in helmand to now 12. that's where the afghan government has control. that's out of a total of 14 of that. and that is progress. and the national afghan army is on target for the 171,000 soldiers this year and 13,000 police i think the key of this is the better balance of forces that we now have. there has been a surge in the number of troops and we got a better balance between the u.s. and the u.k. forces so we are more thickly concentrated in fewer areas and better able to do the job. we set this clear timetable of saying we do not want u.k. forces to be in combat or in large numbers by 2015. i believe that is achievable but we're going to have to work hard on training up the afghan national army on pursuing a political track to reintegrate those that have been involved in insurgency and we also need to make sure that the government of afghanistan improves in the way that i know he believes, too, is important. >> mr. speaker, it's that point about the political track that i want to pursue with the prime

that is right on the edge of the central helmand river valley. has the afghan security forces continue to get built -- and remember, when we went into the central helmand river valley last year, there were five of us to every one afghan national security force. now there is one to one in that area. we're trying to get that expanded out as quickly as we can, build the durability there to withstand the challenges that will come in the summer, and then expand the security areas for the people. >> those 1500 marines are not intended to stay there through the spring offensive? >> no, they are not. the upper geresk river valley is right north of the central helmand river valley. >> it is up near sangin? >> between sangin and route 1 and the northern part of the central helmand river valley. yes, sir. >> the new tactics which were expecting the taliban to adopt next year, are you basing that on firm evidence on an assumption that is the way they'll go? how will you be able to protect the leadership that are the ones that you think it will try and target

in helmand, government authority has gone from 6 to 12. that is progress. the increase in the afghan national country is one of its genuine thousand soldiers by the end of this year and 134,000 police. i think the key to this is a better balance of forces that we now have. there has been surging number of trips and we need a balance -- troops and we need a balance between the u.s. and u.k. forces so that we're more thickly concentrated in fewer areas and better able to do the job. we have set this timetable and said that we do not want u.k. forces in combat by 2015. i believe that is achievable. but we have to train the national afghan army and pursuing a national track to integrate those in the insurgency and make sure that the government of afghanistan improves in the way that i know he believes, too, is important. >> about the political track, i want to pursue that with the prime minister. does he agree with me that setting the time table makes it more important that we have a lasting political settlement and one beyond the departure of british troops? d

in helmand to now 12. that's where the afghan government has control. that's out of a total of 14 of that. and that is progress. and the national afghan army is on target for the 171,000 soldiers this year and 13,000 police i think the key of this is the better balance of forces that we now have. there has been a surge in the number of troops and we got a better balance between the u.s. and the u.k. forces so we are more thickly concentrated in fewer areas and better able to do the job. we set this clear timetable of saying we do not want u.k. forces to be in combat or in large numbers by 2015. i believe that is achievable but we're going to have to work hard on training up the afghan national army on pursuing a political track to reintegrate those that have been involved in insurgency and we also need to make sure that the government of afghanistan improves in the way that i know he believes, too, is important. >> mr. speaker, it's that point about the political track that i want to pursue with the prime

that is right on the edge of the central helmand river valley. has the afghan security forces continue to get built -- and remember, when we went into the central helmand river valley last year, there were five of us to every one afghan national security force. now there is one to one in that area. we're trying to get that expanded out as quickly as we can, build the durability there to withstand the challenges that will come in the summer, and then expand the security areas for the people. >> those 1500 marines are not intended to stay there through the spring offensive? >> no, they are not. the upper geresk river valley is right north of the central helmand river valley. >> it is up near sangin? >> between sangin and route 1 and the northern part of the central helmand river valley. yes, sir. >> the new tactics which were expecting the taliban to adopt next year, are you basing that on firm evidence on an assumption that is the way they'll go? how will you be able to protect the leadership that are the ones that you think it will try and target

