on heavywater, iran has agreed to have no reprocessing. if you have no reprocessing, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb from heavywater. i run has agreed to export spent fuel iran has agreed to export spent fuel. if you are exporting fuel, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb. iran has agreed to reduce plutonium to one kilogram, which would be non-weapon grade plutonium. all major measures assuring that iran would not make nuclear bombs from heavywater is already agreed. then we go to enrichment. on enrichment also iran has , agreed to confidence building measures on non-diversion of uranium enrichment to facilities. iran has agreed to in ridge below 5%. as long as enrichment below 5%. iran has agreed to reduce. iran has agreed not to have enrichment activities. therefore, i would say all measures assuring that uranium iranian heavywater and enrichment facilities would not direct toward weaponization. although all of these measures are beyond npt, and iran has agreed to measures beyond npt as a goodwill. the problem is with excessi

therefore, all possible measures have been agreed to secure no nuclear weapon from heavywater.then we go to enrichment facility. iran has agreed to enrich below 5%. to make nuclear bomb from enrichment facility, you need to enrich about 90%. as long as you are enriching below 5%, it is impossible to make nuclear bomb. second, iran has agreed to the current stockpile to 300 kilograms for just domestic needs. iran has agreed to convert the second enrichment site [indiscernible] and also two thirds of centrifuges would decrease for at least 10 years. and the confidence building measures. therefore, on the transparency also, iran has agreed to all practical arrangements at the maximum level within the international rules and regulations, which is safeguard agreement, which is -- finally, is additional protocol. internationally, on transparency and inspection, we don't have anything more. iran has accepted all three. therefore, iran would be the most transparent nation on its nuclear program. in iran has given the confidence building measures, has accepted measures which no other me

if you have no reprocessing, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb from heavywater. if you are exporting fuel, it is impossible to make a nuclear bomb. iran has agreed to reduce plutonium to one kilogram, which would be non-weapon grade plutonium. all major measures assuring that iran would not make nuclear bombs from heavywater is already agreed. then we go to enrichment. iran has agreed to confidence building measures on non-divers and of uranium -- by version measures -- non-diversion measures. iran has agreed to reduce. iran has agreed not to have enrichment activities. therefore, i would say all measures assuring that uranium heavywater facilities, and enrichment facilities would not direct toward weaponization. all of these measures are beyond -- iran has agreed to measures beyond npt as a goodwill. the problem is with excessive demands, far beyond protocols. charlie: you are opposed to this deal. bret: the reason my iran is being put to these additional tests is because iran has a lengthy record of deceiving the international community. you can remember the an

it will reduce storage by 96% and will move or modify the core of the heavywater nuclear reactor in iraq so that it no longer -- billions of dollars in international sanctions relief. the negotiations were long and arduous. >> the relief among the negotiators was tangible. after a decade of negotiation deadlines to contain iran's deep in her program, a deal that many are calling historic. >> this is very much needed in these times. >> as someone who has been part of this for 10 years, the german prime minister said i am happy we have reached a point where an agreement has been reached that will make the middle east and the yen to her a bit safer. >> it is a step away from the specter of conflict and toward the possibility of these. >> the agreement is to ensure tehran is not able to build atomic weapons. one allowing for the domestic use of nuclear power. stocks of enriched uranium are to be reduced and inspectors from the atomic agency are to be granted full access to all power plants. in return international sanctions will gradually be phased out. the iranian president also hailed the

it will reduce storage by 96% and will move or modify the core of the heavywater nuclear reactor in iraq so that it no longer -- billions of dollars in international sanctions relief. the negotiations were long and arduous. >> the relief among the negotiators was tangible. after a decade of negotiation deadlines to contain iran's deep in her program, a deal that many are calling historic. >> this is very much needed in these times. >> as someone who has been part of this for 10 years, the german prime minister said i am happy we have reached a point where an agreement has been reached that will make the middle east and the yen to her a bit safer. >> it is a step away from the specter of conflict and toward the possibility of these. >> the agreement is to ensure tehran is not able to build atomic weapons. one allowing for the domestic use of nuclear power. stocks of enriched uranium are to be reduced and inspectors from the atomic agency are to be granted full access to all power plants. in return international sanctions will gradually be phased out. the iranian president also hailed the

will dismantle two thirds of their centrifuges, and they will take out the existing core of the heavywater reactor and fill it with concrete. iran has agreed to refrain from producing highly enriched uranium for at least 15 years. and if they began to do that, we will know it. immediately. they have also agreed to accept the additional protocol. that is an outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience. it put in additional access requirements precisely so that we do know what they're doing. and they have to ratify it before the human sanctions are lifted at the end of this process. they have to have passed it. they have agreed to live by it, from day one. they will live by the additional protocol. in addition, there are additional transparency measures. we can go into them in the course of this hearing. if they fail to comply, we will know it. we will know it quickly. we will be able to respond accordingly. by reinstituting sanctions, all the way up to the most akoni and options that we have today. none of them are off the table at any point in time. many of the measures that are

will become completed with heavywater based on the deal.regarding fordow they said that it's really difficult to your the name of fordow. do not name it and we are going, we will not hear it. and then they said that, and they said that there should be no centrifuges in fordow. at all so it's going to be sustainable isotopes and after several months of bargaining they said that 11 casket should remain. 164. and let me tell you that they would be 1000 centrifuges in fordow and part of fordow will be allocated to our anti-concerning -- r&d concerning isotopes. regarding the lifting of sanctions they said that the sanctions will not be lifted at once and they said that the sanctions facility will be step-by-step and settlements of 2004 enable to gain trust and we are not going to lift the sanctions. do not speak of lifting of sanctions and they said that sanctions have to be first suspended and then in years to come the iaea gave a positive report and the sanctions would be lifted step-by-step. today, i announced to the great nation of iran tha

