of them. and this is a paramilitary force, one of the generals who commanded the force, the general said to me, the frontier, the main inside difference, given specific information, they had weapons, capability, tra

the taliban and haqqanis having their safe haven in pakistan, and going back further the viet cong with safe havens in cambodia. you leave them a place where they can rest and be safe, your chance of success are very slim. >> sreenivasan: yesterday ben rhodes made the quote, we're not going to be restricted by borders which is a fairly aggressive foreign policy stance. >> that's certainly the first time we've heard that, and i think the administration is starting to recalculate exactly what's involved in some of its internal preferenceit may have to overcome to effectively confront the isis threat. >> sreenivasan: and here's how it gets a little trick nethe middle east in the sense that last year, there wasn't enough support by the international community to go after the assad regime. and now, we essentially attack an enemy of our enemy, are we essentially helping bashar al-assad? >> the short answer is yes. and that's what makes this so complicated. this is why we've not struck isis in syria as no one has wanted to give even the aappearance of giving aid and support to the assad regime

one is a haqqani group which is now on the run some people believe because there's a major pakistani operation that is happening. i will come to the haqqani group later as well but i want to explain about this division between the old guard and the new taliban. the pakistani taliban -- the taliban had kind of coordinated with al qaeda and the likes but it never merged. there's a couple very good strategies that have come out in recent years explaining there was never a merger. bin laden had use d the taliban for their purposes for their financial needs, it had used al qaeda. however, in case of pakistani taliban, there was more of a merger that had taken place. the nature of the group and their bubblecations, their media and the pakistani taliban are active on media, on social media. pakistani taliban are for more gangerrous and lethal in my understanding than the other taliban. the main reason is they have moved far closer. if you ask me and many other experts how do we define and analyze al qaeda today, you'll not be able to explain the dynamics of al qaeda without explaining the d

. >> reporter: in release of the sergeant bergdahl held captive by the haqqani network five years after apparently leaves his post in afghanistan in june of 2009, the pentagon released five top taliban commanders, inmates at guantanamo bay for a decade into qatari custody. a former army officer suggested the administration is embarrassed by the gao finding. >> i think it does matter. i also believe if the administration had a redo on they would have notified congress appropriately, notified them what the content of exchange was, and adjustments to make and certainly funding would have been right. >> reporter: army officials say they're in the final stages investigating whether sergeant bergdahl desserted his post. jon: james rosen in washington. thank you. heather: relatively quiet night on the streets of ferguson, missouri, as governor jay nixon orders the national guard to pull out of the st. louis suburb. police making only a handful of arrests as federal civil rights probe gets underway and attorney general holder promise as thorough investigation into the police killing of michael

the taliban and haqqani are not far from their ideology in how they kill. >> the united states government says that bowe bergdahl was in the u.s. military so that's different. that's not something that be embolden anyone to kidnap or demand prisoner swaps because it's a u.s. serviceman. do you buy that? >> i don't buy. that you have to have a clear statement of policy and be true to. that you negotiate with these people or you don't. you have to pay the ransoms or you don't. and you can't -- you sort of can't pick and choose depending on the quality or cast of the victim. we have to be clear that we don't do that. >> tim, i was talking to jim foley's boss yesterday and he was saying he changed his mind on this. he would have wanted the ransom paid. and the family thought it would be $5 million to get their son free. but what i'm curious about is this issue of ransom. the united states, again, if they're going to negotiate with the taliban for the release of bowe bergdahl would it be consistent to pay ransoms. are those two things consistent? >> i don't think they are inconsistent. obvious

groupr, the high connie has not been delicately -- haqqani group has not been delicately targeted. there is skepticism about some policies. i think the new military leadership that is not working around one person, but around four or five who previously related to the chief of staff. they were the ones who are the architects. i think they are very clearheaded and >> however, what concerns me the most is there is no comprehensive policy. the pakistani police officers have, and i say it with some responsibility, even the leading police officer in these provinces have not been given any briefings. they are not part of this overall operation. the consequences of this operation will be seen -- let's say they are incompetent. he should be on the same table when these things are discussed. i mention this to my political friends and military as well. they say we are very incompetent and corrupt. are we not having the same food as you are? are we coming from mars yucca that i am not seeing. the real battle against pakistani terrorists and militants will be fought by the civilian law enforce

they're al qaeda, they're the haqqani network, they're isis. i say so, too, have our refugees changed and we must recognize that. this bill is not good for our country and it doesn't reflect who we are as a people. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from oklahoma. mr. cole: mr. speaker, i continue to reserve my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman reserves. the gentleman from massachusetts. mr. mcgovern: mr. speaker, i yield one minute to the gentlewoman from texas, ms. jackson lee, the ranking member of the homeland security subcommittee on border and maritime security. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman from texas is recognized for one minute. ms. jackson lee: i thank the gentleman. i wonder what my grandmother coming from jamaica west independenties with two babies thought about this great country called america. i wondered as i went to the border and i looked in the eyes of a little 7-year-old who had just gotten off a bus by himself from some place in central america or the toddler in a d

if we don't have a residual force in afghanistan, the haqqani network will move in, the taliban will move in. it will be utter chaos just like what we're seeing in iraq and it will revert back to a safe haven for terrorists, and that's precisely what we don't want to see. now, both candidates, now that you have a contested election, with potential fraud, but both candidates do support that notion. the president said he supports it, too, but on a timetable, which i'm not sure i agree with that. but having said that, i think that's vitally important and the leadership. now, malaki utterly failed to reach out and include the sunnis and the sunni tribal leaders. and now he's paying the price for that. i mean, for five years he purged his own administration. he couldn't work it out with the sunnis. and now what do we have? we have a safe haven for isis. and it is one of the saddest things. i talked to ryan crocker, the ambassador, i talked to petraeus and general kean and general austin, and they are so angry with the situation because we did awakening which got the sunni tribal leaders b

painful, and that was the issue of civilian casualties, frustration over pakistani safe havens, the haqqani network and the cross border fires in 2012 and early 2013, part of which was a myth and part of which was a reality. we also dealt very closely on the issues of detentions. this goes again to this issue of president karzai seeking to establish and to reinforce the sense that afghanistan was a sovereign country and to wrest from the united states and other countries the kinds of respect due to that country and due to its people, and as we negotiated a contentious mou for my turning over of several thousand afghan detainees to afghanistan, that process and that sense of sovereignty came home in a very real way for me. and then, unfortunately, when president karzai abrogated parts of the mou, i had to cease the turnover of detainees until such time i was sure that they weren't going to be released ultimately to target us or afghan citizens of the afghans again. we also had a period of time where we worked very closely on night operations and special operations, and that resulted in a mem