helmand province was the second area that we visited. their poppy cultivation has been in full bloom. it is taliban country. where are we traveled in h elmand, we traveled in the company of the marines. in the north, we had no security at all. we went east of kabul where poppies have been completely eradicated. >host: the eradication efforts -- there is a history of those areoppose it and there those who profit. you have written that this is the hinge on which america's national securities -- security interest swing. on the ground level among farmers, what is their notion of why they are growing poppies and why people want them to be destroyed? guest: for the last couple of decades, it was the only way they could make money. there is a history in afghanistan. these problems did not crop up overnight. copies have been cultivated for centuries, maybe even to the fourth century bc when alexander the great was there. he left behind the crop that may have conquered the country. it was only grown sparingly, for medicinal uses throughout the 18

military offensive in marjah in the helmand province in southern afghanistan it was called alteration muster up and it was the largest military operation in afghanistan since the fall of two thousand and one it was announced through a massive p.r. campaign reported the world over marjah was meant to signify a new escalation of our war effort to target the taliban secure key population centers but despite what the obama administration and military officials have been saying as they try to sell this idea of progress helmand province where marjah is located saw insurgent attacks double just in this year and about the fact that the u.s. has now spent at least two billion dollars a year to keep the area secure and then the picture becomes even more bleak so a year later what if we learnt earlier i caught up with matthew hoh senior fellow at the center for international policy and the director of the afghanistan study group so i first asked him to look back to one year ago. the way that this marjah offensive assault the very high profile p.r. campaign that was launched and i wonder if that

that is right on the edge of the central helmand river valley. as afghan security forces continue to get built -- and remember, when we went into the helmand river valley last year, there were five of us to everyone in the afghan security force. now that is one-one. we're trying to build the durability that will withstand challenges of the summer. >> so the marines are not intended to stay there through the spring offensive? >> they are not. >> the new tactic which you are expecting to employ next year, are you basing that on certain evidence, and how will you be able to protect the leadership better in the months that you think they will be targeted? >> baathist then the response in local areas each time we have seen it -- that has been the response in local areas each time we have seen it, so that is why we think they're going to do it again this year. how we protect against that is a combination of things we are doing. we are going to continue to protect the leadership, build a forces, and mobilize the people as fast and effectively as we can

group says many of the child fatalities occurred not only in the southern provinces of kandahar and helmand, which are taliban strongholds, but also in the eastern and northern provinces. the group is urging insurgents and international forces to ensure the safety of children and other civilians during combat. >>> russia's president says he'd like to develop several russian-held islands that are also claimed by japan. dmitry medvedev describes the islands as an inseparable part of russia. medvedev made the comments on wednesday at a meeting with regional development minister victor barsagian and the defense minister anatoly serdyukov. the two ministers briefed the president on their visits to the islands last week. medvedev ordered the swift modernization of the island's military and promised further development of their economies with the help of neighboring countries. medvedev visited one of the four disputed islands kunashiri last november. japanese prime minister naoto kan described the visit as an unforgivable outrage, which sparked criticism from russia. foreign munster seiji maehara

of taking away important safe havens from the taliban in areas around kabul, kandahar and central helmand province and so forth. we want to not only solidify those further in the two months or so before the fighting season begins but we want to expand those further in fact we are working right now in connecting the kandahar security bubble and helmand security bubble. >> bro: what about the issue about handing over responsibility, more responsibility to the afghans themselves? >> well, the transition to afghan forces is essential that's the way that the u.s. begins to draw down its own forces and we asked general petraeus about that? >> we think that we won't be able to commence transition here by indeed, i will make a recommendation to the nato command. make a recommendation to president karzai somewhere around the end of february. and so that recommendation will go forward and we believe that there are some very viable candidates for transition that we will be able to identify. clearly a lot of this hinges on the ability of afghan to do more as we do progressively less. we are not just

having soldiers deployed to places where we can make a difference for example in afghanistan in the helmand province area for example in kosovo or non. color would we do encounter piracy. at the coast of somalia and we are we whenever we decide to deploy soldiers we say can we make a difference and if we can make a difference we say yes and that's also why i think we are overweight because we we sometimes we say no we say well if we can't make a difference then let somebody else do it. but we think it's important to be an international player and i say. you don't need to be well then what is a small state but instead of just being a small state we have to be. smart state so i've introduced that what we're actually doing in defense policy issues and security policy issues we choose to be smart states we choose to be involved special places around the world where we can make a difference. in afghanistan that really is the hot spot right now and many people believe that it's completely unrealistic for nato troops to leave its alliston by two thousand and fourteen what do you think. i think i t