of their installed centrifuges and they are going to take out the existing core of an existing heavywater reactor and fill it with concrete. iran has agreed to refrain from producing or acquiring highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium for at least 15 years. and if they began to do that ernest muniz will tell you, we will know it immediately. iran has also agreed to accept the additional protocol, and the additional protocol is an outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience, which put in additional access requirements precisely so that we do know what iran is doing. and they have to ratify it before the un's sanctions -- un sanctions are lifted at the end of this process. they have agreed to live by it from day one. they are going to live by the additional protocol. in addition, there are additional transparency measures. we can go into in the course of this hearing. now, if iran fails to comply, we will know it. and we will know it quickly and we will be able to respond accordingly. by reinstituting sanctions, all the way up to the most forceful options we have tod

for the next 15 years iran will not build any new heavywater reactors. because of this deal we will for the first time he in a position to verify all of these commitments. that means it is not built on trust. it is built on verification. inspectors will have 24/7 access. iran will have access to the entire nuclear supply -- supply chain with uranium mines mills and conversion facilities and manufacturing and storage facilities. this ensures they will not be able to divert materials from known facilities to covert ones. some will be in place for 25 years. inspectors will also you will to access any suspicious location -- put simply, the organization responsible for the inspections the iaea, will have access when necessary where necessary. that arrangement is permanent. the iaea has also arranged to get access what it needs to complete investigation into that military dimensions of their past nuclear research. finally iran is currently prohibited from pursuing a weapon under the nonproliferation treaty which provided the basis for the international communi

for at least the next 15 years, iran will not build any new heavywater reactors.this deal, we will for the first time be in a position to verify all of these commitments. that means this deal is not built on trust -- it is built on verification. inspectors will have 24/7 access to iran's key nuclear facilities. and access to iran's full nuclear supply chain mines, conversion facility, and it's centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities. this ensures that iran will not be able to diverge materials from known facilities to covert ones. some of these measures will be in place for 25 years. because of this deal, inspectors will be able to access any suspicious locations. put simply, the organization responsible for the inspections, the iaea will have access when necessary. that arrangement is permanent. and the iaea will get access that it needs to complete its investigation into possible military dimensions of iran's pass nuclear research. and iran's is prevented from -- which provided the basis for the international community's efforts to apply pressure on iran

iran's heavywater research reactor will be redesigned so that it will no longer have the capability to produce weapons grade plutonium. given a historic levels of mistrust built-up between iran and the international community, a strong inspection regime and a framework for addressing concerns about past military dimensions are vital for building trust and providing us with the confidence that iran is meeting commitments. some of the crucial monitoring and transparency measures of this deal will last indefinitely, such as the implementation of the additional protocols of the safeguard agreement. it will allow access to sites about which the iaea has concerns that cannot be addressed in other ways. iran is no exception. iran's obligations, including the obligation never to acquire or develop weapons will apply during and after the. of the deal -- period of the deal. we will not hesitate to take action including sanctions if they violate at any time. our concerns about the military dimensions of the nuclear program will be addressed. the iaea and iran have agreed a roadmap of actions to c

iran's heavywater research reactor at iraq will be redesigned and rebuilt so that it will no longer have the capability to produce weapons grade plutonium. given the historic levels of mistrust that have built up between iran and the international community, a strong inspections regime and framework for addressing concerns about past military dimensions to iran's nuclear program are vital to build trust and providing us with the confidence that iran is meaning it's commitments. some of the crucial monitoring and transparency measures will allow -- will last indefinitely such as the addition of the safeguard agreement. every -- the iaea has concerns that cannot be addressed in any other way. iran is no exception. iran's energy -- obligations including the application never to acquire or develop nuclear weapons will apply during and after the time of the deal. we will not hesitate to take action including the reimposition of sanctions that iran -- if iran violates its obligations at any time. our concerns about the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program will be addressed. t

committed to reducing their uranium stockpile by 98% and removing centrifuges, rendering harmless their heavywater. it would take all of those steps before any sanctions are relieved. if we discover that iran is starting to cheat on the deal they will be trying to make up significant ground they have already lost. that means the international community will be in a much better position to respond to any cheating if it occurs. >> the president saw hamilton saturday, did he enjoy the play and did it alter his belief of whether alexander hamilton should be on the $10 bill? mr. earnest: i didn't speak to the president firsthand about this but i spoke to somebody who did and he said the president genuinely enjoyed the play and that the president believed the show lived up to the hype. he is confident, he enjoyed the opportunity to enjoy the show with his daughters. there is a process underway at the treasury department that would make a change to the $10 bill but would not run contrary to some rumors, it would not remove alexander hamilton. his face would remain on the $10 bill. >> so no change? mr. ea

i wanted to ask a technical question about the heavywater reactor. the original framework agreement said the court would be destroyed. think the final agreement said that concrete will be poured into the core. -- into the core. is that the same as destroying it? yes, it renders it unusable in that or any other reactor. >> iran will be able to get that core restarted or rebuilt? secretary moniz: if the agreement is rejected, then obviously -- well, i say obvious i presume iran will not take the steps. one is removing that reactor, and then in collaboration with 5+1, which includes the united states, to carry through an alternative design with less plutonium production and then build that reactor and in thetion to send all of irradiated plutonium-bearing fuel out of the country for the whole life of the. but if there is no agreements, i do not see personally why they would do that. they would presumably leave that just finish that reactor, which is a major plutonium producer. >> how long is that process? at what point in the agreement are they supposed