hassell, mr. sosin, dr. dempske. >> who oversees dugway. >> the army. >> help me figure out who is responsible fb who's the chain of command that's responsible for the death certificate for the procedures to show that the agents leaving is truly dead? >> are you talking about the chain of command at the laboratory -- >> i'm talking about the chain in command to find out that the anthrax that is shipping out -- this isn't is hard question. who is over finding out for sure the procedures to find that the agent is dead? >> it would be -- >> you don't know? >> it would be the scientist at dugway. >> dr. sosin can you answer that question? >> i can't answer -- >> dr. sempski b edempske can you answer that question? >> not specifically. >> i couldn't figure it out either. there is so many people that touch this there is no clear line of chain of command. this goes back to a line of questions that was already asked. no one can be fired because no one takes responsibility because no one has responsibility for it. we

hassell. can you work request dr. sosin and his colleagues? >> yes. we stated in our statement we would work together. >> here's something else, having been on this committee for a long time, i've noticed is that all the federal labs, not just the ones dealing with anthrax and other select agents but also our nuclear labs have the same problem of a culture of safety. and we we really have struggled in this committee to get people to understand how important it is to have a culture of safety. so dr. hassell, can you think of anything we can do to systemize some kind of culture of safety? >> that's a question i have myself. ma'am. i spent ten years at the dupont company which goes back 200 years making gunpowder for thomas jefferson and that safety culture is there. so one of the things i plan to do is to go out and see those industry best practices for doing this. >> how long have you been there? >> at the -- >> at dod. >> just at a year today. >> and dr. sosin do you have some ideas about how

hassell. five minutes. >> thank you, chairman murphy, ranking member -- thank you and distinguish members of the sub-committee, i appreciate the opportunity to brief you on the department of defense inadvertent of samples containing live spores or anthrax. my name is david hassell i'm the deposit assistant deputy of defense for biological defense. this is an important standard to develop ways to protect war fighters an the public from known biological threats. doing this with a development of testing of detection and protection equipment diagnostics and decontamination capabilities. we first learned of the incidents under consideration today on may 22nd of 2015 when the centers for disease control and prevention was alerted by a private company regarding the live of anthrax in a sample activated at the dougway proving ground in utah. the cdc immediately began an investigation working with d.o.d. laboratories state officials and the fbi. by may 25th all known laboratories that received anthrax

hassell?> yes, sir. >> based on the previous problem should they have made a better effort to see if the process worked? >> that is my initial impression we will look at that to see if there are simplifications so we can report back. >> they announced flashier they inadvertently transferred by the anthrax. as dod tried to check their own process to make sure that was inactivated properly? >> no sir. >> why not? >> i'm not sure that is a good question. what are the steps leading up there should be better indicators to take action to detect this earlier. >> they think the reason for the hearing is it is strange that the cdc made a mistake with the dod facility but somebody did not say let's check to make sure dod is doing it right. particularly because of the problem but nobody decided to do that? >> it does not appear so. >> beyond the particulars the fact that such shipments can actually occur raises questions about the select agents at the other labs. dr. hassell, based on the continuing prob

doctor hassell was talking about going to the private sector.here are we finding the best practices today? private or public sector? >> it is a combination of both. we will look at the private sector. that often does not happen as a 1st reaction. the department of defense my centers for disease control nih are outstanding facilities doing cutting-edge work which have risks places where best practices and not best practices will occur because of the broad range. >> i have additional questions that i was a bit for the record later. >> the gentleman is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. appreciate you being here. i am sure you are having a blast. it is frustrating for me to see what is taking place. to here you guys say you have protocols. it is hard for me to follow this. is it the practice of the dod to send out a death certificate with select agents when they leave. >> it has been. >> it has been? how long has that been going on? >> i apologize. >> one similar to this. i am not sure. we can look at that back 12 years. i wil

hassell.an you work with dr. sosin on that and his colleagues? >> yes, as stated by our death are working together. >> having been on the committee for a long time, i notice all the federal labs not just ones dealing with anthrax and other agents but also nuclear labs have the same problem of a culture of safety. we've really struggled in this committee to get people to understand how important it is to have a culture of safety. dr. hassell, can you think of anything we can do to systematize subculture of safety? >> that is a question i have myself ma'am. i spent 12 years at the dupont country which goes back 200 years making gunpowder for thomas jefferson. the safety culture is fair. i plan to see if the industry best practices for doing this. >> how long have you been there? i dod? >> a year today. >> dr. sosin committee of ideas how we can increase the culture of safety in labs? >> i do not. i know the cdc and director take the issue incredibly seriously and have developed a series of ideas

hassell, since anthrax is the most dangerous agent we can handle. i suppose more dangerous than ebola. getting that is probably the biggest threat. in this case has anyone tried to grow the anthrax after receiving the products with 200 laboratories? have they tried to reactivate it? >> it was grown to show the presence of the life spores. >> is this the same type of anthrax used in 2001? >> it is absolutely not the same type of anthrax used in 2001. this was in a liquid formation with small numbers of spores and one ml sample. very different situation. none the less taken serious. >> this is different. do you feel our national security is more at risk because of the process we have been handling this? >> i don't believe that these samples created such a risk. i believe they were secured quickly and destroyed and very small numbers of spores n this material and it is naturally occurring type of anthrax. >> it is often said that my thought process initially -- why were we shipping this to seven foreign nations? was there -- is someone having a written

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. >> are you confident, doctor hassell? >> okay. are you confident that we have enough proper vaccines and therapeutics in place to save lives? >> i do not have sufficient information to answer that question. >> nor do i. >> would that be for the workers that are being exposed or how about with respect to the committee building on the congressman's questions about one of these individuals if you have been exposed to presented to any our? can you explain to me what your view is if you have one? >> thank you for that question. the strategic national stockpile did provide vaccine for the states that have workers while receiving prophylaxis. i am confident we have the ability to do it the vast supply of countermeasures for anthrax,anthrax, the nature of the events you might be trying to prepare for always determines whether you have enough but they're have been a variety of processes and procedures to review the requirements set by the federal government for this threat and we meet those can't requirements. >> how we can ensure that we

hassell was talking rug going to the private sector. where are we finding them today? >> it is the combination of both i said we go look at the private sector that doesn't happen mermaz a first reaction. >> the department of defense and nih are outstanding facilities during critical worked these are enhancements where these will have been because of the broad range of practices >> i do have additional questions i will submit for the record. >> mr. chairman, i appreciate you being here i am sure you are having a blast and insuring your time here but it is frustrating to see what has taken place with those protocols how long does it take to looking into this? it is hard to follow that. is it the practice of of the dod to send out a death certificate with select agents? >> it has been. >> to go long has that been going on? >> i apologize i am not sure >> i am not sure how long that is part of the process. >> i am not sure at what point that was initiated. i can find out. >> we know what has been building on. >> why is it the private lab that found the anthrax not have a d