working down in helmand at the time.ince then i have had to personally revise a lot of my views on what we, the international community, can do in afghanistan. i would just like to start by saying, i find it harder and harder to see how the current strategy could be made to wrk. we have a military surge. but the insurgency has been spreadin from the south and east toprovinces. ey used not to be the ground for insurgency. this continued centurion pakistan, a tenfold increase of taliban fighters since 2005. what my staff estimated was about to a 3,000 fighters. the recent estimates have been up to 35,000. some analysts was suggesting a much higher number than 35,000. also a vast amount of money has been spent, and the pressure to spend that money quickly has resulted in a war that in itself, i think, is stealing some of the rivalry and conflict on the ground. the massive conflict is becoming much more messy, not just about taliban government, but all kinds of localized conflict that are unclear in the bigger picture. the w

rtu positions since you're going to be doing the work at the helmand and other transmission line andgoing to be doing the work at the kandahar and of the line, haven't you positioned yourself so that you basically have a lock when if i come to award the transition? >> commissioner tiefer, i think that's a position for usaid but i would say they have competition on the street right now for energy and water. i think they plan to award at least five specified. so i suspect there will be competition speemac thank you mr. guerre. doctors implant has a question speemac -- doctors that -- that's fundamentally different if you are doing something very, very different from what you were doing in kandahar, correct? you were advising the government. you weren't building -- >> what we had to do was use knowledge of how already built systems work. that's sometimes more difficult to our engineers had to be very creative internet how to use all of these facilities that have been built by a bunch of different donors that were not to the standards that you talk about where they're all the same standa

security has improve inside kabul and in key provinces like helmand and kandahar. the momentum of the taliban insurgents has been blunted, and in some places, even reversed. now, from the beginning we have recognized the fundamental connection between our war effort in afghanistan and the extremists' safe havens and enablers in pakistan. it is no secret that we have not always seen eye to eye with pakistan on how to deal with these threats or on the future of afghanistan. but as a result of growing cooperation between our governments, militaries and law enforcement agencies and determined action by the pakistani army, we have been able to dramatically expand our counterterrorism and intelligence efforts. pressure is increasing on both sides of the border. as a result, the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 are under threat like never before. al-qaeda's leadership is weakened, its safe havens in the border regions are smaller and less secure, and its ability to prepare and conduct terrorist operations has been significantly degraded. but make no mistake, al-qaeda re

in afghanistan, two british soldiers were killed on a patrol in helmand province in the south. that made ten nato deaths so far in february. meanwhile, general david petraus-- the top u.s. and nato commander in afghanistan-- warned taliban attacks likely will get worse this spring. he said, "they have to fight back, they're losing momentum that's quite clear." the u.s. house will try again to extend key parts of the patriot act. republican leaders fell just short of a two-thirds majority last night, under a special procedure that allowed no amendments. they plan to raise the issue again next week. the security provisions would renew authority for extensive wiretaps, among other things. they expire at month's end. the chairman of the u.s. federal reserve ben bernanke got a grilling today on inflation worries. republicans at a house hearing charged the fed's interventions to boost the economy will send prices higher. budget committee chairman paul ryan said he's worried the fed will be slow to react. >> you're going to see inflation after it's already been launched. and given tha

come described as being the geostrategic tele- density and reality at the village of 2000 people in helmand. it took the americans three months to take marjah. it was a storming of normandy or something like that. any month afterwards we find it so popular, still fighting in marjah. every house is half a mile from the other house theaters no roads. you can have individual victories and successes pushing them away from one village to another, but she don't have and never will have the number of troops required to occupy the entire pashtun the south, southeast to control all villages. there is no way to do it. you can't unite any single individual victories to run. another key element in counterinsurgency is you have to build the capacity of the national government so they can come over for you. in iraq you had maliki who gained legitimacy and clean up the security forces and destroy militias and you have a civil war so brutal that it actually made the americans had maliki look like a better alternative. in afghanistan now come the last thing you want to do is to the capacity of the karzai go

would be helmand province or kandahar province. it is true that they are guarding the opium fields. it is not true that they are overseeing with the kind of indifference the cultivation of poppies. what they have done is paid the opium growers not to grow and instead to self-eradicate. this may be what your role gemara -- geraldo rivera was talking about. they gave the farmers a deadline to eradicate. let's say march or april. the deadline passed. a lot of them hadn't done so. they may have extended the deadline. this does allows farmers the opportunity to very quickly cultivate -- disallows farmers to vy quickly cultivate the opium, then get profit, then do the eradication. maybe we are in agreement that it has become little bit of a shell game, but it is not like the marines are saying, we want them to grow poppies and we will protect them from people who do not want them to. in this last growing season, the marines were a bit permissive. they're trying to win hearts and minds, but they do not want to become too heavy-handed. we

rtu positions since you're going to be doing the work at the helmand and other transmission line and you're going to be doing the work at the kandahar and of the line, haven't you positioned yourself so that you basically have a lock when if i come to award the transition? >> commissioner tiefer, i think that's a position for usaid but i would say they have competition on the street right now for energy and water. i think they plan to award at least five specified. so i suspect there will be competition speemac thank you mr. guerre. doctors implant has a question speemac -- doctors that -- that's fundamentally different if you are doing something very, very different from what you were doing in kandahar, correct? you were advising the government. you weren't building -- >> what we had to do was use knowledge of how already built systems work. that's sometimes more difficult to our engineers had to be very creative internet how to use all of these facilities that have been built by a bunch of different donors that were not to the standards that you talk about where they're all the sam

rtu positions since you're going to be doing the work at the helmand and other transmission line and you're going to be doing the work at the kandahar and of the line, haven't you positioned yourself so that you basically have a lock when if i come to award the transition? >> commissioner tiefer, i think that's a position for usaid but i would say they have competition on the street right now for energy and water. i think they plan to award at least five specified. so i suspect there will be competition speemac thank you mr. guerre. doctors implant has a question speemac -- doctors that -- that's fundamentally different if you are doing something very, very different from what you were doing in kandahar, correct? you were advising the government. you weren't building -- >> what we had to do was use knowledge of how already built systems work. that's sometimes more difficult to our engineers had to be very creative internet how to use all of these facilities that have been built by a bunch of different donors that were not to the standards that you talk about where they're all the sam

helmand province was the second area that we visited.ir poppy cultivation has been in full bloom. it is taliban country. where are we traveled in h elmand, we traveled in the company of the marines. in the north, we had no security at all. we went east of kabul where poppies have been coletely eradicated. >host: the eradication efforts -- there is a htory of those areoppose it and there those who profit. you have written that this is the hinge on which america's national securities -- security interest swing. on the ground level among farmers, what is their nion of why they are growing poppies and why people want them to be destroyed? guest: for the last couple of decades, it was the only way they couldake money. there is a history in afghanistan. these problems did not crop up overnight. copies have been cultivated for centuries, maybe even to the fourth century bc when alexander the great was there. he left behind the crop that may have conquered the country. it was only grown sparingly, for medicinal uses throughout the 18th and 19th

security has improved in kabul and in key provinces like helmand and kandahar. the momentum of the taliban insurgents has been blunted, and in some places even reversed. from the beginning we have recognized the fundamental connection between our war effort in afghanistan and the safe havens and enablers in pakistan. it is no secret that we have not always seen eye to eye with pakistan on how to deal with these threats or on the future of afghanistan. but as a result of growing cooperation between our government, militaries, and law enforcement agencies, and determined action by the pakistan the army, we have been able to dramatically expand our counterterrorism and intelligence efforts. pressure is increasing on both sides of the border. as a result, the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 are under threat like never before. al qaeda's leadership is weakened, its safe havens in the border regions are smaller and less secure, and its ability to prepare and conduct terrorist operations has been significantly degraded. but make no mistake, hawkeye there remains a s

spear if he could imagine the helmand part which has those two pieces as distinct from the kandahar part which has four pieces could've been submitted separate. they are 100 miles apart. there is no transmission line between them and the dialogue between him and me went -- and could 124, the first four and five and six the separable? s and then i said again, couldn't they potentially be separated? t fear, yes i have said they could be separable. now hee disagreed as to whether they should have been separated and so forthr but we reach that point. forth but we reached that point. what i want to ask, you must know, or i hope you know, the major breakdowns cost twice of that project. wouldn't be substation and the dam been at least out of the 255 million, 80 million, at least 89 in terms of cost breakdowns? >> i don't care the numbers in my head but my recollection is it was not that high. >> okay. among other questions for the record can ask for the cost breakdowns? >> i think usaid needs to provide those, but let me talk to usaid about that. >> okay. now, i want to go to the issue of dela

the results werequite obvious in helmand and also in kandahar. we were able to establish control and some of the most difficult parts of the enemy territory, and the result is now the people are not oppressed any more. the the right to choose what they are exercising and the perception of security in the government has improved immensely. and just to mention i think there are really good indications that there is a change in the tie on our table. if the key to success in operation is going to be support of the people, then in that case i think we are getting that support. and that can be illustrated that the number of ied which we help the people have been between 70 to 80% in the last two or five months it has been that high and has been identified with the help if you compare to those of nine it was 163 and now for the last three months of 2010 it was er a thousand. and the reason this has gone much higher. what we've done during these operations we havefocused conventional forces on protecting the population and directed our special operations

saying that coalition force mis-afghanistmis in afghanistan have beaten the taliban insurgency in helmandt >>> health officials in southern california are scrambling this morning to contain an outbreak of an illness that has already infected over 170 people, all of whom intended an event at the playboy mansion. ben tracy is outside the mansion this morning with the very latest. ben, good morning. >> reporter: good morning. just on the other side of this gate here, that is the playboy mansion and as you mentioned, authorities are still trying to track down all the people who were at a party here up a can elf weeks ago because they believe hugh hefner's house could be the epicenter of an outbreak of a rare disease. it was a lavish fund-raiser at a legendary location. 750 were invited to the party. >> who hasn't wanted to go to hugh hefner's playboy mansion. >> reporter: but within 48 hours of the february 3rd event, dozens fell ill with extreme flu-like symptom, cough, fever, chills and respiratory infections, symptoms that wouldn't go away. >> i'm very fatigued. it wiped me out very quickl

the results were quite obvious in be helmand and also in -- in helmand and also in kandahar. we were able to establish the guard and control in some of the most difficult in the actual leader, the hearts of the enemy. territory. and the result is now the people are not oppressed anymore there, they have a right to choose which they're exercising, and the perception of security and the government has improved immensely. and just to mention, i think there are really good indications that there is a change in the tides on our favor. if the key to success in current operation or is going to be the support of the people, in that case i think we are getting that support. and that has been, can be illustrated really easily, that the number of ieds which we detect and neutralize with the help of the people have increased between 70-80%, and for the last four or five months it has been that high. and, also, the if urge -- the number of the cachets which have been identified with the help of the people which have been captured and destroyed. it was 163 and now for the last three months

the results were quite obvious in helmand and also in kandahar. we were able to establish control and some of the most difficult parts of the enemy territory, and the result is now the people are not oppressed any more. the the right to choose what they are exercising and the perception of security in the government has improved immensely. and just to mention i think there are really good indications that there is a change in the tie on our table. if the key to success in operation is going to be support of the people, then in that case i think we are getting that support. and that can be illustrated that the number of ied which we help the people have been between 70 to 80% in the last two or five months it has been that high and has been identified with the help if you compare to those of nine it was 163 and now for the last three months of 2010 it was over a thousand. and the reason this has gone much higher. what we've done during these operations we have focused conventional forces on protecting the population and directed our special operati

our first foray using this strategy was down in the central helmand river valley, a coordinated civil-military effort on both the international community and the afghan partners. that is number one on your map. while there were almost immediate security effects through the partnered operations that we conducted there, the afghans, supported by the international community had a tougher time building government capacity in the wake of security gains. but the partnered team learned some significant lessons during those operations that they were able to apply in the summer and fall of 2010 in kandahar city and its environs. and that is number two on your map. several of these lessons included the need for prior planning to prepare government activities in advance. we all had to improve the complementary effects of the convention and special operations forces. the minister of interior learned some lessons on recruiting and training police forces, which were much more effective in the follow-on operations. and we all learned that building local political bodies that represent the people is an iterat

needs including projects necessary in the south for five provinces that included capped hair and helmand. we had a good understanding of the work up front, and that's important to know. the other thing that's important is you talked about past issues by u.s.-aid. you heard what we did sin that time, and i remember i was asked at the last hearing whether people were using evaluations of their contractors, and our latest evaluation is very, very positive, and i'd like to read just one comment from it. the execution of the power plant resulted in a high quality state of the art pour plant capable of meeting all requirements and providing reliable power for 6,000 afghan citizens for years to come. this was given to us -- the date that we received it was 2010 in may. >> what's the date of it? you received it in may of 2010, but what's the date of the document? >> it reports on 2008 to 2009. >> we'd like a copy of that. >> i'll get you a copy of that. >> thank you. now, you say you did a number of things between march 20, 2009, the last document that we have from aid complaining about your per

was a lot of hope, there were a lot of things that seemed could go right, and i was working down in helmandhat we, the international community, can do in afghanistan. i'd just like to start by saying i find it hadder and harder to see oh the current strategy could be made to work. we've got a military surge, but the insurgency has been spreading from the south and east to provinces which used not to be the ground for insurgency. those continue in pakistan of the there's a ten-fold increase of taliban fighters since 2005. what i first estimated when i was out there was about 2,000-3,000 fightser. we're up to 35,000, and some analysts suggest a much higher number of than 35,000. there was also vast amount of money that had been spent, and the pressure to spend that money quickly has resulted in a war in a economy that in itself, i think, is fueling some of the rivalries and some of the conflicts from the ground, so the massive conflict is becoming much more messy. it's about government and localized conflicts that are unclear in the bigger picture. there's a whole industry that has grown up a

working down in helmand at the time.ce then i have had to personally revise a lot of my views on what we, the international community, can do in afghanistan. i would just like to start by saying, i find it harder and harder to see how the current strategy could be made to work. we have a military surge. but the insurgency has been spreading from the south and east to provinces. they used not to be the ground for insurgency. this continued centurion pakistan, a tenfold increase of taliban fighters since 2005. what my staff estimated was about to a 3,000 fighters. the recent estimates have been up to 35,000. some analysts was suggesting a much higher number than 35,000. also a vast amount of money has been spent, and the pressure to spend that money quickly has resulted in a war that in itself, i think, is stealing some of the rivalry and conflict on the ground. the massive conflict is becoming much more messy, not just about taliban government, but all kinds of localized conflict that are unclear in the bigger picture. th

the summer of 2009, i was in helman just after the marines went in -- was in helmand just after the marines went in. this young state department foreign service officer was there the second day after the marines went in. i have seen that time and time again, whether it is in iraq or afghanistan. i don't get to travel to -- i get invited to london, i get invited to paris, which are places i used to spend a lot of time. i have been to london once in this job, and to paris once in this job. i don't get to go there anymore. i am in baghdad and kabul and is, by and others that we have challenges in -- baghdad and kabul and islamabad and others that we have challenges in. the relationships are critically important. but i've seen the merging of these two teams in these wars, and these wars have changed us. they've changed how we think accommodate changed how career paths, certainly in the military, at an are going to be. i hope that they would certainly have that kind of impact in the foreign service world as well. i have great pleasure of rejoining up just a few minutes with it and patterson -- a

working down in helmand at the time. since then i have had to personally revise a lot of my views on what we, the international community, can do in afghanistan. i would just like to start by saying, i find it harder and harder to see how the current strategy could be made to work. we have a military surge. but the insurgency has been spreading from the south and east to provinces. they used not to be the ground for insurgency. this continued centurion pakistan, a tenfold increase of taliban fighters since 2005. what my staff estimated was about to a 3,000 fighters. the recent estimates have been up to 35,000. some analysts was suggesting a much higher number than 35,000. also a vast amount of money has been spent, and the pressure to spend that money quickly has resulted in a war that in itself, i think, is stealing some of the rivalry and conflict on the ground. the massive conflict is becoming much more messy, not just about taliban government, but all kinds of localized conflict that are unclear in the bigger picture